

The Dialectic of the Other in the Psychology of C.G. Jung:  
A metatheoretical investigation.

by

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in memory of my late brother

Doros Papadopoulos

(1950 - 1972).

ABSTRACT

The present thesis is an attempt at developing a new understanding of the psychology of C.G. Jung by means of an original metatheoretical approach which reveals a central problematic in the Jungian opus: the problematic of the Other, the essence of which is the pivotal phenomenon of the composition and dissociability of the psyche.

Initially, the problematic of the Other is set in its broad cultural and psychological perspectives before an historiographical account of its treatment is attempted. In this, the Heraclitean, Platonic, and Hegelian theories are investigated and their respective positions on the Other are developed and distilled in an original discussion which particularly focuses on their fundamental dialectical approach.

Jung's life and work are examined in depth as a coherent whole in their developmental evolution. The present approach reveals the progressive reformulations of Jung's problematic of the Other in the chronological periods which mark his theoretical development. This investigation enables an original understanding of (among other issues) the Freud-Jung controversy, the epistemological meaning of Jung's obscure period between the years 1912-1917, and the gradual construction of his unique epistemological system. The Self is finally accepted as the dialectical synthesis of all opposing Others. A series of original diagrams is designed to illustrate the complete development of Jung's reformulations of his problematic and demonstrates



their dialectical texture.

The first three theorists are subsequently revisited and their views are compared to Jung's formulations in an analysis highlighting the implications of the attempted approach. Finally, a tentative formulation of the dialectic of the Other in terms of language is advanced and explored.

This thesis constitutes a metatheoretical investigation in that it approaches the Jungian thought from a position outside the framework of his theories, in order to seek the meaning not only of his theoretical formulations themselves, but also of their metatheoretical significance within the framework of his life and work. Thus, a number of Jung's usually neglected texts are here re-examined and located within their broad historical, epistemological and developmental perspective in an attempt to illuminate his central dialectic of the Other.

PREFACE

The polymorphous nature of the present study does not lend itself to the adoption of a uniform referencing and bibliographical system. Each section had to be treated, as far as possible, according to the rules of its respective tradition. Above all, the main consideration was to ensure the maximum efficiency in the most straight forward manner. For this reason a short explanatory note to this effect is necessary:

1. When referring to the fragments of Heraclitus a simple cardinal system of numbering was used, according to the order of their appearance in this investigation. This enables an easy and unambiguous reference to the fragments in the text. At the end of each quoted fragment the source text appears. The choice of the source from which the particular fragment was taken was based on what was considered to be the best translation fitting into the language of the arguments presented in this study.
2. In the case of Plato the accepted Stephanus pagination was retained. As far as the choice of translation is concerned, the grounds on which the extracts were chosen were the same as in the case of Heraclitus. However, by and large the Jowett translations were preferred. The Greek text comes from the Standard Edition which was edited by J. Burnet.
3. All quotations from the works of Freud and Jung come from their authorized editions, viz. the Standard Edition (S.E.) and Collected Works (C.W.) respectively. The date after the quotations in the text

refers to the year of publication of that particular work. In turn, in the References section at the end of the study the reader may find the exact location of that particular in the S.E., or C.W. In the case where there is more than one work published in the same year, the second, third, fourth etc articles/books are identified as b, c, d, etc respectively. For example Jung 1948; 1948b; 1948c; etc. The reader's attention is drawn to the fact that no a denotation is used. The principle of ordering follows their order of appearance in the text.

4. As far as the rest of the references are concerned, the accepted standards of the American Psychological Association have been followed as far as possible.

It should be noted that in the case of translations from texts not in the English language, if no mention of a translator is made either in the main body of the study or in the References section at the end of the study, the translations were done by myself.

In order to facilitate the coherence of the material, certain nodal points appear in the study under the title Transition. These may also include the sub-titles Above, and later Below. Although at times they do summarize preceeding arguments and findings, and gradually introduce forthcoming ones, the reader is warned not to accept them as distilled summaries as such. They cannot replace the reading of the sections that they cover as they might not necessarily include all the salient points in the study. Their function is merely to facilitate reading and thus they should not be taken in isolation.

The preparation and production of this thesis stretches back many years and it would be impossible to acknowledge and thank each one who has in some way or another contributed to it. However, I do wish to mention:

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

Teiresias, the grand old wise man of Greek antiquity, told Leiriope, the blue nymph, that her newborn would "live to a ripe old age, provided that he never knows himself!" (Graves 1960, p.286). The baby's name was Narcissus and the prophetic words of the blind seer found tragic fulfillment: Not only did he not live to an old age, but Narcissus in his full youth terminated his own life. He transgressed the implied command in the prophecy by knowing himself, and moreover, fell in love with his own image.

This powerful myth is full of typical Greek ironies: The 'seer' is blind. He does not need eyes to become wise. It is precisely Narcissus' eyes that tempt him and finally bring him to his own destruction. One of Narcissus' lovers is the nymph Echo who, once, while in a forest secretly following her beloved, desperately tried to call him out; but, alas, she was condemned to merely repeat what he would say first. She is destined to be only the acoustic image of others without any of her own individuality. Narcissus rejects her. Is it perhaps too painful for him to see in her the ultimate exemplification of his own condition, i.e. in herself she is nothing more than everybody else's image.

Freud saw in this mythical predicament a useful tool to illustrate his theory of evolution of choice of sexual object. Narcissism in psychology



today refers to more or less the same phenomenon: Preoccupation with one's own self and "self-love" (English and English 1958, p.336).

But perhaps the myth also/only indicates something else. Teiresias' ominous warning was against self-knowledge. This might indeed seem paradoxical. Teiresias' credentials are unquestionable. He was not just any old man who professed to having prophetic abilities. He was the same person who appeared in other crucial circumstances in Greek mythology, such as guiding Odysseus and foretelling Oedipus' royal parents of the painful fate of their son. He could not have contradicted the Delphic oracle 'Know thyself' so blatantly. His warning reminds us of a similar foreboding: God's prohibition on Adam and Eve not to eat the fruit of the tree in the "mist of the garden" (Genesis, 3:3), the tree of "knowledge". Here again, why should God prohibit his human creatures access to knowledge?

The answer to both situations might lie in the specific kind of knowledge that was referred to in these two instances. After the first human inhabitants of the garden of Eden ate from the fruit, we read that "the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked" (Genesis, 3:7). The first thing that that particular kind of knowledge enabled them to grasp was neither the mysteries of creation nor their own nature, but their own external appearances. In fact, the Old Testament does not refer to any other kind of knowledge that they gained by eating the forbidden fruit. So, what they found out about was nothing else than their own image. Our Greek hero was punished for precisely the same thing: Seeing his image. Well, admittedly he went a little further and even loved his own image, but

that was after he had already committed the forbidden act which was merely to look at himself.

The tragedy in both the biblical and the old Greek positions lies in the fact that the obtained "self-knowledge" led to self-destruction. It is a tragedy because self-knowledge is a desired and much praised achievement. People in their effort to gain 'true knowledge' sometimes fail and the effects are harmful. The path towards self-knowledge is slippery and dangerous and can easily lead to annihilation rather than liberation.

Is there perhaps a misunderstanding of the term 'self-knowledge'? Without entering here into any detailed discussion of this highly intricate issue, it may be observed that what the heroes of both the above examples actually achieved was a certain type of 'knowledge', viz., knowledge of their external appearance, of their external images. No special expertise is needed to distinguish between this sort of 'self-knowledge' and the one that was preached at Delphi. The distinction is perhaps clearer in the scriptural predicament. Man was created according to Lord God's image. This is overemphasised in the first chapter of Genesis: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" (Gen., 1:26), "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him" (Gen., 1:27). Man's task is to discover this divine image. Instead, Adam and Eve first became aware of their own external images, they became preoccupied with them and became 'self-conscious' of themselves, i.e. their nakedness. The Bible starts with man's punishment for disobeying

God's orders by achieving that incomplete and distorted 'self-knowledge'. Whereas the myth of Narcissus stops with his punishment, the scriptures start with it. Thus, in a sense, all the rest of the Bible may be accepted as illustrating various ways and attempts at correcting that first mistake and developing instead 'true knowledge', which could not be about the external appearance of a person, but should concern the kind of knowledge which would make comprehensible the 'inner image'.

It is this duality (or even multiplicity) of 'selves' with its corresponding kinds of knowledge which, in broad terms, sketches the theme of this study. Man decides to pursue a particular kind of 'self-knowledge', and as many myths and artistic works show, he invariably discovers that he was searching in the wrong direction. The tragedy of this blindness or ignorance (avidyā) suggests the existence of an other, somehow inaccessible self, and an other, somehow elusive kind of knowledge. This highly complex topic, with implications for many disciplines, may be examined from a variety of different perspectives. The present investigation will focus on the examination of this issue as undertaken by the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung. However, because the subject matter is of such extensive scope, in order to achieve an adequate degree of comprehension it is necessary to locate it within a context which would provide not only its historical perspective but also some of its crucial conceptual and psychological dimensions. Heraclitus', Plato's and Hegel's treatment of this central problematic were thus chosen in order to construct this basis which in turn would place Jung's formulation of the same

question in relief.

As the sub-title suggests, this investigation is metatheoretical. In general terms, it does not arise from within the frameworks of any of the theories discussed in the thesis, but constitutes a comment on them. Theoretical studies investigate the internal consistency of a particular theory (e.g. how certain parts relate to others within the same framework), whereas metatheoretical approaches discuss the theory from a viewpoint which does not incorporate the basic premises of that theory.

The great majority of studies dealing with the work of C.G.Jung come from 'within' the Jungian system. Even the current trend of revived interest in Jung has not altered significantly this state of affairs. It is rather unfortunate that after a great man's death his followers tend to stare in adoration at his pointing finger rather than trace the implications of the pointed direction (to paraphrase Alan Watts' expression).

A notable example of the few metatheoretical studies in this field are the works of Drs Rauhala (e.g. 1969; 1973; 1976) and Rychlak (e.g. 1968; 1973; in press). The former author clarifies that the "source and point of departure" of a metatheoretical approach (his particular one is Hermeneutic metascience) is

"...the realization that not only is the matter to be investigated a problem, but the investigation itself is also problematic" (1976, p.50).

Similarly, the present study attempts an inquiry primarily into Jung's investigations. In other words, his writings will be examined with a view to illuminating his choice of the particular areas which he selectively studied, the meaning of his interpretations and their implications in the development of his subsequent direction. The metatheoretical approach adopted here would thus fall into the hermeneutical tradition, and it will attempt to provide an appropriate metatheoretical structure within which the Jungian contribution will be meaningfully located.

Since no unified theory of the Other exists, this study will modestly attempt to construct such a theoria. Not a theory according to the rigid methodological criteria of a systematic cluster of laws and hypotheses, but a theoria, after the verb θεωρῶ = "to look at, to view, behold, observe" (Liddel and Scott 1901), which would offer a meaningful and comprehensive view of the problematic under discussion. Such an approach is essentially hermeneutical insofar as it attempts to re-create the meaning of the texts treated here. As Robinson (1941) aptly argued

"The purpose of an interpreter ... is to make himself and others rethink the very thoughts that were thought by some one long ago .... Interpretation is recreation of that thought" (p.4).

It is for this reason that this study will not take the form of either a polemical dissection of the Jungian opus (as well as of the works of Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel), or a glorification of their contributions. Instead, it will essentially represent a re-reading of these authors in the light of the problematic of the Other. The terms reading or

re-reading come from the French structuralist tradition which emphasizes the "active reconstruction of meaning" (Hawkes 1977, p.157). Such a reading should reveal Jung's own problematic - the manner in which he posed questions, as well as the direction of his search in answering them.

Jung's personality and certain aspects of his life history will form an integral part of this investigation, together with the conceptual analysis of his writings. Although an inclusion of personal history and other subjective factors would have no place in studies of a purely logical nature, in investigations of the type of the present thesis this is an accepted procedure (cf. Mannoni 1971; Rychlak 1973). Guntrip (1973) maintains that "personal factors" can never be "negligible" as

"... the estimation of their influence is essential to the evaluation of all psychodynamic theories. In no other branch of science is it so important to know what sort of person the scientist is. This simply extends to the psychodynamic theorist a criterion already applied to the psychotherapist" (pp. 47-8).

Atwood and Tomkins (1976) argue this position in even stronger terms. In their article "On the subjectivity of personality" they propose the institution of a "new discipline" which they call "psychology of knowledge" and which should include, in addition to the "psychobiographical investigation" the study of "subjective factors in the structure of man's knowledge in general " (p. 177). It is therefore essential to include as many relevant dimensions as possible in order to obtain a more complete re-construction of the meaning of Jung's problematic:

Accordingly, in addition to his theoretical writings, excerpts from his correspondence (particularly with Freud), biographical anecdotes, and his 'non-scientific' book "Septem Sermones ad Mortuos" will also be discussed here.

In psychological and philosophical terminologies as well as everyday language there is an abundance of concepts of the 'other', e.g. in the 'inner daimon', the 'significant others', the 'other minds', 'divided self', 'alienation', etc. One may classify them into groups, such as intrapersonal- interpersonal, cognitive-affective, psychological-social and others, or according to a) moral, b) epistemological, c) ontological d) physical criteria and so forth. This, however, does not suffice. Pedantic classifications are not the best promoters of knowledge and even less of understanding. What is necessary is a comprehensive framework where all these concepts could be meaningfully located and inter-related, implicitly or explicitly. In undertaking such a task, a historiographical study of the Other becomes imperative. Only a broad spectrum reading of the meanings and interpretations given to this term by thinkers of diverse cultural and temporal backgrounds can provide an adequate mapping out of this territory. But the vastness of this pursuit imposes severe limitations. In order to avoid superficiality by rapidly scanning through many authors and ideas, Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel were here chosen and studied in relative depth. The inevitability of history being a selective process is an accepted fact (Carr 1961; Klein 1970). Thus, the selection criteria employed were a) their particular historical presence, and b) the content of their contribution.

Part One of the thesis commences with a general overview of the concept of the Other in various theories and approaches. This furnishes a broad background to the discussions in the subsequent sections. Since Greece is often referred to as the 'cradle of civilization' it would be of particular importance to a psychological investigation to observe the 'infantile' functions and behaviours, as far as the problematic of the Other is concerned in their first inception as shaped in Greece in the early times. Heraclitus is said to have been the first western philosopher in whom Logos and Physis were inextricably united (cf. Heidegger 1953; Seidel 1964) and it will thus be instructive to follow his thought. It may also be argued that this unity represented possibly the earliest articulation of the Other in the Western world. Oriental formulations will not be examined. Only sporadic allusions to them will be made. This is indeed regrettable, but the space and conceptual limitations of this thesis could not possibly have accommodated any meaningful treatment of the enormous wealth of material on this topic which the old and modern Eastern thinkers have presented. Such a study should form a separate piece of research on its own.

In Plato, and especially Hegel, where their writings, in comparison to those of Heraclitus, are so voluminous, the task of restricting the arguments only to formulations of the Other presented a number of complications and dilemmas. Considerations of economy of space prevented the intended elaboration. Concise passages from existing sources were freely used if they aptly conveyed the desired meaning in support of the relevant argument. Not only in the section on Jung, but with Heraclitus, Plato, and Hegel too, a new reading of their positions was ventured. Building mainly on accepted interpretations



of their pivotal theses, the new reading introduced the dimension of the problematic of the Other through which their work was examined.

Part Two constitutes the main thrust of the thesis and consists entirely of an examination of the problematic of the Other in Jung. The unfolding of this problematic is followed in five main developmental periods (Childhood and Prepsychiatric; Psychiatric; Psychoanalytic; Break/Breakdown/Breakthrough; Years of Individuation) which represent five relatively distinct stages in the development of both Jung's theories as well as his personality. The fourth chapter is in fact a trilogy: The Break, The Breakdown, The Breakthrough. In this period, which receives special attention, a new understanding of the break between Jung and Freud is articulated in terms of the central problematic of the Other.

In Part Three, a final integration between the treatment of the Other in the first three theorists and in Jung is offered. This is not the first time that such an integration is included. Throughout the section on Jung wherever necessary such comparative references are made. It therefore remained in this section to briefly sum up the overall implications and similarities. One of the main issues dealt with here is the fundamentally dialectic nature of all the formulations of the Other examined in this thesis. Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel and Jung appeared to be able students (if not masters) of the dialectic. The advantages of dialectic approaches to the problematic of the Other are traced, and their relevance in the context of recent moves towards a dialectical psychology is highlighted

Before the closing remarks, a brief excursion into the implications of viewing Jung's formulations of the problematic of the Other in the light of modern theoretical trends is taken. Here, a tentative conception of viewing the Other in terms of language is suggested. The issue of language is a theme that runs through this study, but due to the scope of this thesis no further development and discussion of it have been afforded, although it does remain as a secondary implication. This thesis remains primarily focused on the construction of an understanding of Jung's formulation of the problematic of the Other, within an adequate perspective. It represents just one expedition into this territory, with the task of mapping it out. As all explorers are well aware, no single attempt can be sufficient in achieving a complete and systematic coverage of any domain. The value of the territory itself, as well as the success of the expedition may be judged from the new vistas that it unfolds: their benefits and their consequences. Thus, the present reading of Jung should be appraised in terms of the amount and worth of the new elements which are introduced in the established understanding of his work, and the implications that this new understanding has in relating Jung's psychology to other efforts of human thought that venture to puzzle out the riddle of the meaning of human life.

## PART ONE

### Chapter One

#### The Other: an overview

'I carved this statue in the stone' - he said -  
'not with a hammer; with my bare fingers, with my bare eyes,  
with my bare body, with my lips. Now I don't know  
who is I and who's the statue.'

He hid behind it,  
he was ugly, ugly - he embraced it, lifted it holding it  
around the waist  
and they walked together.

And then he'd tell us that supposedly  
this statue (marvellous, indeed) was he; or even  
that the statue walked on its own. But who believes him?

Yannis Ritsos

Selected Poems Tr. N. Stangos (p.113).

The term 'other' does not have a self-evident connotation. Its meaning, moreover, depends upon the specific theoretical framework within which it is defined, as is the case with many technical terms. However, the concept of the 'other' lacks even an 'obvious' general meaning, a clear connotation in everyday language. The precise definition of the term 'personality', for example, is determined by the theoretical affiliation of the theorist who defines it. Nevertheless, there is a consensus concerning the meaning of the term, whereas in the case of the 'other', this facility is absent. In everyday language the 'other' merely denotes 'not this, but the other'. Thus, the 'other' is located by what is referred to as 'this'. It falls into the category of words which Gilbert Ryle names "index words":

"... they indicate to the hearer or reader the particular thing, episode, person, place, or moment referred to" (Ryle 1949, p.179).

Other words in this category are distinguished by Ryle as 'today', 'now', 'I', 'you', all of which depend upon the referred context, without which they have no substance by themselves.

Conversely, the word 'other', by virtue of its dependency on a 'this', could be seen as an index word of a higher order, because it refers to something other than that referred to by the index word. It is therefore tempting to call the 'other' a 'counter-index word' but this would inevitably force a meaning in which the 'other's' relation to 'this' will always be that of opposition. Linguistically such a meaning would be unjustifiably restrictive as the 'other' can also be complementary to 'this'. The only restriction language dictates over the relationship between 'other' and 'this' is that they should belong to the same genus. So the 'other' of 'this' table cannot be the dog which is also present in the room but the 'other' table; or, the chair would be an-'other' piece of furniture in the room.

In Greek there are two words for the 'other': 'allos' and 'heteros'. Liddell and Scott (1901) regard 'heteros' as "better Greek" whereas Barber (1968) as well as Chantraine (1968) maintain that 'heteros' is the Attic form of 'allos'. Both of these words are to be found in modern English, e.g. in 'allotheism - Worship of strange gods', 'heterogenous - Diverse in character; composed of diverse elements' (Fowler and Fowler, 1964). Strauss, in his phenomenological analysis of the 'other', prefers using 'allon' (the neuter form of the male 'allos') in order to "avoid confusion" (Strauss, 1961, p.268) which surrounds the nuclear meaning of the English word 'other'.

The 'other' has deep roots in the Indo-European languages. 'Allos' is related to the latin alter, alius, alienus (Liddell and Scott 1901). Alienus is, of course, the root of alienation - otherness, estrangement. In Hebrew acher means other, different, foreign. 'Allos' belongs to the same family as the Sanskrit ant-aras - other "of many with a sense of difference" (Benfey 1866). Other meanings of ant-aras are: "the interior, the main substance, difference". Benfey in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary relates, in turn, ant-ara to the latin interior, alter, ulterior, ultra. Chantraine (1970) finds that 'heteros' relates to the sanskrit eka-tara - one of two. Other relevant meanings are: eka-tas - on one side, eka-ta - harmony, conjunction, eka-ka - solitarily, same, and finally, eka-chitta-ta - fixing one's mind only on one object: unanimity. Benfey again relates the sanskrit root eka to the latin aequus - equal.

This brief linguistic excursion indicates that the family of the 'other' includes some seemingly contradictory meanings: separation, difference, and yet also, unity, harmony; inner core, main substance, same, as well as alien, alter, other. It seems there is a basic duality of meanings here. The dichotomy of meanings will be examined later in the context of various

theoretical frameworks. The following phrase from Plato may temporarily bring about some clarity. In the Meno, he writes about ' ἡ ἄλλη ψυχή ' (88d) "alle psyche" which could be translated as "the other soul". Barber (1968) correctly renders it as "the rest of the soul". Here the other could either mean separate, alien or the main one, the inner core. This will naturally depend on how this soul is understood. But it can safely be given a neutral translation as the "rest" which implies that there is still some other part of the psyche which constitutes the rest of the one already mentioned. Thus, the inherent duality of meaning in the 'other' can be comprehended as follows: if the rest is added to the existing part, then a wholeness, a totality will be achieved. But if the rest is not added then there will be a separation, a division. So, the very act of realization of an existing other in the psyche creates a separation into a me and an other. When that separation is overcome then there will be a unity, wholeness, and harmony.

The Oxford English Dictionary lists among other meanings of the word 'other' the following:

as an adjective:

- 1) one of the two.
- 2) that one of the two which remains after one is taken, defined or specified; the remaining of the two, three or more.
- 3) that follows the first, second.
- 4) existing besides, or distinct from that already mentioned or implied.
- 5) not this, not the same.
- 6) different in identity.
- 7) further, additional

and as a pronoun:

- 1) one of the two (Latin alter).
- 2) that which follows the first, the second.
- 3) one besides.
- 4) in philosophy, in particular: that which (in relation to something already mentioned) constitutes the other part of the universe of being, and is thus the counter-part or double of the former; e.g. the non-ego is the "other" of the ego.

The last definition provides the philosophical context and the best

working definition of the 'other' and will thus be used in this study.

The 'this' will refer to the 'subject', the 'me', and, therefore, the 'other' (the pronoun 'other') will refer to the 'other me', an opposite me, another me, a second me. In the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 'Alter' (Other) is defined as:

"An individual's thought of another self as such."

It is further clarified that:

"the term is generally used as correlative with Ego and emphasizes the distinction seen in the term Altruism, between 'self and other' within the individual's consciousness." (Baldwin 1901, vol.I, p.35).

This outline is intended to demonstrate that the 'other', with which we are dealing, is a very familiar concept. It is the little horned figure in comical cartoons who urges the hero to do something naughty. It is also the other little figure with a halo who counteracts the bad influence with saintly advice. But apart from the good-evil dichotomy, the other is experienced in everyday life as any part or parts of the personality which is/are relatively separated from, or even in conflict with, the main and central body of the personality.

The question then arises: could any tendency in one's self, which raises its voice above the aggregate noise level of the personality, be named as 'other'? The following example might clarify this issue: I sit in my room undecided whether I should 1) go outside and work in the garden, 2) stay indoors and study, or 3) go to the club to meet my friends. First of all it is clear that I experience my 'me' as the undecided person who tries to solve this three-pronged puzzle. Are these three tendencies three 'others' in myself? A closer examination is necessary: if they are fleeting, superficial thoughts which do not stir anything in myself, if they are indifferent momentary indecisions, such as choosing between a red or a green balloon (excluding, of course, any possible complex implications in this choice) they would then not fall within the definition of the 'other'. But if,

on the other hand, these three thoughts cause an emotional turmoil, and I experience them as manifestations of familiar tendencies in myself which I have observed operating time and again, in a fairly consistent manner, then they could be referred to as 'others'. In this case, the urge to go and do some gardening might be coming from the 'other', the 'peasant in me' whom I know well for 'his' strong attachment to the earthy and simple life; 'I' have repeatedly felt the conflict 'he' creates in 'me' by longing for a life outside of town, on a farm, to be closer to the natural cycles.

Secondly, the 'intellectual in me', who attempts to rationalize everything and has high intellectual ambitions can also be distinguished. Finally, I encounter the 'sociable me' who enjoys the company of other people and is considered by them as a jovial and merry character. These three tendencies qualify as 'others' since they are distinguishable and considerably independent of each other. Their inter-relationship could be either complementing or, as in this case, in opposition.

Thus far then, in everyday life terms, the 'other' is understood to be a permanent or semi-permanent structure within the personality which has some degree of autonomy. In addition, as in the above example, the 'other' also has a certain continuity, and is usually experienced as 'a person within a person', distinct, to some extent, from the 'experiencing personality'. It might seem that this characterisation of the Other (= 'other') does not introduce any novel notion into psychology. A number of other terms seem to denote similar phenomena. Would then, proposing a new term, the Other, complicate and overburden unnecessarily the already overloaded arsenal of psychological terms, concepts and phenomena? What clarity does such introduction aspire to achieve? An answer to these questions will be attempted at the end of this section after an historical and theoretical survey of the topic. But a brief discussion of similar terms, as an elucidation of certain underlying issues might, by way of introduction, facilitate this survey.



Instinct In most cultures the potentially dangerous autonomy of the biological instincts is well known and overt or covert rituals are devised to ensure a workable coordination between these urges and the other functions of the individual. Entire chapters in Psychology deal with the dynamics of this coordination as well as the actual relationship between the biological, psychological and social aspects of human nature. Every psychological theory is coloured by the explicit or implicit stand it takes on this issue. The importance of this relationship cannot be emphasized enough. It should be remembered that it is an aspect of the eternal mind-body controversy.

Rollo May has recently revived this issue in a manner directly relevant to the present discussion of the Other by introducing the term daimonic into Psychology. The daimonic is:

"any natural function which has the power to take over the whole person" (May 1972, p.123).

As examples he cites sex, eros, anger, rage and the craving for power. The "daimonic", then, is what is usually referred to in everyday language as 'the animal' in a person.

The daimonic has provided a popular theme, particularly in literature as, for example, a well-integrated and cultured individual inadvertently discovers 'the savage in himself'. A classical example is Robert Louis Stevenson's "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" (1886) where the charming Dr. Henry Jekyll discovers with horror that there is an untamed monster in himself, Mr. Edward Hyde, but nevertheless admitting, 'This, too, was myself' (p.51). The dual nature of man, animal and human is a very old theme. 'Tragic', after all, comes from the word 'tragos' (=goat) and was first used in the early stages of the Greek theatre where the actors were dressed as half goats to celebrate the festivals of the gods, Pan and Dionysus. One of the intentions of these religious festivities, among other aims and meanings, was to bring about harmony between the

human and animal natures of man.

Roles Another source of possible conflict stemming from autonomous parts of the personality arises from a clash between contradictory roles or between a single role and instinct. Roger Brown defines a role as:

"a scenario prescribing certain actions and a script prescribing the lines to be spoken. Roles in society are prescribed actions and words rather than persons" (Brown 1965, p.152).

Swensen (1973) distinguishes between "ascribed roles" which are permanent and "achieved roles" which "people acquire through their own efforts" (p.413). Examples of the former are: age, sex, race, and nationality, and of the latter: the role of a doctor, the role of an educated person, etc. Thus, role is a mode of behaviour which is externally prescribed and which we assume in order to be accepted as part of the society. In the effort to play a role as adequately as possible the person can so intensely identify with the role that confusion and conflict result.

Both types of roles can become autonomous and distinct from the rest of the personality and thus create a division between a 'me' and an 'other'. Salvatore Maddi (1967) has suggested a kind of neurosis, termed 'existential' as the condition in which the individual, lacking any coherence and continuity, becomes merely an "embodiment of biological needs" and "a player of social roles". Characteristics of the "existential neurosis" are, for Maddi, chronic alienation, aimlessness and meaninglessness. The case of existential neurosis is, of course, an advanced state of such incoherence between the biological, psychological and social functions of the person. The conflict of roles as a source of human tragedies has been frequently portrayed in literature. Antigone refuses to compromise her role as sister of Polynices who was killed in battle (and according to King Creon's order his body was not to be buried as punishment for his political aspirations). Her role as good citizen obeying the orders of the state is secondary to

her duty to her own brother. She chooses to bury him, an act which finally leads to her own death.

A similar concept to that of a role is what might be called the 'personification of a value system'. A person tries to become a living example of a state he aspires to reach. A good Christian will try to 'imitate Christ'. This category seems to differ in some ways from that of a role as it refers mainly to a state of being rather than following any explicitly prescribed rules of external behaviour. In addition to the conscious goals, an individual might also unconsciously strive to fulfill certain ideals. The superego, for Freud, was the sum of the external values which the child had internalized. Freud stressed the separateness of the superego from the rest of the personality and many disturbed states in the individual were attributed to conflicts between these different 'little men' within the person. Edgar Allan Poe's story "William Wilson" is a typical treatment of this issue in literature: an arrogant and nasty William Wilson becomes tired of the constant critical eye of an-other person who looks exactly like himself, and even has the same name. This 'other', is always around when William does any mischief. The 'other' William Wilson is good and gentle. One day William Wilson kills the other, only to realize that he himself is stabbed. The other William Wilson was obviously a personification of William Wilson's conscience.

Artists and authors in particular have illustrated another phenomenon which could fit these variations of the Other. This phenomenon consists in (i) attributing 'real' existence to an artistic creation, for example - a fictional character, (ii) in recognising it (him) as part of the author's own self, and (iii) then relating to 'him' as if he was indeed a real person. The Greek novelist, poet and playwright, Nikos Kazantzakis, who wrote the 33333-verse epic "Odyssey - a modern sequel" (1938), spoke very dramatically about his strong need to free Odysseus from his own

(Kazantzakis') self. It is not accidental that he rewrote the "Odyssey", the longest poem of the western world, seven times! For him, Odysseus was a real 'other' person stemming from himself and their relationship was very complicated. In his autobiography (Kazantzakis 1961) and letters (Helen Kazantzakis 1968) he writes how he wanted to follow Odysseus in his journeys and how he watched him with envy, admiration and repulsion. Kurt Vonnegut Jr, half-way through his book "The Breakfast of Champions" (1975) wants so much to relate directly to the characters in the novel that he himself enters the narrative in the dual role of both author and fictitious personality.

At times the artist experiences his creativity as the work of an 'other' in himself. He perceives his conscious self who eats and sleeps as a person separate from the artist 'other' in himself. Whereas in the above examples, the artistic creation was seen as the Other, here, the source of artistic creativity is compared with the Other. The modern composer Karlheinz Stockhausen says:

"first you must make music ( Something in me works it out )  
and then the music changes you" (Cott 1974, p.46) ,

Amy Lowell writes about her poems:

"I meet them where they touch consciousness and that is  
already a considerable distance along the road of (their)  
evolution" (1930, p.109).

The great Argentinian author, Jorge Luis Borges, candidly begins his short story, entitled "Borges and I", with this sentence: "Things happen to him, the other one, to Borges." A little further he adds:

"It would be an exaggeration to say that our relationship is a hostile one; I live, I go on living, so that Borges may continue his literature; and that literature justifies me."

He ends this beautiful piece as follows:

"I shall subsist in Borges, not in myself (assuming I am someone), and yet I recognise myself less in his books than in many another, or than in the intricate flourishes played on a guitar. Years ago I tried to free myself from

"him, and I went from the mythologies of the city suburbs to games with time and infinity, but now those games belong to Borges, and I will have to think up something else. Thus is my life a flight, and I lose everything, and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him.

I don't know which one of the two of us is writing this page." (Borges 1972, p.171-172).

This long quotation illustrates eloquently the complex relationship between the 'artist-self' and the 'everyday-life-self'. It illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing the 'me' from the 'other'.

The discussion of instinct, role, personification of values, as well as the various aspects of the 'other' in artistic creativity aimed at providing a perspective to facilitate the understanding of the 'other' by juxtaposing it to familiar concepts and phenomena, thus contributing towards a denotation of the Other. Now, following the same approach, an identification of some underlying issues will be attempted in order to move closer toward a connotation of the Other.

A vital observation emerges from the above discussion: the person is not always aware of the existence of the Other. There is a strong possibility that he will become aware of it once he experiences a conflict between a 'me' and an 'other'. The separation between 'me' and 'other' becomes forcibly evident during such conflict. A conflict, after all, presupposes a separation; conflict, in a sense, is a painful separation. So, once a conflict is experienced, the other will show its face; it will definitely be felt. Now, is it possible that the Other may be 'dormant' and not be experienced? Or is it the mere act of experiencing the separation that creates the Other? In other words, could one say that if there is no experience of separation then there is only a 'me' and no 'Other'? In which case the 'me' and the 'Other' must always exist in conflict?

These questions touch fundamental issues in Psychology - the unity of consciousness and the cohesion of the personality. Psychology has by and large now accepted at least two layers of the psyche: the conscious and the unconscious. The above questions could then be rephrased: is there any unconscious Other? Or is the very unconscious the only Other? Is it possible to have a conscious Other? If yes, a person would be aware of two 'personalities' in himself. Is this then the pathological state of double or multiple personality?

There is no reason to monopolize the Other for either the conscious or the unconscious. With respect to a previous example, (the 'peasant in me', 'the intellectual in me' and the 'socialite in me') it is clear that the Other can be at least partially conscious. The person is aware of the occasional urges from a particular Other and he can identify 'him' because of the coherence of the demands and their circumstances. Whether this condition will lead to a pathological double, or even to a multiple personality, will depend on the strength of the central, coordinating agency, the Ego. It will depend on the degree of autonomy the Other will gain, or be allowed to gain by the Ego. Whereas the psychotic condition of multiple personality is relatively rare in our culture today, a similar phenomenon attracts a great deal of attention: alienation.

In Social Psychology alienation is usually understood as man's estrangement from the others, from his social unit (e.g. Seeman 1959). Artists and philosophers (following a celebrated lineage from Jean Jacques Rousseau - "Social Contract" 1762, via H.D. Thoreau - "Walden or life in the Woods" 1854) use the term alienation to refer to man's distance from nature (e.g. Read 1967). Psychologists tend to see alienation as the estrangement of a person from one's own self. Erich Fromm's definition provides an apt example:

"By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one

"might say, estranged from himself ...The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other person" (Fromm 1955,p.74).

In adopting such a definition of alienation we see that the Other is a constituent element of this phenomenon. We should also be reminded of the actual synonymy of the Other and Alien.

There is an abundance of examples of alienation in literature and it is a difficult task to select the most appropriate one. It has now become fashionable for most artistic media to depict alienated characters in alienated environments. At least three studies on this topic, from the psychological point of view, should be mentioned: Professor Hallman's work on "Psychology and Literature" (1961), Professor Sypher's study "Loss of the Self in modern Literature and Art" (1962), and Rene Girard's "Deceit, desire, and the novel; Self and Other in Literary Structure" (1965). We must acknowledge Albert Camus' novel "L'étranger" (1942) as a milestone in literature and philosophy. A more recent example is Robert M. Pirsig's exceptional novel-autobiography - philosophical treatise entitled "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" (1974). This is an odyssey of a rehabilitated schizophrenic ex-college lecturer who painfully tries to piece his life and personality together. He gradually recalls his previous 'other' personality which led him to the mental hospital. He persistently traces his 'other' with alternating fear, fascination and calm purpose, until he finally succeeds in bridging the gap and achieving wholeness.

The concept of alienation is helpful in this discussion because it can also indicate another underlying issue in the study of the Other: the role of the actual other person. Alienation is not only the inability to relate to one's own self, but also to others, the other people in the person's life. Estrangement from one's self, (dividing the self into a 'me' and 'other'), is followed by estrangement from other human beings. These two conditions are so closely related that there are theorists who argue that they cannot be divorced, (e.g. Laing 1960, 1961; Ruesch and Bateson

1968). Perhaps the most prominent theorist of this approach is George Herbert Mead who in his "Mind, Self and Society" (1934) was the first to emphasize how the interaction with others represents the formative process of the self. Some interpersonal theorists argue that the intrapersonal alienation is a result of an interpersonal estrangement (e.g. Laing and Esterson 1964).

## TRANSITION

### ABOVE

The concept of the Other, although it is meaningful in many theories and many contexts, has no precise theory of its own. In this section an attempt will be made to provide the groundwork for such a theoria.

1) In the brief linguistic analysis, the basic meanings of the Other were traced and a duality of meaning was discovered - The Other as unity and as division.

2) Concepts and phenomena related to the Other were discussed in order to locate the Other in a broad perspective. Instinct, role, personification of values, artistic creation and source of creativity were examined. Illustrations from literature were cited to serve the following three functions: i) to vitalize the conceptual issues discussed by placing them in a human context, ii) to indicate that the issues concerning the Other are relevant and not at all unusual phenomena, and iii) to demonstrate the treatment of the Other in one sphere of human culture, viz., the Arts, thus anticipating its treatment in Philosophy and Psychology.

3) Two fundamental issues were isolated by the above investigation. Those concerning a) the unity of consciousness, and b) alienation (interpersonal and intrapersonal).



BELOW

The following historical introduction will concentrate primarily on three theorists: Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel. Only those aspects of their writings that are relevant to a theory of the Other will be examined here. In so doing a second major focus of the present study will be elucidated, namely, the Dialectic.

The choice of these three major thinkers requires some justification. It may well be asked why it is necessary to commence this examination with a philosopher as remote in time as Heraclitus? In textbooks on the history of Philosophy, a line is usually drawn to indicate that Western Philosophy begins with Socrates and Plato (e.g. Russell 1961; Copleston 1950). This demarcation can be rationalized in terms of the following three relevant points:

1) Before Plato there was no separation of the various scientific disciplines. Philosophy, science, mathematics, poetry, ethics and religion were included in one and the same activity: the 'love of wisdom' (philo-sophia).

2) Philosophical discourse as such commences with Plato. The pre-Socratic period is characterized by 'mythical' thinking; self-centred, undifferentiated from the wishes, needs and fears of the thinker and lacking logical and conceptual clarity. There was also no clear distinction between subjective and objective (Wheelwright 1959).

3) The language itself is said to have been grammatically and syntactically different from ours. Even Plato's language did not differentiate between individuality and consciousness, noun and verb. Therefore it is of great value to observe how the problem of the Other was seen and treated in such an undifferentiated state of human thought.

Heraclitus belongs to the 'prelogical', 'mythical' epoch of philosophy; in Plato we witness the first coherent theoretical steps. Heraclitus has been recently 'rediscovered'. Contemporary philosophers often cite Heraclitus' thought with a sense of precious discovery, particularly his views on change and becoming (e.g. Popper 1972). Jung, moreover, made frequent use of the Heraclitean principles of fire, water and the opposites. Plato's position is very crucial. He is the first philosopher at the threshold of the "written tradition" which followed the "oral tradition" (Russo and Simon 1968). In Plato we register the actual turning point from 'prephilosophy' to philosophy. Hegel, twenty-two centuries later, takes philosophical thought to a culminating peak and lays the foundations for the intellectual adventure of the 20th century. Hegel's positive relevance to contemporary philosophical and psychological endeavour has continually been re-emphasized (e.g. Findlay 1963, Kojève 1969, Steinkraus 1971, MacIntyre 1972). Hegel also offers a sophisticated theory of the Other and the Dialectic. Before focusing on Jung's position, an excursion into Hegel's thought is imperative as he provided Jung's immediate intellectual background.

PART ONE

Chapter Two

Heraclitus

φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ

(Nature loves to hide)

Heraclitus

Tr. Kahn (1979, p.33).

Heraclitus lived between the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. in the Ionic city of Ephesus. Wheelwright (1959) reminds us that about the same time Lao-tse in China and Zoroaster in Iran produced their remarkable works of wisdom and the Upanishads were written in India. Some early Greek commentators, experiencing difficulties in attempting to decipher Heraclitean ideas labelled him 'The Obscure' and 'The Riddler'. These characterizations did not seem to surprise Jung who felt that Heraclitus had a very deep understanding of the psyche and his words were "not meant for grown-up children" but for those "who have ears to hear" (1952,p.196). It appears that Heraclitus did not write any treatise as such. What survives today is a number of fragments, aphorisms which are considered to have been oral apophthegms rather than excerpts from any written discourse (Kirk and Raven 1971). Although Ephesus is very near to Miletus, the birthplace of Thales, and the centre of his school, there is no evidence that Heraclitus ever belonged to the Milesian School - or any other for that matter. He was an independent eccentric who followed no master and left no disciples behind him. For a member of an aristocratic, some claim royal, family, he did not live an easy life. He appears to have led an unconventional existence which roused the suspicions and contempt of his contemporaries. Even the circumstances of his death are obscure and bizarre. It is said that he died having been buried in either sand or dung (Kirk 1954).

Heraclitus' basic contributions to philosophy are his doctrines on change, and opposites. These are based on the crucial concepts of fire and logos. A formulation of an Heraclitean theory of the Other, based upon an examination of these pivotal notions, is developed below.

Professor Ferrier regards the work of Heraclitus as a special milestone. Philosophy before Heraclitus, according to Ferrier, could be described as

a "philosophy of Being"; with Heraclitus, a "philosophy of Becoming" is launched (Grant and Lushington 1881, p.110). The prevailing problem in philosophy at the time was to find an adequate "first principle", (arche), an element, indeed, the constituent element upon which the universe is based. Heraclitus rejected the "static description of the universe" (Frankfort and Frankfort 1946, p.256) and instead adopted a dynamic understanding derived from a principle of constant change, eternal flux; in his words:

Fragment 1. "Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives way and nothing stays fixed" (Wheelwright 1959, p.29).

Fr. 2. "All things are in process and nothing stays still, and likening existing things to the stream of a river ... you would not step twice into the same river" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.197).

Fr. 3. "Sun is new each day" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.202).

Sir Karl Popper also sees the problem of change as the central problem in Heraclitus' philosophy:

"How is change possible? How can a thing change without losing its identity - in which case it would be no longer that thing which has changed?" (Popper 1972, p.159).

Popper formulates the solution presented by Heraclitus as follows:

"There are no unchanging things; what appears to us as a thing is a process. In reality a material thing is like a flame; for a flame seems to be a material thing, but it is not; it is a process; it is in flux; matter passes through it; it is like a river" (Popper 1972, p.159).

The illustration of the flame was not, of course, introduced by Popper. Heraclitus himself spoke of the Fire as the basic principle. Traditional textbooks of Philosophy often treat Heraclitus' principle of Fire in the same manner as the "primary substance" of the other presocratic philosophers (e.g. Russell 1961). Thales considered water to be such a substance, Anaximenes advocated that it was air, etc. Such treatment is erroneous as it fails to observe a vital difference between Heraclitus and the other Ionians.

The Heraclitean Fire represented a dynamic principle of the world and it was not a static element, the constituent and 'single material' the 'world was ultimately derived from' (Kirk 1974, p.297). Heraclitus did not argue that the world ultimately consisted of fire, as Thales said of water. According to Heraclitus the world is in a constant dynamic change, flux, and Fire was both the agent and symbol of this change. Some of his relevant fragments read:

Fr. 4. "Thunderbolt steers all things that it directs; thunderbolt ... means the eternal fire; ... this fire is sagacious and cause of the management of the universe" (Kirk 1954, p.349).

Fr. 5. "All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things" (Kirk 1954, p.345).

Fr. 6. "This (world-) order ... is and shall be: an everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures" (Kirk 1954, p.307).

It seems very likely that the language of the time permitted Heraclitus to use the word fire metaphorically, symbolically and literally. Kirk and Raven, stressing the aspect of Fire as an agent, call it an "archetypal substance" (1971, p.433). Helm develops an original interpretation claiming that what Heraclitus meant by fire was nothing but the "hearth-fire" which was invoked at all ceremonies of family transitions (e.g. births, weddings, deaths), explaining that:

"the private religion of the aristocratic household ... centers around the hearth" (Helm 1964, p.565).

This view was criticised by Constance Smith (1966) who saw fire as the symbol for the "eternal ordering principle" (p.125) of the eternal flux. Heraclitus, according to her, did not draw this symbol from the household hearth, which is associated with the "rites of normal human passage" (p.127), but from his own terrifying personal experiences during the political upheaval of his time.

"Out of the suffering of social experience was born the idea of the transitoriness of all things" (Smith 1966, p.126).

Bertrand Russell, who interprets the Heraclitean Fire literally as the "fundamental substance", not surprisingly considers Heraclitus as a "mystic, but of a particular kind" (1961, p.59). Nevertheless, he correctly remarks that Heraclitus' preoccupation with fire anticipated the mediaeval alchemists. Indeed, these similarities did not escape Jung's attention in his extensive studies of alchemy and he duly acknowledges Heraclitus throughout his writings (e.g. 1952, p.120; 1954, p.310). Moreover, Jung, en passant, cites Heraclitus as one of the forerunners of synchronistic thought (1952b, p.485; 1957, p.57).

Shibbes interprets Heraclitean Fire exclusively in a symbolic way, as a "Delphic-like sign for the underlying reality" representing a "dynamic strife" (1971, p.42). Kirk, finally, distinguishes three kinds of applications of Fire in Heraclitus:

- 1) "The world-order as a whole",
- 2) "The unextinguished fire in cosmological changes", and
- 3) "the motive and directive of fire" (1954, p.365).

Thus Fire seems to suggest:

- a) a principle of constant change, and
- b) a transforming agent.

This principle implies an underlying 'plan' or 'pattern' without which perpetual flux would amount to unbearable chaos. And certainly for the Greeks and Heraclitus the world, the universe, 'cosmos' (the word includes also people) was not chaotic. On the contrary, the Greek word 'cosmos' strongly implies an order, even adornment (as implied by the English word 'cosmetic'). Heraclitus had another almost synonymous term for this cosmic order, the fateful term, in our civilization, logos, with all its multiplicity of modern connotations. He was in fact the first who introduced it to philosophy. He made explicit connections between Fire and logos:

Fr.7. "... Fire, by the Logos and God which arranges all things, is turned by way of air into moisture, the moisture which acts as seed of the world-forming process". (Kirk 1954,p.325).

Here again, there is controversy as to whether logos should be literally or metaphorically understood. Burnett argues that Heraclitus' logos is simply his own word, his own discourse (1952). It seems that this would be a very narrow interpretation, especially if one seriously considers the following fragment:

Fr. 8. "Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one" (Kirk 1954, p.65).

For Minar, logos is the "true account", the "meaning of things" (1939, p.341). Frankfort and Frankfort (1946) as well as Kirk (1954) see in logos the crucial element in the Heraclitean philosophy because with the concept of logos he introduced a new chapter into philosophy:

"Here for the first time, attention is centred not on the thing known, but on the knowing of it"  
(Frankfort and Frankfort 1946,p.255).

Human thought added to its material preoccupation a genuine philosophical concern. The introduction of logos could also be seen as a marriage of a physical principle (Fire) with a human one (Logos). Truly, Fire and Logos do not have such clear boundaries for Heraclitus, although they originally stem from these two different realms. Human beings, by attaining wisdom (logos), become part of the cosmic principle. In the following fragment (with which T.S. Eliot very aptly introduces his 'Four Quartets', 1944), the above thesis becomes evident:

Fr. 9. "But although the logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding. This is nothing other than an explanation of the way in which the universe is ruled. Therefore in so far as we share in awareness of this, we speak the truth, but in so far as we remain independent of it, we lie" (Kirk 1954, p.57).



The individual, therefore, has to 'tune into' logos otherwise he will develop an individual or 'idiotic' (=private) opinion. (Idiotes, which in Greek means a person with a private understanding, is the primary connotation of the word 'idiot'). Logos is "common" and thus people can only communicate through this collective, universal 'structure'. Another characteristic Greek word for an individual who does not partake in the common logos is barbaros (=barbarian) - the person whose language consists of a repetitive 'bar-bar-bar ...'. Sharing the common logos is, in a sense, an act of some measure of self-abandonment. An idiot or a barbarian is basically self-centred, and this 'autistic' preoccupation with one's own self brings about a feeling of arrogance, hybris. Heraclitus gave an early warning concerning the destructive consequences of hybris:

Fr.10. "One should quench arrogance (hybris) rather than conflagration" (Sambursky 1963, p.229).

Later, the great Greek dramatists Euripides, Sophocles and Aeschylus used the theme of hybris and its catastrophic results as one of their fundamental leitmotives. Edinger (1973) stresses the relevance of this concept, and relates it to the Jungian process of inflation.

In short, Fire was the symbol of change and Logos the ordering principle underlying change. How was change possible in the first instance and what were the dynamics of this ordering principle? The following fragments from the Heraclitean discourse will serve as basic references and will thus introduce the discussion on the principle of opposites. In this discussion an attempt will be made to answer the above questions.

Fr.11. "War is father of all and king of all"  
(Kirk 1954, p.245).

Fr.12. "It should be understood that war is the common condition, that strife is justice, and that all things come to pass through the compulsion of strife" (Wheelwright 1959, p.29).

Fr.13. "And the same thing there exists in us living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old: for these having changed round are those, and those having changed round are these" (Kirk 1954,p.135).

Fr. 14. "Of the logos which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to their logos men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is - but the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.187).

Fr. 15. "Things that are cut in opposite directions fit together. The fairest harmony is born of things different, and discord is what produces all things ... Let us unite wholes and not-wholes, convergence and divergence, harmony and discord of voices" (Stokes 1958, p.78).

Constant strife is the driving force of change. Change is a result of the "compulsion of strife" (Fr.12). War or strife are the fundamental principles. But both terms presuppose two conflicting sides. In the process of change opposing positions change place (Fr. 13). Opposite states, such as sleep and waking, may produce fragmentation. What is necessary is awareness of the continuity underlying the apparent diverse states in the process of flux.

We may now consider Popper's position outlined above, and conclude that the question of appearance and reality with regard to things may be reformulated with reference to persons. The law of change renders impossible any adequate description of being, as a static entity, as the clash between opposite states is an inherent condition in the process of change. Thus, continuity must be taken into account. The reality lies in the 'becoming' rather than in the 'being'. The becoming unites all opposites occurring in the continuum of change, such as the transition between sleep and waking state (Fr.14). Therefore, Ferrier's emphasis on Becoming

as ultimately representing the most substantial contribution of Heraclitus can now be evaluated as a very appropriate remark. Copleston echoes this by stressing that Heraclitus' original contribution to philosophy was:

"...the conception of unity in diversity, difference in unity ..." (1950, p.40).

For him the conflict of opposites, so far from being a blot on the unity of the One (logos) is essential to the being of the One. In fact, the One only exists in the tension of opposites: "this tension is essential to the unity of the One" (1950, p.40). Emlyn-Jones (1976) qualifies this claim by noting that Heraclitus himself was not fully conscious of the connection between his theory of unity of opposites and his general cosmological ideas.

Kirk concludes that Heraclitus developed:

"...a systematic interpretation of the world that had many of the elements of philosophy - it only lacked systematic logic to be philosophical" (1974, p.301).

This might be so. It might also be true that his work still belongs to 'mythical' thought and that his 'style' and content seem obscure.

The way Heraclitus characterised the language of the Delphic oracle may aptly be used to describe his own language:

Fr.16. "It neither speaks out nor conceals but gives a sign" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.211).

It is, nevertheless, evident that even this brief account of his theories makes possible an understanding of the Other. Man, as a member of cosmos is also in flux and perpetual change. His relationships to the physical and social environment continuously undergo changes. But at the same time, a similar process takes place within himself since his relationship to his own self also continuously changes. Heraclitus was clear that there is no such thing as a static being. Instead, it is a process of becoming - becoming something other than what already is. The process of becoming

is a perpetual movement towards an otherness: an unending renewal of the being by the Other. Heraclitus' principle of change is in the main understood as:

"...a passage from some quality to its opposite"  
(Wheelwright 1959, p.32).

Fr.17. "Cool things become warm, the warm grows cool - the moist dries, the parched becomes moist" (Wheelwright 1959, p.29).

Thus under a sharper focus the process of becoming should look as a perpetual interchange between being and its opposite other.

"Heraclitus' world is of adjustment, and of a kind which is not only compatible with contrariety, but can only exist through the latter: and since it is all in change the contrariety it exhibits is that of changes proceeding in opposite directions"  
(Vlastos 1955, p.350).

In Fr.15, we read "...The fairest harmony is born of things different.." (vide p. 35 ). If we do not unite the opposites we shall be unable to grasp the continuity between opposite states, as in the case of sleep and waking. (cf. Fr.14). This unity can be brought by accepting the process of change - otherwise an uncomfortable 'fixation' on a static point may result.

Fr.18. "It is weariness to keep toiling at the same things so that one becomes ruled by them"  
(Wheelwright 1959, p.83)

Fr. 19. "Even the sacred barley drink separates when it is not stirred" (Wheelwright 1959, p.58).

Thus an inability to follow change, a 'fixation' to a static state might lead to a condition where the other which is in an immediate opposition to the 'me', takes over and establishes 'himself' as an absolute 'ruler' over the 'me'. But the moment we accept that both 'me' and 'other' are transitory and become reconciled to the inevitability of change, we facilitate the process of change and become part of it - we then acquire (their) logos. Unless an individual is established in the Logos of the phenomena of his immediate experience and thus gradually the Logos of the Universe, he will remain within what Heraclitus described as a

loathesome understanding and which he termed private ('idiotic').

Normal everyday awareness is not sufficient. That precisely constitutes the private and not common understanding. (cf. Fr. 8 and Fr. 9). Professor Vlastos makes this distinction clear:

"... the 'common' is not the common run, nor the individual the 'private'; what is 'common for all' is not what all, or almost all, happen to think, but what all should think, and would, if they had sense" (Vlastos 1955, p.347).

How then is man to acquire the wisdom of Logos? How is he to relate to the cosmic Other? Heraclitus replies:

Fr.20. "If one does not expect the unexpected one will not find it out" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.195).

Normal everyday consciousness will not lead to the Other, Logos (cf. Fr.14). We can now understand how Heraclitus' teachings must have irritated the wealthy merchants of Ephesus, thus making him an outcast. Private understanding is wrong, as is the consensus ("the common run") - the way out is waiting for the unexpected. "Unexpected" in the sense that if it were expected then it would be a product of the existing 'private' consciousness. It seems that T.S. Eliot was alluding to the same paradox with the following verses from East Coker (1944):

"I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope.  
For hope will be for the wrong thing."

The basic issue here is to find a way to become attuned to the Other, true, cosmic awareness in which change is accepted and accounted for and the opposites do not exist in their individual fragmentary positions. To achieve this one has to realise the necessity of conflict and its illusory transient character:

Fr.21. "To god all things are beautiful and good and just, but men have supposed some things to be unjust, others just" (Kirk 1954, p.180).

By working through the polarities one comes to the realisation of their inner connectedness:

Fr.22. "They do not apprehend how being at variance agrees with itself: there is a back-stretched connection, as in the bow and the lyre" (Kirk 1954, p.203).

Therefore, if one is in a positive position he will tend to view the negative position as an opposite, but in fact that is the Other of this first position. By grasping their unity in the rhythm of change he will develop their logos, he will be entrenched in their logos which in turn is the Other of his previous mode of being, the fragmented one.

Two kinds of Other may now be distinguished: an 'internal Other', a product of the division of human consciousness into opposites and another Other, referring to the general principle of the universe, which could be termed the 'external Other' as it is (or could be) common to all. The 'internal Other' is the opposition to the 'me', the other being which in the chain of becoming and change, takes the place of the given being. If a person perceives this as permanent opposite, he has not yet acquired the logos behind it, and his understanding is private. The 'external Other', on the other hand, is the new higher state of being achieved once the person moves from a private understanding to logos, the 'common' understanding which is wisdom and accounts for the changes and union of opposites.

The internal Other could be seen as an illusory Other as it is a transitory state. The 'external' Other is the only reality, true existence.

Fr.23. "Wisdom consists in speaking and acting the truth, giving heed to the nature of things" (Wheelwright 1959, p.19).

But:

Fr.24. "The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself" (Kirk and Raven 1971, p.193).

Therefore, as the "common run" understanding amounts to a 'private' understanding, and as the real nature of things is hidden, the way to reach this Other, 'real' state is through one's own self: by unifying and overcoming the opposites in one's own existence and seeing the endless line of changes in becoming. Heraclitus could afford to speak about this Other because, as he admitted:

Fr.25. "I have searched myself" (Wheelwright 1959, p.19)

This was not an arrogant statement. Arrogance (hybris) is an insistence on and boasting of the mistaken truth of private understanding. The distinction might not be visible to a person who has not attained the 'external' other. That is why, again, Heraclitus was an unpopular figure and later was called "Obscure" and "Riddler". His language, as Jung noted (vide supra p. 29), was comprehensible only to people who had surpassed private understanding.

The above discussion has shown that what we termed 'external' Other is, in fact, the inner core, the 'real' nature of everything in the universe, including, of course, the person who realises this. Thus, after closer examination it becomes evident that what seems at the beginning to be external, is, in fact, the true inner Other as opposed to the illusory, transitory other. That is why Heraclitus' language is full of riddles. To speak in the language of 'private' understanding about the 'common' logos amounts to a paradox. That is why Heraclitus, the Riddler, spoke the language of the Other!

## PART ONE

### Chapter Three

#### Plato

"The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato"!

Alfred North Whitehead (1929, p.63).



Whitehead's famous saying might be exaggerated; nevertheless it contains a truth with which very few philosophers would disagree - that Plato was the first to formulate and ask most questions concerning the nature of man which are still central to western thought. Plato's stature, both physical and intellectual, led to the erroneous speculation that the name Plato, which in Greek means broad, was actually a nickname (Notopoulos 1939). Indeed, the breadth of his genius embarrasses modern academic attempts to classify him. Plato considered himself a philosopher but according to our modern categories of disciplines, he was also very much a psychologist, a theologian, an historian, a poet, a dramatist, a natural scientist and a politician. Armstrong thus justifiably considers him as:

"the philosopher of beginnings, the source and originator"  
(1965, p.33)

Plato's life is significant for the history of philosophy for two particular events: his association with Socrates and the establishment of Academy. Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) was born at the end of Pericles' Golden Age into an aristocratic Athenian family who were descendants of Solon, the famous statesman and reformer. He became a pupil of Socrates in his early twenties, at a time when the great master was in his sixties. After the trial and execution of Socrates, Plato left Athens to avoid any harassment. Later he travelled twice to Sicily to advise first King Dionysius and then his son Dionysius II who succeeded him. These visits were not successful. In one of them he was even sold as a slave, and friends had to buy his

freedom. On his return to Athens, he established a school of his own in the orchards of a rich Athenian called Academus, the famous Academy.

Academy was perhaps the first university. Gymnastics were taught together with dialectic and mathematics, poetry together with rhetoric and astronomy. Among the prominent pupils of Academy was Aristotle who studied there for twenty years before establishing his own school, the Lyceum, after his Master's death. Plato, besides doing Philosophy by being with his pupils, performed other duties, such as writing the Dialogues! Fisher (1966) convincingly argues that Plato's main activity was being a philosopher; writing was a peripheral task similar to "sitting in committees" for modern academics! The significance of this distinction will be discussed later (vide p. 70).

In reading Plato, the student is faced with three principal difficulties:

- 1) How to distinguish between Plato's own views and the teachings of Socrates.
- 2) How to account for the development of the Platonic thought.
- 3) How to extract a clear theory from a Dialogue, written in a dramatic form.

1) Approximately two-thirds of the surviving Platonic Dialogues are centred around Socrates. They are in the form of records, of Socrates' own dialogues which he allegedly held with his own pupils and other prominent men. In a sense, then, these Dialogues could be seen as Socratic and not Platonic, i.e., expounding the doctrines of Socrates and not those of Plato.

Following this view Plato would appear as only an industrious pupil who patiently and faithfully minuted his Master's teachings. Such an understanding of the role of Plato would, of course, be erroneous. We cannot be certain whether those dialogues actually took place at all, although most

of the characters in them are identifiable as contemporary figures in Greek life. Thus, all Platonic scholars accept that the Dialogues represent Plato's device to express his own philosophy. Naturally, his ideas were strongly influenced by Socrates. It is, however, inevitable that Plato would indeed at times have recorded Socrates' own teachings. Therefore, lacking any other records of Plato's own lectures at the Academy and/or other dialogues, the Platonic Dialogues are considered by all commentators as Plato's philosophical corpus. A certain development of thought can be traced throughout the Dialogues, culminating in a period which definitely transcends the Socratic teachings.

2) There is no consensus among classicists as to the exact chronological order or grouping of the Dialogues. The controversy extends to include even the question of authenticity of some of them, but there is general acceptance that Plato is indeed the author of twenty-seven Dialogues, although six were written by others. The authorship of another six Dialogues is disputed. In this study only the undisputed Platonic Dialogues will be used. Nevertheless, the student who wishes to trace Plato's theory on a particular topic will not find this an easy task. Like the children's game with letters, Plato's philosophy changes depending on the order in which the Dialogues are arranged.

3) Perhaps the greatest difficulty the modern reader - accustomed to explicitly formulated textbooks - faces in approaching Plato, is how to extract a philosophical theory out of a written dialogue. Plato never appears as a character in any of his Dialogues, and thus his doctrines are interwoven in the subtleties of dramatic interaction. The reader must be constantly alert: is an author's message one of despair if he writes about a character in despair? Is the literary text in 'isomorphic' (to use an early Gestalt term) relationship to the personality of its creator?

Plato's Philosophy encompasses such a vast field that it is not possible to sketch its total scope as was done in the case of Heraclitus, before proceeding to formulate a Platonic theory of the Other. Here, it will be necessary to be selective from the very beginning, and therefore only these highly pertinent Platonic theories are considered:

A) The theory of Ideas or Forms, B) The structure of the Psyche, and C) The Dialectic. These are perhaps the central themes of Platonic thought. The first two will be considered as Plato's attempt to articulate his understanding of the Other, and the third, the Dialectic, as the crucial process of realizing and coming to terms with the Other.

A) The Forms.

Plato's term "ideai" is usually translated in English as 'ideas'. Some eminent classicists, such as Jowett (1892), Robinson (1941), and Guthrie (1967), have followed this tradition. Guthrie maintains that there is an apt similarity between "ideai" and 'ideas' in that they both refer to a "common ground of meaning" as in the sentence "we have an 'idea' of goodness or equality" (1967, p.89). Modern Platonic commentators, on the other hand, have argued a good case for substituting "Forms" for "Ideas" as the proper translation of "ideai". In English 'idea' refers mainly to something personal, a private product. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary we read:

"Idea = Notion conceived by the mind, way of thinking, vague belief, fancy" (Fowler and Fowler 1964, p.601).

Such meaning is certainly contrary to Plato's understanding of the word (Armstrong 1965, p.37; Lee 1955, p.234n). For Plato "ideai" had an existence of their own, independent of things and people. Of special interest is the connection between Forms and archetypes. Wild, referring to Jung's concept of the archetype, explains an early Socratic understanding of the

Forms as follows:

"The forms are models or archetypes which exist somewhere in nature by themselves" (1946, p.214).

The first meaning of the word Idea is given by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as 'Archetype, pattern'. Bozonis (1974), in stressing the relevance of Platonic philosophy to modern thought, equates the Forms with the Jungian archetypes. Jung, an able classicist himself, makes extensive reference to Plato throughout his writings. However, Jolande Jacobi, in a much quoted passage, finds that Forms and Archetypes do not have the same meaning, although they have certain similarities (1968, p.42). This question will be examined in detail in Part Three.

Plato arrived at this theory of Forms by means of three contributing factors: 1) the legacy of the Heraclitean theory of eternal flux, 2) his reaction to the Sophists, and 3) his sharp attack on contemporary artists and poets. These seemingly unrelated reasons may be moulded into a coherent argument.

1) There is no doubt that we constantly observe changes in the world around us as well as in our own selves. But if everything remains in perpetual change then knowledge is impossible (Cornford 1960). This question troubled Plato. He was eager to find some 'Archemeidian point' outside of, beyond the flux; a constant which might be used as a measure of knowledge. The cosmogonies of pre-Socratic philosophers, expressed in a vague 'illogical' manner, contributed very little towards such an answer. Indeed Heraclitus spoke of an ordering principle, Logos, but this was far from a concise logical theory, and needed further elaboration. Guthrie interprets Plato's solution:

"...whatever of quasiexistence our changing world possesses; it owes to an imperfect participation in the full and perfect existence of the other" (Guthrie 1967, p.90).

This 'other' world was nothing else but the world of Forms (cf. Irwin 1977).

2) Sophists, the villains in the Platonic Dialogues, constituted a very peculiar establishment in ancient Greece. They were wandering teachers who taught, at a good fee, an assortment of skills necessary for a citizen to survive and succeed in the Greek 'polis' (city-state). Their main concern was the practical applicability of their teachings. General ethical issues were of no concern to them. Their speciality was Rhetoric and they would instruct a pupil how to argue from any point of view and win. Plato's great Master, Socrates, was particularly distressed by this phenomenon, and his entire philosophy could be seen as a reaction to the destructive relativism of sophistry. Hegel goes so far as to describe him as "The Inventor of Morality", explaining that Socrates objected to a "customary morality" by advocating that:

"the moral man is not he who merely wills and does that which is right but he who has the consciousness of what he is doing" (Hegel 1872, p.281).

Socrates' main themes were self-examination and self-knowledge along with an unshakable commitment to moral principles. Plato inherited his teacher's concern for firm moral values which would not change according to the expedient needs of people but would stand by themselves outside of any utilitarian grasp. For both Socrates and Plato, philosophy was not an abstract activity, but closely interlinked with action. The lovers of wisdom and truth (philosophers) had to live in truth in their everyday circumstances (Versfeld 1972). Thus the Forms would provide the foundations of morality; being unchangable and absolute, they would provide points of reference upon which people might fashion their lives.

3) Plato had a similar regard for artists and sophists; he regarded them as masters of illusion. Art, for him, was essentially 'mimesis' (imitation) of something noble and eternal, of Beauty and Good. If an artist was not in touch with the reality he was supposed to imitate, his artistic creation would, according to Plato, be false:

"... for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the (artistic) piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false" (Laws 11668, trans. Jowett).

Moreover, the artist:

"... if he really knew about the things he represented, he would devote himself to them and not to their representations" (Republic 599, tr. Lee).

Therefore, Plato had no respect for artists and poets and he banished them from the ideal Republic he devised. At best, they represented reality removed three times from itself, as in the example of the bed (Republic 597-599). There, the artist painting a bed is seen as imitating the bed which was built by a carpenter, who in his own turn imitated the Form of the bed. The Form of bed was created by God. Thus, artists and poets deal with "shadows and not realities" and their products are "representations at the third remove from reality" (Republic 598,599, tr. Lee).

These three points show that Plato was very keen to grasp the immutable essences or absolutes which are immune to the relativism of 1) change (Heraclitus), 2) knowledge and morals (Sophists), and 3) diverse representations (artists and poets). In each case, he was dissatisfied with the instability of relativism. It is, of course, a rather thorny argument whether Plato arrived at the theory of Forms through his attitude towards the sophists, poets and artists or whether his actual theory of Forms was responsible for his negative feelings towards them. The above enumerated illustrate his aversion towards any form of relativism, but furthermore, there is clear evidence that he disliked sophists and artists: sophists, following Socrates' well known rejection of them, and artists because a) of their specific political involvement at the time, and b) his conviction that the Arts were in a great decline during his life (Jowett 1892, vol.3, pp.clvii-clxv, Moutsopoulos 1974, pp.15-16).

All phenomena and objects in the world of our sensory perception are in flux, are in a process of constant becoming. But Plato saw another world,

the world of being, the world of Forms, which are universal objective entities. They are not simply elusive states in our minds and are not subjective in character. They have existence beyond the perceptible.

Plato has Socrates explain:

"Parmenides Tell me now, was this your distinction between forms in themselves and the things which partake of them...? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?

I think that there are such forms, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute forms of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?

Yes, he said, I should." (Parmenides 130, tr. Jowett)

Thus Plato rejected Protagoras' "man is the measure of all things"

(Theaetetus 152). Verbal ability could not determine the truth. Words could not be manipulated to suit the speaker. They are not empty shells. Words are images, imitations, eikonai of the things named (Cratylus 439A) and these things behind the facade of the words would naturally be immune to the flux of the world (439D-E). Similarly, A.N. Whitehead argued that:

"... the very purpose of Philosophy [is] to delve below the apparent clarity of common speech" (1942, p.257).

Forms are the real essences of things and it is the philosopher's task to seek their nature. Copleston attributes two characteristics to Forms:

Immanent and transcendent. A Form is:

"... immanent for phenomena embody it, 'copy' it, partake in it, manifest it, in their varying degrees; but it is also transcendent, for it is said to transcend even being itself ... Absolute Beauty, for instance, does not exist outside us in the sense in which a flower exists outside us ... on the other hand, it cannot be said to be inside us in the sense that it is purely subjective, is confined to us, comes into being with us, and perishes through our agency or with us" (Copleston 1950, pp.174-175).



Stevenson distinguishes four aspects of the Forms: i) logical, ii) metaphysical, iii) epistemological, and iv) moral (1974, pp.24-26).

i) The logical aspect is the account of the Forms as "general words", the "problem of universals" - the Form of Good as a "general word" which refers to all particular things which are "good".

ii) The metaphysical aspect regards Forms as "more real than material things for they do not change and decay" (p.24).

iii) Epistemologically, true knowledge is considered as knowledge of Forms only.

iv) The moral aspect deals with the Form as "objective moral standards" (p.25).

To these four, the artistic aspect should also be added. As was shown above, Plato saw the Forms as the "real essences" which the Arts attempt to imitate. Thus the artistic image should represent the Form as closely as possible.

There is controversy concerning the multiplicity of forms implicit in Plato's philosophy: For example, the just, beautiful and good partook of the Forms of Just, Beautiful and Good, but a little further, in the same Dialogue, Socrates was uncertain as to whether there were Forms of mud, hair and dirt. Stenzel (1940) observes a transition in Plato's thought concerning this question. At the beginning, Stenzel claims, Plato accepted only positive Forms, moral and aesthetic; later he had to admit Forms for all class-concepts. This claim is very firmly grounded. The first Forms to be mentioned by Plato were those of Virtue, Beauty and Good. These come almost directly from Socrates' own teaching. As was mentioned above, Plato's early work is focused chiefly on his Master's moral Philosophy. The main concern was that of a virtuous life.

Philosophy, Ethics and life were closely linked. Stenzel's 'discovery', in a sense, pinpoints the beginnings of the differentiations between various disciplines. Plato was forced to change his theory of Forms and to include all concepts. This was necessitated by logical thinking and argumentation. Moreover, Stenzel maintains that Plato was unaware of this change in his theories; so smooth and inevitable was the development from a singular Form to a multiplicity of Forms. This led to a detailed study of the various Forms and their inter-relationships, thus laying the foundations of separate disciplines like Ethics, Philosophy, Religion, Physics, etc.

The pertinent question for this study is, naturally, whether there was any Form of man? Did Plato suggest any Ideal Man whose paler or brighter imitations would be the ordinary people in this life? Does man have in himself a greater or lesser 'portion' of an Ideal Man? Before taking up this difficult question we might consider Robinson's summary of Plato's position and follow his lead:

"Plato's whole theoretical philosophy is largely a condemnation of images and a struggle to get away from them. Man, he holds, has the misfortune to be so circumstanced that he inevitably begins life by taking shams for realities. The world revealed by the senses, which engross all of us at first, is only a half real image of the true being; and wisdom lies in the progressive substitution of the pure for the adulterated, looking forward to the day when 'we shall know through ourselves all that is pure' (Phaedo 67)" (Robinson 1941, pp.232-233).

The sentence from the Phaedo implies that man is capable of knowing the pure, the Forms, and the method indicated is to know one's self. This was precisely Socrates' message: The Delphic "Know thyself". As Hegel remarked (vide supra p27) the "real" morality (as opposed to "customary" morality) was, for Socrates, based on self-knowledge. Should then the "know thyself" be rephrased as 'know thy Form'?

The implicit duality in 'self-knowledge' has long been observed and stressed by philosophers. The duality consists of one self, to be known, and an-other self, to arrive at that knowledge. Professor Ballard, in his study on Platonic self-knowledge, suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by introducing a Form of Man. This implies that:

"... the self which refers is the concrete embodied self, whereas the self to which reference is made is the universal Man. Consequently, self-knowledge, considered as the possession of the embodied self, could take as its object the ideal self. The two, being on different levels, are not identical; they are the same, but only in a sense that an instance is the same as the form instantiated. Then the knowing subject (the instance) would no longer be its own object (the form man). Thus a paradox would be avoided. ...The Platonist would then be able to say with Pindar, 'Become what you are', for the 'what you are' refers to the real self, Man, the Form (Ballard 1965, p.116 - emphasis added).

Although Plato admitted with Socrates (in the Parmenides 130) that he was uncertain as to whether there was a Form of Man (in the same way that he was not ready to accept Forms for mud, dirt and hair), in the Phaedrus he builds a strong argument for the existence of a Form of the Psyche of Man.

The brief account of the Platonic Forms has revealed some striking similarities between the Heraclitean state of 'common understanding', or Logos, which, in this study, was termed 'external Other', and the Forms. As was mentioned earlier, it was Plato's aim to develop further that part of Heraclitus' theory which accounted for the stability (Logos) of the changing cosmos. Thus, the Forms could be seen as an elaboration of Logos. Logos was an abstract general ordering principle whereas Forms are specific, they refer to certain entities, e.g. the Form of Beauty. The Form of Beauty could be seen as accounting for the Logos of particular beautiful objects. Beautiful objects, despite the changes they undergo and the differences between them, nevertheless partake in the universal Form of Beauty, if they are rightly called 'beautiful'. Therefore,

the earlier discussion concerning the Otherness of Logos could be useful in examining the Otherness of Forms also.

Forms are the 'real counterpart' of everything in this world which is but a world of shadows (cf. Plato's simile of the cave in the Republic VII 514 ff). The unchanging essence of a being, the Form, or Other of that being, is in a special relationship to this being as it is in it (immanent) and yet beyond it (transcendent). The closer the being comes to its Other, its 'true' substance, the more perfect will it be. Simone Pétrement in her book "Le Dualisme chez Platon" emphasises that Plato's fundamental doctrine was:

"... the idea of a separate truth, a truth which exists by itself and does not depend on us" (1947, p.309).

Moreover, this:

"... truth is the other (autre), and this other is preferred to the me" (p.310).

The Form is 'truer' than the particular being which partakes in it. The truth lies with the Other.

Before considering the full implications of viewing the Form as the Other, it will be necessary to examine another closely related issue, the division of the Psyche.

#### B) The Structure of the Psyche.

Plato gives an original and imaginative account of the inner division of the Psyche, in the Phaedrus (246 - 257), by using the model of a "winged yoke of horses and a charioteer". The charioteer, who controls the vehicle, is the logisticon (reason, spirit, rational apprehension). He tries hard to coordinate the two temperamental horses; each one pulls in a different direction. The 'base', 'bad' horse (epithymeticon -

appetitive) has a very limited vision and is only interested in "childish" affairs and the "charms of love"; it is governed by desire (epithymia). The other, the "noble" horse, which has a much broader vision is the thymoedes or affective part of the Psyche. (Wilford 1959, suggests self-assertiveness as a better translation of thymoedes). He exercises "a restraining influence over his companion" and has a "more distant goal" (Wild 1946, p.150). This noble horse is a "lover of sophrosyne" (wisdom) (Republic 253D), and is governed by higher emotions. Even without the mediating intervention of the charioteer the noble horse is capable of compensating for the imbalance created by its undisciplined partner. The wings represent an important part of this model of the Psyche. Wild correctly remarks that:

"... the wings are attached to the horses and possibly the charioteer himself, but they are not mentioned in the separate description of the two steeds. Hence we are led to infer that they belong rather to the united power of the whole vehicle as the living being aspires or loves with the whole of his being (psyche), rather than with any particular part" (1946, p.149).

Thus, the winged-chariot model of the psyche (more commonly known as the tripartite model) makes a distinction between two conflicting emotions, the higher and the lower, and reason, the third principle, which plays a coordinating role. Plato considered reason alone to be immortal, therefore creating a further sharp distinction between divine reason, on the one hand, and the assertive and appetitive on the other, the latter representing elements of the particular mortal psyche of the individual. In addition, Plato suggests the potential of upliftment, provided that all parts are harmoniously coordinated. The wings are useless as long as the conflict between the rivalling horses is not contained so that both of them may fulfill their roles without obstruction by the other.

The striking similarities between the Platonic tripartite psyche and the Freudian model of the mental apparatus have received considerable attention and even led to a proclamation (by Muller-Braunschweig) that Plato was the Father of Psychoanalysis (in Simon 1973 , p.10). Particularly illuminating are the three studies by the Harvard Psychoanalyst, Dr. Bennett Simon (1972, 1973 , 1973b) in which, inter alia, he examines the correspondence between the appetitive and rational parts of the psyche and the id (instinctive, primary process, unconscious) and ego (secondary process, conscious) in Freudian Psychology. These comparisons seem to have scandalized another North American psychoanalyst, Dr. Hanly, who attempted to settle the issue by stating categorically that whatever similarities might exist:

"Plato constructed a 'moralised psychology' whereas Freud built a scientific psychology" (1977,p.140).

To return to the structure of the psyche, the same theory appears in the Republic, but this time the three parts of the human soul correspond to the structure of the 'politeia' (state). The three main classes in the state, i.e., philosophers, guardians, and artisans play similar roles as the charioteer with his two horses. So the following parallels could be drawn:

<u>Psyche</u>	<u>State</u>
Rational (logisticon)	Philosopher-kings
Affective or assertive (thymoedes)	Guardians
Appetitive (epithymeticon)	Artisans, common citizens, etc.

(Simon 1973a, p.8)

It might be interesting to note, en passant, that Ernest Jones (1949) also used the correspondence between the structures of the personality and the State by comparing the Super Ego with the King, the Ego with

the Parliament and the Id with the citizens. Freud himself drew similar parallels (1897, p.255). It was only natural for Plato that if the state was to offer the optimal conditions for the overall well-being of its citizens, it had to cater for the unity of their personalities, the individual winged chariots. The state was itself a large winged chariot, as it were, comprising all its relevant members.

"We are bound to admit that the qualities that characterize a state must also exist in the individuals that compose it" (Republic 435, tr. Lee).

The objective of the Republic was not merely to maintain law and order, but to promote what we would today call 'mental health'. It was the duty of the philosopher-king to nurture the psychae of his citizens, as he was capable of knowing the Forms and had achieved himself the internal harmony (Versfeld 1972). The term for this harmony was dikaiosyne translated as justice (or virtue). Professor Sinclair in his classic study on "The History of Greek Political Thought" says:

"A just man is he who performs his own function; in an unjust man the parts of the soul are at war with each other. Justice is a right order, a healthy condition within the soul of man or the state" (1961, p.154).

Thus, justice refers to a balance and resulting unity between all parts of the human psyche as well as the State. This is no mere analogy.

Socrates in his famous prayer to God Pan asked:

"... may the outward and inward man be at one"  
(Phaedrus 279B, tr Jowett).

The integrity Socrates prayed for was the totality of the individual, in thoughts, speech, actions, desires. A man cannot be just with his fellow citizens alone. In order to deal justly with other people a man must first be capable of being just with the Others in himself.

Hall (1959) drew a distinction between what he termed "personal justice" and justice of the polis (State). Hoerber (1960) went further to differentiate these two types of justice basing his argument on the interpretation that justice equals knowledge of the Forms. Conversely, only the philosopher-rulers of the Republic, who were the only ones capable of the knowledge of the Forms, were in a position to bring about 'inner harmony' in themselves, i.e., justice. The ordinary citizen would have to rely on the second-hand knowledge of the Forms as dictated to him by the philosopher and therefore the implication is that their justice would also be 'second rate'. Skemp considers the above arguments overdrawn. Justice for Plato, according to him, was one and the same for "man in all possible worlds"(1960, p.38).

This is no implicit inference. Plato emphasised that the Republic's ...

"... real concern is not with external actions, but with man's inward self ... The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self to trespass on each other's functions or interfere with each other, but by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle and low, or whatever they be), within the truest sense set his house in order, and be his own lord and master and at peace with himself. When he has bound these elements into a single controlled and orderly whole, and so unified himself, he will be ready for action of any kind ..."

and a little further,

"... the knowledge which controls such action [is called] wisdom" (Republic 443, tr. Lee).

The above discussion points out two kinds of desired states for man to achieve: a) justice, which is a workable coordination of all parts of the psyche, and b) knowledge of Forms, an even higher state of wholeness, which implies a 'direct' relationship with the transindividual realm of Forms. Everybody is capable of reaching the state of justice but only the philosophers have the means for the ultimate knowledge, knowledge of the Forms.



Once the harmony within the psyche is achieved, the chariot is capable of rising to higher states, beyond the 'petty' conflicts between the rival horses. But if this harmony is lacking, a state of 'incongruency' results. Plato's term for this state was "mania" which Pieper (1964) renders as "being-beside-oneself". A person in mania, according to Pieper, loses "command over oneself" (p.49). This is:

"... a condition of being carried away out of the centre of one's own being" (Pieper 1964, p.50).

Other conditions with similar consequences were, for Pieper, enthusiasm and metanoia, both having in common the element of "decentredness", a shift from one's own "true" and "real" centre to an-other one.

In enthusiasm (=being filled with the god, divine madness) the locus of the personality has shifted to the divine (Other). It is as if the charioteer, through some error ascends, with the assistance of the wings, whilst the rival horses have not necessarily come to a harmonious resolution of their conflict. In metanoia (repentance):

"... a man abandons the complacency of a mind which imagines itself autarchic" (Pieper 1964, p.62).

The salvation of a 'decentred' person lies in reestablishing his 'real', 'natural' centre, which is a position of 'inner harmony' and justice to all parts of his psyche. This readjustment might appear to represent a further 'decentredness' in that a new shift from the 'false' centre to the 'real' centre will be required. Pieper cites Jung as adopting a similar approach to Plato as far as this process is concerned:

"He [Jung] too, like Plato, speaks of the necessity for submitting to a state of being outside oneself ... for the sake of healing wholeness. To strengthen his case he quotes the 'ancient motto of the Mysteries': 'Let go of what you have; then you will receive'" (Pieper 1964, p.61).

It is now easier to ascertain the strong similarities between the Heraclitean and Platonic theories. In the case of Heraclitus, "private opinion" was contrasted with the "common Logos" which was seen as its

'true Other'. Therefore, a 'decentredness', i.e., an emphasis on one particular aspect or part of the psyche at the expense of the whole, would correspond to the Heraclitean state of "private opinion", whereas 'true centredness', which is the state of "justice", i.e., harmony between all the parts of the psyche would be equivalent to the establishment of, and in the common Logos. Now, Plato offered a finer differentiation of the common Logos by proposing two kinds of 'wholeness'. One, justice, which was defined within the boundaries of the individual psyche (harmony of all its parts) and another, knowledge of Forms which included an essential transindividual element - the Forms themselves. In the case of the former, the wholeness embraces all 'personal Others', whereas with the latter a further requirement is demanded - that the harmonious totality of the individual psyche establish a 'direct relationship' with her 'true Other' (the 'external' or 'transpersonal' Other) which at the same time is her own 'true nature'. In both situations again, the achieved state is of a 'higher level', beyond the conflicting state of opposing polarities.

Heraclitus was vague about the means of achieving this desired state. However, he warned against any exploration which was motivated and designed by man's private opinion. Man had to wait for the unexpected and the solution had to come from an inner search. Plato agreed with these positions but could not afford to stay unclear as to the way of reaching perfection; the sophists and artists were quite specific in their instructions. Plato's answer to the techniques of sophistry, rhetoric and image representation was the Dialectic.

C) The Dialectic.

Plato consistently avoided offering a final definition of the Dialectic, with the result that there is still controversy concerning the precise meaning of this much abused term. Robinson goes so far as to say that Plato applied the term 'dialectic':

"... at every stage of his life to whatever seemed to him at the moment the most useful procedure"  
(1941, p.74).

This might be somewhat exaggerated. It is true that a number of fairly distinct periods in Plato's treatment of the Dialectic may be delineated, but this does not mean that Plato was indiscriminate in his use of the term. It is also true that Plato himself was at times uneasy about the use of Dialectic:

"... and if I find any man who is able to see 'a One and Many' in nature, him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right or not"  
(Phaedrus 266, tr. Jowett).

Nevertheless, there was only one aim of the Dialectic: The search for Truth! Plato never changed this aim and all varieties of Dialectic throughout his work have Truth as their goal. The following passage offers an apt illustration. Socrates, referring to the Dialectic, asks:

"Socrates In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?

Phaedrus And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgement; not with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth."

(Phaedrus 259-260, tr. Jowett).

In other words, the main commitment is to the Truth. However, it is obviously insufficient to define the Dialectic as the search for Truth, as another question naturally follows: what is the Truth? The sophists also proclaimed that they were speaking the truth. But what they were not doing, according to Plato, was to talk about the essence of things because they simply did not know it. Their arguments were peripheral to the real nature, the essence of the issues they debated.

Thus, the Dialectic is more precisely defined as:

"... the only activity which systematically sets about the definition of the essential nature of things" (Republic 533, tr. Lee).

As was shown above, the "essential nature of things" according to Plato, was closely inter-linked with the Forms. Therefore, the Dialectic is the:

"... procedure [which] involves nothing in the sensible world, but deals throughout with Forms and finishes with Forms" (Republic 511, tr. Lee).

The search for Truth culminates in the knowledge of Forms. This final stage is beyond the realm of opinion and persuasion, and it entails a just and moral attitude towards oneself and others. The moral and intellectual aspects of the Dialectic were given differential emphasis by Plato at different times during the development of his thought.

Stannard points out that:

"As Plato came to recognize the significance of his dialectical method the notion of the goal of philosophy was modified accordingly" (1959, p.123nl).

The same author identifies three such periods:

1. The early period during which the emphasis was on "moral betterment",
2. The middle period, where Plato's explicit aim was the discussion of a single Form, e.g., the Good, or Beauty, and

3. the later period which combined the goal of the first period (moral betterment) with a new, additional aim, the "knowledge of a plurality of Forms and their inter-relations"

(Stannard 1959, p.123nl).

The by now familiar trend of moving from the Socratic emphasis on moral life to a more 'detached' intellectual and philosophical discourse on Plato is again readily observable here. The main link between the moral and the intellectual is maintained throughout Plato's theories of the Dialectic, although there is a trend towards differentiating them and emphasising the intellectual. Robinson regards the Platonic Dialectic as:

"a moral and intellectual excellence" (1941, p.75).

Could these three periods of Plato's philosophical goals, as outlined by Stannard, be taken to correspond with a similar development of the Dialectic? This will surely depend on the exact relation between Philosophy and the Dialectic.

In the Sophist (227) Plato characterized the Dialectic as:

" ἡ μέθοδος τῶν λόγων"

which, translated literally, means: The method of logoi. Two problematical issues arise out of this famous saying:

- I) How are the words 'method' or 'procedure' to be understood?
- II) What interpretation, in this context, must be given to 'logos'?

I) Cornford maintains that:

"Dialectic is not what is now known as 'Formal Logic'" (1960, p.264).

although:

"the whole ... discussion of the 'combination' or 'blending' of Forms is usually called 'logical'."

Therefore, as the aim of the Dialectic is to:

"... yield the knowledge needed to guide us to true affirmative and negative statements about Forms, of which the whole texture of philosophic discourse should consist" (1960, p.264),

it will be an erroneous interpretation to view the Dialectic as a mere logical instrument. Robinson adamantly affirms this conclusion:

"Dialectic was not a tool that you might or might not choose to use in philosophizing. It was philosophy itself, the very search for the essences, only considered in its methodical aspects"  
(Robinson 1941, p.75, emphasis added).

The last qualifying sentence is important. Dialectic was not a methodology, or Logic, but the methodical aspects of philosophy. The difference is of great significance. A Sophist could not simply apply a dialectical technique within a philosophical framework which was utilitarian, lacking respect for the Forms, and not totally committed to Truth. In other words, Plato refused to accept the feasibility of using 'good means' to achieve 'bad goals'. Means and goals were inseparable. Any separation would endanger the Dialectic and denigrate it to a technique without any foundations. Indeed when this separation occurred in the Aristotelian Dialectic, it became 'nothing but' a method, and, according to Robinson, it was reduced to "a dubious game of debate"(1941, p.76). No wonder that Plato considered the Dialectic as a "divine gift" (Philebus 16), implying both its healing effects as well as the respect men should have for it.

What, then, were these "methodical aspects" which distinguished the Dialectic from a mere method?

i) Plato made extensive reference to Diacriteke (Separation, Division) and Synkriteke (Combination, Collection). Although there are certain misgivings concerning the identification of Division with the Dialectic (Trevaskis 1967), there is consensus among Platonists that Division and Collection comprised one major characteristic of the Dialectic. According to Lloyd:

"Dialectic meant always the discovery of the One in the Many, and in the later Dialogues this consisted of Collection and Division" (In Trevaskis 1960, pp.42-43).

Collection, according to Plato, was:

"... the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea" (Phaedrus 265, tr. Jowett)

Cornford explains the meaning of Collection as follows:

"Collection is a survey of specific Forms having some prima facie claim to be members of the same genus" (1960, p.186).

Division was the separation:

"... into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might" (Phaedrus 265-266, tr. Jowett).

And, according to Cornford, Division:

"... exhibits Forms arranged in systematic classification, spreading downwards from a single genus, through a definite number of specific differences, to the indivisible species at the bottom" (1960, p.186).

Making generous allowance for obvious discrepancies, Collection and Division might be compared to Jung's methods of amplification and analysis. Jung's amplificatory method consisted of the collection of as much material as possible which was related prima facie to the image, word, or dream element under investigation. This provided the working context so that he would:

"... know what tissue that word or image is embedded in" (Jung 1935, p.84).

Then a methodic process followed which consisted essentially of identifying the various archetypes involved, so that the analysand, with the assistance of the analyst, could successfully integrate them. This is one possible way of looking at Jung's analytic method. This matter is further discussed below.

To return to the methodical aspects of Collection and Division, it may be concluded that they cannot be seen as mere 'methods', separated from the understanding and whole philosophy of Forms (in the same way that Jung's methods cannot be considered in isolation from his theory of archetypes). Thus, the Dialectic studies:

"...the structure of the real world of Forms. Its technique of Collection and Division operates on that structure. It is a method for which some rules are laid down; but these are rules of correct procedure in making Divisions; they are not laws of inference or laws of thought" (Cornford 1960, p.265, emphasis added).

ii) a second "methodic aspect" could be introduced with Plato's following passage:

"Dialectic in fact is the only activity whose method is to challenge its own assumptions so that it may rest firmly on first principles" (Republic 533, tr. Lee).

This is a rather neglected aspect which is nevertheless of great importance for a proper understanding of the Dialectic in Plato. It is related to the "unexpected" of Heraclitus, in that an individual cannot rely on his own assumptions, or private opinion to reach the Truth. Such an endeavour will be condemned to failure from the beginning, as the very premises from which he will set off will be inadequate (private opinion) and will inevitably lead to false conclusions. The solution lies in challenging his own assumptions. Such self-questioning will have the liberating effect of Plato's phrase:

"we shall know through ourselves all that is pure"  
(Vide supra, p. 51 )

The awareness of "first principles", then, would correspond to a higher level of awareness of "common Logos".

The same "methodic aspect" also relates to the Socratic ignorance.

Socrates' confession of ignorance was more than a gesture of humility; it had a solid epistemological foundation. Man could not achieve self-



knowledge before abandoning his starting assumptions, i.e., firstly acknowledging the limitations of his capacity for knowledge. Ballard clarifies:

"The Socratic ignorance is not merely the remediable ignorance of individual detail which follows from having only a definitional knowledge of one's general type; rather it is the paradoxical understanding of the indefinite or a-rational factor within the very constitution of the soul" (1965, p.154).

The paradox is central to this issue as only after an individual understands the limitations of his own understanding will he be in a position to achieve a proper understanding devoid of any fancy. Plato had a special term for those who fancied themselves as wise. He called them dokisophoi.

In short, Dialectic cannot be seen as a technique, independent from the subject matter of investigation. Dialectic is philosophy itself, although two methodic aspects could characterize it: i) Collection and Division and, ii) a constant examination of the assumptions from which an inquiry is about to begin; such self-questioning would lead to the first principles, the Heraclitean logos, the knowledge of Forms, and their inter-relationships.

II) The second problematical issue concerning the Dialectic is the interpretation of logos in the Platonic phrase "method of logoi" (vide supra, p.62). Xenakis (1959) interprets the logos aspect of the Dialectic as a "logical", rational process as opposed to "disputation" or "argumentation" (p.40). Stannard elaborates on the same point as follows:

"The truth dialectic seeks to uncover is rooted ultimately in the ability to discriminate the real from the apparent ... and to understand the logical implications of the vocabulary of Forms. Hence truth and rational conviction go hand in hand" (1960, p.55n2, emphasis added).

This argument does not contradict the previous contention that the Dialectic is not Logic but Philosophy. Logic is a tool of thought which can be applied to any scientific discipline. Although Plato considered the Dialectic as an essentially logical process, he did not equate it with the discipline of Logic. By that he meant that it had an intrinsic rational character. Sophistry and rhetoric were based on persuasion by using disputation and argumentation. Plato frequently contrasted the Dialectic with what he termed Eristic, a category containing all of the above methods which were contrary to the Dialectic. The Dialectic, to paraphrase Vlastos' words on Heraclitean Logos used above, was logical inasmuch as people cared and had the sense to perceive its rationality. Thus, the 'logical' aspect of the Platonic Dialectic was in more than one way related to the Logos of Heraclitus. The awareness of "first principles", which were concerned with the existence and inter-relationships of Forms was, in a sense, the knowledge of "common Logos". Moreover, the investigatory process involved in the search for such knowledge was essentially 'logical' and within the grasp of every person with sense and commitment to Truth.

Another meaning of logos is the obvious reference of the Dialectic to Dia-logos (= dialogue), verbal interaction between two interlocutors. As shown above, an aspect of the Dialectic was the questioning of the basic assumptions of any inquiry. Such questioning is more effective when conducted with the help of another person. This was the role Socrates saw for himself in his interactions with his pupils: to help them reach the Truth by themselves, by simply questioning their assumptions. He called this art midwifery:

"Come to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain's shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their children are taken away from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill..." (Theaetetus 151, tr. Jowett).

Real knowledge is beyond the "darling folly", which, corresponding to Heraclitus' "private opinion" usually represents one's preliminary 'conception' or assumptions. A great deal of subsequent exploration is necessary in order to achieve real knowledge. Such exploration is impossible without strong commitment on the part of the pupil in order to withstand all the pains of conception and separation from the "darling folly". Flexibility, openness and preparedness to await and accept the "unexpected" is imperative for this kind of dialogue. Professor Plochmann emphasises the cooperativeness of the Dialectic:

"[Dialectic] conversation requires some kind of joint contribution, some sort of agreement, even if the conversation be quarrelsome, for at least the subject matter has to be jointly explored though in opposite ways" (1973, p.106).

In a sense, the teacher becomes the alter ego (to use a psychodramatic term) of the pupil. In a close relationship of total trust the disciple 'drops his defences' and allows the Master to question any of his (mis) conceptions. This does not imply that the disciple's attitude is that of absolute passivity. The Dialectic enterprise is cooperative. The Master becomes the disciple's Other and together they carry on their search for Truth, the pupil relinquishing his feelings of possessiveness attached to his "private opinion". This approach could be termed cooperative opposition, a most pertinent characteristic of the Dialectic as opposed to the

Eristic methods of inquiry. In the latter, as shown above, argumentation and disputation were the main colouring ingredients, and the pervading spirit was one of antagonism rather than cooperation.

Before concluding this part, it is necessary to focus on the spoken as opposed to the written word. Robinson (1941) gives three main reasons for Plato's insistence on the superiority of the spoken word as the proper means for the Dialectic:

i) The written word acquires a kind of independence of its own and people tend to give it more credence than their own memory.

ii) The written text cannot answer questions the reader might like to pose, and

iii) The written word is the same for all readers, so that there is no guarantee that it is properly understood, and no adjustments can be made to match the reader's level of comprehension.

An explicit indication of Plato's mistrust of the written word is the myth of the invention of words which he has Socrates narrate in the Phaedrus. According to this myth, when the Egyptian sage Tammuz brought king Thoth the alphabet, his proud discovery, he claimed that it was the "medicine for memory and wisdom". To this the wise king replied that the new discovery would

"create forgetfulness in the learner's souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves"

and he expressed concern that the written word

"... is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing" (Phaedrus 275, tr. Jowett, emphasis added).

Moreover, those who read much would become mere 'dokisophoi' (individuals who fancy themselves as being wise). It is obviously significant that Plato attributed this discovery to the Egyptians and not to the Greeks. Greeks had the 'live word', the spoken word, the Dialectic, and they did not need any fossilized forms of the Truth. Further, in the same Dialogue, writing is considered a "pastime", "for the sake of recreation and amusement" (276) and no serious teaching, it is claimed, could be done by means of the written word, which serves merely to remind (hypomnesis) those who already know. The earlier reference to Fisher (1966) (vide supra, p. 43) may be evaluated in the context of this discussion. There is an apparent contradiction in Plato's views on the written word. Socrates remained faithful to his conviction and never wrote anything. But Plato was quite a prolific writer. Fisher claims that Plato's writing was indeed a sort of pastime, an additional duty he had to perform. His main duty was "doing philosophy", "doing the Dialectic" in actual dialogues with his students, thus fulfilling all of the conditions of the Dialectic as outlined above.

To summarise, the proper Dialectic was basically an interpersonal verbal activity of cooperative opposition firmly entrenched within the rational realm of Logos, and aiming at discovering the real nature of things. This real nature was for Plato firstly related to moral betterment, then to the nature of a single Form, and finally to the knowledge of many Forms and their interrelationships.

Now, once the Dialectic brought forth its fruit, the individual would achieve the state of internal (intrapersonal) and external (interpersonal) justice, i.e., a fairness and harmonious balance without any violence towards the other parts of his psyche or the other people around him.

Plato's connection between the 'internal' and 'external' other in the concept of justice is noteworthy. Also, the exploration which would lead to justice was much facilitated through an active interaction with the Other person.

In conclusion, Plato elaborated and developed the Heraclitean concept of Logos, which was seen as the true Other. The Platonic theory considers the individual as an essentially divided being who, in order to achieve wholeness, must first bring harmony between the Others in himself. Dialectic is the means for achieving such a state of unity and an essential requirement is the cooperative opposition with his external Other, his Master. The resultant unity lifts the person to a higher realm of knowledge and awareness (Logos), beyond the world of the senses and of constant change, thus establishing him in his true centre which is a harmonious unity of all the Others.

The initial theme of this study                      dealt with the concept of the Other as both unity and division. The discussion of Heraclitus and Plato provided a wealth of material against which this theme could be examined. Both of these great thinkers saw man as a divided unit. Heraclitus considers that the process of the eternal flux creates opposites both outside the person, in nature, as well as within him. The Platonic theory is more elaborate and accounts for three parts in the human psyche. It also relates these internal Others to external Others (psyche and State). This internal division engenders a state of opposition between a 'me' and an 'Other'.

Apart from this division, both Heraclitus and Plato postulated a realm of being and understanding higher than the "common run" of ordinary everyday life. The controversial Ephesian equated this level with the acquisition of the "common Logos", an understanding of the inevitability of change achieved by searching one's own self: once established in this higher order

the individual then realises his true nature. Thus, by relating to his Other (encountered 'outside'), the desired unity may be acquired. Plato expounded a similar theory where the external, but at the same time 'real internal' Other is the Form. Plato also attempted a 'set of instructions' as to how one could achieve this real unity, and establish oneself in one's own natural centre of existence, viz., the Dialectic. In this enterprise, the guide (Master) adopted the role of the disciple's Other, and a common cooperative pursuit (dialogue) took place between the searcher and his Other. The division between 'me' and 'Other' was gradually eliminated as the common source of these superficially opposing poles was approached.

A notable contribution has been recently made by Professor Jarrett who argued that there is "no rest from the dialectic", there is "no static state", no end state of the dialectic (1974, p.85). The harmonious balance may be achieved by the process of the dialectical activity. Jarrett compared this formulation of the Platonic dialectic with Jung's theory of the 'individuation process' which he viewed as a continuous dialectical process without a static end-state.

PART ONE

Chapter Four

Hegel

"O life-giving sun, off-spring of the Lord of creation, solitary seer of heaven! Spread thy light and withdraw thy blinding splendour that I may behold thy radiant form: that Spirit far away within thee is my own inmost Spirit"

From the 'Isa Upanishad',

Tr. J. Mascaró.



Plato's Dialectic remained an inseparable and integral part of his entire theory. He vehemently refused to allow it to take the shape of any particular tool in the service of thought; Plato preciously guarded the Dialectic lest it might lose its divine character and become a secular technique. This is precisely the aim of Aristotle:

"... to correct Plato and free dialectic from ontology" (Evans 1977,p.51).

Immanuel Kant, twenty-two centuries later, continued the Aristotelian tradition in this respect. He began the section of "Transcendental Dialectic" in his monumental work "Critique of Pure Reason"(1781), with the following revealing sentence:

"We call Dialectic in general a logic of illusion (eine Logik des Scheins)" (p.238).

Thus, the Kantian Dialectic is the free and unrestricted manipulation of concepts by the intellect, independently of empirical principles. The "transcendental dialectic" deals with the "improper and fallacious application" of the a priori concepts (Körner 1955, p.45). Located solely in the abstract and illusory realm of the intellect, Kant's Dialectic lost all of its 'therapeutic' properties which Plato had firmly established and was, moreover, interpreted as "absolute reason's jugglery" (Heiss 1975, p.36). However, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) has perhaps contributed most to our modern understanding of the Dialectic whilst, at the same time, advancing an original theory of the Other. A contemporary of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, Hegel is legitimately considered as one of the greatest systematic philosophers of all times. It is doubtful whether there are

many philosophical systems which can match Hegel's colossal structure which includes articulated philosophical approaches to Art, Religion, History, Right, Nature, Mind, as well as systems of Logic and Phenomenology. As with most great thinkers, Hegel's positions have been interpreted in almost diametrically opposite ways. He was seen and followed by some as an arch-conservative, and by others as a liberal and radical thinker (Korać 1975). The division between "right" and "left" Hegelians (Jay 1973) still persists. Moreover, Hegel's contribution is constantly subject to reappraisal, (e.g. Findlay 1963, Avineri 1972, Hyppolite 1968, MacIntyre 1972, Kaufmann 1972, Prior 1972, Habermas 1972).

When one undertakes to investigate only certain segments of a particular philosophical system, criticisms concerning the legitimacy of such an undertaking are inevitable. A philosophical system, being a network of meaningfully interrelated theories, should not be dissected and compartmentalized, as it then loses its cohesion wherein its strength resides. Considering a concept in isolation deprives the investigation of its contextual meaningfulness. This reasoning (which was also shared by Hegel himself), however sound and rational it might appear, contradicts the validity of countless short essays and studies of limited scope about specific aspects of philosophical systems. Moreover, Solomon (1972) pondering the same issue in his essay on "Hegel's Concept of 'Geist'", realised, with an obvious sense of liberation, that Hegel himself was guilty of such transgression, despite his sayings to the contrary.

"What we must do for Hegel, therefore, is to read his work not as he insists that we read it, but as he reads the work of his predecessors" (Solomon 1972, p.134).

### The Dialectic of the Other in Hegel

It might be appropriate to start this section with an interesting remark concerning the original Hegelian conception of the dialectic. Professor Heiss (1975), correctly realised Hegel's

"... desire to unite the whole of Western thought into one unified, yet at the same time many-branched system" (p.5).

This desire was based on a conviction that

"... it is this whole - not the particular of it - which is the truth" (p.5).

Yet, paradoxically, Heiss argues that Hegel's motive for developing the Dialectic was rooted in an inner 'split' in Hegel's own personality.

"He always saw, so to speak, with two different eyes, one seeing the sic, the other the non, the Yes and the No" (p.37).

Professor Heiss goes as far as to categorically deny any other roots of the Dialectic in Hegel stressing that this very 'split' in Hegel's personality was solely responsible for his passionate attraction to this celebrated approach:

"... I do not believe that it was historical empiricism through which Hegel gained dialectical experience and a dialectical point of view. He saw things dialectically, the dialectical experience was more deeply rooted in his nature and the dialectical method as he later ingeniously elaborated it was far more essential to him than at first meets the eye" (p.38).

Professor Heiss' claim is based on (a) reports of Hegel's pupils about a "dark side", a "demonic streak in (Hegel's) being" and, in particular (b) on a totally neglected document from Hegel's early writings. This contains an unusual description of a dissatisfied God, angry

"... with himself over his otherness, over being fixated here as the fallen Lucifer" (In Heiss 1975, p.40).

As a result God destroys what He had created. But by so doing and thus overriding His own manifestations:

"... at the same time this constitutes a going-into-himself (In-sich-selbst-gehen), indeed an act of 'becoming a focal point'" (p.40).

In this peculiar document, unusual in that it was penned by Hegel at a time when he had only recently completed his theological training, Professor Heiss sees the first manifestation of a strong dialectic experience. The essence of this experience lies in the conception of the so-called dialectic triad - thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

"God split himself asunder by becoming enraged with himself. His rage, the negation of himself, did not however lead to his destruction, but to a new unity... this process of annihilation was both a retreating into himself and a genesis of the 'middle point'... out of the antithesis...'consumed Nature rises up in a new, ideal form'. But this cycle does not happen only once. It recurs. Thus systematic knowledge is also understood as a self-devouring process which at the same time leads to new formations" (Heiss 1975, p.43).

And in Hegel's own words:

"If God is the all-sufficient, the unneeding, why does he decide on something plainly unequal to himself? The divine Idea is precisely this, to resolve to put this Other out of himself and take it into himself again, so as to make it subjectivity and spirit" (In Heiss 1975, p.120).

It might be unwise to unconditionally accept this psychological evidence as the sole explanation for the origin of the Dialectic in Hegel. The majority of authors have argued that Hegel, a keen observer of the contemporary political scene and a scholarly student of History, collected his evidence and formed the idea of the Dialectic from these fields (e.g., Prior 1972, Avineri 1971). Nevertheless, Professor Heiss' valuable insight offers a new perspective in understanding Hegel which is of particular relevance for this study.

Having accepted that Hegel derived the idea of the Dialectic through a personal struggle to overcome his own 'other' side, the 'dark side' as well as by observing the dialectical developments in the historical and

political arenas, we may now proceed to investigate the actual meaning of the Dialectic in the Hegelian system.

The traditional interpretation of Hegel's Dialectic is that it is a method, the Hegelian method par excellence. This view has, however, been seriously challenged by a number of eminent Hegelian scholars. Dove (1971) maintains that Ivan Iljin in 1946 first suggested that "Hegel in his philosophical method was no dialectician" (Dove 1971, p.35n). This claim is obviously incorrect as Alexandre Kojève emphasised that very point in his celebrated lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind at the École Pratique des Hautes Études during the academic year 1934-35. Kojève, who admittedly understands the Dialectical method as narrowly as:

"... nothing but the method of dialogue - that is of discussion" (Kojève 1969, p.179),

developed his argument in the following way.

He first describes the history of the Dialectic, commencing with the function of myths which he saw as essentially representing an opinion. The innovators of new myths had to forcefully change the minds of people concerning the old myths, by means of war, if necessary. This "method" was gradually replaced by an attempt to convince the believers of the old myths concerning the superiority of the new ones. This, according to Kojève, was the period of dialogue with Plato and Socrates as the major exponents of this method. By "destroying each other" a "synthetic" truth emerged from the series of theses and antitheses so that a 'single One' was reached which was "not in opposition to an Other" as it was a:

"... Whole - the Idea of the Ideas, or the Good" (p.180).

In addition, Kojève sees a "parallel line" to this history: the introduction of the Divine. Certain myths were valid and were accepted solely by virtue

of being 'revealed' by God, not after persuasive discussions with the men of the city. A 'revealed truth' had absolute validity and was beyond any argumentative dialogue. Some men (such as Abraham) 'managed' to in fact strike up a 'conversation' with God, thus entering into a dialogue with the 'creator' of those 'truths'. As a further development, Saint Augustine had 'dialogues' with his own 'soul', an activity which could also be called 'meditation'. Through the 'method' of 'meditation' the great systems of the 17th and 18th century Philosophy became possible (notably the Cartesian Meditations). This was achieved by an internal dialectical method in which the author would present to himself theses, oppose them with antitheses, derive certain synthetic conclusions which would then in turn serve as further theses to be opposed by fresh antitheses and so on.

Hegel, in Kojève's view, exactly observed this dialectical movement of human thought, which essentially is the origin and history of human consciousness, and systematically described it after having captured the essence of the dialectical process in it. Hegel's system is thus not another thesis which may be negated by an antithetical system. The Hegelian Philosophy is immune to this cycle as it is itself the description of these cycles:

"... therefore we see that this (Hegelian) discourse is not dialectical, in the sense that it is not a 'thesis' that can be 'dialectically overcome'"  
(Kojève 1969, p.194).

Hegel, being the "first auditor-historian-philosopher" (p.183), had discovered "the dialectic of the Real" (p.184) as manifested in History. Kojève thus concludes that Hegel's method is:

"... nothing but the method that we nowadays call 'phenomenological'" (p.195, emphasis added).

Moreover, Kojève maintains that:

"... If the thought and the discourse of the Hegelian scientist or the Wise Man are dialectical, it is only because they faithfully reflect the 'dialectical movement' of the Real of which they are a part and which they experience adequately by giving themselves to it without any preconceived method" (pp.178-9).

Thus, the Hegelian phenomenological method amounts to total absorption in the subject matter without any method as such.

Husserl, normally accepted as the founder of Phenomenology, was thus wrong in claiming to have innovated Phenomenology, thereby rejecting Hegel's contribution. Kojève dismisses Husserl's arguments as based on a misunderstanding of Hegel.

Kojève's basic arguments are accepted by the majority of serious Hegelian scholars of today: Hegel is considered to have accurately presented the actual dialectical movement although his own method of presentation was not dialectical. Dove (1971), for example, referring to the method of Hegel's central work, the Phenomenology of Mind (1807), emphatically denies that it is dialectical and adds:

"Insofar as it can be characterised in a word, it is descriptive" (Dove 1971, p.35).

Both Heiss' insight into Hegel's personal psychology and Kojève's contentions indicate that Hegel's Dialectic was not a superficial methodological technique but had far deeper roots. This position might be contradicted by the very existence of studies on the Hegelian Dialectical Logic. If such a Logic can be legitimately constructed, then surely this supports the claim that the Dialectic represents a technique, a logical technique. But the argument is not so simple. Kosok reasons as follows:

"The formalization of Hegel's Dialectic logic rests upon the contention that Hegel's intuitively generated system can be represented as a meta-language structure in which a given set of elements on one level are capable of being analysed from a meta-level which refers to the original elements from a perspective of reflection,

thereby bringing out and expressing properties about that level not capable of being formulated within the original level itself" (Kosok 1966,p.596).

And a little further the same author argues that such:

"... unique dialectic logic ... is inherent in Hegel's Phenomenology and Encyclopedia as the basic 'generating' principle governing the intuitive movements of his structure as it evolves increasingly complex levels of inter-relation" (p.596).

Therefore this meta-language structure represents the generating principle of the actual dialectical movement, the dialectic of the Real and is not a mere technique such as when formal logic is employed as a correcting tool in the thinking process.

Mure has captured the core of this argument:

"Hegel's logic is not formal but ontological"  
(Mure 1965, p.110).

And:

"Dialectic is the only philosophical method because it is one with its content" (p.33).

Having anticipated some potential objections to the broad framework of the Hegelian Dialectic, it is now possible to examine the actual nature and development of that Real Dialectic.

The following two characteristics of the Hegelian Dialectic can be extracted from what has been said thus far:

1. The Dialectic has three 'moments': thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.
2. The dialectic of the Real refers to the dialectical movement which can be illustrated by its manifestation in the development of human thought.

The common element in the above two characteristics is motion, movement. Perhaps the very first expression of a dialectical thought, anticipating even Plato, is contained in Zeno's famous puzzle concerning the explanation of motion (Zeller 1885; 1892). The puzzle lies in the 'realisation' that at every given



moment a moving arrow is in fact at rest. Debrock uses a similar description of a waterfall given by Hegel in the diary of his hiking trip through the Alps to suggest that the impact of that image "provides a very expressive model of the dialectic of all reality" (1973,p.287). The diary entry includes such a suggestive description:

"... every moment it is pushed away by a new image, and in this fall, the spectator sees eternally the same image, and sees at the same time, that it is never the same" (In Debrock 1973, p.287).

Hegel was well aware of the centrality of motion in the Dialectic:


"The reason why dialectic first seizes upon motion lies in the fact that dialectic is itself this motion; or, put another way, motion is the dialectic of all that is" (In Gadamer 1976, p.13).

The motion is expressed in the Dialectic by the famous term Aufheben translated in English as sublation (e.g., in Baillie's translation of the Phenomenology of Mind, Stace 1955, Mure 1965) but also as overcoming (e.g., Nichols' translation of Kojève's lectures), transition (e.g., McTaggart 1896), and superceding (e.g., Navickas 1968). This notion is at times confused with transcendence which also implies a movement to a state further beyond. But transcendence, as advocated by Kant in particular, refers to an existence totally beyond the realm from which the enquiry is made, and it is thus based upon the hypothesis of an a priori existence. The Aufheben may perhaps be more accurately described by comparing it to a spiralling ascent (Mure 1965), rather than a linear or disconnected movement.

The following passage from Kojève might serve as a convenient point of departure for a deeper understanding of this aspect of the Hegelian system:

"The Hegelian Dialectic is entirely summed up by a single fundamental category, which is that of dialectical Overcoming (Aufheben). For what is to be 'overcome' is precisely the Immediate, and the 'overcoming' itself is Mediation through negating action which creates the Mediated, this latter being nothing but the Immediate taken, or posited, as dialectically 'overcome'" (Kojève 1969,p.208).

This movement can be illustrated as follows:



This can be taken as the general formula of the Hegelian Dialectic, and it can be analysed in the example of the Dialectic of Self-consciousness: The Immediate state of Self-consciousness, according to Hegel, is "simple existence for self" (Phenomenology of Mind, tr. Baillie\*, p.231), or in Kojève's rendering, "simple" or "undivided Being-for-itself" (p.10). This Being-for-itself is immediate as it essentially lacks any consciousness of itself. But this is not entirely true. Hegel qualifies it by suggesting that this state is the mode of consciousness that has "not risen above the bare level of life" (Ph.M.-B., p.231), that is "autonomous concrete-form, Consciousness submerged in the given-being of animal-life" (Kojève 1969, p.10). This undivided and immediate state consciousness is 'self-identity' which excludes any other which is not included in the 'I'. In other words, one might say that there is a kind of Self-consciousness comparable to that of the non-reflecting animal, which is of an immediate nature. This 'pure' state cannot endure. With the first encounter of another human being this immediacy is inevitably challenged and threatened. In Hegel's words, such an encounter results in a situation where:

"Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth" (Ph.M.-B., p.232).

The lack of 'truth' would be a consequence of the essentially 'autistic' state of each human being in such an encounter. If each one's own consciousness is unable to account for, or to include any other but is

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\* Hereafter referred to as Ph.M.-B.

totally absorbed in itself, then it will be obvious that there will be no recognition of the Other. Recognition, however, will not be possible:

"... except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for itself" (Ph.M.-B., p.232).

Thus recognition is the outcome of the negating action of overcoming one's own immediacy. It is negating, as such action of recognition negates the 'I' as the sole subject and object of consciousness. Self-consciousness is achieved once the earlier form of 'self-consciousness' is sublated, overcome. Prior explains:

"... man begins his (self-conscious) life only when he realises that others are also capable of self-consciousness. Unlike animals, man can come 'outside himself'; he can recognise that he himself is not the only subject with a world of its own - other subjects also possess worlds of their own. Man can grant that the other is not necessarily an object in his world but a subject with a world of his own: 'Self-consciousness had before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself'" (Prior 1972, p.56).

Once Self-consciousness finds itself face-to-face with another self-consciousness and "comes outside itself" then Hegel sees two things taking place:

"First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other" (Ph.M.-B., p.229).

This state may be described as one of 'fusion' between the self and the other, but could perhaps be better depicted as one of a mirrored image. Professor Hyppolite, the distinguished Hegelian scholar and translator of the Phenomenology into French, characterised the dialectic of self-consciousness: "Self-consciousness as a mirror play" (Hyppolite 1971, p.61).

He admits that this phraseology has the strong influence of Dr. Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, who suggested a crucial 'mirror phase' ('stade du miroir') in the development of consciousness. Hyppolite explains further:

"Self-consciousness exists as Ego only if it sees itself in another self-consciousness; phenomenology presents us here in abstract terms the scheme of otherness, where the 'mirror' relationship is essential. We might say that the double (Hegel says 'duplication') is fundamental in self-consciousness. Understand by this that self-consciousness is not confined somewhere within a biological organism. It is a relation, and a relation to the other. But it is related to the other on condition that the other be I; related to me on condition that I be the other. This is what Hegel calls the Infinite, characterized by a double meaning, which is expressed in the contradiction of the double, the alter ego, with alter and with ego." (1971, p.62).

Thus, the original state of immediacy of Self-consciousness is altered by the mediation of the negating action which is aptly portrayed in the mirror relationship and the contradiction of the alter ego. Moreover, Hyppolite stresses that "Hegel's real discovery" was that:

"there is no sense in speaking of an Ego outside this ['me' - 'Other'] relationship" (1971, p.63).

The French interpreters of Hegel have implicitly and explicitly emphasised the interpersonal or social nature of this dialectical relationship, giving the Other a meaning of an external, other, person. Kelly (1966), acknowledging the validity of such exegesis, adds that this Hegelian relationship should be primarily considered as an internal process dealing with internal Others. Kelly's remark is of particular significance to the following discussion.

So far, the dialectical overcoming of the immediacy of Self-consciousness has been examined. The resultant state was that of a mediated selfconsciousness, in a mirror relationship with itself. But this double consciousness

cannot be the end product as it is "at variance within itself" (Ph.M.-B., p.251). Hegel calls this consciousness the Unhappy Consciousness.

"Hence the Unhappy Consciousness, the Alienated Soul which is the consciousness of self as a divided nature [is] a double and merely contradictory being" (Ph.M.-B., p.251).

There is an illusory understanding that this consciousness is a unity, but in fact it is divided and double; the relationship is both alienated and negative. What has to take place is another negation which will not restore the previous state of affairs (which after all is not possible) but will result in an ascent on the dialectical spiral, to a point further ahead which at the same time represents a synthesis of the previous two positions.

Hegel's own terms for the dialectical movement are: Immediacy, Mediation, and Overcoming (Kojève 1969, pp.208-9). In the Immediate state there is an identity of being, as there is no consciousness of anything but itself. Mediation is:

"... nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-directed process; or in other words, it is reflection into self, the aspect in which the ego is for itself, objective to itself. It is pure negativity, or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, the process of bare and simple becoming. The ego, or becoming in general, this process of mediating, is, because of its being simple, just immediacy coming to be, and is immediacy itself" (Ph.M.-B., p.82, emphasis added).

The second state then is one of a negative Negativity, where the being becomes the Other while at the same time retaining its first identity. Thus, it is essentially a double consciousness. The third state, which comes about through the overcoming, which Kojève attributes to a positive Negativity, is the Unity of the being and the Other, the synthesis of absolute self-consciousness which has in it both the self and the other, and of course does not represent the mere sum of the two earlier states.

Hegel summarises this process as follows:

"Since we started from the first immediate unity, and return through the moments of form-determination, and of process, to the unity of both these moments, and thus again back to the first simple substance, we see that this reflected unity is other than the first. As opposed to that immediate unity, the unity expressed as a mode of being, this second is the universal unity, which holds all these moments sublated within itself" (Ph.M.-B., p.224).

"Thus, in spite of the Negativity which it encloses and presupposes the final Totality is just as much one and unique, homogeneous and autonomous, as the first and primordial Identity" (Kojève 1969, pp.202-3).

Having outlined the central process of the Dialectic, the following three relevant issues will now be examined.

1. Negation. The basic movement of the self towards the Other and then back to itself after having been enriched by the Other is nothing but a series of negations. Seen in this context negation loses its negative connotation and is understood in a positive way as a necessary step (in Hegel's terminology, "moment") in the entire dialectical process. Hegel states that one should "look at the negative in the face and abide with it", as "this abiding is the magic force which transforms" (In Heiss 1975, p.56) the superficial negative appreciation into an acceptance of the totality in which negation is but a necessary moment. Heiss calls this principle "creative contradiction" (p.16), the emphasis being in accepting the contradiction in a creative, positive manner, in the knowledge that the potentiality of the Dialectical overcoming lies dormant in the contradictory process. Another issue related to this interpretation of the negation is the union of opposites. The Other, as an opposite and negation of the being should not be seen as a permanent isolated negative entity but as a step, a moment in the process of achieving totality. As such it can only have a 'positive' value because it facilitates the dialectical movement.

2. The collective nature of consciousness. One of the significant implications of the Hegelian Dialectic of Self-consciousness is its essentially collective nature. As has been shown above, Self-consciousness cannot be developed unless there is an active participation of an Other. The dialectic of recognition indicates that one cannot achieve self-consciousness before one recognizes the Other's self-consciousness. The universal unity, which is the final product of the dialectic, enables Hegel to arrive at statements such as:

"Ego that is 'we', a plurality of Egos, and 'we' that is a single Ego" (Ph.M.-B., p.227).

Or, in Smith's translation:

"The I which is we and the we which is I"  
(In Gadamer 1976, p.58).

Seen in this context, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind is the exposition of the development of this 'universal consciousness'. The Hegelian Mind (from the German term Geist, which is also translated as Spirit) refers precisely to this consciousness.

"Geist is simply the underlying unifying principle of consciousness and, at the same time, the underlying rational will 'behind' all practical reason and action" (Solomon 1972, p.148).

Solomon compares Hegel's position to Strawson's "no-ownership theory of consciousness" admitting that both Strawson and the later Wittgenstein:

"took this conclusion as a reductio ad absurdum argument against any ... first-person-oriented theory of consciousness, while Hegel took the argument to establish an interesting and true proposition" (p.149).

The collective nature of self-consciousness can be better understood when it is remembered that the essential nature of Mediation is conceptual. Hyppolite, who refers to the Geist as "L'esprit supra-individuelle" (1968), remarks that the problem of "we" can be solved only in language (1971, p.69). This is no speculation - Hegel himself

made extensive reference to the pivotal role of language in relation to this 'collective nature' of the Geist.

"We see Language to be the form in which spirit finds existence. Language is self-consciousness existing for others; it is self-consciousness which as such is there immediately present, and which in its individuality is universal" (Ph.M.-B., p.660).

And further:

"Language, however, comes forward merely as the mediating element only between self-consciousness independent and recognised; and the existent self means immediately universal recognition, means manifold recognition and in this very manifoldness simple recognition" (Ph.M.-B., p.661).

Thus, in achieving a mediated consciousness the being enters a realm which is universal and through this universality, can realise, recognise itself. By means of the mediation of conceptual thought and language, the subject establishes itself in the Geist whose existence is manifold in language (Die Sprache [ist] das Dasein des Geistes).

Mure (1965) distinguishes three phases in the Dialectic of the Spirit.

1. Spirit undivided and positive (being)
2. Spirit self-negating (thought) "othered" and "alienated"
3. Spirit self-reconciling or returning upon itself (unity of thought and being).

The final synthesis, unity of thought and being, represents a consciousness of the individual being seen through the lenses of the universal, collective structure of language, a return to itself with collective validity. The being then achieves an objective recognition of itself which at the same time is a collective recognition.

Seth in his classic study "Hegelianism and Personality" (1893), attacked what he understood as Hegel's "unification of consciousness in a single Self" (p.226). Accepting that individuals, a) share a common world, and b) are "all embraced within one Reality", a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of communication, he objects to any further conclusions:



"But it is a great step further to say that this universal attitude of the Self, as such, is due to the fact that it is one universal Self that thinks in all so-called thinkers" (Seth 1893, p.227).

This rather extremist interpretation of Hegel could be corrected once the notion of language is introduced. The individual achieves self-consciousness through the mediation of the relationship with the Other, an activity which is conceptual in character and located in language. The means through which the final self-consciousness is reached is a collective structure, language.

Debrock, in his perceptive article on the "Silence of language in Hegel's Dialectic" expresses this function as follows:

"Language, at least in its most fundamental form which is speech, is that mode of consciousness wherein the individual realizes himself by becoming other, an other that is his opposite, and through this process of self-negation, gives itself universal content" (1973, p.292).

Now, considering that:

"... all speech is utterance, a giving away of the inner self, but this utterance is the condition for the possibility of self-perception" (p.292),

the conclusion that:

"Hegel shows his growing fascination with the property of alienation which is inherent to the act of speech" (p.291),

can be understood.

Therefore:

"In the moments of consciousness, Aufhebung was always Aufhebung of words. But in self-consciousness, Aufhebung means Aufhebung of existence" (p.298).

Which means that:

"... the truth which is here obtained is not conceptual, but existential truth" (p.298 emphasis added).

As:

"Consciousness in its immediacy, and language as the expression of that consciousness, must perish in order for the true word, i.e., the word of the Spirit[Geist], to arise" (p.295).

3. The relationship between the 'me' and the Other, the subject and the object. Hegel considered all opposition not static and final, but dynamic and dialectical. Navickas crystallizes this position in the following sentence:

"In Hegel's view there can be no radical either-or between subject and object" (1968, p.90).

The essential interdependency between subject and object has also been observed in the process of mutual recognition in the Dialectic of self-consciousness.

"Strange as it may seem, the universalizing action, negativity, and self-mediation of the subject supply the link connecting subjectivity and objectivity. Here lies the main reason for Hegel's contention that the subject is both one term of the cognitive relationship and also the whole relationship" (Navickas 1968, p.90).

Butler clarifies this issue:

"The other self is as a self a means of self-realization but as other it represents the alienation of one's own self. One finds one's self, as it were, beside oneself. Since one previously knew no self besides one's own, it will seem in the recognition of another self that one's own self has gotten away from oneself ... Seeing the self as other, the originally simple distinction between the self and the non-self is upset, and one is no longer certain that one's self is indeed one's self" (Butler 1976, p.512).

One may add that it is also no longer certain that the other is indeed an other. These relationships are no sophistry and should not lead to a total confusion with regard to the nature of the self and Other. The essence of what they indicate is the basic interrelationship between self and Other and its meaningfulness in the process of emergent self-consciousness.

Thus, seemingly paradoxical statements like "Je est un autre", by Rimbaud, and "Everyone is the other and no one is himself", by Heidegger (both in Wilden 1972), should be understood in this context. Hegel, in his celebrated essay on Love, (1797) in the "Early Theological Writings," again underlines this interrelationship. Referring to the subject and object he writes:

"... Nothing carries the root of its own being in itself ...  
[subject and object] each is only relatively necessary;  
the one exists only for the other, and hence exists in and  
for itself only on the strength of a power outside itself"  
(Hegel 1948, p.304).

And in the "Fragment of a System" (1800) he puts this relationship in a broader perspective:

"Absolute opposition holds good [in the realm of the dead]. One kind of opposition is to be found in the multiplicity of living beings. Living beings must be regarded as organizations. The multiplicity of life has to be thought of as being divided against itself; one part of this multiplicity (a part which is itself an infinite multiplicity because it is alive) is to be regarded purely as something related, as having its being purely in union; the second part, also an infinite multiplicity, is to be regarded as solely in opposition, as having its being solely through a separation from the first. Therefore the first part [the unity] can also be defined as having its being only by means of separation from the second one. The unity is called an organization or an individual"

Therefore:

"It is self-evident that this life, whose manifold is regarded purely as being related and whose very existence is exactly this relation, can also be regarded as being differentiated in itself, as a mere multiplicity, because the relation between the separated is not more intrinsic to it than the separation between that which is related" (Hegel 1948, p.309).

Thus, Hegel's entire system is governed by the principle of universal interdependence. Life is a multiplicity of individual organisms, separated and yet united.

## TRANSITION

The purpose of including a reading of the works of Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel, in the light of the problematic of the Other has already been presented in the Introduction , the Transition of the first chapter and at the end of the third chapter. However, a brief overview is here indicated in order to facilitate reading.

Heraclitus is usually considered the true and authentic doer of philosophia , in that logos and being were in him still united, and the line of development after him is interpreted as a gradual estrangement of logos from being. According to Heidegger (e.g. 1953), this lineage, which leads logos to legein (speaking) and then to logic is one of a gradual loss of vigour. The preceeding three chapters were intended to illuminate this issue. In Heraclitus, the Other is not a static and identifiable entity. It has been argued that it was a constantly changing opposition. That is what was termed 'internal Other'. Common logos was understood as being the 'external' and true Other. External is a rather unfortunate term, but nevertheless it conveys the intended meaning of its relation to the commonness of logos which suggests an external and public quality. Yet, according to Heraclitus, common logos is the true and authentic state of being, and it has, in that sense, an interior quality too. It is this reading of the Ephesian Riddler that reveals the meaning of the unity of logos and being, within the problematic of the Other.

Plato develops the Heraclitean positions further. His theory of

Forms, in conjunction with his tripartite model of the psyche, offers a more sophisticated understanding of the Other in terms of its implications for philosophical thought as well as for other disciplines and activities (e.g. Art, politics, etc). Yet, the Other is now an identified entity outside. The Forms, despite their intrinsic relation to being (and this relation should be strongly emphasised), still belong to a realm "higher up" and beyond the being. Plato went a long way to analyse the inner division of the psyche and the virtues of overcoming them through convergence into a unity. The state of unity represented again an higher, Other state of being. The gap between the being and its Other is, however, so large that Plato introduces the Dialectic to account for, as well as deal with the inner disharmony. Thus, again, the new reading of Plato unites these aspects of his teaching (viz. the Forms, the division of the psyche, and the Dialectic) in a novel integration which at the same time illuminates the problematic of the Other.

Hegel is located further along this lineage of separation of logos from being. His grand system ventures to encompass almost all philosophical questions. Yet, a reading which extracts his formulation of the Other appears to bring the salient aspects of his thought into one coherent whole. The dialectic assumes in Hegel dimensions of a universal principle; while through its expression in the development of consciousness, a more advanced theory of the Other is obtained. It is perhaps the first time that the external, psychological, social, cultural and environmental Other is accounted for. Without recognition of the external Other, no authentic self-consciousness can be achieved. In the intricate Hegelian analysis a series of

relevant nuances are illuminated. Among them is the collective nature of consciousness which might be accepted (with discretion) as the descendent of the Heraclitean common logos and the Platonic Forms.

It may appear as a paradoxical phenomenon that the more removed the lineage is from Heraclitus, and the greater the division between logos and being, the more elaborate the attempts at grasping this condition (of unity) are. Plato and Hegel may represent a progression in this direction. The concise apophthegms of Heraclitus on common logos captured the essence of this problematic, and yet in Plato, and especially in Hegel, the complex theories and many discriminating terms needed to achieve the same aim, paradoxically achieve the opposite. They further estrange logos from being and in turn in order to re-unite them conceptually, have to develop even more refined explanations, which again in their turn contribute towards even further estrangement etc. This direction might be perceived as an endless and futile exercise which could lead to a disheartening state, resulting in an abandonment of the pursuit of unravelling the problematic of the Other. In the chapters to follow, it will be shown that Jung actually followed the same path but with the significant difference that he found a resolution of this seemingly Sisyphean endeavour, in his understanding of the psychological totality of the Self.

The new reading of Jung in the following pages will therefore fall in the perspective of the preceeding chapters.

## PART TWO

### Chapter One

#### C.G. Jung: Childhood and prepsychiatric period.

"My life is a story of the self-  
realisation of the unconscious"

Jung (1963, p.17).

An examination of Jung's childhood is imperative, not only because such an investigation is a legitimate procedure in understanding any personality, i.e., by placing the interests and achievements of that person in the developmental perspective of his childhood, but for a particularly pertinent reason: it was during his childhood that Jung first recognised the existence of an "Other" in his own self. That Other played a significant role in his life and served as a primary motive for most of the crucial moves in his professional career, theoretical researches and personal inner development. In his autobiographical work "Memories, Dreams, Reflections"\* Jung writes explicitly about his early awareness of the Other, which Marie-Louise von Franz terms a "second living psychic presence" (1975, p.38). Jung called it No.2 personality which he distinguished from No. 1, the "ordinary" personality of Jung the schoolboy.

Carl Gustav Jung was born on the 26th of July 1875 in Kesswil, Switzerland, to Pastor Johann Achilles Jung (1842-1896) and Emilie Jung (1848-1923). Soon after his birth the family moved to Laufen, "the castle and vicarage", near the falls of the Rhine. He spent his early childhood in the country, close to nature, without any playmates and absorbed in his own fantasy world interwoven with intense experiences with his parents, whom he later regarded as belonging to the "medieval times". Jung refers to this period as rather Gothic, with his sickness of "pseudo-croup accompanied by choking fits" (M.D.R., p.34), his recurrent nightmares, haunting memories of funerals, under the constant shadow of an austere church which evoked fear rather than awe in the boy Jung.

Yet it would be wrong to consider this period as traumatic and without any positive value for Jung's development, because, at the same time,

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\* Hereafter referred to as "M.D.R."



he managed to derive some extremely illuminating insights about himself and human nature in general.

The isolation of Jung's early childhood was broken when he first went to school.

"One of my reasons for liking school was that there I found at last the playmates I had lacked for so long" (M.D.R., p.33).

Going to school was a big step because Jung soon became aware that his playmates were not only a source of joy:

"I found that they alienated me from myself. When I was with them I became different from the way I was at home ... It seemed to me that the change in myself was due to the influence of my schoolfellows, who somehow misled me or compelled me to be different from what I thought I was. The influence of this wider world, this world which contained others besides my parents, seemed to me dubious if not altogether suspect and, in some obscure way, hostile" (M.D.R., pp.34-5).

This "splitting" of himself due to the alienating influence of the "wider world" was not a permanent state. Jung, in his childhood world of imagination found three ways of healing that "split" and reestablishing his "inner security" which "was threatened" (M.D.R., p.35).

First, through his game of making a fire at a particular spot in his garden, he developed a particular 'relationship' with 'his' fire. Other children had their own fires;

"... but these fires were profane and did not concern me. My fire alone was living and had an unmistakable aura of sanctity" (M.D.R., p.35).

Another game which seems to have been of greater importance to Jung was sitting on a stone in his garden:

"Often, when I was alone, I sat down on this stone, and then began an imaginary game that went something like this: 'I am sitting on top of this stone and it is underneath.' But the stone also could say 'I' and

think: 'I am lying here on this slope and he is sitting on top of me.' The question then arose: 'Am I the one who is sitting on the stone, or am I the stone on which he is sitting?' This question always perplexed me, and I would stand up, wondering who was what now" (M.D.R., p.35)

The split was clearly manifested in this game, and, in a sense, externalized. Despite the lack of definite identification of the boundaries of his personality, revealed by the primitive question "Am I this stone or this body?", the actual stone was not a source of fear or anxiety for Jung. On the contrary, he cherished that stone and his relationship to it very much:

"... there was no doubt whatsoever that this stone stood in some secret relationship to me. I could sit on it for hours, fascinated by the puzzle it set me" (M.D.R., pp.35-6).

Perhaps the most significant of all of Jung's childhood "imaginary games", and which at the same time represented the "climax and conclusion" (M.D.R., p.38) of his childhood, was associated with a carved manikin and a pebble from the Rhine. Without really being aware of what it meant, Jung had carved a little manikin at the end of his school ruler "about two inches long, with frock coat, top hat, and shiny black boots". He coloured the manikin with black ink, sawed him off the ruler and placed him in a yellow, varnished pencil-case. He had also made him a bed in the case and a coat made out of a bit of wool.

"In the case I also placed a smooth, oblong blackish stone from the Rhine, which I had painted with water colours to look as though it were divided into an upper and lower half, and had long carried around in my trouser pocket. This was his stone" (M.D.R., p.36).

This innocuous child's game had an extremely powerful meaning. he hid the pencil-case with the manikin and stone in one of the beams under the roof in the attic which was hardly accessible due to the "worm-eaten and rotten"

floorboards, and visited it, secretively, when he was unhappy and in some way "unsafe". The entire ritual, which was carefully kept secret from his family, had a profoundly soothing effect on Jung. Being with the manikin and the stone would restore the feeling of security in the frightened boy. Moreover, every time he went up to the attic to look at the contents of the case, he:

"... placed in the case a little scroll of paper on which I had previously written something during school hours in a secret language of my own invention. The addition of a new scroll always had the character of a solemn ceremonial act. Unfortunately I cannot remember what I wanted to communicate to the manikin. I only know that my 'letters' constituted a kind of library for him. I fancy, though I cannot be certain, that they may have consisted of sayings that particularly pleased me" (M.D.R., p.37 emphasis added).

There is an implicit similarity in all of the three imaginary games . They all involved a fascinating "secret relationship" with an "object" (fire, stone, manikin and pebble) which somehow represented an Other in Jung's own personality. It is also clear from his descriptions that those Others were in such close relationship to himself that there was even a confusion of the boundaries of his own personality which at times, included, or was totally absorbed in, that Other. It is very significant that Jung related these games to a state of inner split . Their function and purpose was to restore the threatened unity of his being. Referring to the game-ritual of the manikin and pebble, he wrote:

"My disunion with myself and uncertainty in the world at large led me to an action which at the same time was quite incomprehensible to me" (M.D.R., p.36 emphasis added).

The "disunion" with himself referred to a number of situations. One, the "alienating influence" of his fellow-pupils, has already been discussed.

Two more factors can now be mentioned: first, the

inconsistencies of his parents' character and behaviour, and second, his own religious questioning. Jung repeatedly described the unsettling and at times frightening effect that his parents had on him. The "unpredictability" of his mother made him develop a mistrustful attitude towards women:

"The feeling I associated with 'woman' was for a long time that of innate unreliability" (M.D.R., p. 23).

As far as his father is concerned, the picture was more complicated because, being a pastor, he represented at the same time both a family (social, secular), as well as a religious authority. Jung remembers him as a "reliable" but "powerless" person (M.D.R., p. 23) with an "irritable" temperament. The Christian religion that he represented created many conflicts in his son:

"...often it seemed to me a solemn masquerade, a kind of funeral at which mourners put on serious or mournful faces but the next moment were secretly laughing and not really sad at all. Lord Jesus seemed to me in some ways a god of death, helpful, it is true, in that he scared away the terrors of the night, but himself uncanny, a crucified and bloody corpse. Secretly, his love and kindness, which I always heard praised, appeared doubtful to me, chiefly because the people who talked most about 'dear Lord Jesus' wore black frock coats and shiny black boots which reminded me of burials. They were my father's colleagues as well as eight of my uncles - all parsons. For many years they inspired fear in me ..." (M.D.R., p. 28)

In these situations Jung felt "alienated" and "disunited" because he experienced both his inner and outer worlds as unsafe, insecure, unpredictable and contradictory.

The imaginary game-rituals can then be seen as a symbolic attempt to restore the unity of his personal experiential world. The objects as such, fire, stone and ruler, were in no realistic relationship to him. There is no mention at all whether that fire was used for any particular purpose, or whether that very stone was associated with any specifically pleasant circumstances. Their function, it could be said, was solely symbolic.

Thus, a hypothesis could be advanced that they symbolically represented the Other in Jung's own personality in an externalized form, so that by being involved with them, the little boy would achieve a unity with himself which would reinstate his sense of security.

"In all difficult situations, whenever I had done something wrong or my feelings had been hurt, or when my father's irritability or my mother's invalidism oppressed me, I thought of my carefully bedded-down and wrapped-up manikin and his smooth, prettily coloured stone" (M.D.R., p.37).

Such consolation produced the following results:

"I felt safe, and the tormenting sense of being at odds with myself was gone" (M.D.R., p.37).

And a little further it is remarked that:

"The meaning of these actions, or how I might explain them, never worried me. I contented myself with the feeling of newly-won security and was satisfied to possess something that no one knew and no one could get at. It was an inviolable secret which must never be betrayed, for the safety of my life depended on it. Why that was so I did not ask myself. It simply was so" (M.D.R., p.37 emphasis added).

Having examined these objects as convenient figures upon which the Other was projected, a further observation can be made: the sequence of the fire, the stone, and the manikin and pebble could be considered as a progression in the development of a clearer articulation of the Other, from an undifferentiated natural presence to a well defined figure with human shape and characteristics.

Jung's particular fire which "had to burn forever", "was living and had an unmistakable aura of sanctity", as was noted earlier. Fire, apart from all its symbolic significance, is a natural phenomenon which offers a basic comfort, its warmth. Jung's special relationship with that fire could represent a primitive attempt to obtain warmth and security. Jung clearly attributed to the stone, also a natural object but of a more concrete and

permanent nature than fire, an anthropomorphic character when he expressed his uncertainty as to whether "he" was actually the stone. The stone was capable of saying "I" and also thinking (vide supra, p. 98). Jung emphasised that undoubtedly he had "some secret relationship" to that stone. The issue here is of a relationship, not of a passive presence as with the fire.

Finally, the critical disunion with himself culminated in the elaborated representation of his Other in the carved manikin and the painted pebble. Here, the stone is transformed by himself and is not any more in its natural state. It is not accidental that it was painted "into an upper and lower half", portraying a unity of division. Jung stated that:

"... the little wooden figure with the stone was a first attempt, still unconscious and childish, to give shape to the secret" (M.D.R., p.37 emphasis added).

That most important secret, the exact nature of which Jung was unaware, was associated with a) his realizations that he had his own understanding of religion, his parents and the world around him, b) the intense feelings of disunity which resulted from these insights, and c) his efforts to restore a unity in himself. Jung's internal conflict, insofar as its resolution was achieved by relating to the fire, the stone, the manikin and the pebble, could be seen as a disunity with his Other as projected onto those objects. Giving shape to that secret could then be seen as an active attempt to relate to his Other. In other words, to objectify the conflict and work it out in the imaginary world. This is the essence of the process which he later called "active imagination".

As far as the manikin is concerned, it is evident that Jung considered it/him as an Other. The pebble belonged to the manikin, it "was his stone". Moreover, as von Franz (1975) correctly observes, the clothes of the

manikin are identical to identifiable people, the parsons and others associated with the Church and funerals, all of whom were central to Jung's conflicts. The manikin was the last development of a primitive representation of the Other. Thereafter Jung clearly distinguished an Other personality in himself, whom he called No. 2.

Before proceeding to investigate No. 1. and No. 2 personalities, three further points concerning the manikin and pebble ritual should be emphasised.

Almost twenty years after this childhood experience, when Jung was researching for his book "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido", he came across descriptions of strikingly similar "soul-stones near Arlesheim, and the Australian churingas" (M.D.R., p.38). At this time he had an image of the manikin as:

"... a little cloaked god of the ancient world, a Telesphoros such as stands on the monuments of Asklepios and reads to him from a scroll. Along with this recollection there came to me, for the first time, the conviction that there are archaic psychic components which have entered the individual psyche without any direct line of tradition" (M.D.R., p.38).

Jung further identifies the pebble with the "life-force" itself. It is therefore very noteworthy that his early childhood episode with the manikin, his first articulated relationship with his Other, was instrumental in discovering the notion of the archetypes, as components of a collective psychic structure.

Another characteristic issue is that part of the ritual in which Jung placed those little scrolls in the pencil case. The inscriptions on them were in "a secret language" of his "own invention". This childish game reflected perhaps the need to communicate vitally important issues concerning one's existential security in a language that is adequate.

Common everyday language was obviously inadequate for Jung to express those secret messages upon which the safety of his life depended.

One might say that the little scrolls represented Jung's first attempt to develop the language of the Unconscious having recognised that our ordinary conceptual language is inadequate.

Finally, it should be remembered that the book "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido", upon which Jung was working when he discovered the idea of the Collective Unconscious is usually considered as one of the main contributing factors in his break with Freud. Jung's main innovation which was not tolerated in the Freudian camp was precisely the Collective Unconscious. Although there is no indication that Freud ever knew about Jung's manikin, one might speculate that Freud might have interpreted it as representing Jung's own father. Such an interpretation might have been reinforced by the fact that the manikin even had the same clothes as Jung's father, "black frock coat and shiny black boots". Jung, however, associated it with a much more "collective" figure, a Telesphoros, a figure full of "a supply of life-force" (M.D.R., p.39).

In summarising what might be called the 'prehistory' of the Other in the life of Jung, the following can be said.

Jung experienced some insecurity in his early childhood due to the personalities of his parents, his loneliness which was interrupted by a more alienating influence of his schoolmates later, and his own religious conflicts. This insecurity was dealt with in a successful manner by devising certain imaginary games/rituals. He thus achieved a state of security and inner unity. These games were related to a) a fire, b) a stone, and c) a manikin and a pebble. All of these may be seen as his



Other because, by relating to them, he experienced peace and unity with himself. As there is a progression in terms of differentiation and conscious activity in these three games, one could hypothesise that they represent three steps towards a more elaborated differentiation of the Other; the Fire, being the most primitive representation of the Other (is it 'accidental' that this study commenced the discussion of the Other with the Heraclitean principle of fire?), and the human figure the most advanced of the three. This last development in the representation of the Other, the manikin, was also associated with Jung's discovery of the archetypes and the necessity for a special and unique language to adequately communicate unconscious material.

Soon after the episode with the manikin and the pebble, Jung, during his twelfth year, had two important experiences which led to his realization that he "was actually two different persons" (M.D.R., p.50). One day, after school, a boy pushed Jung and he fell and hitting his head against the kerbstone, almost lost consciousness and was carried to a nearby house. As a result of this, he began having:

"... fainting spells whenever I had to return to school, and whenever my parents set me to doing my homework" (M.D.R., p.46).

The fainting spells kept him away from school for more than six months and caused his parents much concern. One of the medical diagnoses given to his condition was epilepsy. During this time Jung seemed to enjoy his solitude, freedom and life without any responsibilities:

"I was free, could dream for hours, be anywhere I liked, in the woods or by the water, or draw ... Above all, I was able to plunge into the world of the mysterious. To that realm belonged trees, a pool, the swamp, stones and animals, and my father's library. But I was growing more and more away from the world, and had all the while faint pangs of conscience. ... I had the obscure feeling that I was fleeing from myself" (M.D.R., p.46-7).

Then, overhearing a conversation of his father, Jung realised the financial difficulties of his family. This distressed him.

"I was thunderstruck. This was the collision with reality. 'Why, then, I must get to work!' I thought suddenly. From that moment on I became a serious child" (M.D.R., p.47).

He gradually mastered his attacks and shamefully reflecting on his "disgraceful" and "neurotic" condition, he studied overconscientiously and desperately tried to compensate for what he saw as overindulgence during his "illness". Moreover:

"... the neurosis became another of my secrets, but it was a shameful secret, a defeat" (M.D.R., p.48).

The second incident occurred while he was returning home from school:

"... and suddenly for a single moment I had the overwhelming impression of having just emerged from a dense cloud. I knew all at once: now I am myself! It was as if a wall of mist were at my back, and behind that wall there was not yet an 'I'. But at this moment I came upon myself. Previously I had existed too, but everything had merely happened to me. Now I happened to myself. Now I knew: I am myself now, now I exist" (M.D.R., p.49).

If these two incidents are placed in the perspective of Jung's previous experiences, one might observe a continuity starting with the three imaginary games and culminating in the awakening of his self-consciousness. In this light, the "fainting neurosis" could be understood as an expression of a pressing need in Jung's personality to remain in a state of permanent unity within himself. He temporarily reached this unity by excluding all outside responsibilities. Such responsibilities triggered off disunity within him and were a cause of great suffering. Jung soon discovered how "un-realistic", ultimately false and dangerous was the way he attempted to achieve that unity. He acknowledged that in fact it was "defeat", a "shameful" "neurosis", as it essentially did not solve the problem, but merely covered it with the seductive veil of denial. His

determination to accept his predicament and to come to grips with his suffering and its causes, naturally led to a richer realization of his own being. He left behind the realm of natural existence with its non-conflicting flow (the swamp, the trees, stones and animals), and his consciousness moved to differentiated maturity where life did not just "happen" but became a result of his own actions and thoughts, and of himself as an active agent. This development, which amounts to nothing else but the first dramatic awareness of the differentiation of his Ego, had to make explicit the disunity within himself.

It is therefore not surprising that the subsequent passages in "Memories, Dreams, Reflections" deal precisely with Jung's first reference to the Other in himself:

"Then, ... it occurred to me that I was actually two different persons" (M.D.R., p.50).

One was the schoolboy with all its weaknesses, and the 'Other' was an "old man" with authority. Jung also refers to this Other as "No. 2", and "second personality". No. 1 was:

"... the son of my parents, who went to school and was less intelligent, attentive, hard-working, decent, and clean than many other boys" (M.D.R., pp.61-2).

No.2 was:

"... grown up - old, in fact - sceptical, mistrustful, remote from the world of men, but close to nature, to earth, the sun, the moon, the weather, all living creatures, and above all close to the night, to dreams, and whatever 'God' worked directly in him" (M.D.R., p.62).

Although at times Jung thought of the Other as a concrete representative of the eighteenth century, even down to the specific details of his attire, he generally considered him as a figure beyond time. This Other, second personality belonged to a realm:

"... like a temple in which anyone who entered was transformed and suddenly overpowered by a vision of the whole cosmos, so that he could only marvel and admire, forgetful of himself" (M.D.R., p.62).

The magical quality that No.2 possessed, along with his "timelessness" (M.D.R., p.110) had a profound effect on Jung. Whenever he was overwhelmed by excessive suffering he would actively seek refuge in the world of No.2. Such experience would result in feelings of "peace and solitude" (M.D.R., p.62), as well as confidence in his own worth. He no longer sat by his fire, or contemplated his stone, neither did he run to his manikin and pebble - the Other he sought was now in his own self, a recognisable part of his own personality.

Thus, the "second personality" which Jung distinguished in himself can only be partly understood as an internalization of the Other which was earlier manifested in the fire, stone, manikin and pebble - partly because this new development added the following characteristics to the rather primitive original formulation of the Other.

Firstly, Jung acknowledged a division within himself which was not only a source of suffering, but also of potential unity. Since that Other was now located within, Jung was no longer a lonely, frightened boy, but had the resources to heal his condition.

Secondly, he started observing similar divisions in other people. This made him aware of the complexities of the human personality and he ceased to see people in terms of unidimensional, childish divisions of good and bad. He applied this mature perception first to his own mother, distinguishing a No.1 and No.2 personality in her. Again, No.1 was her ordinary personality, a "loving mother" (M.D.R., p.67), "innocuous and human" (p.66), and No.2 was "uncanny", "archaic and ruthless; ruthless as truth and nature" (M.D.R., p.68). Jung noticed that his mother's No. 2

was an:

"... embodiment of what I have called  
'natural mind'" (M.D.R., p.68).

This "natural mind" was described by Jung as springing:

"from natural sources, and not from opinions  
taken from books; it wells up from the earth  
like a natural spring, and brings with it the  
peculiar wisdom of nature" (M.D.R., p.68n3).

Thirdly, Jung realised that one significant implication of the division between No.1 and No.2 personalities was the strong relationship between man and a) his fellow human beings, and b) nature. Since all men have two personalities they share a personal and at the same time, a suprapersonal secret. Moreover, all people's second personalities have their roots deep in nature and it is therefore possible for them to communicate through that channel. Jung referred to this kind of perception as "insight" and considered it as:

"... based on instinct, or on a 'participation mystique' with others. It is as if the 'eyes of the background' do the seeing in an impersonal act of perception" (M.D.R., p.68).

Such understanding of human nature enabled Jung to appreciate a very profound unity within the entire cosmos.

Fourthly, the division between a first and a second personality within the same individual represents a decisive step towards Jung's mature conception of a transpersonal domain. Insofar as No.2 was, in a sense, common to all men, one might say that there is a supraindividual element in everybody's personality. Moreover, Jung was fascinated at the thought that even other people came to a similar realization as far as the division between No.1 and No.2 is concerned. For example, he interpreted Goethe's Faust as portraying this very issue and suggested that Faust himself was "the living equivalent of No.2". This insight:

"... was not only comforting to me, it also gave me an increased feeling of inner security, and a sense of belonging to the human community. I was no

longer isolated and a mere curiosity, a sport of cruel nature" (M.D.R., p.107).

At this stage Jung, naturally, did not have either sufficient experience or an adequate theoretical background to formulate this important insight with more psychological sophistication. The distinction was rather crude and the precise functioning and dynamics of the dualistic psyche remained undefined. Jung, nevertheless, had a sound grasp of many significant aspects of the Other, and during his school and student years, he developed a fairly comprehensive understanding of the Other.

Jung realised that the Other had no "pied-à-terre";

"... in him I was lifted beyond the here and now, in him I felt myself a single eye in a thousand-eyed universe" (M.D.R., p.94).

He:

"... had no definable character at all; he was a vita peracta, born, living, dead, everything in one; a total vision of life" (M.D.R. pp.106-7).

Despite all the virtues of the Other, which were more evident in times of crises, the second personality created many conflicts with No.1 personality. No.2 was of a passive nature and lacked any realistic motivational impetus. He was:

"... incapable of moving so much as a pebble upon the earth. No.1. rebelled against this passivity; he wanted to be up and doing, but was caught in an insoluble conflict..." (M.D.R., p.94).

Furthermore:

"... though pitilessly clear about himself, he was unable to express himself through the dense, dark medium of No.1, though he longed to do so. When No.2 predominated, No.1 was contained and obliterated in him, just as, conversely, No.1 regarded No.2 as a region of inner darkness" (M.D.R., p.107).

Thus, the "insoluble conflict" was centred around the passivity of No.2, and "his" inability to adequately relate to the external reality. No.1,

on the other hand, had to respond to the demands of the social reality, "study, money-making, responsibilities, entanglements ..." (M.D.R., p.108), and his struggle was not at all eased by the obscurity of No.2. After a crucial dream in which Jung succeeded in protecting a tiny light in a powerful storm, he had a "great illumination": he realised that "No.1 was the bearer of light" (M.D.R., p.108). The "light" was his consciousness, and however limited, "small" and "fragile" it was, he began to value it since it represented his only source of survival. The insoluble conflict was not really insoluble. Jung found a solution:

"My task was to shield the light and not look back at the vita peracta ..." (M.D.R., p.108).

As in the case of his earlier resolution not to give in to his "fainting neurosis" but to "go forward", Jung realised the dangers of neglecting No.1 personality, the bearer of consciousness and the sole agent who could negotiate the physical as well as social survival of himself. But this did not mean that No.2. had to be totally suppressed:

"I must leave No.2 behind me, that was clear. But under no circumstances ought I to deny him to myself or declare him invalid. This would have been a self-mutilation..." (M.D.R., p.109).

The depth, richness and wisdom of No.2 were too well known to Jung since his childhood for him to fall into the trap of banishing "him". He aptly characterized such a step as "self-mutilation". No.1 and No.2 were, after all, one person and they had to coexist. Both of them were necessary and beneficial in their own separate and yet interrelated spheres. Referring to this inter-relation and dialogue, Jung candidly described it as his:

"profoundest experiences: on the one hand a bloody struggle, on the other supreme ecstasy" (M.D.R., p.65).

Jung's distinction between No.1 and No.2 personalities within himself was widely misunderstood. Being aware of this, Jung in his autobiography, clarified that this separation had:

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"nothing to do with a 'split' or dissociation  
in the ordinary medical sense" (M.D.R., p.62).

On the contrary, he considered it as a natural and typical phenomenon which resides within each person. The Other, although in everybody, is only "perceived by the very few":

"Most people's conscious understanding is not sufficient to realise that he is also what they are" (M.D.R., pp.62-3).

Barbara Hannah compares Jung's understanding of the Other to the use of the term 'Self' in Eastern philosophies and religions, particularly Hinduism. Interpreting No.1 as the Ego and No.2 as the Self (an interpretation which was very strongly implied by Jung himself), she gives the following quotation from the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad which aptly illustrates the striking similarities between these two exegeses:

"He who dwells in the seed, and within the seed, whom the seed does not know, whose body the seed is, and who pulls (rules) the seed within, he is the Self, the puller (ruler) within, the immortal; unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived, but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver than he, there is no other knower but he. This is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal ..." (In Hannah 1976, p.47).

Jung repeatedly underlined the "timeless" character of the Other, and in a typical passage he almost paraphrased the description given in the Upanishad:

"[No.2. was] never clearly defined but yet [was] definitely present" (M.D.R., p.110).

Every individual has the Self within himself as the pivotal agent for meaningful living. It is usually "unperceived". Jung, according to Hannah:

"... at the age of twelve, to his own great consternation, did see, hear, perceive, and know this figure" (1976, p.48).

Moreover, he studied and described this Other, not only in himself but, one might claim that he made it his life task to relentlessly explore



the various manifestations of the Other in as many spheres of human culture as possible. Jung's scientific contribution might be seen as a stubbornly continuous effort to refine and elaborate his understanding of this Other, and "his" relationship to the Ego, commencing with the imaginary games of his childhood through to the mature definitions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. He admitted that:

"... the play and counterplay between personalities  
No.1 and No.2 , ... run through my whole life..."  
(M.D.R., p.62).

It is, therefore, a legitimate claim that Jung's awareness of this division played an invaluable role both in his personal life and his scientific research.

After the fainting neurosis Jung's explicit wish was to reinforce his No.1. as much as possible. The task was not easy, as the Other was very much needed. Jung slowly came to a solution to his big dilemma, and between his sixteenth and nineteenth years, managed to give full expression to his No.1. During this period his behaviour changed noticeably and from a "shy, timid, mistrustful" person he became "more accessible and more communicative" (M.D.R., p.89). Along the way, he also associated No.1 with science, and No.2 with the humanities and religion. Thus, during this period his No.1 was absorbed in the scientific materialism which was predominant at the time, and No.2, with its idiosyncratic tendencies, was experienced as an embarrassment. As far as the choice of studies was concerned, Jung wanted to study natural science. Yet, there was a strong inclination towards archaeology. He had a special interest in "everything Egyptian and Babylonian". Obviously the first choice was from No.1 and the second from No.2. This dilemma was solved by a "sudden inspiration" to study medicine. Jung did not perceive this decision as representing a middle solution between No.1 and No.2, but only as a relative triumph for No.1 :

"I had definitely opted for science"  
(M.D.R., p.105).

The hard reality of the financial situation of his family was one of the main reasons that compelled him to study medicine. Although there was the possibility of a wide choice of specialization after the initial studies, Jung, nevertheless, understood that his enrollment for medicine was basically a "compromise" with the demands of the external, social reality; a compromise which was painful but at the same time also very necessary.

During his studies he became very interested in philosophy and he followed with great enthusiasm the intellectual currents of his time. He delved into the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kant, and was also attracted by the literature on "spiritualistic phenomena" which he felt exemplified the "objective behaviour of the human psyche" (M.D.R., 119).

In 1898 he started thinking seriously about his future career and the problem of specialization came to the fore. The choice was between surgery and internal medicine. He was even promised an assistantship in Munich by Professor Müller, then in charge of the department of internal medicine at Basel University, which Jung attended. Despite this attractive offer Jung finally chose Psychiatry, a field which was not part of his earlier plans. The unexpected choice came about after a number of events which Jung mentions in his autobiography.

First, there were two incidents during which objects in the Jung household inexplicably split and broke. One day, without any apparent reason, the top of a solid walnut wood table cracked with a powerful noise and Jung's mother's No. 2 said, nodding "darkly", "Yes, yes, ... that means something" (M.D.R., p.126). Then, a couple of weeks later the steel blade of a bread knife snapped off in several pieces, again with a deafening noise. Although Jung had no explanation for either of these incidents, he felt his mother's No. 2 had intuited their meaning. The last, and perhaps most significant

episode preceeding Jung's final decision to specialize in Psychiatry, involved a girl who acted as a medium in a group of people indulging in spiritualistic phenomena. A more detailed discussion of her behaviour and Jung's explanations will be given in the following chapter, but it is necessary to stress here how Jung "somehow connected" this girl with the previous two puzzling and causeless occurrences. He persistently observed her for a period of two years and finally moulded this study into his doctoral dissertation. The significance of these observations can be appreciated once Jung's own words are quoted:

"... I had learned from this example [of the girl with the abilities of a medium] how a No.2 personality is formed, how it enters into a child's consciousness and finally integrates it into itself" (M.D.R., p.128 emphasis added).

In addition to the above mentioned events, Jung also considered another factor instrumental in his sudden inclination for Psychiatry. One of the set books which he was studying for the state examination reversed his original prejudice against psychiatry. Through the pages of Krafft-Ebing's "Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie," Jung realised with great excitement that psychiatry was:

"... the empirical field common to biological and spiritual facts, which I had everywhere sought and nowhere found" (M.D.R., p.130 emphasis added).

At long last his No.1 and No.2 did not have to be antagonistic to each other but could co-exist. Studying psychiatry would enable him to give full expression to all parts of his personality. Thus, he came to his decision, despite the reaction from his colleagues at the University, and felt confident that it was undoubtedly the right one. He experienced himself as a "united double nature" with all the energy and confidence that the eradication of the previous split could bring.

It is, therefore, once more evident that Jung's experience and conceptualization of a division between 'himself' and an-Other personality played a

crucial role in his life. Here it was the significant factor in deciding his career in psychiatry. Jung's constant preoccupation with the inter-relationship between No. 1 and No.2 compelled him to view his own experiences and the phenomena around him in terms of this dichotomy. The two unusual events in his house (with the table and the knife) were "somehow" connected with the Other. He got this clue from his mother's behaviour. Then, the girl in the spiritualistic seances (whom he also related to the previous incidents) made him realise the 'formation' of No.2. Jung called this encounter a "great experience" which:

"... wiped out all my earlier philosophy and made it possible for me to achieve a psychological point of view. I had discovered some objective facts about the human psyche" (M.D.R., p.128 emphasis added).

When finally he saw that there was an established scientific discipline, psychiatry, whose very subject matter was this division within the human psyche, Jung, in a sense, had no option but to devote himself entirely to it. In psychiatry Jung found an objective scientific account of what had troubled him for so many years in secret.

No.1 and No.2 were not a product of his own world of imagination, but indeed existed in all people, and moreover psychiatry had this "united double nature" as its object of investigation. Reading Krafft-Ebing's textbook Jung was also overwhelmed by the discovery that the author, in a perfectly legitimate way, expressed his subjective experiences. The book was "in part a subjective confession" and the author stood behind the "objectivity of his experiences ... with the whole of his personality, .. with the totality of his being" (M.D.R., p.130). This was for Jung a great revelation. He did not have to hide his own intimate search for making sense out of human existence - in psychiatry he would be allowed to utilise his insights within the framework of a scientific

discipline. The totality of his being could be involved and not only his No.1 personality.

Viewed in this way, Jung's option to specialise in psychiatry is afforded a logical and developmental explanation. Other factors influencing this choice can also be enumerated, e.g., his father's nervous breakdown (Rieff, 1966), and perhaps all include elements of some truth. Nevertheless, the argument developed above still stands, as it captures the inner consequence and personal meaning of Jung's choice of career, by presenting it as a culmination of his long personal inquiry into his own psyche.

PART TWO

Chapter Two

C.G. Jung: Psychiatric period.

"When you set out for Ithaka  
ask that your way be long,  
full of adventure, full of instruction... "

C.P. Cavafy: Ithaka

Tr. E. Keeley and P. Sherrard.

Jung's early psychiatric work, which begins with the period after his clinical internship and continues approximately until the time of his close association with Freud, (1900 - 1907), has received very little attention. Very few studies have concentrated on this period and, with the notable exception of Ellenberger (1970) and Fordham (1956), most have treated it in a rather superficial manner, as unrelated to Jung's later periods and as a subject of mere historical curiosity (e.g. Lewis 1957, Bennet 1967, Hall and Nordby 1973). In contrast, Michael Fordham, stressing the "remarkable inner coherence" throughout Jung's researches, emphasised that

"... the only way to understand Jung is to take his researches as a whole, perceiving how one stage grows out of that preceding it" (1956,p.3).

This study, in full accordance with this viewpoint, goes a step further by adding Jung's own life, in addition to his researches, in an inseparable part of the continuum which reveals this "remarkable inner coherence". This approach has already been demonstrated in the previous chapter and will continue throughout this investigation, from the specific viewpoint of the metatheoretical structure of the Other.

In 1900 Jung started his psychiatric internship at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Hospital which at the same time was the training centre for the Medical School of the University of Zurich. Two years earlier Dr. Eugen Bleuler took up the post of medical superintendent, replacing Dr. August Forel.

It was Forel who first coined the term "dissociation", referring to "confused processes of thought" which "apply most correctly to schizophrenic disturbances of association" (Bleuler 1911, p.86). This term was destined to exert considerable influence on psychiatric thought for many succeeding years, and acquired a central place in Jung's early work.

During his period of service at Burghölzli (1900 - 1909), Jung found himself among prominent psychiatrists and psychologists such as Ludwig Binswanger, Karl Abraham, Eugene Minkowski, Frederick Peterson, A.A. Brill and Herman Rorschach. The Zurich School of Psychiatry, as it was called, under Bleuler and in the tradition of Forel and Adolf Meyer (who, before leaving for America in 1892, was also associated with Burghölzli), established itself as an international centre of research in the fields of hysteria, schizophrenia (dementia praecox), and the pathology of association. Eugen Bleuler's contribution to Psychiatry is substantial. His pioneer studies led him to originate the term schizophrenia, thus abandoning the gloomy and theoretically restrictive model of dementia praecox as a process of premature and irreversible degeneration. Bleuler's theory of schizophrenia rejected the previously held view that the age of onset was in adolescence (praecox), and that the course of illness was that of a progressive deterioration. He found that the essential features of this abnormality were the "loosening of associations" and a "disharmony among affects" (Bleuler 1911). This psychological theory offers a functional interpretation of schizophrenia by focussing on the disorganisation of the association process. One might remark here that Forel found in Bleuler a most imaginative and innovative successor who creatively moulded the concept of "dissociation" into a modern theory with many implications



and great heuristic value. As will be examined later, both dissociation and schizophrenia touch on the fundamental issue of inner division and Jung's treatment of this issue will be considered against this background.

Bleuler is also credited as being the first psychiatrist who introduced the Freudian theories of psychoanalysis (then considered very unorthodox) into a mental hospital. Jung, in his second letter to Freud (5th October 1906) claims credit for Bleuler's 'conversion' to psychoanalysis, and Freud, by return post (7th October) congratulates him on this achievement,

"... I am especially gratified to learn that you have converted Bleuler..." (McGuire 1974, p.5).

The Zurich School was also renowned for the particularly sensitive and caring attitude of the staff towards patients. A.A. Brill's exclamatory record of his first encounter with the approach of the Burghölzli team is characteristic :

"They were not interested in what the patient said, but in what the patient meant" (Brill 1946, p.12).

This strong commitment at Burghölzli to grasping the meaning which the patient himself attributes to each of his acts can be seen as the inevitable background inspiration for Binswanger's and Minkowski's later phenomenological writings. It is also glaringly evident in Jung's approach to patients. Ellenberger (1970) gives a dramatic account of the working conditions and austere atmosphere at Burghölzli at the time of Jung's internship. Bleuler's selfless service and dedication set an example to his medical staff, all of whom were resident at this "secular monastery".

No alcohol consumption was permitted and the working hours were shaped by the amount of work that had to be done and the patients' needs. The lights of all doctors' rooms were regularly on until late at night. Bleuler's humility and good nature were also responsible for the friendly and supportive relations among the staff.

Jung writes in his memoirs that he spent most of the first six months at the Burghölzli reading through all the fifty volumes of the "Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie," thus mastering the psychiatric theories of his time. One may identify two major trends in them:

- i) the predominantly French interest in hysteria, hypnosis and somnambulistic states (Charcot, Liebault, Binet, Bernheim, Janet et al ), and
- ii) the particularly German orientation which included investigations into dementia praecox, catatonia and hebephrenia (Morel, Kahlbaum, Kraepelin, et al ), the development of classificatory systems of mental diseases (Millon 1969, p.11) and studies on association.

Zurich, in the Swiss tradition of neutrality, combined both of these trends - blending them in the phenomenological pursuit of meaning.

Jung consulted Bleuler, his professor and clinical supervisor, for a topic for his dissertation and Bleuler suggested an experimental study of the disintegration of ideas in Schizophrenia. Jung, because of various difficulties, was unable to follow this research and instead decided to study the young female medium (who has already been mentioned in the

previous chapter). Jung candidly admitted that this choice of topic for his thesis was "probably not by accident" ! (1958, p.256).

Jung's first published independent scientific work was the inaugural dissertation for his medical degree, "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena"(1902). It is therefore justified to examine it in some detail in order to trace his early basic themes, and see how they are conceived and treated.

First of all, in examining the background of Jung's choice of thesis topic, the following data could be drawn together:

1. His own admission that the choice was not accidental.
2. The role his experiences with that medium had played in his choice of psychiatry as a specialisation and career.
3. The 'occult' character of the phenomenon treated in the thesis.
4. His intense interest in occult phenomena. According to Ellenberg's (1970) and Oeri's (1970) evidence, during his student years at the University of Basel, Jung was known for his passionate lectures in student societies on occult and philosophical themes.
5. The existing interest of scientific circles in hysterical and somnambulistic states, and
6. The rather startling fact that under the false initials "S.W." Jung concealed the identity of Helene Preiswerk, his cousin, on his mother's side (Hillman 1976).

Taking all the above together one could say that Jung's thesis combined the personal and scientific aspects of enquiry; the research for his thesis, although it could be seen as rooted in his own search for meaning was, at the same time, phrased in the prevailing scientific paradigm.

"On the Psychology and Pathology of so-called Occult Phenomena"

When Jung first attended Helene Preiswerk's (S.W.) seances, she was fifteen and a half years old and had not previously had any serious illness or peculiar symptoms of any kind. She came from a disturbed family. Her father and two of his brothers had exhibited "waking hallucinations", and her mother had a "congenital psychopathic inferiority often bordering on psychosis" (1902, p.17). The aloof father died when S.W. was still an adolescent and left the children to be looked after by their mother who was often cruel to them. S.W. grew into a shy and reserved person and "it is no wonder that she felt shut in and unhappy" (p.18). Her educational level was considerably low. She had read virtually nothing outside the school syllabus. Some members of her family were involved in tableturning, spiritualistic sessions and S.W., having expressed some interest, was allowed to join in. She initially treated the whole affair as a joke but soon, "amid general astonishment" it was discovered that she was "an excellent medium" (p.19).

As far as Jung was concerned S.W.'s performance as a medium was, in fact, a somnambulistic act. He carefully observed and described how she assumed different personalities, allegedly of the spirits that were expressing themselves through her at that particular time. He also noted that shortly before her trance, S.W. entered into a catatonic state. While in 'trance' S.W. referred to herself in the third person, as the first person was the

alleged spirit that had taken her over. The new role that S.W. had found was very exciting and immensely rewarding. She was convinced that she had discovered her "true vocation" (p.23). Gradually her happiness disappeared and the "crude quality" of everyday living made her painfully aware of her

"Curiously contradictory life, a real 'double life'. With two personalities existing side by side or in succession, each continually striving for mastery" (p.25).

The initially fascinating material she used to produce slowly degenerated into dull and stale regurgitations. One day, in her efforts to revive the excitement of her earlier performance, she was caught cheating. Soon after, she was compelled to abandon her spiritualist career and get a job in a large business concern. In the meanwhile, her character had improved considerably. She became "quieter, steadier, more agreeable" as well as "industrious and dutiful". After a period in Paris she returned to Basel and opened her own dressmaking shop. Her premature death from tuberculosis put an end to a successful career as dressmaker.

Jung undertook detailed analyses of many aspects of this interesting case. One of them was the development of S.W.'s somnambulistic personalities. S.W.'s first "control spirit" i.e. the spirit that established the link with the "spiritual realm", was that of her own dead grandfather. He was her "protector and guide" (p.31) and had a constant paternalistic and moralistic attitude. The second "control spirit" was that of a Mr. P.R., a dead brother of a member of the group. He was childish and frivolous and had an "astonishing eloquence towards the ladies of the circle" (p.31). The third guide spirit, a certain Ulrich von Gerberstein, was a more sophisticated

version of P.R., also with special affinity to the female members of the group, but of nobler origin and speaking polished High German. At this time Jung observed a critical development; S.W.'s own "spiritualistic" personality formed itself into a special coherent ego which was markedly different from S.W.'s everyday personality. Jung called it the "sommambulistic ego". The differentiation between the two personalities was such that S.W., herself, gave a special name to her 'other' ego - Ivenes . Jung remarked that

"... Ivenes was not boringly unctuous or irrepressibly silly like her two guides: she is a serious, mature person, devout and rightminded, full of womanly tenderness and very modest, ... There is something soulful and elegiac about her, an air of melancholy resignation; she longs to get out of this world, she returns unwillingly to reality, she bemoans her hard lot, her odious family circumstances"(p.36).

Ivenes, according to S.W.'s own description was a

"... personality almost entirely freed from the body: a small but fully grown black-haired woman, of a markedly Jewish type, clothed in white garments, her head wrapped in a turban" (1902,p.33).

In the final analysis Jung rejected that he was dealing with the phenomenon that psychologists of that time (e.g. Janet 1906), described as double consciousness . By observing that all the sommambulistic personalities of S.W.'s shared the same memory (p.32), and that conscious content from Ivenes was passed to S.W., and vice versa, Jung concluded that it was a case of "semi-sommambulism" (p.47). There was one further difficulty: Ivenes talked a 'mystical language of her own' which had similarities with Latin. Jung dismissed this as being any special language. He examined the syntax of both the 'mystical' language and the patient's own, found that it was the same and concluded that these languages were not different from each other. Moreover, he analysed the 'mystical' language

and discovered that "it was only based on the unconscious use of different impressions" (p.86). This meant that S.W. was creating latin-looking words by distorting existing ones through acoustical or optical association, e.g. Persus, Fenus, Sirum, Magnesor, hyfonism from Perseus, Venus, Sirius, Magnetism, Hypnotism.

Jung tried to give an answer to the question "Who is speaking?" (p.52), who is really speaking? After all his investigations he could only report that there was one "person" speaking. One who had strong "preoccupations" (p.47). By preoccupations Jung meant the extreme absorption of the patient in a particular role. His following step was to investigate the psychological function of these preoccupations.

#### 'Ideal middle' and the 'two extreme' personalities

Jung first accepted Janet's conviction that "Once baptised, the unconscious personage is more definite and distinct, he shows his psychological characteristics better". Jung underlined the importance of this "individualisation of the subconscious" as "a great step forward" (1902,p.53-54). Then he examined the various somnambulistic personalities of S.W. which he assumed were instances of individualisation and personification of her own unconscious. This examination led Jung to the understanding that Ivenes could be accepted as the 'ideal middle' between the 'two extreme' personalities of her grandfather (moralistic, pious) and von Gerberstein (frivolous, gay). "The patient is a peculiar mixture of both" (p.77). Now, since these two were "...really only a question of two different subconscious personalities appearing under various names..." (p.73), Ivenes could also be seen as an unconscious representation of the desired ideal personality.

Piecing all parts together, the following picture emerges: Ivenes is the "direct continuation of her [S.W.'s] everyday ego" (p.64), "waking ego" (p.65), and she is essentially an 'unconscious' personality. Because Ivenes has all the desired characteristics of S.W.'s ideal personality, and is also much older, Jung postulates that S.W.

"... anticipates her own future and embodies in Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty years time - the assured influential, wise, gracious, pious lady ... builds up a personality beyond herself."

But

"... one cannot say that she deludes herself into the higher ideal state, rather she dreams herself into it" (p.66 emphasis added).

Thus, the phenomenology of Ivenes and of the other two subconscious personalities are not similar. Although all three belong to the realm of the unconscious, the two extreme ones are existing aspects of S.W. at present. They are her painful extremes that she 'represses'. Ivenes, on the other hand, is the desired personality.

"The patient is obviously seeking a middle way between two extremes; she endeavours to repress them and strives for a more ideal state. These strivings lead to the adolescent dream of the ideal Ivenes, beside whom the unrefined aspects of her character fade into the background" (p.77).

Jung, therefore, presupposes an independent unconscious drive towards achieving a more balanced personality. This striving has an obvious teleological function. He postulates that wherever there are any "special difficulties, (unfavourable circumstances, psychopathic dispositions of the nervous system, etc.)", which do not allow the "future personality



to break through", then "somnambulisms sometimes have an eminently teleological significance, in that they give the individual, who would otherwise inevitably succumb, the means of victory" (p.79 emphasis added).

This position implies that what is usually called 'illness' could also be understood as a positive attempt on behalf of the organism to circumvent certain existing difficulties which prevent the natural growth of personality, by offering the "means of victory". Jung, as early as 1902, spoke about "teleological" or "visionary" hallucinations, with precisely this function - to restore the balance of personality and bring about a healthy wholeness. The unconscious, besides its "repressive" function (as exhibited here by the two 'extreme personalities') also has a teleological tendency intended to assist the growth of the personality if and when endangered.

Jung's description of the development of this process seems to imply the following steps: (a) individualising , or personifying , the unconscious, i.e. giving certain strong unconscious tendencies an individual character and even an actual name; (b) these split off egos , by acting independently somehow activate the teleological function which produces a "reconciliatory" figure which at the same time -

- (i) reduces the tension of the two existing opposite tendencies by representing the 'ideal middle', and
- (ii) paves the way towards the natural progression and development of the personality by anticipating a state of wholeness where the opposing aspects harmoniously coexist.

Briefly, this is the personality theory that emerges from Jung's first scientific publication. Some similarities between this theory and his previous problematic of the Other must have become obvious during the

presentation but nevertheless it would be useful to make them explicit.

Fragment Other (F.A.) and Anticipated Whole Other (A.W.O.)

There should be little difficulty in perceiving the striking correspondence between the phenomenology of Jung's childhood No. 2 personality and Ivenes. Both were in sharp contrast to the 'everyday' personality, i.e. No. 1 and S.W. respectively. The everyday personalities were insecure and full of fears, whereas the 'other' ones were confident, wise and well grounded in the entire context of existence. They were in tune not only with the specific environment of their own families, but with Nature and the universe in general. It is characteristic that both were old and, in a sense, beyond time. Their wisdom and knowledge seems unrelated to the life experiences of their everyday personality counterparts. It is also worth noting that both had a special 'mystical' and private language.

The similarities between No. 2 and Ivenes extend to their function. Both had a very soothing effect and assisted in bringing about a more balanced state. They, in fact, represented a mature 'version' of the same personality. If one assumes that here Jung is dealing with the same phenomenon, i.e. the 'other' personality, it is of great interest to examine the developments that he introduced to this model of personality.

For a better understanding of Jung's new position in the case of Ivenes, an examination of the two 'extreme personalities' is necessary as they are closely related. According to Jung these two personalities represented the extreme tendencies of S.W.'s own personality, they were personifications of two diametrically opposed unconscious tendencies. Moreover, these two tendencies could be traced back to S.W.'s own life: the childish frivolous

tendency could be seen as her own childishness trying to impress and play games, whereas the pious, moralistic tendency was directly related to her own grandfather and past religious upbringing. It could be said that the latter was an introjection of the externally imposed mores. In their personificatory form the two unconscious tendencies elaborated themselves in an explicit manner and in a sense reached their own limits. Ivenes gradually makes her appearance once the other two have 'extinguished' themselves and Jung's analysis places her as a synthesis of the first two. But here Jung goes further. He claims that Ivenes, in fact, anticipates the mature whole personality of S.W. and shows that this, indeed, takes place. S.W. subsequently develops a stable personality. Ivenes is, therefore, not only a mere synthesis of the extreme poles of the personality but also has elements of what might be termed a 'prototype' of S.W.'s maturity, or 'true nature'.

This analysis introduces new insights into Jung's understanding of the Other in this period. Firstly, it offers a differentiation of two types of 'others':

- (a) the Other as illustrated by Ivenes and No. 2, which was characterised "not only as a source of suffering but also of potential unity". This Other (anticipatory ideal middle) could be called the Anticipated Whole Other, and
- (b) the 'other' which was a personification of an extreme unconscious tendency. This type of Other, corresponding to no previous description offered by Jung, is introduced for the first time in his dissertation. It is these Others that would account for 'the little devil' or 'little angel' within a person, which could be understood as existing aspects of one's own personality and be identified as such. This Other could be called the Fragment Other.

Secondly, Jung's new theory partly accounts for the origin and function of these Others. As far as the Fragment Other is concerned, Jung indicated that by virtue of it having striking similarities with externally identifiable figures, (e.g. S.W.'s grandfather), one might say that its origin could, at least partly, be accounted for by the process of internalisation of external, parental and societal norms and mores. Such definition would bring this type of Other close to what Freud terms Super-Ego . The function of this Other has already been mentioned above. It accentuates the extreme aspects of one's personality in order to have attention drawn to them so that a digestive process can deal with them accordingly.

The origin and functions of the Anticipated Whole Other have also been enlarged and clarified in this new theory. As outlined earlier, Jung postulated a "corrective" and teleological function embedded within a personality, which would come to the assistance of an endangered maturity. Jung could offer no explanation for the origin of this Other. In his dissertation he mentions two possibilities:

- (a) The A.W.O. personality will appear as a reconciliatory third tendency in order to synthesize two opposing tendencies, and
- (b) The A.W.O. although it has in its make-up aspects drawn from the personal experience of the individual, it also possesses qualities that seem to come from outside the personal repertoire. Here Jung advances the "explanatory hypothesis" that the layers of the unconscious which are beyond the reach of the split caused by the F.O., try to represent the unity of the automatic personality (pp. 76-77)

In other words, there is a part in the unconscious that is not affected by the split of opposing tendencies, and this part is responsible for bridging the disparity. (For a graphical depiction of the process from the Fragment Other to the Anticipated Whole Other, see the diagram below).

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


Fig. 1.1




Fig. 1.2




Fig. 1.3




Fig. 1.4




Fig. 1.5




Fig. 1.6




Fig. 1.7




Fig. 1.8

This diagram illustrates Jung's understanding of the function of the Other/s in the development of personality as exemplified by his analysis of S.W. in his dissertation. The importance and relevance of this diagram to Jung's later theoretical positions will become more evident in the chapters to follow (and with particular reference to the processes of active imagination specifically and individuation in general).

Fig.1.1 The personality is undifferentiated in an amorphous whole.

Fig.1.2 The "two extreme" unconscious tendencies appear as opposite polarities - the moralistic, pious vs. the frivolous, gay.

Fig.1.3 The "two extreme" tendencies are repressed because they are irreconcilable.

Fig.1.4 The "two extreme" tendencies are formed as "other" personalities (Fragment Others) - they are "baptised", named, identified and then continue to operate on a conscious level, but at the same time weakening the central ego personality.

Fig.1.5 The two F.O.'s cease their explicit operation and the "ideal middle" personality appears as a result of the overstretched central ego personality.

Fig.1.6 The "ideal middle" personality (Anticipated Whole Other) develops further. It represents a synthesis of the two

F.O.'s and at the same time an anticipation of the whole mature personality.

Fig.1.7 The A.W.O. guides the development of the central ego personality so that it comes closer to the projected, anticipated whole, mature personality.

Fig.1.8 The central ego personality and anticipated whole personality coincide in a whole again, but unlike in Fig.1.1 this totality is now differentiated into a "conscious nature". Jung later called this the "Self", das Selbst.

\*\*\*\*\*

A little further he refers to this part as the "'supraconscious' personality" (p.77). In addition, he discusses "certain accompanying phenomena" to this under the title "Heightened Unconscious Performance" (pp.80-87). Here, he elaborates on theories and cases drawn from the scientific literature of the time, dealing with such phenomena as cryptomnesia, glossolalia and finds that he has

"... no choice but to assume for the present a receptivity of the unconscious far exceeding that of the conscious mind..." (p.80).

Later, he comes to the conclusion that in order to make sense of these phenomena it is necessary to



"... postulate a highly developed intellectual activity of the unconscious ..." (p.87).

This he does, though, not in a naive manner. He is fully aware of the inherent difficulties in postulating such a mechanism of "unconscious intellectuality", ("... if, indeed, it is permissible at all to make an analogy between the cognitive processes in the unconscious and those of the conscious ..." (p.87)).

These hypotheses allow Jung to assume that Ivenes' wisdom could be accounted for in terms of that heightened unconscious performance which transcends S.W.'s conscious capabilities and personal experience. This performance is the first evidence of that "supraconscious personality", the core of No.2 and Ivenes, the 'nature' of the Other.

#### COMPLEX - Preliminary observations

Jung first introduced the term complex in his doctoral dissertation. But he did so in a rather unsystematic way. He called the 'extreme personalities' and "split off egos" complexes, but at the same time also interpreted Ivenes as being an ego-complex. No clear description of their functions was given then. Nevertheless, in terms of the theory of the Other, Jung, in his doctoral dissertation offered sufficient indications to substantiate a claim that all types of complexes could be accepted as instances of the Other. In another paper, "On Hysterical Misreading", Jung (1904) makes a somewhat better distinction between the ego-complex and the 'other' complex. In his "hypothesis of split consciousness" (p.91) he describes how this other complex has autonomy and can manifest its activity independently of the ego-complex

which has a centralising function. A year later Jung becomes even more explicit in his article on "Cryptomnesia" (1905). The "heightened unconscious performance" of his dissertation is here openly called "unconscious perception" (p.96). It is the dynamics of this perception that Jung studied. He observed how the contents of this perception, when charged with sufficient affect, can assume an independence from the coordinating ego agency. This independent, or "automatic" process he also called "complex". Complexes are, therefore, structural components of the unconscious which act on their own and exert their influence on the personality. Jung, in this study, outlined several aspects of the complexes' function and implications.

- (1) A person should "continuously exercise the most rigorous self-criticism" (p.99) otherwise he is prone to become prey of the complexes.

"One of the commonest and most usual marks of degeneracy is hysteria, the lack of self-control and self-criticism..." (p.99).

Jung, therefore, defines psychopathology in terms of his complex theory and assumes that when they are sufficiently powerful, complexes can disrupt the entire personality and cause 'mental illness'. A kind of psychological vigilance (self-criticism, self-control) is understood by him to be the antidote to pathology.

- (2) Complexes are not in themselves pathological. It is part of normal psychological functioning that complexes are formed in the unconscious. Pathology is, therefore, a question of degree and not of quality.

"... hysteria ... is nothing other than a caricature of normal psychological functioning ..." (p.98).

Psychological abnormality depends on the relative strength of the ego to control the complexes and their autonomy . The more the control of the ego the less the autonomy of the complexes.

- (3) Not only normality and abnormality rest on the same continuum but also creativity shares the same dimension!

"Our unconscious must therefore harbour an immense number of psychic complexes which would astonish us by their strangeness. The inhibitions imposed by our waking consciousness do something to protect us from invasions of this kind." (pp.98-99).

But "...all new ideas and combinations of ideas are premeditated by the unconscious", and it is therefore

"... to this unconscious that all those who do creative work must turn" (p.99).

and further

"... the genius ... has to bear the brunt of an outsize psychic complex ... tapping the depths of the psyche, the instinctively functioning complex sends up from its unknown and inexhaustible treasure countless thoughts ..." (p.100 emphasis added).

"Consciousness only plays the role of slave to the daemon of the unconscious, which tyrannises over it and inundates it with alien ideas" (p.105).

From the above it follows that for Jung, at least at this stage of his career, the complex is a source of innovative thoughts, and also functions autonomously (instinctively).

As far as the origin of the unconscious material that the complex channels into consciousness is concerned, Jung had no final answer: First, he clearly argued that complexes are made up of images and thoughts that are overloaded with affect. The personality, unable to negotiate with them represses them in the unconscious. Men "try to repress the affect from their daily life ..." (1905, p.100). One can therefore say that Jung's first explanation as to the origin of the complex is from one's own personal everyday life. This reveals nothing unusual. It is the same theory that Freud propounded at the same time. But Jung does not stop here. In this very same paper he makes some further remarks on this subject. It will be necessary to follow his train of thought faithfully in strict order to be able to appreciate the conclusion that he is led to.

Considering the originality and creative qualities of the unconscious, he writes that, "... only the combinations are new, not the material, which hardly alters at all, or almost very slowly and almost imperceptibly ..." (1905, p.100 emphasis added). The distinction between originality and creativity as, (a) combinations of old material, or as, (b) new material, could be better understood once the question of the origin of the unconscious material is brought back into focus. Jung seems reluctant to accept that a person can create ab ovo, totally new thoughts and ideas, without the assistance of already established patterns and, of course, existing material.

"...our psyche is not so fabulously rich that it can build from scratch each time."

He observes, and adds that

"...neither does nature. One can see from our prisons, hospitals and lunatic asylums at what enormous cost nature takes a little step forward ; she builds laboriously on what has gone before" (p.101).

The analysis now narrows down to the question: What is the meaning of "what has gone before" in the realm of the unconscious of a person? Does Jung here allude to any hereditary factors?

It seems of paramount importance to read Jung's own words with regard to this matter, as it seems that it was the first time that he openly dealt with this issue:

"This process in the world at large is repeated in the smaller world of language: few novel combinations, nearly all of it old fragments taken over from somewhere. We speak the words and sentences learnt from parents, teachers, books" (1905,p.101 emphasis added).

One should be extremely cautious not to misinterpret or 'read into' the above quotation ideas that Jung did not intend. Nevertheless, a number of remarks could be afforded here:

The topic of this paper is cryptomnesia and the issue of plagiarism, so that Jung could have mentioned language only to illustrate his argument, viz. remembering a text unconsciously is not a straightforward case of plagiarism, but it depends on affective factors and complexes. It is also possible that Jung meant to utilise language as a model for the unconscious. In other words, as one does not learn language from scratch, i.e. inventing all its rules and words, but enters , as it were, into an established realm where one has to learn certain parts and by doing so also acquires the accumulated experience stored in language.

The third possibility is that Jung equates the unconscious with language and says that by learning language through books, parents and other people we, in fact, amass an enormous amount of potentially conscious material, i.e. a great wealth of unconscious material which does not come from our own life experiences. This material is not part of our own personal unconscious but belongs to a larger, collective pool, because by learning language we automatically acquire all the unconscious material embedded in it.

It is ultimately difficult, if not impossible, to decide what Jung means here exactly. Does he use language only as part of the argument on cryptomnesia, does he use language as a model for understanding the unconscious, or does he equate language with the unconscious? At this stage, any further interpretation would be dangerous and without substantiation. Whatever the case might be, there is no doubt that he introduces here the idea of a collective, transpersonal, unconscious, which is indispensable to his definitions of abnormality and creativity as well as normal psychological functioning.

Translated into the theory of the Other, the complex, or the Other, originates from personal experiences of the individual, as well as experiences that existed before him, i.e. material that could be called collective.

Any discussion of Jung's theory of the complexes would be incomplete without a close examination of his research eg. into the association experiment. It was in these investigations that his understanding of complexes was moulded and as a result of which his first coherent psychological theory formulated. Firstly an historical/theoretical background to the field of Association will be outlined in order to place into relief Jung's own innovations in this area. This will then provide a clearer vantage point from where the context of his theory of the Other may be more competently surveyed.

### Word association experiments

As indicated earlier, Bleuler with his team at the University of Zurich constituted an international hub of psychiatric research. One of their fields of investigation was in association. As an outgrowth of the British empiricist philosophy, associationism established itself in psychology after the theoretical and experimental work of Francis Galton (1822-1911) in England and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) in Germany. According to this doctrine, man's source of knowledge is his sensory experiences. The input of these experiences (images or ideas) are connected, associated among themselves. The mind is therefore nothing but the network of all the associations the individual has amassed. This basic formulation underwent many modifications from Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753) and Hume (1711-1776) to the time of Galton and Wundt. The laws of association, (simultaneity, similarity, sequence and contrast) are by themselves the result of accumulation and transformation of the various theories of association put forward by philosophers as early as Plato and Aristotle.

Galton, trying to trace the origin of associative reactions presented words written on a slip of paper to his subjects and demanded their associations. He also measured the time between the presentation and the response (reaction time). One of his significant conclusions was that childhood and adolescent experiences were often the source of the associations (Watson 1971). In addition, Galton divided the "stimulus" words into various categories and from the statistical treatment of his results was able to observe the response's character, "... their tendency to recurrence, and their relative precedence ..." (Galton 1883, p.145). The whole enterprise for him was valuable in offering credence to the belief, "... in the existence of still

deeper strata of mental operations, sunk wholly below the level of consciousness", (p.145). Also, he concluded that, "...our working stock of ideas is narrowly limited and that the mind continually recurs to the same instruments in conducting its operations, therefore its tracts necessarily become more defined and its flexibility diminished as age advances" (p.146).

Alexander Bain (1818-1903), a Scotsman with a special place in the school of British Associationism (cf. Boring 1957), emphasised one important limitation of associations. Concerned with the logical consequence of strict associationism, that no new action is possible which is not related to existing associations, he introduces the issue of Will. He argued that spontaneous action is possible. In his voluminous study, "The Emotions and the Will" he connects spontaneity with the self.

"... Spontaneity, or original tendencies of our nature, viewed in contrast to the check, guidance or influence of impressions from without, is an aspect of self" (1865,p.95).

It is worth remarking here on the similarity between Bain's idea that there are "original tendencies in our nature" which are closely related to the self, and the Jungian concept of the Self where the potential true nature of the individual is stored .

Wundt's actual experimental work on association has been described by Boring as including nothing "classical" (1957,p.343). But the Wundtian theory of association is of considerable importance. Any attempt at a systematic exposition of this theory would be out of place in this present study, although the following remarks are indicated.



Wundt drew a clear distinction between association and apperception.

The former was a passive phenomenon whereas the latter was an active process. Wundt defined apperception as

"...the psychological process in which, on the objective side a certain contents becomes clear in consciousness and, on the subjective, certain feelings arise which, as referred to any given contents, we ordinarily term the state of 'attention'..." (Wundt 1910, p.316).

In association, on the other hand, the clarity of consciousness and feeling is missing. Wundt's involvement of feeling, attention and activity in his understanding of association and apperception are worth noting as they formed the background of Jung's theoretical framework for his researches.

Both Galton and Wundt examined word associations as part of their investigations into the field of cognitive functioning. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), a psychiatrist, adapted this method and applied it in his studies of psychopathology. Being well versed in the technique of the association experiment (he was Wundt's pupil), Kraepelin introduced certain modifications by manipulating the conditions of application; e.g. he denied food or rest to his subjects from whom he demanded a response to a series of experiments lasting from eight o'clock at night to eight in the morning. Another experimental situation that he introduced was alcoholic intoxication. He observed that under these unfavourable conditions the subjects' external associations were increased and their internal decreased. Internal associations were defined as based on a pairing of "meaning or conceptual content of the words", (Jung 1906, p.412) whereas 'external' associations were of a kind that "the connecting link" was "not the intrinsic sense or meaning but an external contingency" (p.412). Aschaffenburg interpreted these findings by assuming that motor agitation was the essential element, present in all experimental conditions, which

was responsible for the predominance of external associations. Jung, according to his experience in this field of experimentation found that it was not motor agitation but a lack of attention, or inability to concentrate that caused the decrease of internal associations (1906).

Since this interpretation touches on the issues that were raised earlier in connection with the personality's control over its complexes (lack of "self-control and self criticism") it is necessary to discuss these two approaches together.

Eugen Bleuler's interest in the problem of association dictated a certain climate at the Burghölzli clinic. Jung, soon after his initial introduction into the new world of psychiatry, set out to investigate specific aspects of this vast field. First, he wanted to establish in some detail the "laws governing the range of associations in normal subjects" and the "direct effects of attention on the association process" (Jung and Riklin 1904,p.4). It is of paramount importance to read the introduction to his first paper on association very carefully, because he challenges here the entire field of association by introducing some disturbing questions. The argument is about the meaning of association. With his co-researcher, Franz Riklin, they query the legitimacy of calling the "connection between stimulus-word and reaction ... an 'association'", (p.9). If by association is meant the psychological phenomenon of a link between two psychological experiences, the association experiment cannot tap this at all. The technique of association experiment simply demonstrates the connection between two "linguistic signs" (p.10), one the "stimulus" and the other the "response".

"We do not, therefore, claim that the reactions we describe are associations in the strictest sense: we even wonder if it would not be altogether better to drop the word

'association' and talk instead of linguistic reaction ... thus, when describing and classifying linguistically expressed connections, we are not then classifying the actual associations but merely their objective symptoms, from which psychological connections can be reconstructed only with caution..." (p.10).

They accept that association experiments, in fact, "stimulate the language apparatus" and, therefore, the classification principles that should be applied for analysing the results should be "simple logical" and not psychological principles as the latter would be totally hypothetical and based on no data at all. Moreover, they emphasise that

"... the use of the linguistic acoustic brain mechanism naturally is not without influence on the associations. The purely intrapsychic association cannot become the object of another's consciousness without being transformed into the familiar symbolism of language" (p.11).

This leads them to include "verbal ability" as "one of the chief principles" of their classification. Jung's acute sensitivity to language issues, especially during this period, is of great importance. As was discussed earlier, he used the model of language to understand some aspects of the complex. Now he exhibits an unusual awareness which helps him to avoid crude confusions by identifying the verbal expression with what it is supposed to express. His linguistic sophistication should be appreciated in its historical context. Similar approaches have gained respectability only recently with the impetus given by the theories of Jacques Lacan (cf. Part Three).

The classification system that Jung and Riklin used is based on linguistic principles (semantic, phonetic, syntactical and grammatical). It has eight major categories, twenty subcategories, twenty-two sub-subcategories and some more sub-divisions.

It is interesting to note that they also include a special major category called linguistic. In this group they assigned all associations which were formed solely on the basis of "certain external accoustic properties" (p.35). Other "external linguistic factors" are also included here, such as "same grammatical syllables" and "same grammatical form" (p.36).

In the elaborated analysis of their data the authors noticed a number of "constellations" which were responsible for clustering the responses around certain themes. These themes were derived from the subject's experiences in the recent past, or present and varied in character from being purely external, situational (e.g. associations with the physical environment of the experimental room and its furniture) to more personal and egocentric (they found that girls failed to respond to "stimulus-words bordering sexual themes"). In addition to the cognitive and linguistic factors in association, emotional factors also featured prominently.

"...Now it is possible that an emotionally charged complex of ideas becomes so predominant in an individual and has such a profound influence that it forms a large number of constellations, failures, and reactions with long reaction-time, all referring to this complex of ideas" (p.82).

Jung thus detected that the reason behind certain abnormalities in responding, if there was a central theme common to all the stimulus-words affected, was an "emotionally charged complex of ideas". This caused the subject to 'make use of a mode of reaction that is not usual' in him, in other words, the complex was, in a sense, taking control of the personality. This phenomenon was understood by Jung in terms of the function of attention. He found that the appearance of a complex causes

"... a big increase of internal associations, probably due to the intense stimulation of attention ... The stronger the emotional stress of the stimulus-word is for the individual and the more attention is devoted to that stimulus-word, the more the number of internal associations rises. This phenomenon is the exact opposite of the distraction phenomenon. Attention is improved because of the invasion of an emotional complex, which absorbs the whole personality, because the attention is directed more to the significance of the 'stimulus-word' " (p.94, emphasis added).

In their analysis, Jung and Riklin present and discuss in detail a great number of different characteristic types of subjects. These are subjects whose responses fall predominantly into one category of the classification system. They do not lose the opportunity to introduce a "complex-constellation type". This type is characterised by the predominance of a 'feeling-tone complex' in the responses.

This preoccupation is so strong that it borders on abnormality. Once again, they make it explicit that the condition resulting from the presence of a powerful complex is of the same quality as psychological abnormalities. It is only a question of degree and duration, in other words, in normals the effect of the complex is more "temporary".

"... One could generalise and say that this abnormal state, caused by the affect, is the prototype of the hysterical reaction" (p.161).

In their final conclusion of this study, the authors underline the importance of the "affective side of associations (effects of feeling-toned complexes)" (p.191) and their implications for experimental investigations in psychopathology.

A last comment on this article is indicated. It again concerns the

role of language. After carefully analysing their results they found that there is a positive relationship between attention and meaningful or "higher" associations. The lower the attention of the subject the lower the kind of associations he was likely to give. Associations were, therefore, ranked in order of personal relevance. At the bottom of the hierarchy were associations based merely on the sound similarities of the stimulus-word and the response-word. These were considered to be the most primitive associations. Then a little higher came the associations with more "meaning" but still within the general linguistic similarities. Gradually, on top of the hierarchy were the strongly personal and highly meaningful associations for that particular subject. In expressing this relationship Jung and Riklin observed:

"If, by further lowering the attention, we remove the linguistic mechanisms, which in most cases still possess some meaning, the sound reactions come to the fore; they represent the lowest level of linguistic reaction and therefore remain constantly below the threshold of consciousness in everyday life. In the process of development of the child's speech, sound reactions, as is well known, still play a fairly important part; later they are increasingly suppressed and usually enter into the unconscious, from which they can under normal conditions be brought up only with a certain effort" (pp.138-139).

In the above quotation, one could discern the relationship between language, the unconscious and the ego: The lower the associations the more impersonal they are, the less they involve the ego of the subject and his personal experiences. In addition, an impersonal, more "primitive" unconscious could be postulated in the child where few personal contents exist apart from the general characteristics of language on a level of sound. This aspect will be discussed again later in the light of a) Jung's reference to phylogenetic memory, and b) recent theoretical contributions in this field.

Jung continued his investigations into the field of psychopathology using the theory of complexes. In 1905 he published a case study of an epileptic ("An analysis of the associations of an epileptic") and in 1906 he completed two papers on this topic. In the first, "Association, dream and hysterical symptom", Jung regards the dream as a "natural" way that the complexes are brought to consciousness in a "harmless form" (p.383) and this gives him the right to deal with dreams in the same manner as with associations. He also indicates that therapy should aim at "resolving" the patient's "possession by the complex" (p.369). In the second, "Psychological significance of the association experiment", he emphasised that the complexes of persons exhibiting mental disorders "are of the same nature as in normal cases, except that the intensity of the emotional content is far greater than in the normal" (p.423). The connection between abnormality and complexes was mentioned widely in Jung's writings of this period. In 1907 he puts normality, hysteria and dementia praecox on a continuum where only the intensity and independence of complexes vary.

"In dementia praecox the complex is more independent and more strongly detached, and the patient more profoundly injured by the complex than in the case of hysteria" (Peterson and Jung 1907, p.517).

Elsewhere he boldly declares that "hysteria and obsessive phenomena stem from a complex"(1906,p.317).

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To return to the complex, it is now evident that Jung's experience from the association experiments led him to postulate the existence of complexes. Specifically, he regarded as complex indicators lengthened reaction time, a "sudden embarrassment" in the behaviour of the subject after being confronted by the stimulus-word or any other reaction "out of the ordinary" (Peterson and Jung 1907, p.527).

These "out of the ordinary" reactions included "failures" to react, "perseveration, stereotyped repetition of the stimulus-word, .... translation into foreign language, strong language, quotations, slips of the tongue, assimilation of the stimulus-word" (Jung 1905c, p.263), "lapsus linguae when pronouncing the reaction-word, ... interpolation of 'yes' or of other interjections before or after the reaction-word" (Jung 1908, p.591) and other specific reactions that Jung documented. The stimulus-words that produced such irregularities in the associations of the subjects were examined and the personal significance and connection with the subject were investigated. They were then assigned to a number of clusters, complexes. Jung mentioned a great number of complexes, e.g. of mother, family, school, sex, money, divorce. A person might possess (or more accurately, be possessed by) one or more complexes. Their number could increase or decrease in time within a given personality and so with their strength or power over the ego. Some complexes are interlinked with each other, while others are independent. In a case study Jung reports that he traced "about ten complexes independent of each other" (1905c, p.256), six of which were major or primary complexes and four "secondary". The secondary were aspects of the main complexes, e.g. an erotic complex with revulsion and remorse as its two secondary complexes.

#### Complex as the Other

Returning to the discussion of complexes in terms of a theory of the Other, a clearer picture now emerges. As was shown earlier, Jung first discussed the complex in his doctoral dissertation, but it was not until his research with the association experiment that he was able to present it in a coherent theoretical and empirical context. Jung's description



of the complex betrays strong similarities with his earlier theme of the Other:

"... A strong complex possesses all the characteristics of a separate personality. We are, therefore, justified in regarding the complex as somewhat like a small secondary mind, which deliberately (though unknown to consciousness) drives at certain intentions which are contrary to the conscious intentions of the individual" (Jung 1911, p.601)

"... A morbid complex plays the part of an independent being, or soul within a soul, comparable to the ambitious vassal who, by intrigue, finally grew mightier than the king" (Peterson and Jung 1907, p.517).

Many years later Jung was to state clearly that

"... fundamentally, there is no difference in principle between a fragmentary personality and a complex" (1948, p.97).

These quotations, in addition to the preceding analysis should be considered sufficient justification for accepting the Complex as Jung's formulation of the Other during this period of his life.

To recapitulate, in this study the following formulations of the Other by Jung were observed up to this period of his life: Childhood - the Other as fire, stone, manikin and pebble, as well as his own No. 2 personality. Early psychiatric period - a) the Fragment Other, as the personification of extreme unconscious tendencies. b) The Anticipated Whole Other as an unconscious 'ideal middle' personality, like Ivenes, the somnambulistic personality in the case of S.W.

A more systematic exposition of the Complex as the Other will be attempted below. Jung's theoretical positions should always be remembered in the

broad context of his personal quest for meaning, (his pursuit for bridging harmoniously the worlds of No. 1 and No. 2 personalities) and the prevailing paradigm in psychology and psychiatry of that time (studies on somnambulistic states, hysteria, dementia praecox, association etc).

Jung understood the complex as essentially a second personality within the personality proper, as if it was an homunculus, a little manikin inside the person. That is why he compared it to a fragmentary personality. As was indicated above, Jung used the complex as the basis for his understanding of psychological abnormalities: following a model of 'balance of power', abnormality was regarded as the state in which the complex controls the personality, and normality the reverse state. It should be noted that Jung's theory of psychopathology included another hypothesis, in addition to complexes - the "metabolic toxins" or "affect-toxins" which he postulated as being responsible for the condition of dementia praecox. These toxins were supposed to be some of the "irreparable organic disturbances" due to "affectivity". "Affectivity" was deemed to be a result of "disposition" (Peterson and Jung 1907, p.517; Jung 1907, pp.36-37, 69, 97-8; 1914, p.156 etc). Nearly fifty years later, Jung appears to have withdrawn the toxin hypothesis in favour of a more "psychogenic causation" of schizophrenia (1958, p.264). Be that as it may, it is significant that Jung, at least during the period under examination, was prepared to argue even for an organic foundation of complexes because, however he tried to introduce the toxins as a factor additional to complexes, he was subtly at the same time offering a biological explanation of the complexes themselves: Firstly, by considering affects as instrumental in producing both complexes and toxins and, secondly, by hypothesising that the affect-toxins were involved in the "final fixation of the complex" (1907, p.37) and thus its ultimate triumph over the dominion of personality.

But what was the very fabric of this Other? Jung conceived "ideas" and "thought material" as the basic nature of complexes. In the association experiments he observed the recurring clusters of "a large number of component ideas" and he called them "a complex of ideas" and clarified:

"The cement that holds the complex together is the feeling-tone common to all the individual ideas ... we are therefore speaking of a feeling-toned complex of ideas" (1906d,p.321).

By "feeling-tone" Jung understood the emotional mood (e.g. unhappiness, agitation) that accompanied those particular ideas.

With regard to the logical question of how the connection between the ideas and affect was established in the first place Jung held at least three opinions - the first one has the visible marks of the Burghölzli traditions, the second is influenced by the Freudian doctrine on psychic trauma, and the third has the stamp of Jung's own original theory of the archetype. The first one will be examined here, while the other two will be dealt with accordingly in the following sections of this study.

It was Bleuler who took the bold step and, in the Wundtian tradition, defined attention in terms of affects. Jung quoted his definitions:

" ... Attention is nothing more than a special form of affectivity, ...attention is an aspect of affectivity, and does nothing more than what we know affectivity does, i.e. it facilitates certain associations and inhibits others... Attention is ... an affective state" (In Jung 1907,p.40).

Against this background it is not then surprising that Jung advanced his own dictum - "Every affective event becomes a complex" ! (1909,p.67). He had earlier established that the key process in association was attention (as

discussed above). Now the formula should read as follows: Associations increase in a positive proportion to the amount of affect involved in the process. The more the underlying affect the more attention will be generated and the more associations will result. A circularity could be observed here. Jung attributed strong affective reactions to every situation where a complex was stimulated. He measured this phenomenon even physiologically with galvanometers, pneumographs etc (Jung, 1907; Peterson & Jung 1907; Ricksher & Jung 1908). It thus follows that a particular idea or "thought material" would be loaded with emotion if it already belonged to a complex. How is the complex then formed? Jung's declaration that "every affective event becomes a complex" points at one resolution of this circularity:

"... If [an affective event] does not encounter a related and already existing complex and is only of momentary significance, it gradually sinks with decreasing feeling-tone into the latent mass of memories, where it remains until a related impression reproduces it again" (1907, p.67).

By successive stimulation a given affective event can, therefore, either be incorporated into an existing complex or form a new complex by attracting a body of related ideas and thought material around it.

According to this interpretation, the Other is formed by a gradual process; it is not as given in the personality. Moreover, the personality itself is also formed in a similar manner and is ultimately nothing but a complex.

"... One's own personality is ... the firmest and strongest complex" (1907, p.40).

Having accepted that a complex is a "higher psychic unity", as it displays an intricate function of interrelationships and organisation, Jung arrives at the conclusion that

"... the ego is the psychological expression of the firmly associated combination of all body sensations" (1907,p.40);

further, that

"... the ego is psychologically nothing but a complex of imaginings held together and fixed by the coenesthetic impressions",

and therefore

"... the complex of the ego may well be set parallel with and compared to the secondary complex. This comparison shows the existence of a certain psychological similarity, because the emotional tone of the secondary complexes is also based upon coenesthetic impressions, and further, both the ego and secondary complex may be temporarily split up or repressed" (1911, p.601).

Jung is here able to give an account of how the Other is formed and for the first time to discuss its very texture. Moreover, in doing so he is in the position to formulate his first theory of personality: Both the 'me' and the Other are made of the same 'stuff'. The Other is defined, at this stage, as a 'secondary me'. The ego is the primary complex simply because it is central, "most stable and the richest in associations" (1907, p.41) and, as such, represents the "highest" psychic authority (1907, p.40). As he was to clarify later,

"... the ego complex forms the centre characteristic of our psyche. But it is only one among several complexes ..." (1948b, p.307).

The Other is no longer a mysterious unknown with so many exciting, but also dangerously far-fetched, implications. Using the scientific theories of his time as well as his own original contributions, Jung formulated his old problem of the Other predominantly in the mentalistic terms of clusters of affective associations. His early hypothesis of split consciousness (1904, p.91) was modified and gradually found expression in the definition

of complex in terms of attention, automatism and association. The Burghölzli tradition is evident. The theory of complexes is situated firmly in the lineage starting with dissociation (Forel), and Schizophrenia (Bleuler).

An aspect of the complex that was mentioned earlier is its autonomy. Jung emphasised the independence of the complex (affective or secondary) from the ego-complex:

"... Researches have shown that this independence is based upon an intense emotional tone, that is, upon the value of the affective elements of the complex, because the 'affect' occupies in the constitution of the psyche a very independent place and may easily break through the self-control and self-intention of the individual. The 'affect-intensity' of the complex can be easily proven psychophysiologically. For this property of the complex I have introduced the term autonomy" (1911, p.601).

Jung also stressed that the autonomy of complexes is not by itself a pathological phenomenon although it could lead to psychological disorganisation and disorder. This could be interpreted to mean that he accepted that the existence of an Other in one's own personality does not imply pathology; the Other is not necessarily a threatening demon. It is normal to have an Other, after all, the Other and the 'me' are relative terms as both have the same constitution.

Moreover, according to Ellenberger's distinction (1970, p.692), Jung identified three types of complexes: a) normal, b) accidental, and c) permanent. This classification should, therefore, correspond to three types of Others.

a) In Jung's personality theory of this period complexes are understood

as normal psychological phenomena formed as a result of the normal psychological functioning of affects and associations.

- b) As "every affective event becomes a complex" strong emotional situations have a higher probability of being incorporated in complex structures. This theoretical position prepared Jung to accept later the Freudian theory of psychological trauma with great ease. As will be discussed later, for a period of time Jung adopted the theory of traumatic causation of complexes.
- c) According to Jung, certain complexes were permanent by virtue of their dependency on unchanged affective states in the person, e.g. women will always have a special emotional relationship to motherhood (be it positive or negative). From his research findings Jung tentatively argued that there are certain permanent complexes associated with particular classes of people, e.g. men, women, educated, uneducated, etc (e.g. Jung and Riklin, 1904).

In addition to these three types, Jung also investigated and presented another type of complex which could be called shared or collective complex. Examining the associations (i.e. linguistic reactions) of members of the same families Jung and his pupils found special "family constellations" of responses. On ingeniously drawn graphs Jung plotted the lines of responses of members of families which he investigated thus indicating clearly the similarities and differences between the particular members, (1909). This enabled him to postulate the existence of identical complexes that are shared by all members of families or by sub-groups within given families. This type of Other would, in a sense, be different from all previously discussed in that it is not a 'personal' Other.

It thus becomes increasingly difficult to refer to the Other as a unitary, simple and specific phenomenon. The above analysis shows that Jung's formulation of the Other during this period, within the theoretical framework of the Complex, belongs to a different category from all his previous formulations in that

- (a) It allows a finer distinction and classification of several kinds of Others, some of them not conceptualized in any earlier formulation, e.g. the Fragment Other; normal, accidental and permanent.
- (b) It offers a clearer understanding of the nature, origins and functioning of the Other/s, and
- (c) it locates the issue of the Other within the psychological theories of the time with the result of
  - i. - rendering it comprehensible to the scientific community, and
  - ii. - introducing innovations in the theoretical field, stimulated and informed by the problematic of the Other.



PART TWO

Chapter Three

C.G. Jung: Psychoanalytic period.

"Odysseus: In Heaven's name, say'st thou  
this to mock at me?  
Neoptolemus: If it be mockery to speak  
the truth."

Sophocles: Philoctetes, 1235-6

Tr. F. Storr.

This title will here designate the period of Jung's association with Freud. This legendary association cannot be confined to a precisely defined chronological period. Jung had read Freud's works long before he established personal contact with the great master. One may also argue that Jung's association with the Freudian doctrines lasted a long time after the bitter termination of their friendship and collaboration, marked by those formal, cold and tragic letters which the two men exchanged in 1913 (McGuire 1974). Nevertheless, for the practical purposes of the present study, the "Psychoanalytic Period" will deal with Jung's life and work during his recorded friendship with Freud. The events and details of this extraordinary relationship with all its peaks and abysses, however interesting they might be, will only be peripheral to the aims of this section and little or no mention of them will be made here. The object of this chapter is to examine Jung's attitude toward his old problem of the Other as shaped during this period - what form did his enquiries into and formulations of the issue of the Other take? This chapter will therefore be divided into two parts (A and B). In the first and shorter part, crucial observations concerning the relationship of Freud and Jung

will be made in the light of Jung's earlier theoretical and personal development. This will place the second part, dealing with a more detailed theoretical analysis of Jung's development in this period, in perspective.

A. THE FREUD-JUNG RELATIONSHIP

To begin with, it would be useful to be reminded of the original difference between these two psychologists. In a very early letter to Freud (19 December 1906) Jung felt the need to outline what he perceived as their differences:

- (a) Different clientele and working conditions: Jung complained that he had to operate "under enormously difficult conditions" and "mostly with uneducated insane patients" (McGuire 1974, p.14). Freud's patients were educated middle class private patients, mostly neurotic. Jung's were hospitalized patients mostly schizophrenic (dementia praecox).
- (b) Jung, in a respectful and/or subservient manner, saw himself as Freud's inferior as far as general psychiatric and specific psychoanalytic experience was concerned. This was the obvious result of the age difference (at that time Jung was 31 years old, and Freud 50) and the fact that Freud was the originator of psychoanalysis whereas Jung was an aspiring novice. These differences are therefore not substantial but rather circumstantial. The fact that Jung mentions them at all is more indicative of his feelings towards Freud than anything else:

these feelings were a mixture of humility in front of the great teacher and a need to justify his own shortcomings. It is very important to note that Jung refers to all three differences in the context of his reply to Freud's criticism of his book "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox" where he treated Freud's "researches too ruthlessly" (McGuire 1974, p.13). The apologetic tone is therefore understandable.

(c) Jung wrote to Freud:

"My upbringing, my milieu, and my scientific premises are in any case utterly different from your own" (McGuire 1974, p.14).

These statements should be accepted as more than just an attempt by Jung to 'save face' before the master's critical eye. Jung here emphasised genuinely the great differences in their personal history, training and individual scientific approach to their subject matter, thus making a plea for tolerance and respect for each other's "personal style".

In this early letter Jung, therefore, indicated his respect for Freud's greatness but at the same time also reserved his right to autonomy. It is incorrect to assume, as several authors explicitly or implicitly do (e.g. Stern 1977; Neel 1977, p.261), that Jung was just a disciple of Freud's who, having used him to rise to fame, later ungratefully deserted his teacher. This view is simply contrary to the historical facts - Jung had made original contributions to psychology long before he met Freud. In "Memories, Dreams, Reflections", Jung stresses the fact that the invitation to Clark University in the USA was extended to Freud and himself "independently" (1963, p.141) although simultaneously. Jung makes this point clear

as if trying to correct the impression which was initiated by Freud (1914), that it was his association with him that procured this invitation. He further explains that it was through his American students and collaborators at the laboratory for experimental psychopathology at Burghölzli, which he founded and headed from 1904, that he became known to the English-speaking world. Jung was highly esteemed for his pioneer work, particularly with the association and psychogalvanic experiments.

It is ironical that one of the main attractions Freud had found in Jung's work was his experimental and scientific approach (McGuire 1974, p.18) which provided a much needed boost to the early psychoanalytic movement. Freud valued and greatly welcomed Jung's "hard-nose scientific" proof for the existence of the unconscious. This proof was offered by the results of the association experiment and Freud hailed it as "the first bridge linking up experimental psychology and psychoanalysis" (1914, p.28). Jung was to be subsequently accused by Freudians and Freud himself (e.g. Freud 1925, pp.52-53; 1923, pp.255-7) of precisely the opposite - that his theories were unscientific and a product of his allegedly speculative and mystical inclinations and thus were ultimately "scientifically sterile" (Freud 1926, p.270).

Despite their inequality in experience and expertise, the relationship between Freud and Jung was not one-sided. Jung indeed learned a great deal from the Viennese pioneer of psychoanalysis but also exerted some influence on Freud's thought. Freud explicitly acknowledged Jung as the originator of at least five important aspects of psychoanalysis:

- (a) The tradition in experimentally investigating psychoanalytic concepts (e.g. 1913, p.174; 1915, p.199).
- (b) The notion of complex (e.g. 1901, p.210; 1910, p.50; 1914, pp.29-30).
- (c) The institution of training analysis as an essential part of the education of new analysts (e.g. 1912b, p.116).
- (d) The use of anthropological and mythological material in the discussion of psychoanalytic theories (e.g. 1912, p.82; 1913, p.185; 1914, p.36).
- (e) The application of psychoanalytic theory in the understanding of psychotic conditions (e.g. 1911, p.77; 1914, p.28).

Moreover, Freud warmly welcomed his close trusting friendship with Jung and saw it as a necessary refreshing antidote to his often inevitable image of leader. In a letter to Jung (6 December 1906) he wrote:

"As you know, I suffer all the torments that can afflict an 'innovator', not the least of these is the unavoidable necessity of passing among my own supporters, as the incorrigibly self-righteous crank or fanatic that in reality I am not".  
(McGuire 1974, p.12).

It is true that Jung, touched perhaps by the overwhelming acceptance he found in their friendship became over-enthusiastic and for a number of reasons temporarily set aside his reservations toward

the Freudian doctrines, particularly those on sexuality. These sporadic expressions of unquestioned support for the Freudian cause in its entirety should not be interpreted as related at all to the genuine respect Jung had for Freud not only during their friendship, but also long after.

Jung had read Freud's Interpretation of Dreams in 1900, the year in which it was published. But it was not until 1903 that this significant book "linked up" with Jung's own ideas (1963, pp.169-170). Reference to Freud is found in Jung's dissertation (see previous chapter). There, in investigating dissociative phenomena of a "split-off personality" type, Jung wonders whether Freud's dream theories and particularly the mechanism of repression could adequately account for them (1902, p.56). A little further on he attempts a Freudian interpretation:

"Our patient's 'romances' throw a most significant light on the subjective roots of her dreams. They swarm with open and secret love-affairs, with illegitimate births and other sexual innuendoes... It is the woman's premonition of sexual feeling, the dream of fertility, that has created these monstrous ideas in the patient. We shall not be wrong if we seek the main cause of this curious clinical picture in her budding sexuality. From this point of view the whole essence of Ivenes and her enormous family is nothing but a dream of sexual wish-fulfilment, which differs from the dream of a night only in that it is spread over months and years." (1902, pp. 69-70 emphasis added).

This is a rather curious quotation. In no other place in his dissertation does Jung bring up this theory again and it certainly does not tie up with the teleological function and other characteristics that he ascribed to Ivenes (as was discussed in the previous chapter). It becomes even more strange when the actual

style of writing is closely examined. Dogmatic phrases such as "the whole essence...is nothing but" are not to be found in the rest of that work, and not in any other writings by Jung, for that matter. On the contrary, Jung was later extremely critical of Freud's frequent use of "nothing but" as an inflexible manner of theorising. Moreover, with evident contempt he grouped all such theories into a "nothing but" psychology" (1914, p.289). In the face of such evidence one is therefore left to speculate that the paragraph quoted above was perhaps an amateurish attempt at including some new theoretical trends in his thesis without really giving them the weight that the strong language of their formulation implies. This hypothesis might also explain a number of other similar references to Freudian theories found in some of Jung's early works (e.g. 1906b, pp.390-393; pp.400-401).

In addition to this almost "snobbish" motivation, the careful researcher could identify another: Jung's explicit intention to please Freud and show him how much he valued his original theories. In these references one again has the strong feeling that Jung "scrambled" sexual interpretations in the text in an unsuitable way. They betray themselves as not belonging to the rest of the argument (e.g. 1906b, p.373).

Jung, on the one hand, propagated openly the Freudian revolution and he actively involved himself in academic arguments defending Freud (e.g. Jung 1906e; 1908b; 1910). But, on the other hand, Jung's individuality and spirit of independence was preserved, even when he was overeager to gain the master's favour. As will be shown later, Jung made a fairly sharp distinction between Freud's



"psychology" which he supported, and the "sexual hypothesis" of whose truth and value he was never convinced. Moreover, Jung never kept this distinction to himself but openly communicated it to Freud. Throughout their friendship Jung emphasized his need to be true to his own convictions. On the 26th November 1906 he sent Freud an offprint of his published reply to Aschaffenburg's lecture where he attacked psychoanalysis. Commenting on his reply, Jung writes:

"...I have tailored it a bit to my subjective standpoint, so you may not agree with everything in it. I hope I haven't misrepresented you! In any case I wrote it out of honest conviction. Incidentally, I have also championed your cause at the Congress of alienists in Tübingen amid stifling opposition..." (McGuire 1974, p.9).

The most important observation one could perhaps make about the relationship of these two men is that it came at a very opportune time for both of them. As far as Jung was concerned, his professional association and subsequent personal friendship with Freud represented at the time a culmination of his bright and promising career. His personal and scientific quest found a comforting and secure harbour in the closeness with Freud. In his memoirs Jung openly admitted that "Freud was the first man of real importance I had encountered..." (1963, p.172). The relationship was one of father-son, king-crown prince, master-disciple. Despite their tragic break Jung retained a deep respect and care for Freud. Laurens van der Post discloses that it was a friend of Jung's (Dr. E.A. Bennet) who assisted Freud in escaping in 1938 from Nazi occupied Vienna and settling in Hampstead, London. Moreover, van der

Post stresses Jùng's sincere concern about Freud's fate at that critical time. Jung anxiously waited for news of Freud's flight to London and when his safe arrival was confirmed, Jung sent him "the warmest of telegrams of welcome" (van der Post 1975, p.148). Jung's personal loyalty and respect for Freud is also reflected in the interview he gave to John Freeman for the BBC in 1959. He refused to divulge any information about Freud's dreams which he had access to, insisting that such action would be "indiscrete" and unprofessional. To the remark of the interviewer that Freud had been dead for many years, Jung replied firmly:

"Yes, but these regards last longer than life"  
(McGuire and Hull 1978, p.418).

Michael Fordham confirms the loyalty and fondness Jung always had for Freud, and recalls that Jung, when asked about Freud, "would talk in warm, appreciative tones and refer to him as 'the master' " (1975, p.110).

The personal friendship that was inaugurated by the thirteen hours of talk during their first meeting, in 1907 in Vienna, was to undergo a great deal of modulation and was destined to leave a very strong impression on the development of psychology.

It appears that Jung had more affinity with Freud's theories of the unconscious and repression than with his theories of sexuality. As already discussed , Jung seems to have paid more lip service to the theory of sexuality than really identifying himself with it; whereas the unconscious made more sense to the young Jung. The reasons

for this inclination are not difficult to find, especially when placed in the perspective of Jung's preoccupation with the Other, developed in the preceding parts of this study.

In short, Jung's position in psychology at that time could be summarised as follows: His eagerness to further explore the entire phenomenon of his childhood No. 2 personality was a very important factor which contributed towards his final decision to choose psychiatry as his speciality. Jung's next crucial choice, with regard to the subject matter of his dissertation, also betrays the same concern. As was shown in the previous chapter, in analysing SW, and discussing the field of somnambulism and phenomena of double-consciousness, Jung developed a number of important insights into the nature, origin and function of the Other. These insights were further augmented by the rich experiences that Jung gained from his pioneer investigations with the association experiment. The notion of the complex represented the culmination of his theoretical achievements in that period. Complexes were regarded as "second consciousness", as "independent selves" within the personality, as an-other personality, as the Other.

It was at this point of his development that Jung became aware of Freud's new and revolutionary teaching. Apart from his impact on clinical psychology, Freud introduced new insights which stirred up the fairly settled contemporary theories of association.

Reik (1956) relates the following characteristic anecdote:

Professor Jodl, lecturing to his psychology students at the

University of Vienna, announced with amusement that there was a fellow, by the name of Freud, who was claiming that in addition to the accepted laws of association there was also a new one based on emotional involvement and the participation of the unconscious. His mocking words were received by his audience with ironic smiles of disbelief. This was the typical reaction to Freud's theories at the time. Jung, on the other hand, for at least two main reasons not only found the Freudian innovations sound and exciting, but he even became a fanatic propagator of them.

- (a) The first reason is theoretical. Jung's own findings in the area of the association experiment, particularly his theory of complexes, bore striking similarities to Freud's discoveries in treating hysteric and neurotic patients. Both had tapped an area of psychological functioning which did not obey the rules of the conscious, everyday ego. Freud referred to it as the unconscious. Jung understood it in terms of automatism and independently functioning complexes.
- (b) The second reason could be called "psychological". Jung's great dynamism and creativity could not be contained within the restrictive environment of Burghölzli. Despite the exciting and pioneering research, work at Burghölzli was, like in many State Mental Hospitals, highly regimented, and routinized according to the rules and regulations of the strictly hierarchical system. One might also speculate that Jung's strong attraction to Freud could be related to Jung's peculiar and ambivalent relation to Eugen Bleuler. Ellenberger (1970) reminds us of the oddity that Jung makes no reference in his

autobiography to his teacher, supervisor and chief! Whatever feelings Jung might have had toward Bleuler, it seems that their relationship could not have developed to that of a master-disciple. Jung, for whatever reasons, was not sufficiently inspired by him to model after and follow him. But with Freud it was different! His courage, imagination and seriousness overwhelmed and inspired Jung. Freud became the idol of many young doctors and despite the "sanctions" that the establishment imposed on the new "heresy", it was for them an honour to belong to the new and revolutionary movement. In his obituary on Freud, Jung made this very point clear:

"...For us, then young psychiatrists,  
[Freud was] ... a source of illumination,  
while for our older colleagues ... an  
object of mockery" (Jung 1963, p.169n).

Psychoanalysis was not merely a system of psychotherapy, or a redefinition of psychology, but also a movement with broader social and moral implications (e.g. Fromm 1971; Marcuse 1956; Rieff 1961; Robinson 1969 ). Jung identified strongly with Freud's call for a re-examination of the hidden and neglected "parts" of ourselves, which we conveniently ignore. This can be better appreciated once it is placed in the perspective of Jung's problematic of the Other, starting right from his childhood No. 2 personality to the theory of complexes.

B. JUNG'S THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

Psychoanalysis offered a systematic understanding of the origin, nature and function of those neglected aspects of personality. This is what Jung needed for his own understanding of the Other as expressed in his theories of somnambulistic phenomena and complexes. Moreover, his theory, that strong affects produced complexes, was phrased within the framework of the association theories; although it was a modification and expansion of the established and accepted theories, it nevertheless lacked a broader basis with implications for a larger variety of psychological phenomena. By marrying his theory of complexes to the new Freudian psychology, Jung was able to establish contact with a whole new world of rich relatives! Thus, Freud's theory of the unconscious provided the much wanted fruitful theoretical context for Jung's own investigations.

It was Breuer who, in the "Studies on Hysteria", published with Freud's collaboration in 1895, propounded that unconscious ideas were a product of a certain process that made them "inadmissible to consciousness":

"...Their psychical ideational activity is divided into a conscious and an unconscious part, and their ideas are divided into some that are admissible and some that are inadmissible to consciousness. We cannot, therefore, speak of a splitting of consciousness, though we can of a splitting of the mind" (p.225).

Contrary to contemporary theories of "double consciousness" or "multiple consciousness", Freud and Breuer had proposed that the

conflict takes place between two separate and distinct psychological systems - a conscious and an unconscious. Freud's most significant contribution was his subsequent elaboration of these two systems, and particularly the unconscious.

The relevance of Freud's distinction of an independent psychological system, the unconscious, should be appreciated in the light of the previous discussion on Jung's preoccupation with the problem of the Other. Freud further developed the process of "inadmissibility to consciousness", having first renamed it repression (1900, p.672). Repression was to become one of the most crucial terms in psychoanalysis. Freud emphasised that:

"The theory of repression became the foundation-stone of our understanding of the neuroses ... It is possible to take repression as a centre and to bring all the elements of psychoanalytical theory into relation with it ..." (1925, p.30).

Initially, Jung's theory of complexes did not refer to the unconscious in a direct manner. As James Strachey correctly notes in his editorial foreword to Freud's article "Psychoanalysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings" (1906), Jung's early understanding of complex did not include any "direct reference" to it being "unconscious or repressed" and concluded that a "complex may or may not consist of repressed material" (p.101). Jung had formulated his theory of complexes within a separate system, different from the Freudian theoretical framework. His was the experimental paradigm of association and attention. It was only during the period under present examination that Jung realised that

Freud's systematic study of the unconscious as a separate and autonomous system provided a most useful background for the understanding of complexes. Soon after, Jung located the complexes, or at least some or part of them, in the unconscious (e.g. Jung & Riklin 1904, p.88). Jung made extensive use of both the concepts of the unconscious and repression in his theories of this period but at the same time maintained that his own theory of complexes "... goes a little beyond the scope of Freud's views ..." (1907, p.38).

According to Jung, "the essential basis of our personality is affectivity" (1907, p.38). He accepted thought and action as "symptoms of affectivity", and further understood that the "elements of psychic life" are formed as "functional units" with three components: "sense-perception, intellectual components (ideas, memory-images, judgments, etc.), and feeling-tone" (1907, pp.38-39). These are interlinked so that when one is focused upon one, all the others will be activated. In Jung's example, when one meets an old friend, the "image" of that friend, as a functional unit, will stimulate all three components along with their further associations, e.g. an unpleasant affair that resulted from the "thoughtless gossip" of that friend:

"... the functional unit, 'my friend', is only one of many figures. The entire mass of memories has a definite feeling-tone, a lively feeling of irritation. Every molecule participates in this feeling-tone, so that, whether it appears by itself or in conjunction with others, it always carries this feeling-tone with it, and it does this with the greater distinctness the more distinctly we can see its connection with the complex-situation as a whole" (1907, p.39).



Following this theory of psychological functions as inter-linked units, Jung extends it to include the supreme unit, the entire personality itself. It was these units of ideas "grouped and selected" by affect that Jung called feeling-toned complexes and by extension Jung termed ego-complex what is called "personality":

"... by this we mean the whole mass of ideas pertaining to the ego, which we think of as being accompanied by the powerful and ever-present feeling-tone of our own body" (1907, p.40).

In a normal person the supreme complex is the ego-complex which dominates the psychological functioning of the individual and should be in control of all other complexes. Now, Jung's experiences with the association experiment and his reading of Freud gave rise to a new understanding of complexes which incorporates the theory of repression:

At a given moment, when any component/s of the complex (sense-perception, intellectual or affective elements) comes to the individual's attention, it will inevitably "irritate" all the other components as well as produce

"... bodily changes, by a complicated harmony of muscular tensions and excitations of the sympathetic nervous system ... [these] countless body sensations become altered, and in turn alter most of the sensations on which the normal ego is based. Consequently the normal ego loses its attention-tone (or its clarity, or its stimulating and inhibiting influence on other associations). It is compelled to give way to the other, stronger sensations connected with the new complex ..." (1907, p.41).

The ego therefore tries to avoid being overwhelmed by the "stronger sensation" of individual complexes and attempts to "silence" aspects or components of the threatening complex. The stronger the feeling-tone accompanying a complex, the more "undesirable" it will be for the ego. This leads Jung to conclude that:

"... complexes are in a state of repression because they are concerned as a rule with the most intimate secrets which are anxiously guarded and which the subject either will not or cannot divulge " (1907, p.45 emphasis added).

Following this approach, Jung had no difficulty in accepting the limited importance of sexuality, as he realised how powerful the feeling-tone that usually accompanies the sexual complex is:

"The strongest and most lasting effects are seen above all in sexual complexes, where the feeling-tone is constantly maintained, for instance by unsatisfied sexual desire" (1907, p.44).

In the interests of the entire personality, aspects of complexes with potentially disrupting effects have to be repressed. At this point, a comparison is indicated between one of Freud's early formulations of repression, and Jung's present theory under examination:

In a letter to Fliess (6 December 1896) Freud outlined his "latest bit of speculation": Assuming that "our psychical mechanism has come about by a process of stratification" (Freud 1954, p.173), he postulated three instances of "registration" (or "transcription") between what is perceived and what finally enters consciousness.

These "registrations" were the following:

- (a) Pcpt-s: It is not conscious and "is arranged according to associations of simultaneity".
- (b) Uc (unconsciousness): It is arranged "perhaps according to casual relations".  
Uc traces may correspond to conceptual memories".
- (c) Pc (preconsciousness) is "attached to verbal images" and corresponds "to the official ego" (1954, p.175).

Freud called the successive movement from one "registration " (or "transcription") to the next "translation" and understood repression as precisely the process through which translation is prevented:

"... I explain the peculiarities of the psycho-neuroses by supposing that the translation of some of the material has not occurred... A failure of translation is what we know clinically as 'repression'. The motive for it is always a release of unpleasure which would result from a translation; it is as though this unpleasure provokes a disturbance of thought which forbids the process of translation ..." (p. 175, emphasis added).

Through this short exposition the similarities between Freud's theory of repression, in terms of the process of stratification and as a failure of translation, and Jung's understanding of the same notion, in terms of the "functional unit", should become evident. Both authors accept repression not in terms of an "all or none" effect but as a partial process of interlinked mechanisms of sensory, perceptual, intellectual, as well as affective elements. Both underline the significant role of affective components (Freud: unpleasure; Jung:

strong feeling-tone) in the protection of personality, the formation of psychological abnormalities and in general, the structure of psychological functioning.

According to Jung's theory, since complexes are constellations not only of ideas, memories, judgments, etc., but also of sense-perceptions and feeling-tone, all functioning as a unit, it is highly unlikely that this entire functional unit will disappear from consciousness when a complex is repressed. Aspects, or components of the unit will always remain conscious but since they will no longer be part of the unit they will inevitably lose their unit character and identity and will ultimately appear distorted. Jung called most distortions of complexes displacements. The repressed complex tries to 'squeeze' as much of itself as possible through the components that are admitted to consciousness. The result is that the personality retains its dominion over the complexes but the victory is indeed pyrrhic. Complexes nevertheless manage to come through either as "double personalities" or in disguise:

"... these displacements and disguises may, as we know, produce real double personalities, such as have always excited the interest of psychological writers (cf. the recurrent problem in Goethe of 'two souls', and among the moderns Hermann Bahr, Gorky and others). 'Double personality' is not just a literary phrase, it is a scientific fact of general interest to psychology and psychiatry, especially when it manifests itself in the form of double consciousness or dissociation of the personality. The split-off complexes are always distinguished by peculiarities of mood and character ..." (1907, p.50).

In other words, the complex, fenced off from consciousness because

of its potentially disruptive role, may nurture a whole other personality, which, by virtue of its isolation will retain an autonomy and will manifest itself in eruptions only. A second possibility is that the complex will strive for expression through its uncensored components by disguising itself as an-other. In both cases an otherness is inevitable.

It is within this context that Jung first made reference to symbols. Repressed and/or displaced, complexes express themselves symbolically. This means that again, parts of the functional unit in carrying the whole complex are inevitably invested with additional meaning that they would not normally carry if they were not representing the entire complex. This is clearly observed when one innocuous association, by virtue of its membership of a certain complex constellation, influences sense-perceptions and evokes affects in an unexpected and disproportionate manner. A special category of symbols are what Jung termed "power-words" which he understood, in much the same way as symbols in general, as hinting

"... at the whole system hidden behind them,  
just as technical words do in normal speech"  
(1907, p.109).

Jung later said that his first understanding of symbols was within the framework of the "personalistic medical psychology mainly as presented by Freud" (1939, p.243). In that passage, Jung's aim was to differentiate between his early understanding of symbols, which was influenced by Freud (relating symbols to personal pathology), and his later development, where he accepted symbols

as being expressions of a collective normal psyche. In fact, the truth remains that his initial use of symbols was derived from his experiences with the association experiment. He then called the relation between a word-stimulus and a complex "symbolic" in "character" (1911, p.599).

In 1907, Jung drew a distinction between "symbolical" and "allegorical". Basing his definition of symbols on Pelletier's theory, he accepted that

"... Allegory ... is the intentional interpretation of a thought, reinforced by images, whereas symbols are only indistinct, subsidiary associations to a thought, which obscure it rather than clarify it." (1907, p.65).

Pelletier's own definition, which Jung quotes in the same passage, emphasizes the inferiority of symbol to thought, and clarifies that

"... one could define symbol as the false perception of a relation of identity, or of very great analogy, between two objects which in reality are only vaguely analogous" (1907, p.65).

Jung, connecting these points with his own position with regard to complexes, focuses on the conditions that lead to the formation of symbols. He observes that "there must be a lack of sensitivity to differences, or a deficiency in the power of discrimination" (p.65). The significance of this focus is not difficult to understand. It brings symbols within the framework of complexes and in fact makes them almost identical terms. To be reminded, Jung stressed the same characteristics for the complexes:

"... When the complex is hit, conscious association is disturbed and becomes superficial, owing to the flowing off of attention to the underlying complex ('inhibition of attention'). During the normal activity of the ego-complex the other complexes must be inhibited or the conscious function of directed association would be impossible ... The effects of the complex must normally be feeble and indistinct because they lack the full cathexis of attention which is taken up by the ego-complex... The main part of attention is directed to the activity of the ego-complex, while the autonomous complex receives only a fraction ... For this reason the autonomous complex can only 'think' superficially and unclearly, i.e. symbolically, and the end-results (automatisms, constellations) which filter through into the activity of the ego-complex and into consciousness will be similarly constituted" (1907, pp.64-65, emphasis added).

Thus, in this period, Jung understood symbols as precisely those complex components which, burdened with the task of expressing the "whole system hidden behind them", i.e. the complex in its entirety, inevitably have to convey meaning that exceeds their "normal capacity".

Following the essence of this analysis Jung was able to write:

"... Dreams, too, are constructed along similar lines; they are symbolic expressions of the repressed complex" (1907, p.57).

As far as the theory of sexuality is concerned, if his initial attempts at pleasing Freud and flirting with theoretical innovations are excluded, it seems that it was again from his own theory of complexes that he set out to incorporate aspects of the psycho-analytic doctrines on sexuality: Jung accepted the partial sexual character of symbols and dreams as a logical extension of his

observation that complexes with sexual themes are usually accompanied by strong feeling-tone. Since

"... the strongest feelings and impulses are connected with the strongest complexes, it is therefore not surprising that the majority of complexes are of an erotic-sexual nature, as also are most dreams and most of the hysterias. Especially in women, for whom sexuality is the centre of psychic life, there is hardly a complex that is not related to sex. To this fact may well be due the significance of the sexual trauma for hysteria, assumed by Freud to be universal. At any rate, we must always bear sexuality in mind in psychoanalysis, though this does not mean that every hysteria can be traced back to sexuality" (1907, p.67).

One can easily note the progression of Jung's gradual acceptance of the Freudian doctrines, but always from his own vantage point. The idea of sexuality became more palatable to Jung once he digested it and it became part of his own theories of complexes. It therefore follows logically that from this position it was easy for Jung to accept (at least temporarily) the traumatic causation of complexes.

Freud's theory of psychic trauma refers to an experience which is produced under severe emotional stress (cf. feeling-tone). A usual consequence is then

"... that some part at least of the affect that accompanies the trauma persists in consciousness as a component of the subject's state of feeling" (Freud, in Freud & Breuer, 1895, pp.86-87).

Freud's experience in treating hysteric patients led him to



appreciate the powerful effects of psychic traumata. He observed how the repressed traumatic experience makes its way through to consciousness even in the most distorted (symbolical) manner. He described how the repressed or traumatic experience which Jung later termed complex, could indeed manifest itself as a separate independent system not only of a psychological but also of a physiological, somatic nature.

"... The incompatible idea is rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation being transformed into something somatic. For this I should like to propose the name conversion." (1894, p.49).

Therefore besides the two possibilities of manifestation of the repressed experience (complexes or traumata) mentioned earlier, i.e. eruptions of a second personality, or symbolical distortions (both psychological in nature), Freud had spoken of a somatic possibility where a substantial transformation of the actual somatic functioning was disrupted. This he saw as the peculiarity of hysteria.

"Thus we see that the characteristic factor in hysteria is not the splitting of consciousness but the capacity for conversion ..." (1894, p.50).

Conversion was not the only result of traumatic experiences. It was perhaps the most powerful one. Depending on the seriousness of the trauma there was for Freud a gradation of disrupting effects.

Jung utilized the theory of trauma as early as 1906 where in at least

two papers he explicitly connected it with his own theory of complexes.

In "Psychoanalysis and association experiments" he argued that

"Hysteria and obsessive phenomena stem from a complex. The physical and psychic symptoms are nothing but symbolic manifestations of the pathogenic complexes" (1906c, p.317).

He concluded that his association experiments might be a "valuable aid in finding the pathogenic complex" thus "facilitating and shortening Freud's psychoanalysis" (p.317). In the other paper, "Association, dream, and hysterical symptom", Jung, looking for the origin of complexes in a case that he discusses, wrote

"We must also postulate the existence of an event that prepared the way for repressing the sexual complex, i.e. a sexual event of childhood. Here the sexual trauma, which the dreams seem to indicate would fit in" (1906b, p.403 emphasis added).

In the preceding paragraphs a number of Jungian insights formulated in Freudian language were presented. Jung indeed enriched his own theories by marrying them with the Freudian ones. What should be emphasised too are his reservations or even rejection of certain psychoanalytic axioms. One does not have to search hard for them. They include the ones mentioned above. Jung always accepted the Freudian concepts in his own terms, so that even when he made use of psychoanalytic theories such as sexuality, repression, trauma, unconscious and others, he did not go all the way along with his

older colleague, but only used them to fit his own theories. He never abandoned his own training in empirical and experimental approaches to association. Even during the peak time of their relationship, in 1909, Jung kept the association experiment so central to his psychological understanding that he wrote

"... The association experiment is nothing other than a small segment of the psychological life of a man, and everyday life is at bottom an extensive and greatly varied association experiment." (1909b, p.305).

On the 5th October 1906 Jung wrote to Freud:

"... What I can appreciate ... are your psychological views, whereas I am still pretty far from understanding ... the genesis of hysteria ... It seems to me that though the genesis of hysteria is predominantly, it is not exclusively, sexual. I take the same view of your sexual theory. Harping exclusively on these delicate theoretical questions, Aschaffenburg forgets the essential thing, your psychology ..." (McGuire 1974, pp.4-5 emphasis added).

Two days later Freud replied:

"... Your writings have long led me to suspect that your appreciation of my psychology does not extend to all my views on hysteria and the problem of sexuality, but I venture to hope that in the course of the years you will come much closer to me than you now think possible" (McGuire 1974, p.5).

Thus, right from the beginning, Jung had differentiated between Freud's

- (a) "psychology" which he understood as the essential contribution to and revolutionary innovation in psychology,

and

- (b) the whole body of "hypotheses" connected with sexuality which he could not find entirely acceptable.

But Freud himself did not make this distinction at all, and did not consider his work on sexuality as mere "hypotheses". Although he could write conclusions like the following:

"The unsatisfactory conclusion, however, that emerges from these investigations of the disturbances of sexual life is that we know far too little of the biological processes constituting the essence of sexuality to be able to construct from our fragmentary information a theory adequate to the understanding alike of normal and of pathological conditions" (Freud 1905, p.243 emphasis added),

one has a strong suspicion that they were more a result of authors' etiquette (an expected humility in writing style) rather than true conviction. In this particular case, if one compares the conclusion with the opening sentences of the same work, one finds that the "fragmentary information" is there referred to as "scientifically sifted observation" (!) (1905, p.136). Even besides the textual discrepancies in qualifying the sexual "theory", Freud's basic attitude to it is well known from his writings. It would be difficult indeed to explain how he could solemnly ask Jung

"... Promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark" (Jung 1963, p.173),

if he accepted his views on sexuality as just a "hypothesis". As far as Jung is concerned, there is ample evidence to show that he genuinely believed in the inconclusive and hypothetical status of Freud's investigations on sexuality and did not think that referring to them as such would offend the master. This will be discussed later.

A typical example is the following: In 1908, at the prime of their relationship, reviewing the Freudian theories on hysteria in an article in Berlin's Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie, Jung writes:

"Freud has never propounded a cut-and-dried theory of hysteria ... his theoretical formulations can claim the status of a working hypothesis ..." (1908b, p.10).

Now, this statement should be evaluated in the light of the fact that Freud had already published a number of studies on hysteria and sexuality by then. Three years earlier, in two consecutive issues of the very same authoritative journal, Freud had published his "Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria" (1905b). Also, apart from his "Studies on Hysteria" (1895) with Breuer, major works had already appeared such as "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (1905), "My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses" (1906b), as well as his three books "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900), "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (1901), and

"Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious" (1905c). Thus Jung's unambiguous remarks about the inconclusive nature of Freud's theories on sexuality and hysteria should be accepted as reflecting his sincere understanding that his master's thesis on the sexual aetiology of neuroses and hysteria was not the final product but a mere "working hypothesis". Jung refused to accept them as definitive and perhaps in his own turn hoped that Freud "would come closer" to him! He continued

"... There can be no talk of a firmly-established Freudian theory of hysteria, but only of numerous experiences which have certain features in common ... we are not dealing with anything finished and conclusive, but rather with a process in development ..." (1908b, p.10).

And again,

"Since it has grown out of empirical practice, the theoretical foundations of the psycho-analytic method are still very obscure" (p.15).

In this review Jung proceeds to define Freud's view of the field and aims of his psychoanalytic researches. He easily accepts that Freud's view is "that hysteria is a psychogenic neurosis" (p.10) based on the theoretical presuppositions which (a) place hysteria in the context of "psychic dissociation and unconscious psychic automatisms" and (b) underline the "aetiological significance of affects" (p.10). One cannot fail to recognize the above as Jung's own theoretical presuppositions. As far as the aim of Freud's research is concerned, Jung again perceived it through the spectacles of his own aims, to discover

"... how the mechanism producing hysterical symptoms works. Nothing less is attempted, therefore, than to supply the missing link in the long chain between the initial cause and the ultimate symptom ..." (1908b, p.10).

Jung relates this search to the Breuer-Freud proposition "that the hysteric suffers most of all from reminiscences" and Jung immediately translates this into his own theoretical language:

"... i.e., from feeling-toned complexes of ideas which, in certain exceptional conditions, prevent the initial affect from working itself out and finally disappearing" (p.11).

Thus, right from the beginning of this review Jung transparently betrays his own reading of Freud which is unmistakably firmly located in his own language. The argument that Jung accepted the Freudian formulations as possible solutions to his own problematic is further supported by the subsequent exposition in that paper. This discussion will focus on the illustration of two further points: (a) Jung's translation of the Freudian theories into his own theory of complexes, and (b) Jung's treatment of the Freudian theory of sexuality.

(a) Jung attributes a central role to complexes in the Freudian theories. It should be noted that Freud himself hardly used the term "complex" a dozen times throughout the twenty-three volumes of his collected works! Despite his original praise of the term (1910c,p234) he later deplored it as irrelevant. But as far as Jung was concerned, the aim of psychoanalysis was

"... to bring to consciousness all the false

associative connections produced by the complex, and in that way resolve them. Thus the patient gradually gains complete insight into his illness, and also has an objective standpoint from which to view his complex" (p.15).

He further offers the following interpretation:

"If, as psychoanalysis presupposes, free association leads to the complex, Freud logically assumes that this complex is associated with the starting-point or initial idea" (p.10).

This assumption leads Jung to accept "... the initial idea as a sign or symbol of the complex" (p.16).

After some theoretical objections Jung finally agrees that it is possible to explore and reach the central core of complexes using the technique of free association, as

"... If you take any segment of the psychological present, it will logically contain all the antecedent individual events, the affective experiences ... that is, complexes ... occupying the foreground, according to the degree of their actuality. This is true of every particle of the psyche. Hence it is theoretically possible to reconstruct the constellation from every particle, and that is what the Freudian method tries to do" (p.16).

Nevertheless Jung does not restrain himself from a translation of the Freudian theories. He goes further in suggesting improvements derived from his own work. Having granted Freud the theoretical validity of his method of free association, Jung still remarks that



"it is extraordinarily difficult" and hazardous, and wonders why his own methods of word association developed in his researches on the association experiment are not used as an alternative:

"An altogether harmless but most instructive exercise, for instance, is the analysis of constellations indicating a complex in the association experiment. With the help of this perfectly harmless material a great many Freudian phenomena could be studied without undue difficulty" (p.18).

Jung basically felt that it was more difficult to use the directionless free association although it would finally lead to the pathogenic complex than the techniques of the association experiment. There, after the initial exposure to the entire list of stimulus-words the subject was asked to give his associations to specific key words that the experimenter had isolated as complex-indicators by virtue of the peculiar responses they had evoked. This technique was therefore more focused and directed though aiming at the very same target - the analysis of the complex.

(b) Jung correctly observed the centrality of sexuality in Freudian thought and always had a number of reservations as far as that position is concerned. In the paper under present examination the reservations and comments are characteristically exemplified:

(1) Firstly, Jung accepted the significance of sexuality as fitting his own theory. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jung had no difficulty acknowledging sexuality as one instance of affectivity. Neither had he any

qualms either in conceding that it is possible that one of the central affective events that is causative in the creation of a complex is of a sexual nature. He therefore saw it as perfectly legitimate for Freud to search for the "memory traces of sexual scenes in infancy" and also to point out the "sexual nature of the initial affect" (p.13).

- (II) Jung nevertheless doubted whether it was possible that all affective components could possibly be of a sexual nature. This view is obviously logical within the framework of his interpretation of sexuality.

"... No-one knows whether Freud's schema is applicable to all forms of hysteria" (p.23).

- (III) Jung at no stage accepted Freud's theory of infantile sexuality in its entirety, especially because of its restricted formulation in terms of (i) its definition of sexuality and (ii) its axiomatic and strong deterministic role in the development of personality. In this paper he voices again his disagreement:

"... Not that the frequency of sexual traumata in childhood could be doubted, but rather their exclusively pathogenic significance for normal children" (p.13).

- (IV) As far as the actual meaning of sexuality is concerned, it appears that the two men had different views. Jung always considered sexuality as something broader than the "libido sexualis". In this paper Jung in fact attributes a

similar interpretation to Freud:

"When Freud speaks of sexuality, it must not be understood merely as the sexual instinct"

and in a footnote continues

"Freud's concept of sexuality includes roughly everything covered by the concept of the instinct for the preservation of the species" (p.18).

And a little further, referring to "sexual excitation", Jung seems to feel the need to clarify it in terms of his own interpretation, and adds parenthetically: "in the widest sense of the word" (p.19).

In passing, it might be necessary to point out that Jung at a later stage, in his "Symbols of Transformation" quotes a long passage from Freud's "Psychoanalytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia" where the following is included

"... we regard instinct as being the concept on the frontier-line between the somatic and the mental, and see in it the psychical representative of organic forces. Further, we accept the popular distinction between ego-instincts and a sexual-instinct" (Freud 1911, p.74),

and in conjunction with his own understanding of certain other passages from the "Three Essays on Sexuality" concludes that

Freud indeed had expanded his definition of libido to refer not only to the sexual instinct per se, but to a broader concept of psychic energy. Jung therefore justified his conclusion by calling upon his reading of the above-mentioned passages. He wrote that the references to Freud which he had discussed

"... allowed me to identify 'psychic energy' with 'libido'. The latter term denotes a desire or impulse which is unchecked by any kind of authority, moral or otherwise. Libido is its natural state" (1952c, p.135).

- (V) This final point on Jung's comments on the Freudian theory of sexuality is, in a sense, an extension of the previous one. Let his words set the tone:

"The public can forgive Freud least of all for his sexual symbolism. In my view he is really easiest to follow here, because this is just where mythology, expressing the fantasy-thinking of all races, has prepared the ground in the most instructive way. I would only mention the writings of Steinthal in the 1860's, which prove the existence of a widespread sexual symbolism in the mythological records and the history of language. I also recall the eroticism of our poets and their allegorical or symbolical expressions. No one who considers this material will be able to conceal from himself that there are uncommonly far-fetching and significant analogies between the Freudian symbolisms and the symbols of poetic fantasy in individuals and in whole nations. The Freudian symbol and its interpretation is therefore nothing unheard of ..." (1908b, p.23 emphasis added).

This lengthy quotation speaks for itself! Having liberated sexuality from the confined limits of libido sexualis, Jung is thus free to observe and hail its wider connections with other spheres of human symbolic activity, such as mythology, poetry and language. This inevitably leads him to appreciate the importance of studying symbolism in its collective context.

Jung's evaluation of the Freudian theories, as typically presented in his article "The Freudian theory of hysteria" (1908b) could, at the same time, be considered as an indication of his own position at that time. This could be summed up as follows:

- (a) The theory of complexes still occupied a central place in Jung's thought. Having become part of the larger theoretical context of the psychoanalytic experience, complexes gained in both depth of understanding and width of application. Specifically, they were now related to hysterical phenomena, dreams, symbols and in general all manifestations of the unconscious that Freud discussed.
- (b) As far as Freud's theory of sexuality was concerned, Jung had clear and firm views. He was quite happy to accept its partial validity as long as it fitted into his own frame of reference. The concept of infantile sexuality as well as the exclusively sexual interpretation of complexes and psychopathological conditions were unacceptable to Jung. It is worth noting

that Jung became aware during this period of the wider implications of sexual symbolism. Areas such as mythology, history of language, artistic creativity, as well as individual and national symbolism were mentioned by Jung as being related to the field of sexual symbolism. Nevertheless, Jung, appreciating the difficulties that his readers might have with the Freudian theories of sexuality, urges them not to throw out the baby with the bathwater, and, if the "obtrusion of sexuality" puts them off (p.18), they should give psychoanalysis a fair chance as there is a lot more to it than mere sexual instincts!

#### THE OTHER AS SYMBOL

In the previous "psychiatric" period, Jung's formulation of the Other was seen to be reflected in his discussion of, inter alia, the Complex. In this chapter, Jung's further elaborations of the complexes were examined, and the following three observations can be made:

1. It appears that Jung gradually adopted symbol as an equivalent of complex. His description of their dynamics of formation and functioning, as discussed above, makes the claim of their equivalence justified. This exchange of terms, however, should not be seen as a static meaningless exercise. Located in its proper dynamic and developmental context it reveals that it was not a mere renaming, but a process with further implications: Jung

increasingly referred to symbols more as carriers of the meaning of complexes rather than as strict synonyms of complexes. Thus, one may observe that in this period Jung initially accepted the symbol as an alternative term for the complex, but soon this led to an expansion of the original denotation. Perhaps the most important extension which was in this manner introduced was the broadening of the meaning and application of the Other (as complex) by including more "shared" or 'collective' forms of Others.

2. More specifically, in examining this development within its historical context, it should be noted that Jung derived the "Shared" or 'Collective' complex from his earlier observations of patterns of complexes within families (1909, 1909b). He then found that certain complexes were shared by a number of members of the same family. A similar observation was made by Jung during this period as well. In his "Contribution to the psychology of rumour" (1911b) Jung discusses the case of a thirteen year old girl whose dream with sexual overtones directed toward her teacher, became instrumental in sparking a rumour about some alleged sexual involvement of the teacher. Jung's interpretation of that phenomenon indicates a manifestation of a general sexual complex that all the girl students "shared".

The researcher, however, finds no further reference in Jung's work to this specific type of "shared" complex as such, and the following inference may be formed, therefore, with some substantiation - that Jung found it extremely difficult to continue referring to this kind of Other within the existing system of the Other-as-complex, and in order to expound on this "shared"

and 'collective' Other he had to move on to a new conceptual framework, i.e. the Other-as-symbol. The latter offered him a more fertile ground for cultivating his novel phenomenon, and a better opportunity for investigating its ramifications and consequences. Hence the extension of complex to relate to symbolic activities represents an advanced formulation of the "shared" complex. The Other-as-symbol enables Jung to explicitly associate the Other with mythology, history of language, artistic creativity, as well as with the national, racial and collective network of symbolism; so much so that Jung as early as 1908 writes about symbols of "whole nations" (1908b, p.23).

3. The third point concerns the issue of language, in particular. First of all, the shift from the complex to symbol should be properly appreciated. Complexes were defined in terms of individual psychological functioning. Symbols, on the other hand, are located within the cultural, mythological, religious and artistic contexts. It is logical therefore that Jung included history of language as one of the spheres where symbols are manifested. To return to the "Freudian theory of hysteria", Jung applauds Freud's references to language and "verbal expression" (1908b, p.17) as, one should not forget, he himself had a clear understanding throughout his researches in the association experiment, that what he was in fact investigating was not a "pure" association but only a language association (vide supra, p.187f). Jung never abandoned that original understanding and was carefully observing its relevance at each stage of his development. That is perhaps why he prefers his



own method of word association to Freud's elusive free association.

In the former the actual activity is named properly. There is no pure association; only verbal association. Why then not call it so?

The differences, naturally, between these two methods are not confined to their names. As outlined in this chapter, in the Jungian method further associations were sought to the key, complex-indicator words, whereas in the Freudian method, associations were free and without guidance. In a supplement to his significant book, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox", Jung raises verbal expression as a "special point". He maintains that "innovations of language" in patients should be accepted as meaningful communications and not gibberish. They are "technical terms serving to designate in concise form certain complicated ideas". He sees no difference in essence between "pathological" speech and the formation of technical terms except that in patients it develops much too quickly to allow the normal process of assimilation. He further suggests that

"... a philologist would be able to make valuable observations on speech-confused patients which would help us to understand the normal changes that have occurred in the history of language" (1907, pp.146-147).

## TRANSITION

During this "psychoanalytic" period, Jung made some significant contributions. These should be appreciated in the light of the discussion which emphasised that Jung entered into that fateful relationship with Freud although always maintaining his own basic orientation, viz. his problematic of the Other. In his association with Freud and the broader psychoanalytic movement Jung accepted only those doctrines that assisted him in further developing his own problematic, the formulation of the Other, and discarded those that he perceived as irrelevant to this central theme.

Specifically, Jung deepened and expanded his understanding of the complex. He analysed it further in terms of its components and functions, and connected it with symbol. Perhaps the most important implication of this extension was the broadening of this concept to include more collective forms of complexes and a more general and collective understanding of the Other.

Finally, an overview of the development of Jung's formulations of the Other is necessary at this stage again. The following formulations have so far been identified and discussed:

### 1. From the CHILDHOOD AND PREPSYCHIATRIC PERIOD

The Other as fire, stone and pebble, and manikin

these could be understood as global, undifferentiated, primitive forms of animistic Others

#### The Other as No.2 personality

although still a global and undifferentiated Other, No.2 was nevertheless of a human form. This development toward differentiation, however, produces a new problem, i.e. the possibility of a dual or split personality.

#### 2. From the PSYCHIATRIC PERIOD

##### Fragment Other and Anticipated Whole Other

The former was a further personalised Other which was differentiated to such a degree that it constituted almost a unidimensional mini personality (extreme unconscious tendency, either of an exaggerated unctuous or childish type); inevitably such an Other was acting in a highly fragmenting way by splitting the personality. The latter, although also of a personalised nature has unifying qualities. Thus the two types of Others could be understood as being of a different order, i.e. whereas the F.O. represents an existing Other competing with the ego personality (and tending towards splitting the total personality), the A.W.O. not only is not in competition with the ego personality, but it also guides and anticipates its expansion. Both nevertheless are more specific Others in a human form.

The Other as Complex (with particular reference to association)

In this formulation the Other ceases to have a fairly distinct human form, and instead is explained in terms of its even further specific functions. In doing so, Jung is able to examine more carefully its overall phenomenology, functions, origins and nature. It is noteworthy repeating here his attempt at offering some kind of biological substratum to the complex (through his tentative theory of toxins).

3. From the PSYCHOANALYTIC PERIOD

The Other as Complex (with particular reference to unconscious)

The examination of the Other in terms of specific functions continues. Here the Other is studied in its relation to the unconscious, sexuality, trauma and other Freudian concepts.

The Other as Symbol

In examining the specific functions of the Other, Jung gradually discovers connections with the entire network of collective symbolism, and however paradoxical it may seem, the further he proceeds analytically in his investigations of the differentiated functions of the Other, the more he, in fact, works synthetically in unifying antithetical individual tendencies by placing them in their collective, global, yet at the same time human contexts.

An examination of these different formulations of the Other reveals the following tendency:

Jung started off from a non-human, animistic, global and undifferentiated Other and gradually in an analytical way he followed its differentiation to a human global Other, a personalized differentiated Other, an Other with specific functions. He carefully isolated its body, dissected it and studied and identified its various parts, aspects, qualities, textures and functions. But, as a true student of Goethe (and also a descendent of his, perhaps more<sup>+</sup> than in the sense of intellectual tradition!) he was well aware of the trap suggested by Mephistopheles:

"He who wants to comprehend a living thing  
Seeks first to drive the spirit out,  
He then holds the pieces in his hand,  
Merely lacks perforce the living link"  
(Faust, Part 1, Scene IV).

Jung, despite his successful apprenticeship in the analytical departments of science, could not possibly have neglected that "living link" and had no desire to drive "the spirit out", because his whole problematic of the Other was precisely the comprehension of this crucial link, the living link.

By the end of the psychoanalytic period, Jung started seeing the generality of the Other and through the new system of the Other-as-symbol, made moves to identify its functioning in larger groups of people. He had, of course, earlier suggested that No.2 Personalities

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<sup>+</sup> The allusion here is made to rumours of C.G. Jung being a blood descendent of Goethe (e.g. in Jaffé 1979, p.11).

exist in all people and that the A.W.O. had transpersonal qualities, but in both instances he did not elaborate further on the matter, and maybe he was not able to within those conceptual frameworks. No.2 personality was a crude global other personality split from the ego personality, and without much empirical foundation; the A.W.O. was conceived within the restrictive theory of association and complex and by virtue of its anticipated and projected nature, which was not rooted in the present, had a quality of intangibility. This did not render it to empirical study. In the Other-as-symbol system, Jung attempts to reconnect the pieces and explore the living link. The global Other, unlike the animistic fire and pebble is now of a human nature, with differentiated analysed functions. This is a prima facie return to the original globality, but with the vital difference of differentiation. The Other-as-symbol is now understood by Jung no longer as an unspecific principle or as specific personalities, but as specific structuring principles.

## PART TWO

### Chapter Four

#### C.G. Jung: The Break trilogy.

"...When tired of being happy and unhappy,  
you mined into yourself and painfully  
climbed with an insight, almost breaking down  
under the weight of dark discovery:  
you carried what you never recognized,  
you carried joy, you carried through your blood  
your little saviour's burden to the shore ..."

R.M. Rilke

From Requiem for Wolf Graf von Kalckreuth.

### THE BREAK

"When I parted from Freud, I knew that I was plunging into the unknown. Beyond Freud, after all, I knew nothing; But I had taken the step into darkness ..."

Jung (1963, p.224).

In this chapter-interlude, the examination of Jung's life and work in the light of his problematic of the Other will cover roughly the period between the years 1912 - 1917. It is called "chapter-interlude" because this period, as a significant landmark, stands in the middle of Jung's theoretical development, viz. in between his early Psychiatric and Psychoanalytic periods, and his subsequent Years of Individuation. In this context, therefore, the intended meaning of interlude is not that of an interval or pause, a cessation of performance in between acts, but rather, according to its original and literal signification, i.e. an inter-play, a "short dramatic performance between the acts" (Wyld and Partridge 1968, p.750). And indeed dramatic it was! In the preceding chapters the Freud-Jung relationship has been reviewed mainly from two perspectives: Psychological and Theoretical.

Psychological: The investigation so far of certain elements of the association and friendship between the two men indicates the following four characteristics: a) Jung admired Freud as an original thinker and theorist as well as an inspiring personal mentor; b) the mutual esteem in which they held each other overshadowed



sporadic flashes of their differences which both wished in time would pass; c) Freud not only appreciated Jung's original contribution to the psychoanalytic school, but also had a strong personal fondness of him; d) In view of the above, it appears that the relationship was advantageous to both men and well timed in terms of their respective development.

Theoretical: It has been argued that Jung's adoption of the psychoanalytic framework and utilization of its terminology within which he formulated his own insights and research findings was based on his realization of the positive implications that it had for furthering his understanding of his own problematic. This argument emphasizes clearly Jung's theoretical independence despite his sojourn in the psychoanalytic territory, and moreover identifies the theoretical kinship of this independence.

These two perspectives form the backdrop to the drama. As the main plot is well known and of no direct interest to this investigation only some reverberations and distant echoes will enter the narrative here. To begin with, the very characterization break appears to be a misnomer. How should this break be understood in the light of all the discussed evidence? How can the characterization break apply to a relationship where differences always existed and were even acknowledged? How should one interpret Jung's own words "beyond Freud I knew nothing" (which appear in the motto of this chapter), if the testimony, that Jung remained consistent in the pursuit of his own problematic throughout the course of their relationship, is accepted?

The attempt to achieve some lucidity on this issue will follow two steps: a logical, conceptual clarification, and a hermeneutic exploration.

On a purely logical basis, the break refers to the termination of the externally manifested forms of personal friendship and professional association between Freud and Jung. The qualification of 'externally manifested forms' is here indicated as it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to determine when the friendship between the two men ended (if it at all ended) in view of what has been said in the previous chapter with regard to Jung's loyalty to Freud. The same applies to their professional association: one may argue that at least certain themes (if not actual theories) followed by Freud were the direct or indirect product of his association with Jung, and vice versa. In other words, it is inevitable that after a period of close contact between two theorists, their subsequent intellectual fruits are affected by their earlier interpollination to such a degree that would render untrue any categorical statement concerning either a clear termination of their professional association, or their complete theoretical independence.

Yet, a break of some kind did indeed occur in the Jung-Freud relationship. It is a historical fact and it is well documented and discussed by many authors (e.g. Balogh 1971; Brome 1967, 1978; Edelheit 1964; Fine 1979; Freud 1914, 1925; Glover 1950; Hannah 1976; Jones 1957; Jung 1931, 1935, 1946, 1948c, 1950, 1961, 1963; Mannoni 1971; McGuire 1974; Roazen 1973, 1974; Schur 1972; Stern 1977; Weigert 1942; Yandell 1978). However, in order to come nearer to the meaning and

exact nature of this break, a hermeneutic exploration is imperative.

Hermeneutics, being the "system by which the deeper significance is revealed beneath the manifest content" (Palmer 1969, p.44) would constitute the most appropriate method for such an undertaking. A major aspect of any hermeneutic investigation is the initial establishment of the textual context of original sources in order to arrive at the problematic; which will in turn be interpreted (cf. Laplanche 1970). In this study, it is imperative to delineate the account of the actual events surrounding the break between Jung and Freud from the numerous exegetical attempts, even (or rather especially) when these come from the protagonists themselves. This very issue is dealt with by Paul E. Stepansky, who, questioning the validity of Freud's and Jung's "retrospective judgements" concerning the break, which appeared in their writings of many years later, states

"... though illuminating from a psychobiographical perspective, constitute a relative stumbling block for the historian of psychoanalysis" (1976, p.217).

Isolating events from lives of people-legends is not easy. Ordinary events were subsequently loaded with biased interpretations. Theodor Reik, referring to Freud, expressed it very aptly when he wrote

"... in retrospect, words he had spoken in everyday conversation acquired undreamed-of significance; casual remarks echoed in our minds for years afterwards ..." (1940, p.27).

Dr K.R. Eissler (1971) comes to a similar conclusion after a detailed

analysis of the much discussed event of Freud's "unusual behaviour" during the Munich Conference of the International Psychoanalytic Association (November 1912). Freud allegedly confronted Jung because of his partizan attitude and it is said that in the ensuing discussion Freud fainted in the arms of Jung. This is often considered as the coup de grâce of their relationship. Eissler's examination of various reports of that incident, including both Freud's and Jung's own separate accounts, lead him to conclude that "Freud's behaviour in Munich cannot be properly evaluated". In summing up the usefulness of that exercise he remarks on "... how difficult it is to interpret a single biographical incident" (Eissler 1971, p.144).

One should, therefore, treat very cautiously the subsequent exposition of and commentary on the 'facts' of the break as given by Freud and Jung, despite their seeming authenticity.

Before enquiring into the theoretical positions held by Jung and in comparison to the Freudian ones during the period of and shortly after the break (where in fact the main interest of this section lies), it will still be necessary to examine one further aspect of their relationship, viz. the political aspect, as some authors have claimed this to be the decisive factor resulting in the break (e.g. Stepansky 1976; Roazen 1974). Although political dimensions of their association have already been discussed in earlier parts of this thesis, it is felt that since reference to them was made in passing and as part of the other two perspectives (psychological and theoretical) which were analysed, a separate short review of them is indicated.

Many authors have made explicit or implicit comparisons between the Psychoanalytic movement and various non-scientific organizations, e.g. with industrial corporations (Szasz 1963), Lenin's revolution (Roazen 1973), religious groups (Brown 1959; Lesse 1972; Suzuki, Fromm and De Martino 1974), political parties (Fromm 1959), cultural organizations (Kazin 1958) and social institutions (Szasz 1961). The argument here is that Freud's dealings with his disciples were primarily geared toward furthering the cause and strengthening the position of the "organization", and any other theoretical or personal motives were of secondary importance. Exemplifying this, Stepansky (1976) has presented the political dimensions involved in the Jung-Freud relationship in a concise manner by quoting three incidents to indicate Freud's biased position toward Jung:

In the first one, Freud attempted to appease Karl Abraham's dissatisfaction with Jung; the master pleaded with the distressed disciple to "be tolerant" with Jung as, the latter being a "non-Jew" and even a "pastor's son", did not share the same "intellectual constitution" and "racial kinship" that they did, and affirmed that Jung's

"... association with us is the more valuable for that. I nearly said that it was only his appearance on the scene that psychoanalysis escaped the danger of becoming a Jewish national affair" (Freud, In Stepansky 1976, p.237).

In the second, Freud openly admitted in a letter to Jung

"My selfish purpose, which I frankly confess is to

persuade you to continue and complete my work by applying to psychoses what I have begun with neuroses. With your strong and independent character, with your Germanic blood which enables you to command the sympathies of the public more readily than I, you seem better fitted than anyone else I know to carry out this mission" (Freud In Stepansky 1976, pp.237-8).

In the third excerpt, Stepansky quotes from Wittels' biography on Freud. Describing the incident following Jung's election as president of the International Psychoanalytical Association at the second congress in 1910, Wittels recalls how the Viennese analysts were angry with Jung's new post and how Freud tried to pacify them:

"'Most of you are Jews, and therefore are incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form ties in the world of general science. I am getting on in years, and am weary of being perpetually attacked. We are all in danger.' Seizing his coat by the lapels, he said, 'They won't even leave me a coat to my back. The Swiss will save us - will save me, and all of you as well' " (Freud In Stepansky 1976, p.238).

Stekel's version of the same event has it that Freud walked into the "secret meeting" of Viennese psychoanalysts called by Stekel himself to discuss strategies to counter Ferenczi's proposition during the first session of the same Congress, that Jung should be elected as life-time president. Stekel parenthetically notes that Ferenczi's proposal was "induced" by Freud (Stekel 1950, p.127). In Stekel's words, Freud entered the room and

"... was greatly excited, and tried to persuade us

to accept Ferenczi's motion; he predicted hard times and a strong opposition by official science. He grasped his coat and cried, 'They begrudge me the coat I am wearing; I don't know whether in the future I will earn my daily bread.' Tears were streaming down his cheeks. 'An official psychiatrist and a gentile must be the leader of the movement.' He foresaw a growing anti-Semitism. We tried to persuade him that his misgivings were exaggerated. There was a long argument pro and con. Finally he proposed a compromise. We should elect a president to serve for two years, and every two years there should be a new election... We accepted the compromise advocated by our adored master. As a result, at the next session Jung was elected president to serve for two years; but Freud was surprised when I announced that Adler and I were going to found an independent monthly journal devoted to psychoanalysis [and separate from the official one edited by Jung] ... The fight with Jung was on ..." (Stekel 1950, pp.128-9).

Referring to his own "separation" from Freud, Stekel pensively reflected "Perhaps Jung was working against me, and Freud was afraid to lose him" (1950, p.142). He blamed Jung directly again in his last interchange with Freud, which, according to him, ran as follows:

" 'Dear Master', I said, 'I am afraid that in a short time you will see you have sacrificed your most faithful collaborator for an ungrateful one. Jung will not remain a Freudian long.' 'Let's hope you are mistaken,' answered Freud, sighing" (1950, p.143).

These two versions differ only in intensity rather than essence and both depict clearly Freud's desperate wish to give Jung a prominent place in the budding psychoanalytic movement. His reasons, according to the above excerpts, were "political" and unrelated to Jung, the person. Years later, in 1930, Freud, reflecting on his attempt "to put Jung at the head of psychoanalysis" (Blanton 1971, p.43), and on

the occasion of the publication of a book by Dr Roback where psychoanalysis was presented as a product of the Jewish mind, said:

"... At the time, I felt that people would think of psychoanalysis as a Jewish movement. Now, Roback is not unfriendly to psychoanalysis, yet he thinks of it as a Jewish movement - so you see I was right ... But Jung proved to be a failure" (Blanton 1971, p.43).

Freud very clearly verbalised that his priority lay with the 'organization' rather than individual disciples when he wrote to Oskar Pfister (in 1913):

"... Do not have too much confidence in a lasting personal agreement between me and Jung. He demands too much of me, and I am retreating from my overestimation of him. It will be sufficient if the unity of the association is maintained" (Meng and Freud 1963, p.59).

The above discussion has highlighted the issue of the ethnic difference between Freud and Jung. On the one hand, much has been made of the "Blond Siegfried's" (Jung's characterization in the early Psychoanalytic circles, especially by Viennese Jewish analysts; cf. Progoff 1956) gentile identity in the writings of the Freudian school, culminating in the ugly accusations of his "Fascist corruption" (sic!) (Schneider 1950). Characteristic is the discussion of the following episode by Max Schur in his otherwise balanced biography of Freud. Referring to the re-election of Jung as president at the Fourth International Psychoanalytical Congress in 1913 in Munich, and the Freudian followers' abstention from voting, he wrote:



"When Jung noted that Jones was among the dissidents, he remarked to the latter: 'I thought you were a Christian [i.e. a non-Jew].' Jones' comment (Vol. 2, p.102f), 'It sounded an irrelevant remark, but presumably it had some meaning,' proved to be an understatement in view of Jung's stand during the Hitler period" (Schur 1972, p.272).

On the other hand, Freud's own ambivalent stand toward his Jewish identity received much more attention (e.g. Bakan 1958; E.Freud 1970; Gay 1978; Heer 1972; Loewenberg 1970; Menninger 1959; Robert 1974; Simon 1957). Freud's emphasis of Jung's non-Jewishness might therefore be more indicative of his own inner struggle than an objective assessment of the positive political role of a gentile in the psychoanalytical movement of the time. The almost messianic qualities attributed to Jung by Freud in the earlier passages are glaringly apparent. In other words, it still remains debatable how purely political the 'political' aspects of their relationship were. Freud's own psychological motives as well as his attachment to Jung, the person, appear to play an equally important part with the undeniably objective political considerations.

This discussion has established that Freud defended Jung rather vehemently against the Viennese analysts. This fact could be seen as a political manoeuvre on Freud's behalf to further the "cause" (as it was usually referred to) of psychoanalysis. The same fact might also be understood in terms of Freud's own psychological needs concerning either his ambivalent position with regard to his Jewish identity, and/or his attraction to Jung as a friend, disciple and "crown prince". The significance of non-political dimensions in the Jung-Freud relationship (and break) is strengthened by accounts

and interpretations emphasizing Freud's standing ambivalence toward his disciples and collaborators in general. Max Schur (1972), for example, sees the Freud-Jung break as a "revival" of Freud's central "old conflict" which was first manifested in his relationship with and break from Wilhelm Fliess. In a further example, Colin Wilson describes the Freud-Jung relationship as "... yet another version of [Freud's] relation with his nephew, John" (1972, p.107).

The purpose of the above hermeneutical excursion to the central theme of this study is to throw some light on the paradoxical phenomenon of Freud's excessive tolerance of Jung's independent theoretical positions, which only at times coincided with the orthodox psychoanalysis but more than often expressed an unambiguous reservation or even rejection of it. This discussion indeed revealed other than theoretical reasons (i.e. psychological, political and personal) responsible for Freud's almost stubborn blindness to Jung's theoretical diversity. This finding renders the whole issue of the break more intelligible: i.e. the implication is that since Freud's prime motive for his persistent association with Jung was of a non-theoretical nature ( viz. a personal, psychological and political nature), the break should also be understood in terms of this prime motive. Therefore, no theoretical disagreements between the two men should be sought to elucidate the meaning of their break.

The claim that their theoretical differences cannot be held responsible for the termination of their association can further be substantiated by the following discussion, in which previously mentioned and additional evidence will be presented to indicate that a) not only can there be no talk of a previous unity of theoretical

positions (which would in turn justify the use of the word 'break'), but also b) the theoretical standpoints held by the two theorists shortly before, during and shortly after the break did not alter significantly.

In previous parts of this study the point was repeatedly made that Jung at all times followed his own problematic and that his theoretical positions were always dictated by that problematic, i.e. the quest for the meaning of the Other. Jung's "Freudian period" was thus understood as a time when he utilized the Freudian terminology to express his own positions. Moreover, during that period, actual explicit differences were traced and discussed, concerning specific theoretical issues (e.g. the sexual hypothesis, libido). Yet, the impression is created that Jung was initially a disciple of Freud's, that they both shared a unified body of theory until at a certain point Jung broke away from it, to develop his own separate theories. The paradox, however, is that Freud and Jung themselves were responsible for starting and spreading this view which was later picked up and propagated by their respective disciples. According to this view, the reasons for the break were based on theoretical differences. Characteristic examples are the following:

Jung in his Tavistock lectures said:

"... I started out entirely on Freud's lines. I was even considered to be his best disciple. I was on excellent terms with him until I had the idea that certain things are symbolical. Freud would not agree to this ..." (1935, p.125 emphasis added).

It is worth noting that Jung, as seen in this excerpt, was not satisfied with merely stating his alleged theoretical origins, but apparently needed to emphasize further his Freudian background. The usual reasons for the break are also reiterated here in the same excerpt; theoretical differences. This is still clearer in the following quotation:

"... When Freud publicly declared that psychoanalysis and his sexual theory were indissolubly wedded, I was obliged to strike out on a different path, and I was unable to endorse his one-sided views ..."  
(Jung 1946, pp.96-7).

This claim is in sharp contrast to the evidence presented in the preceding chapters where Jung openly communicated to Freud his reservations and rejection of the "sexual hypothesis" and Freud was fully aware of them and still accepted the state of affairs as it was. To strengthen the latter point, Freud's own words are illuminating. In July 1912 he wrote to his good friend, the Swiss pastor, Oskar Pfister:

" ... It is a pity that you did not meet or speak to Jung. You could have told him from me that he is at perfect liberty to develop views divergent from mine, and that I ask him to do so without a bad conscience ..." (Meng and Freud 1963. pp.56-7).

Freud's message here is unambiguously clear. Binswanger's record (1957) of his friendship with Freud, which could be read as a tribute to Freud's ability not only to tolerate his friend's theoretical differences, but also to continue his selfless support and encouragement of them, gives additional validation to Freud's magnanimity which

is here expressed. Yet a very dramatic turn takes place within the following few months in his attitude to Jung's "divergent views".

It is worth tracing it. Five months later (9 December 1912) Freud writes to Pfister:

"... Naturally I am very pleased at your opposition to Jung's innovations..."

A rather startling contrast to the earlier letter! and Freud continues:

"... but do not expect me to write anything against him. My disagreement is too obvious to make any impression ..."

And the same paragraph ends in the following revealing manner:

"But I think he will receive a great deal of criticism from most of the leading analysts. So you will not be isolated in this purely internal and objective battle. I wonder what sort of technique he uses to arrive at such views" (Meng and Freud 1963, p.58).

It should be remembered that a month earlier (in November 1912) the famous incident in Munich (which was mentioned above) took place. Two more samples of Freud's feelings toward Jung as expressed in the same correspondence are of interest. Hardly a month later the sudden gap between Freud and Jung seems to broaden. It was in this letter of 1 January 1913 that Freud wrote the telling excerpt which has already been quoted earlier (but which is nevertheless repeated here due to its significance):

"... Do not have too much confidence in a lasting personal agreement between me and Jung. He demands too much of me, and I am retreating from my overestimation of him. It will be sufficient if the unity of the association is maintained" (Meng and Freud 1963, p.59).

Further, Freud two months later (11 March 1913) writes to Pfister:

"My congratulations on having finished your book. I hope that in my judgement of it I shall once more see eye to eye with Jung ..."! (Meng and Freud 1963, p.60).

In these few passages from Freud's letters to Pfister one may witness the amazing change in Freud's attitude: from extreme tolerance of Jung's "divergent" views to open rejection of them (to such an extent that his "disagreement was so great that he felt that no critique would make any 'impression'", to the final yearning to "see eye to eye with Jung". This oscillation augments the argument that it was not the theoretical differences per se responsible for the break, but others of a more personal, psychological and partly political nature.

One may justifiably question both Freud's and Jung's motives for initiating and spreading an account of their relationship and subsequent break which, according to the presentation here, does not correspond to the actual facts. The way of answering this legitimate query should include further exploration of whether the two men experienced these facts as facts. It is possible that for certain psychological reasons they were not aware of these facts in the same manner as were unfolded here. It is also possible therefore that they were not aware of the contradictory nature of their account of the break. It might further be possible that they were in full knowledge of the

discrepancy between their accounts and the actual events, but for various reasons (personal, psychological and political), they tainted the truth! An investigation into this issue forms a separate problematic of its own, and will obviously not be followed here.

The most frequently mentioned cause of the break is Jung's book Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (1911-12). In Memories, Dreams, Reflections Jung in no ambiguous terms described this book's decisive role in the break. He wrote that after he realised that for Freud the theory of sexuality did not represent a working hypothesis, but "some kind of dogma" he was left with "no choice ... but to withdraw" (Jung 1963, p.191) from the Freudian psychoanalysis. It was in the Wandlungen that he intended to expand along his own path away from the Freudian emphasis on sexuality and he conveyed the magnitude of his dilemma in that he could not touch his pen for two months. The conflict between keeping Freud's friendship and freely expressing his own ideas was very painful, and

" ...At last I resolved to go ahead with the writing -  
and it did indeed cost me Freud's friendship" (Jung 1963, p.191).

The heretical thoughts printed in that book are taken to be, in broad terms, Jung's preoccupation with symbolical and mythological dimensions of libido with all its implications of a 'desexualized' conception of libido. Yet, as previously discussed, Jung held these same positions even earlier and with Freud's full knowledge. In addition, the following evidence gives more credence to the argument that it was not the theoretical differences, exclusively, between the two men that led to the break.

In contrast to the claims Jung made in his memoirs, Freud's reaction to the

draft of the Wandlungen was that of approval! After some specific comments and some disagreements, Freud in his letter to Jung (circa 22 June 1910) concludes:

"... Nevertheless everything essential in your essay is right" (McGuire 1974, p.335).

Jung, virtually by return mail (26 June 1910) replies:

"... Today being Sunday I am using it to go over your critique in peace. I am most grateful to you and quite agree with what you say ..." (McGuire 1974, p.335 emphasis added).

A little further he reassures Freud

"... I am always open to good advice" (p.338).

Freud's next letter (5 July 1910) includes a rather remorseful note:

"... Today I see that my criticism was quite premature"

and adds

"Still , I believe that such far-reaching interpretations cannot be stated so succinctly but must be accompanied by ample proof, which, I am sure, you will now add" (McGuire 1974, p.338).

In other words, Freud stuck to his original evaluation of the work that "everything essential" was "right" and only due to its succinct form, additional substantiation from the literature was needed.

It is of some interest to examine the notorious 'libido theory', which in addition to previously discussed factors is also commonly held responsible for the break. In the chapter on "The conception and the genetic theory of libido" of the Wandlungen (the same chapter in the Collected Works, which is based on the extensively revised edition of 1952, is called "The concept of libido") Jung gave a clear account of the history and origin of the term. It is of great importance to follow this account and especially the discrepancy between the original and the 1952 editions carefully. Jung started with Freud's introduction of the term in his "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (Freud 1905) and commented:



"... There the term libido is conceived by him in the original narrow sense of sexual impulse, sexual need" (original edition, English translation 1919, p.77),

which implied that there was a later sense of the term which was not "narrow". But even within this "narrow" usage, Jung clarified that

"... despite his definition of libido as sexuality, Freud does not explain 'everything' in terms of sex, as is commonly supposed ..." (translation of the 1952 edition, p.132).

It is highly significant that this last statement survived all editions (unlike many parts of this book concerning his theoretical kinship with Freud). This makes it an undeniable fact that Jung at least until 1952 did not share what is "commonly supposed" about Freud's theory of sexuality! Returning to his reading of Freud, the previous quotation continues as follows:

"... but recognizes the existence of special instinctual forces whose nature is not clearly known ... At the back of all this lies the hypothetical idea of a 'bundle of instincts', in which the sexual instinct figures as a partial instinct ..." (1952c, p.132).

In another example of his understanding of the Freudian libido, Jung stated:

"Later, however, Freud was forced to ponder whether libido might not in the end coincide with interest in general" (1952c, p.133).

It is again worth registering that this is how Jung viewed Freud's libido theory more than a decade after the master's death!

The last piece to be considered here, and perhaps the most revealing one, is a discrepancy between the two editions. It only appears in the original edition of the Wandlungen and is missing totally from the 1952 one.

It reads:

"Since the appearance of the "Three Contributions"  
[i.e. "Three Essays"] in 1905, a change has taken place  
in the libido conception; its field of application has  
been widened. An extremely clear example of this  
amplification is this present work. However, I must  
state that Freud, as well as myself, saw the need of  
widening the conception of libido ..." ! (1917, p.77 emphasis added).

This demonstrates Jung's sincere understanding of Freud's concepts of  
libido and sexuality, during the period of writing the Wandlungen, and his  
own relation to those concepts. Specifically, he accepted that the  
"narrow" concept of libido, as expressed in the "Three Essays", was not  
as simplistically sexual as 'commonly supposed', and , moreover, both  
Freud and himself "saw the need of widening" it; finally, as a faithful  
adherent of the Freudian psychoanalysis, he took it upon himself to under-  
take such a task and, here, in the Wandlungen was doing precisely that,  
i.e. continuing the "widening" of that concept according to both Freud's  
and his common design.

Such a reading of the state of affairs allows no room for the claim that  
the Wandlungen represented Jung's major deviation from the Freudian "dogma".  
This reading is further supported by the correspondence between the two  
men.

In order to present a fuller picture of their correspondence and especially  
to provide the developmental background which led to Freud's positive  
assessment of Jung's draft of the Wandlungen it would be useful to start  
with Jung's letter to Freud dated 14 October 1909. In that letter, Jung,  
greatly inspired by Freud's analysis of the Rat Man (1909) responds in the

following manner concerning the implications of that analysis:

"... I am obsessed by the thought of one day writing a comprehensive account of this whole field, after years of fact-finding and preparation, of course. The net should be cast wide. Archeology or rather mythology has got me in its grip, its a mine of marvelous material. Won't you cast a beam of light in that direction, at least a kind of spectrum analysis par distance?" (McGuire 1974, pp.251-2).

Parenthetically, it is worth noting the streak of prophesy in these words: Jung indeed followed that direction and "after years of fact-finding and preparation" did cast the net wide.

Freud's reply (17 October 1909) to this letter states clearly:

"... I am glad you share my belief that we must conquer the whole field of mythology..." (McGuire 1974, p.255 emphasis added).

It is interesting that from this correspondence an unclear account emerges as to whose original idea it was to "conquer the field of mythology". Nevertheless it is definitely clear that both men were extremely enthusiastic about their new expansions into the virgin field of mythology. Freud, in the same letter (17 October), adds:

"...I have had an inspiration ... The riddle of Leonardo da Vinci's character has suddenly become clear to me ..."

And Jung again writes (8 November 1909):

"...One of the reasons why I didn't write for so long is that I was immersed every evening in the history of symbols, i.e., in mythology and archeology ... All my delight in archeology (buried for years) has sprung into life again ... If I come to Vienna in the spring, I hope to bring you various ancient novelties ..."  
(McGuire 1974, p.258).

Freud, obviously pleased, replies (11 November 1909):

"... I was delighted to learn that you are going into mythology. A little less loneliness. I can't wait to hear of your discoveries ... But recently chance brought me a young Gymnasium teacher who is studying mythology. His ideas are similar to ours (emphasis added), but backed up by solid erudition..." (McGuire 1974, p.260).

The same pattern continues. Jung writes (15 November 1909):

"... Now to better things - mythology. For me there is no longer any doubt what the oldest and most natural myths are trying to say. They speak quite "naturally" of the nuclear complex of neurosis ..."

and after some specific examples of his insights into mythological themes he candidly confesses:

"... I am painfully aware of my utter dilettantism and continually fear I am dishing you out banalities ..."  
(McGuire 1974, p.263).

Freud replies with the almost adolescent excitement of a new discovery:

"... I am delighted with your mythological studies. Much of what you write is quite new to me ... These things cry out for understanding and as long as the specialists won't help us, we shall have to do it ourselves ... And isn't it odd that none of the mythologists ... has seen the need for an interpretation on different levels! We really ought to shake them into consciousness ... I do wish I could show you my analysis of Leonardo da Vinci, I am desperately sorry not to have you here..."

and he also admits

"... I am coming to attach more and more importance to the infantile theories of sexuality. My treatment of them, incidentally, is deplorably incomplete ..." (McGuire 1974, pp.265-6).

No wonder Jung did not accept these theories as definite and final facts, but only as hypothesis (cf previous chapter).

This common search into mythology expanded Jung's horizons and openly communicated themes that were later to become significant aspects of his own theoretical "school":

"... I feel more and more that a thorough understanding of the psyche... will only come through history or with its help. Just as an understanding of anatomy and ontogenesis is possible only on the basis of phylogenesis and comparative anatomy. For this reason antiquity now appears to me in a new and significant light. What we now find in the individual psyche - in compressed, stunted, or one-sidedly differentiated form - may be seen spread out in all its fullness in times past. Happy the man who can read these signs!" (McGuire 1974, p.269)

And he too reiterates the same wish: "I often wish I had you near me."

So many things to ask you..." (p.270).

Freud replies: "... your letters delight me because they suggest a frenzy of satisfying work ..." (p.272), and about a month later he expresses again his joy at the new collaboration:

"... your displeasure at my longing for an army of philosophical collaborators is music to my ears. I am delighted that you yourself take this interest so seriously, that you yourself wish to be this army; I could have dreamed of nothing better but simply did not suspect that mythology and archeology had taken such a powerful hold on you..." (p.282).

This should be sufficient to silence the usual commentators who attribute the break to Jung's branching off into mythology. Freud then advises:

"... I don't think it would be a good idea to plunge directly into the general problem of ancient mythology; it strikes me as preferable to approach it in a series of detailed studies..." (p.282).

This is precisely what Jung attempted in the Wandlungen and his later studies. He followed his older friend's advice, breaking this field down into smaller manageable studies, as well as providing "erudite", "ample proof" for the "far-reaching interpretations". Jung confirms this "hold". On 10 January 1910 he writes:

"... mythology certainly has me in its grip" and he explains "I bring to it a good deal of archeological interest from my early days..." (McGuire 1974, p. 285).

For the first time Jung writes to Freud about the Wandlungen (then in the form of two public lectures he gave) at the end of the same month:

"... the subject was 'symbolism'. I have worked at it and have tried to put the 'symbolic' on a psychogenetic foundation, i.e., to show that in the individual fantasy the primum movens, the individual conflict, material or form (whichever you prefer), is mythic, or mythologically typical ..." (p.288).

And yet again Freud's agreement, support and encouragement is beyond any question. Within a week he replies (on 2 February 1910):

"... Your deepened view of symbolism has all my sympathy... It would be wonderful if you could do a piece on the subject for the Jahrbuch ..." (McGuire 1974, p.291).

This is exactly what Jung undertook to do. The Wandlungen was indeed first published in two parts in the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III-IV (1911-2) with Freud's full blessing. Before the actual publication, the two men continued their frank exchange of views about matters of common interest, from the politics of the psychoanalytic movement and administrative issues, to specific themes (e.g. the symbolism of wood) which later were included in the Wandlungen. On 24 May 1910 Jung writes about another lecture that he gave "on symbolism" (on which the Wandlungen was later based) and assures Freud that he would send him a copy. To this Freud replies (26 May 1910):

"I was delighted to hear that I shall soon have the opportunity to read another fine piece by you ... especially as I am counting on your formulations to clarify certain vague ideas of my own... " (McGuire 1974, p.320).

Jung continues:

"... my mythology swirls about inside me, and now and then various significant bits and pieces are thrown up ..." (2 June 1910)

and Freud again replies encouragingly:

"... eagerly awaiting your mythology ... " (9 June 1910).

Substantial proof for the argument that no theoretical differences can be held to be responsible for the break is offered by the following exchange: Jung (17 June 1910) expresses unguarded enthusiasm after reading Freud's "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood" (1910b). In that essay (vide infra p.246f) Freud explored certain psychoanalytic projections into mythology. This appealed to Jung who found the whole work "wonderful" (McGuire 1974, p.329). Freud's reaction to this, fairly predictable by now, was equally enthusiastic:

"... I was overjoyed at your interest in Leonardo and at your saying that you were coming closer to my way of thinking ..." (19 June 1910)

and went ahead, acknowledging receipt of Jung's initial draft of the

Wandlungen. It was to this draft of the Wandlungen that Freud offered that positive response mentioned above.

The same pattern continues. Freud (1 October 1910) writes to Jung

"... I see that you go about working in the same way as I do; rather than take the obvious path that leads straight ahead, you keep your eye peeled for one that strikes your fancy. This is the best way, I think; afterwards one is amazed at the logical sequence in all these digressions. Consequently I wish you luck with your immersion in mythology ..."  
(McGuire 1974, p.358 emphasis added).

Jung, feeling greatly encouraged by his older mentor, decided to carry on with his investigations which appeared in the first draft:

"... What I sent you will be completely reworked on the basis of further studies which reached into the most impenetrable obscurities of philosophy ..." (20 October 1910).

And a couple of months later he remarks about the expansion of that draft

"... this time I have hit the mark, or nearly so, as the material is falling into a surprising pattern ..." (13 December 1910), and warns Freud,

"... be prepared for some strange things the like of which you have never yet heard from me ... My conscience is clear, I have done honest work and drawn nothing out of a hat ..."  
(McGuire 1974, p.378).

Later that month, commenting on Adler's work, Jung critically notes that

"... he is trying to replace the libido ... by rigid instinctual forms, and crushing the spirit and the life out of our theory..."  
(23 December 1910, emphasis added).

It gradually, however, becomes evident that both men are very sensitive about their individual expeditions into mythology and from time to time reassuring remarks appear in their correspondence:

"... I don't know why you are so afraid of my criticism in matters of mythology. I shall be very happy when you plant the flag of libido and repression in that field and return as a victorious conqueror to our medical motherland ..." (Freud to Jung, 22 January 1911).

Jung again openly describes his own part of the expedition without any traces of defensiveness, but, on the contrary, with pride and excitement:

"... Symbol formation, it seems to me, is the necessary bridge to the rethinking of long familiar concepts from which the libidinal cathexis is partly withdrawn by canalizing it into a series of intellectual parallels (mythological theories) ... As you see, I approach the problem from a rather different angle ..." (19 March 1911).

Two months later the net is cast even wider:

"... Occultism is another field we shall have to conquer - with the aid of the libido theory ... Please don't worry about my wanderings in these infinitudes. I shall return laden with rich booty for our knowledge of the human psyche..." (8 May 1911).

To this Freud replies:

"... I am aware that you are driven by innermost inclination to the study of the occult and I am sure you will return home richly laden. I cannot argue with that, it is always right to go where your impulses lead ..." (12 May 1911 emphasis added),

and a month later,

"... in matters of occult I have grown humble ... I promise to believe anything that can be made to look reasonable. I shall not do so gladly, that you know. But my ὕβρις has been shattered ..." (15 June 1911).

This frank interchange was characteristic of this period of their correspondence. Even when Freud had reservations, such as in this case with regard to the occult (cf. Devereux 1953), his encouragement of Jung was unequivocal. The exhilaration continues. Jung communicates his pre-occupation with unconscious fantasies and how he considers them "the matrix of the mind" (23 June 1911) and Freud writes

"... in respect to ucs. fantasies, I share your assumptions as well as your expectations ..." (27 June 1911).

Two months later Freud announces that he has "been working in a field where you will be surprised to meet me ... I add that I am dying to read your 'Transformations and Symb. of the Lib.'" (20 August 1911) and Jung replies with uncontrolled contentment

"I was overjoyed by your letter, being, as you know, very receptive to any recognition the father sees fit to bestow... thanks to your discoveries, we are on the threshold of



something really sensational ... I daren't say too much, but would only counsel you (very immodestly) to let my 'Transf. and Symb. of the Lib.' unleash your associations and/or fantasies ..." (29 August 1911).

Apparently both Freud and Jung did. Jung became more aware of the "historical layer of the unconscious" (12 June 1911) and wrote a lot to his older friend about the "phylogenetic memories in the individual", to which Freud, in his open style of making his reservations as well as his appreciations clear, responded by admitting that such memories "unfortunately will soon be undeniable" fact (13 October 1911).

After Freud read the second draft of the Wandlungen he wrote Jung a rather peculiar letter, in which he praises the author of the essay in the third person(?), "...it is the best thing this promising author has written up to now, though he will do still better..." (12 November 1911), and adds

"In the section about the two modes of thought I deplore his wide reading. I should have liked him to say everything in his own words ..."

This seems to contradict a) his suggestion after reading the first draft, i.e. that the ideas expressed then needed "ample proof" and b) his implied criticism that both he and Jung lacked "erudition" in their dealings with mythology. These same words could also be seen as an encouragement to Jung to stop hiding behind other authors' writings and express clearly and openly in his own language his thoughts about that topic. It should be noted that the "two modes of thought" were perhaps Jung's first attempt to formalize the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities in terms of psychological and more particularly, cognitive functioning (vide infra p.279f). Freud in the same letter continues with this admission:

"... Since you yourself are this author, I shall continue more directly and make an admission: it is a torment for me to think, when I conceive an idea now and then, that I may be taking something away from you or appropriating something

that might just as well have been acquired by you. When this happens, I feel at a loss ... Why in God's name did I allow myself to follow you into this field? You must give me some suggestions..."

These words indicate that something started happening in their relationship. Freud appears to exhibit some possessiveness of his ideas that did not exist earlier. The tone of the letter is still friendly but Freud's changed mood cannot be mistaken. Jung in his reply tries to rationalize

"... Our personal differences will make our work different... and because of the difference in our working methods we shall undoubtedly meet from time to time..."

but also shows signs of possessiveness, even if his writing is perhaps tongue in cheek:

"... the outlook for me is very gloomy, if you too get into the psychology of religion. You are a dangerous rival - if one has to speak of rivalry ..."

and in a pensive but determined way, he continues

"... Yet I think it has to be this way, for a natural development cannot be halted, nor should one try to halt it..."  
(14 November 1911).

The hazards that face every explorer seem to have spared neither Freud nor Jung. Venturing into new fields with "rich booty", and driven by "innermost inclinations" and "impulses", requires so much concentration and energy as well as vigilance and care in guarding the booty, that possessiveness might easily replace the idealism of the original "impulse" and as a result other considerations and relationships may somehow suffer.

At about this time something very significant happens. Jung's wife, Emma, wrote four letters to Freud, unbeknown to her husband. They contain both a private confession to the great master as well as a plea for his favour towards her husband, in a style of servility, great trust and self determination. In the first one (30 October 1911) she expresses her

concern (in fact "torment") that "... your relation with my husband is not altogether as it should be." She attributes this to the Wandlungen

"I do not know whether I am deceiving myself when I think you are somehow not quite in agreement with 'Transformations of Libido' "

and asks that he should tell her what the reason was if it was not indeed because of the Wandlungen. In the third one (14 November 1911) she clarifies the issue when she writes:

"... Lately Carl has been analysing his attitude to his work and has discovered some resistances to it. I had connected these misgivings about Part II [of the Wandlungen] with his constant worry over what you would say about it, etc. It seemed out of the question that he would have resistances to his own work; but now it appears that this fear of your opinion was only a pretext for not going on with the self-analysis which this work in fact means" (emphasis added)

and she adds that she now realises that it was her own interpretation that led her to that "projection" of her problem from her own "neighbourhood into distant Vienna".

Jung's differences from Freud, which, as shown above, always existed, were acknowledged, respected and accepted, but somehow at this point in time appear to have acquired some unprecedented importance. Also the willingness to share new thoughts and ideas in an unformulated manner gradually gives way to a cautious restraint until they are well formulated and substantiated. The impression is strongly formed of both men frantically working on their new ideas while communication of their results assumes secondary importance. On the 30 November 1911 Freud becomes impatient and bold:

"... I should be very interested in knowing what you mean by an extension of the concept of the libido to make it applicable to Dem pr. I am afraid there is a misunderstanding between us ..."

To which Jung replies

"... The essential point is that I try to replace the descriptive concept of libido by a genetic one. Such a concept covers not

only the recent sexual libido but all those forms of it which have long since split off into organized activities..."

and pleads

"You must let my interpretation work on you as a whole to feel its full impact. Mere fragments are barely intelligible..." (11 December 1911).

and Freud responds:

"...I am all in favour of your attacking the libido question and I myself am expecting much light from your efforts" ! (17 December 1911).

This indicates that even after the differences started becoming important, they were not really of such great importance, as Freud here still shows open mindedness and flexibility.

At this point another pause for reflection and adjustment of the course of the hermeneutical exploration is necessary. On the basis of what has been presented above the following can be said:

No actual theoretical differences have been identified as responsible for the break. Indeed, theoretical differences existed right from the beginning of their relationship, but this did not prevent their relationship from continuing and flourishing. Moreover, it becomes evident here that during this particular period their theoretical differences somehow subsided in the face of a common search into new territories - archeology and mythology. A rather clear picture has emerged of the two men walking hand-in-hand and with almost adolescent excitement into the virgin fields of their discovery, picking up gems here and there and shouting to each other about their findings with mutual encouragement. Yet, in the true tradition of classical thrillers, we, the readers, know in retrospect while watching them, how tragically that relationship ended; and introspectively we may ponder whether this frantic exhilaration was not an

unwise act on their part , viz, unrealistically and without caution they ignored their existing differences as well as the new conflicts which surreptitiously crept in, thus dangerously building all kinds of expectations of themselves, each other and the "rich booty" which they believed they had discovered. Dramas teach us how heroes slip and fall in times of euphoria when vigilance slackens or disappears and instead, all sorts of fantasies reign uncontrollably. This intentionally extensive exposé of the period through their correspondence strongly suggests this scene. It is now necessary to put the above picture into a broader context and examine the specific conflicts and expectations in this particular situation between Freud and Jung, and further, seek any links with previous developments that have already been observed in Jung.

In this search, Emma Jung's letter is invaluable: and a closer analysis is needed. She begins with the statement of an event, i.e. her husband had some resistances to his own work. It seems that this claim can be accepted as indeed a factual event as it is corroborated by evidence from at least two other sources: Jung's memoirs and his correspondence with Freud. As quoted earlier, Jung, during this period, related how he was unable to touch his pen for months. This is also reflected in the correspondence. Jung kept on promising to send the final draft of the Wandlungen to Freud, and the latter kept writing how eagerly he was awaiting it. In addition, Jung repeatedly confessed to Freud some difficulties he was encountering in relation to his work. But, at no time did he communicate to Freud any interpretation of them (his difficulties, conflicts and resistances), according to which they could be seen to be a product of his alleged fear of how Freud would receive his 'new' theories contained in the Wandlungen. Jung did, however,

admit in his letters to Freud that some of his difficulties were related to Freud the person. He formulated that interpretation in terms of a terminology that would have been intelligible to Freud: the father-complex. Examples of this confession are the following:

It seems to be no mere coincidence that Jung made the first reference to his own difficulties in that letter of 30 January 1910 in which he also for the first time referred to his lectures on "symbolism" (the first version of the Wandlungen)

"... During the time when I didn't write to you I was plagued by complexes, and I detest wailing letters ...  
... In spite of tempestuous complexes my enthusiasm for work is riding high ..." (McGuire 1974, p.289).

Freud (2 February 1910) acknowledges the intimate communication

"... Living so far apart, we are bound to have experience of all sorts that we cannot share. You are living on high seas, while I often can't help thinking of our little Dalmatian islands where a ship puts in every second Monday ..."

Jung again confesses:

"... Luckily the Walpurgis Nights of my unconscious do not affect my capacity for work although my mythology is temporarily at a standstill ... Otherwise I am in good shape and still have resistances to writing you at the right time, my conscious motivation being that I must select a particularly undisturbed moment which of course never comes until one takes it. The reason for the resistance is my father-complex, my inability to come up to expectations..." (20 February 1910)

Freud's reply to another letter of Jung's on the same issue starts:

"Believe me, there are no misunderstandings between us, nor do I regard you as 'vacillating'. I am neither so forgetful nor so touchy, and I know how closely we are united by personal sympathy and by pulling on the same cart I am merely irritated now and then ... that you have not yet disposed of the resistances arising from your father-complex, and consequently limit our correspondence so much more than you would otherwise. Just rest easy, dear son Alexander, I will leave you more to conquer than I myself have managed..." (6 March 1910).

On the 26 July 1911 Jung writes to Freud

"... The feeling of inferiority that often overcomes me when I measure myself against you has always to be compensated by increased emulation. I need a large practice in order to

gain experience, for I do not imagine that I know too much. Also, I have had to demonstrate to myself that I am able to make money in order to rid myself of the thought that I am non-viable ... Scientific work does me far more good [than financial success] ..."

And Freud in another letter, in which he writes how Ferenczi "complained bitterly" about his (Freud's) "lack of affection", candidly says, after Ferenczi admitted that he was wrong in that complaint:

"... I don't deny that I like to be right. All in all, that is a sad privilege, since it is conferred by age. The trouble with you younger men seems to be a lack of understanding in dealing with your father-complexes..."  
(31 December 1911).

The powerful "grip" that his work had on Jung is clearly evident:

"... I am overwhelmed with work and grappling with the endless proliferation of mythological fantasies. In order to master the overwhelming mass of material I have to work unceasingly and am feeling intellectually drained ..." (23 January 1912),

"A quick word to let you know I am still alive. I am having grisly fights with the hydra of mythological phantasy and not all its heads are cut off yet. Sometimes I feel like calling for help when I am too hard pressed by the welter of material. So far I have managed to surpress the urge. I hope to reach dry land in the not too distant future ..." (circa 15 February 1912),

"... I think I am not wrong in suspecting that you rather resent my remissness as a correspondent. In this regard my behaviour is indeed a little irresponsible, as I have allowed my libido to disappear into my work ..." (25 February 1912).

Freud's reply (29 February 1912) to the last letter was explosive

"... What you say about my resentment of your tendency to neglect our correspondence warrants more thorough Ψ A elucidation. There can be no doubt that I was a demanding correspondent, nor can I deny that I awaited your letters with great impatience and answered them promptly. I disregarded your earlier signs of reluctance. This time it struck me as more serious ... I took myself in hand and quickly turned off my excess libido. I was sorry to do so, yet glad to see how quickly I managed it. Since then I have become undemanding and not to be feared ..."

He then switches to saying how important the Psychoanalytic Association is and how "it would be a severe blow to all of us if you were to draw

the libido you require for your work from the Association", and later indirectly assures Jung of his care for him when again referring to the Association, and writes:

"But I am less concerned with the present than with the future; I am determined to make all necessary preparations for it, so as to see everything safe in your hands when the time comes ..."

It was Freud's first attempt to draw serious attention to Jung's manifested conflicts with his older colleague. The interpretation given to these conflicts was presumably the same as previously, i.e. Jung's father-complex. Jung's reply was equally explosive

"... I have not kept up a lively correspondence during these last weeks because I wanted if possible to write no letters at all, simply in order to gain time for my work and not in order to give you a demonstration of ostentatious neglect ..." (3 March 1912).

In that very letter Jung explains that he did not actually neglect his duties towards the psychoanalytic movement and concludes in an assertive and possibly challenging manner:

"... Of course I have opinions which are not yours about the ultimate truths of  $\Psi$  A..." and later "I would never have sided with you in the first place had not heresy run in my blood ..."

Again he writes:

"Since I have no professional ambitions I can afford to admit mistakes. Let Zarathustra speak for me:  
'One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil..' ...This is what you have taught me through  $\Psi$  A. As one who is truly your follower, I must be stout-hearted, not least towards you ..."

It is worth noting that when ultimately confronted in the open, Jung did not use the father-complex interpretation but defended his own explanation that the delay in correspondence was only a result of his absorption in his work.

Freud responded in the usual pacifying manner. He referred to the



situation as "so simple" and assured Jung that "otherwise we agree about everything" and further, made a new interpretation:

"... The indestructible foundation of our personal relationship is our involvement in  $\Psi A$  ; but on this foundation it seemed tempting to build something finer though more labile, a reciprocal intimate friendship. Shouldn't we go on building?... Still if you think you want greater freedom from me, what can I do but give up my feeling of urgency about our relationship, occupy my unemployed libido elsewhere, and bide my time until you discover that you can tolerate greater intimacy? When that happens, you will find me willing ... Rest assured of my affective cathexis and continue to think of me in friendship, even if you do not write often ..."  
(5 March 1912 emphasis added).

And in another letter,

"... my sense of disappointment probably springs from the postponement of your 'Transformations and Symbols'..." (21 March 1912).

From these excerpts, Jung's version of the cause of the break as far as the Wandlungen and the theories he propounded there are concerned, does not seem to receive much support. What emerges here is that Jung's productivity was not hindered at all, but on the contrary, it was his excessive preoccupation with the Wandlungen that led him to neglect his correspondence with Freud. Theoretical differences did not appear in these excerpts to have played the role that is usually attributed to them. What again featured prominently here was Jung's conflicts. These did not seem to be caused by the "father-complex" which was so casually communicated between the two men. In the letter of 5 March 1912 a rather more serious interpretation of Jung's conflicts was offered by Freud, who virtually accused him of being incapable of forming an "intimate friendship" with him.

Jung alleged in his memoirs that another reason for the break was Freud's authoritarianism. Certainly this does not appear to be so from the

excerpts considered here. Conversely, Freud's almost desperate attempts to accommodate any of Jung's theories and writing regimes, as long as their friendship was ensured, reveal a rather submissive attitude. Jung, in Memories, Dreams, Reflections mentioned that "during this period I became aware of how keenly I felt the difference between Freud's intellectual attitude and mine" (p.184), and clarified that they held different views due to their respective different backgrounds in their study of psychology and in particular with respect to the issue of the historical successive layers of consciousness. But again, it was clear from the above that Freud was not opposed to Jung's views and moreover encouraged him to carry on along his own direction.

Thus, as the reasons mentioned by Jung are not supported by the evidence of their correspondence perhaps an opening to the cul-de-sac could be provided by an admission he once made. He wrote that because he feared he "might lose his [Freud's] friendship" (M.D.R., p.183),

"... I wanted to know ... what his reaction would be if I deceived him by saying something that suited his theories. And so I told him a lie. I was quite aware that my conduct was not above reproach, but à la guerre, comme à la guerre! ..." (M.D.R., p.183).

Of course, Jung did not say this in connection with the particular issue at hand, but with a dream he had at about the same period. He then decided to give Freud a 'Freudian' interpretation to that dream as he was apprehensive that his own interpretation might not have been palatable to Freud. After this admission one wonders what validity to give to their correspondence. In other words, Jung might have 'dissimulated' also in other instances in order to make things easier for himself. But the question of validity should not become a blanket issue. The overall authenticity

of the correspondence cannot be seriously affected. This incident can only affect Jung's interpretations mentioned in the correspondence and only these should be scrutinized with caution and studied in the context of other evidence. Therefore the validity of Jung's "father-complex" interpretation should be regarded with scepticism. This throws this puzzle again wide open , with the key always remaining elusive, with the link still missing.

Returning to Emma Jung's letters, it is significant to note that her interpretation with regard to the "reason" for the "not-as-it-should-be" relationship between her husband and Freud, was identical with Jung's own version of the break, i.e. Freud's disagreement with the Wandlungen. It is perhaps more significant that she later dropped that "reason" and admitted that it was just a "pretext" that Jung himself used "for not going on with the self-analysis which this work in fact means"! Now, if one gives credence to the latter interpretation, i.e. that Jung's difficulties during this period were primarily the product of his own "self-analysis", then a great deal of other evidence falls into place and seems to further validate this version. This new approach also places Jung's life and work in the perspective of the developmental analysis of the problematic of the Other. It might not be a question of a missing link, after all, in a chain already mis-shapen by a series of mis-guided hypotheses, but of a new chain constructed with newly formed links.

The culmination therefore of this hermeneutical exploration will consist of a progressive series of four hypotheses in order to arrive at a new understanding of the break.

First Hypothesis:

Jung's reference to his interest in archeology and mythology at this time which he admitted was a revival of an old similar interest, to be understood as referring to a revival of his old interest in the No.2 personality and, broadly speaking, to the whole problematic of the Other.

This hypothesis will be based mainly on the following data from Jung's letters to Freud -

"... all my delight in archeology (buried for years) has sprung into life again ..." (10 November 1909);

"... mythology certainly has me in its grip. I bring to it a good deal of archeological interest from my early days ..." (10 January 1910).

"... I have read Leonardo straight through and shall soon come back to it again. The transition to mythology grows out of this essay from inner necessity, actually it is the first essay of yours with whose inner development I felt perfectly in tune from the start..." (17 June 1910).

One cannot fail to note that Jung spoke about previous interests in archeology and mythology when, in his memoirs, he discussed his dilemma of what to study at the University. He then wrote of two opposing directions: on the one hand, history, philosophy and particularly archeology ("... I was intensely interested in everything Egyptian and Babylonian, and would have liked best to be an archeologist ..." - M.D.R., p.104), and on the other hand, science. On the very same page Jung describes this dilemma as "... No.1 and No. 2 ... wrestling for a decision ...". This is not the only connection Jung made between No. 2, the Other, and archeology. In the chapter on his School Years of the same book, he explicitly noted that "... Science met ... the needs of No. 1 personality, whereas the humane or historical studies [Greco-Roman, Egyptian, and prehistoric archeology] provided beneficial instruction for No. 2 ..." (p.91). In his letter to Freud (17 June 1910), Jung stresses the inner development and inner necessity of the transition to mythology, with which he feels

"perfectly in tune from the start". The strong wording of this passage demands further examination. After such strong collaboration and friendship, Jung admits that Freud's Leonardo was the first work of his master with which he felt "perfectly in tune". Leonardo was indeed Freud's first essay where he introduced mythology in a serious manner, so if the close link between mythology and the Other is accepted, then Jung's excitement is understandable - it was the first indication to him that Freud perhaps shared his problematic of the Other. This inference is further substantiated if the actual theme of Leonardo is considered. In that essay Freud discusses da Vinci's "double nature" ("as an artist and as a scientific investigator" ! 1910b, p.73). It is thus highly probable that Jung's enthusiasm for this work was directly related to his problematic of the Other.

#### Second Hypothesis:

Jung's reference to himself being gripped by mythology and archeology to be understood as suggesting that at this particular period he was gripped by the problematic of the Other in an especially forceful manner.

In addition to the points made in the previous assumption and according to the development of Jung's problematic of the Other, one would expect that Jung would now have arrived at a decisive turning point in his own relationship with his problematic. Jung, at the end of his previous period had entered a synthetic process in his understanding of the Other, viz. he started seemingly to return to the globality and generality of the Other, although this time not in the primitive manner of his early childhood formulations, but within an appreciation of the Other in terms of differentiated functions (more precisely, differentiated structuring

principles) of collective application (= the Other-as-symbol). This return to the original problematic with the enrichment of the meticulously and painfully traversed routes of clinical and experimental psychiatry, as well as Freudian psychoanalysis, coupled with the timely revived interest in archeology and mythology (in short, the modes of No. 2 personality) must have created a climate in him which would make intelligible to any researcher Jung's strong wording in describing the "grip" that his work had on him during this period. In other words, one is here witnessing a climax of a life-long search, one aspect of which was in the form of an intellectual puzzle (i.e. a further and finer reformulation of the Other towards a better and more advanced understanding of it). However, this aspect was not unrelated to the entirety of the experiential meaning of his problematic. Clearly demonstrating this are the excerpts from Jung's letters which refer to a) the special meaning his work had for him - nothing of which he claimed was "drawn out of a hat", but was a "natural development" which could "not be halted" and b) the great amount of libido that "disappeared into" his work, leaving him "intellectually drained".

### Third Hypothesis:

Jung's reference to the "something really sensational" that he and Freud were on "the threshold" of discovering (which was based on Freud's pioneering work) to be understood as an expression of Jung's genuine belief that despite their original differences they were now marching together with a common purpose, approaching the territory of the problematic of the Other; and that this belief created in him great expectations of Freud

The extracts from the Freud-Jung correspondence that have already been quoted offer ample substantiation to the claim that both Jung and Freud

believed that they shared a common theoretical platform. The references to "our" theory abound during this period, as well as their common investment in the fields of mythology. Now, if this is added to the previous two hypotheses one would accept that Jung believed that Freud shared his own problematic. This hypothesis can be further supported by Jung's special exhilaration at reading Freud's Leonardo. Jung's emphasis on the "inner development" and "inner necessity" of that essay was accepted in the first hypothesis as betraying his involvement in the problematic of the Other; it can now equally be applied to Freud. In other words, it is very likely that Jung thought that the theme of the Other (which was the motif in Leonardo) had the same "inner" meaning for Freud as it had for himself. This special shiver of hope must have activated hoards of expectations in Jung that Freud would assist him in solving their 'common' problematic. He had earlier asked Freud to "cast a beam of light in that direction, at least a kind of spectrum analysis par distance"! The unusually pleading tone of that letter is particularly conspicuous and reinforces this hypothesis. This argument is further supported by extracts from their correspondence in which Jung received repeated encouragements from Freud to follow his own "impulse". Freud not only allowed him to criticize the "libido question" but also "expecting much light" from him, hoped that he would "clarify certain vague ideas" of his (Freud's) own. One therefore wonders what Jung was thinking of while reading Freud's blessings to "conquer more than he himself 'had managed'"; also of what he meant when he wrote to Freud about "something really sensational" which they were on the threshold of discovering.

It can therefore be assumed with not undue justification that both Jung and Freud had great expectations of each other. Jung expected Freud to

assist him in his problematic, and, seeing that he also believed that they had a common theoretical interest with an equally gripping effect on them, he possibly believed that Freud expected the same from him.

#### Fourth Hypothesis:

Jung's reference to his "conflicts" and difficulties during this period to be understood as suggesting: firstly, a primary inner conflict created by the critical stage of the problematic of the Other, and secondly, a secondary conflict with Freud and himself which developed after realising that Freud could not meet his expectations as he did not, after all, share his problematic.

It is important to reiterate that Jung's conflict with Freud (however one wishes to understand it) was not of a primary nature. Jung's correspondence with Freud offers considerable support for this argument. Jung repeatedly wrote about the "grisly fights with the hydra of mythological phantasy" (read: inner conflicts with the problematic of the Other) and how they occupied all his libido as a separate issue from his "father-complex" which he felt were responsible for his difficulties with Freud. In other words there are two types of conflicts that Jung experienced initially: the one in connection with his newly launched expedition (read: his old problematic), and the other, in connection with Freud. The second one does not appear to have much power. It was to this conflict that Freud attributed Jung's procrastination in writing. Freud is the one who time and again goes back to this. It seems that Jung's pre-occupation with the new fascinating field caused certain delays in his correspondence with Freud who was a self-confessed obsessive correspondent. Jung, on the other hand, was not that particular about his correspondence, and after all, the delays were not that serious. But, it appears that Jung used the "father-complex" interpretation as yet another example of



his policy à la guerre, comme à la guerre. The problem with Freud, however, gradually became more serious as Jung did not see his expectations being fulfilled. Their common excitement, alas, must have been after all not so common, or rather, not about the same thing. Each one, as it turned out, had great but different hopes from their expedition into mythology and archeology. And it was at this particular time that they both became victims of their blind excitement when they hoped now that firstly, their previous moderate differences would be eradicated, and secondly, that they would soon make the "sensational" discovery which would prove the correctness of their previous (separate) routes. Each was expecting clarification of his own view from the other and they now considered their theoretical positions as identical. It goes without saying that in this situation the strong personal ties between the two men were equal (with the theoretical issues) in responsibility for the particularly strong bond that developed between them. Freud's overdrawn tolerance and pleas especially bear out this observation.

Despite his earlier impressions (e.g. with Leonardo), it now started dawning on Jung that Freud in fact did not even share his problematic. It was only then that his original and primary conflict with No. 2, already reinforced and multiplied (cf. hydra) by the length of all the years that it had remained unresolved, and despite his increased intellectual understanding, flared up in dangerous dimensions. Moreover, this conflict assumed even greater proportions when he felt the withdrawal of Freud's friendly and moral support. Further, he received no theoretical enlightenment or guidance from Freud, but on the contrary, increasing hostility and suspicion because he (Jung) did not live up to Freud's expectations!

The break can therefore be understood in terms of these four assumptions. The present hermeneutical exploration does not produce a formula of the break based on one single aspect of this highly complex issue (e.g. theoretical differences, political factors, personal-psychological dimensions) or even a mechanical combination of them because it has been shown that such attempts cannot solve the puzzle in a satisfactory manner, and always leaves an unfathomed missing link. Instead, the adopted approach places the understanding of the break in the tapestry of the developmental perspective of Jung's life and work with all aspects of the issue woven into it- so that it produces an intelligible whole. It is in this way that it differs from all previous exegeses of the break.

A final note about this account of the break is necessary: The manifold and intricate aspects and issues of the break with their fascination have attracted a great number of authors and the field is by no means exhausted. Despite the luring temptations of being side-tracked into exciting excursions, the present analysis must remain well tied to the mast of this study, the problematic of the Other... A more complete account of the break per se should also establish Freud's own problematic as separate from Jung's and moreover include a synthetic discussion of the two in the light of personal-psychological, theoretical and political aspects. In addition, particularly illuminating would be a survey of the relevant literature from which a classification would be undertaken of the various interpretations of the Freud-Jung relationship in terms of such categories as: exploitative, opportunistic, repressive (for whom? - Freud or Jung), compromising, of mutual benefit and growthful. It would then appear that the majority of studies on this association are not particularly helpful to the independent researcher as their approaches are imbued with various

degrees of personal bias. It would, finally, perhaps become evident that the last word has not yet been written about this relationship, and only attempts along suggested guidelines given here could aspire to grasp the meaning of the friendship between the two men in a comprehensive manner.

Continuing the historical development of the break, a separate subsection is deemed appropriate to examine in brief the period following immediately after Jung's termination of formal and informal contact with Freud. This will again be viewed from the perspective of the problematic of the Other.

THE BREAKDOWN

"Between two big roles exists a logical emptiness  
which you have to fulfill in the best possible way  
you know and are able"

Danilo Kiš (1977, p.58).

Due to the nature and main theme of this investigation, the reader is spared the tragic details of the closing moments of the Freud-Jung episode - the description of the deadly blows, the evaluative commentaries attempting to identify the victor and the vanquished, the villain and the martyr, and the analysis of the vicissitudes of their strength and righteousness.

This sub-chapter will deal with what Jung in "Memories, Dreams, Reflections" calls "Confrontation with the Unconscious". The beginning of that chapter runs as follows:

"After the parting of the ways with Freud, a period of inner uncertainty began for me. It would be no exaggeration to call it a state of disorientation. I felt totally suspended in mid-air, for I had not yet found my own footing ..." (M.D.R., p.194).

These words can now be understood in the light of the previous analysis. Jung's comprehension of his own problematic, previously formulated in the language of Freudian terminology, gained substantial impetus from the novel expansions of psychoanalysis into fields such as archeology, history and mythology. Jung expected a great deal from this extension, only to

be disappointed. He became aware of the fact that Freud's expectations of this expansion were dissimilar to his and a period of great uncertainty was therefore inevitable. Jung describes vividly this period of uncertainty, and it is important to follow its outline, not for the historical record but for the continuity of the argument in this study.

Abstracting the developmental stages of this period the following steps can be identified: Firstly. Jung became acutely aware of his unfulfilling achievement in the Wandlungen (vide infra p.288 ). He had indeed written a book about "the hero, in which man ... always lived", but what about himself, there and then, at that particular time? He questioned himself deeply, but soon "the dialogue with myself became uncomfortable and I stopped thinking. I had reached a dead end" (M.D.R., p.195). He had indeed ventured into the enchanting lands of mythology, archeology and history, come back and reported on the expedition, but, the excitement soon vaporised. The findings still meant very little to him as they were not digested sufficiently and they did not radicalise the existing psychoanalytic terminology of his problematic. On the contrary, they created a gap between the meaning of their discovery and the psychoanalytic language that was used to account for them. He had gradually discovered that Freudian "terminology and theory" was "concretistic" and "too narrow" and thus unsuitable for his novel insights (M.D.R., p.175). Jung understandably reached a dead end.

Realising the unsuitability of his theoretical understanding in relation to the inner experiences that overwhelmed him, he was compelled (later he admitted that he had had little choice) to follow the experiences which took their own course without much conscious control and theoretical

understanding. He allowed a series of powerful dreams to "activate" his "unconscious" progressively. This was not an easy undertaking. The earlier theoretical discrepancy was growing into a fundamental upheaval of his whole personality. Jung spoke about this state with sincerity and humility. The helpless "feeling of disorientation" developed into a "constant inner pressure" ...

"At times this became so strong that I suspected there was some psychic disturbance in myself ..." (M.D.R., p.197).

It was then that Jung started returning to his childhood memories. This led to a yearning for the security which he experienced during childhood. He then began to play favourite childhood games by "gathering suitable stones" (emphasis added) and building with them. He later called this moment "a turning point in my fate" (M.D.R., p.198). These games and introspections gradually revoked many childhood dreams and experiences, and Jung in his memoirs, saw that this exercise put him "on the way to discovering my own myth " (M.D.R., p.198).

Jung commenced describing the next step as follows:

"Towards the autumn of 1913 the pressure which I had felt was in me seemed to be moving outwards, as though there were something in the air ..." (M.D.R., p.199).

This marked the beginning of a series of visions that initially disturbed Jung considerably, to the extent that he "decided that I was menaced by a psychosis" (M.D.R., p.200). After about a year, Jung's "task was clear". He had to "understand" that which was in himself and that which was not of himself in these visions and fantasies. Above all he had to make sense

of his experiences, "find the meaning" (M.D.R., p.201) of that which he was undergoing

"... For as long as we do not understand their meaning, such fantasies are a diabolical mixture of the sublime and the ridiculous ..." (M.D.R., p.202).

His lack of an adequate system in and through which those experiences would be rendered intelligible became painfully evident. His existing theoretical language/system proved so inadequate that he considered it nothing but "a few theoretical prejudices of dubious value" (M.D.R., p.203).

The way he found most appropriate was "to translate the emotions into images" (M.D.R., p.201 emphasis added). A number of such images emerged from Jung's psyche, the most important being Philemon. These figures-images represented forces which Jung experienced as being not himself. Jung characteristically pondered about one of them:

"Perhaps my unconscious is forming a personality that is not me, but which is insisting on coming through to expression" (M.D.R., p. 210).

He accepted them as "mediators" (M.D.R., p.212) with the task of communicating meaning from the unconscious. His experience taught him that

"The essential thing is to differentiate oneself from these unconscious contents by personifying them, and at the same time to bring them into relationship with consciousness..."

(M.D.R., p. 211).

"Insight into them must be converted into an ethical obligation ..." (M.D.R., p.218)

In other words, it was by no means sufficient to allow himself to be exposed

to the inner autonomous forces, but initially they had to at least assume a certain form, i.e. become personified, and then "bring them into relationship with consciousness". The final word was with consciousness, the ultimate reality was of the conscious system and thus whatever was brought into relationship with it had to be scrutinized by the ethical agency of consciousness. If these conditions were not upheld, Jung had fleeting glimpses of the ominous consequences: insanity, psychosis, a state where the unconscious floods and annihilates consciousness. Finally, Jung's task was to translate all this process into a psychological, scientific language/ system, which was his reality.

"... For me reality meant scientific comprehension" ! (M.D.R., p.213)

Jung finally achieved this reality, but it was by no means an easy achievement . These steps were repeated several times during this period which, incidentally, approximately coincided with the First World War. He repeatedly developed new languages/systems to account for his experiences, only to find later that they were still inappropriate. One of these attempts was his Black and Red Books in which he registered the incoming fantasies with "aesthetic elaboration". Then

"... I became aware that I had not yet found the right language and that I still had to translate it into something else" (M.D.R., p.213 emphasis added).

Another attempt was his work "Septem Sermones ad Mortuos" (Jung 1916) (which will be examined later on its own).

These experiences are certainly not that common, particularly in



autobiographies of eminent psychologists, and have therefore stirred the imagination of many authors who have attempted to interpret them. The interpretations which members of the Psychoanalytic School have offered, range from a benevolent and patronizing reference to "insanity" (e.g. Andreas-Salome, in Pfeiffer 1972, p.82) to a clinical diagnosis of "psychosis" (e.g. Leavy 1964). Other authors gave their free speculations: e.g. Brome diagnosed him "a cyclothymic personality who suffered a manic-depressive psychosis" (1978, p.168), Winnicott (1964) , "a recovered case of infantile psychosis" whereas Storr thought it was more a question of "a schizophrenic episode" (in Brome 1978, p.301). Ellenberger compared Jung's intense suffering of this period with similar states that Fechner and Freud experienced and termed them "creative illness". By that he understood

"... a polymorphous condition that can take the shape of depression, neurosis, psychosomatic ailments, or even psychosis ... the subject ... suffers from feelings of utter isolation ... [and] emerges from his ordeal with a permanent transformation in his personality and the conviction that he has discovered a great truth or a new spiritual world ..." (1970, pp.447-8).

A similar process is the condition described in the recent writings of Dr Bührmann based on her observations of tribal African diviners (Bührmann 1977; 1978; 1979; in press; Schweitzer and Bührmann 1978). The person "called" by his ancestors falls into an "illness" called "thwasa". Then, if he accepts the call he will undergo certain rituals which will eventually not only free him from the "illness", but also develop his own divining powers (cf. also Sandner 1972; Fortes 1959). This process again may be likened to the condition of the "Dark night of the soul". In the medieval poem of the same name, Saint John of the Cross (1959 translation

by E. A. Peers) describes the thorny path of the soul towards its mystical union with God (cf. Fordham 1958). The purgatory function of intense suffering/illness/'death'/rebirth is a well known theme that runs throughout human history from the ancient Greek understanding of tragedy i.e. hybris/fall/catharsis (Aristotle's "De Arte Poetica"; Hallman 1961; Vickers 1973; Murray 1934; Sheppard 1911) through Dante's "Divine comedy" to modern time anthropology (e.g. Lewis 1971), mysticism (e.g. Leuba 1925; Muktananda 1972; Suzuki 1957; Zaehner 1957), mythology (e.g. Campbell 1949; 1968; 1972; Eliade 1959; 1968), and psychology (e.g. James 1902; Frankl 1964; McGlashan 1976; Otto 1970; Watts 1961). Dr Kahn (1975) considers yet again a similar phenomenon in biblical Job. In his book "Job's Illness: Loss, Grief, and Integration" he identifies at least three possible cycles which could be applied to this type of "illness". They are: health/illness/cure; obsessional preoccupation/depression/creative insight; and perfectionism/disintegration/integration. All three could be applied in some sense to Jung's situation. Finally, the central themes of creativity and the renewal process in madness (cf. e.g. Perry 1974; Greely 1974), the positive effects of the journey through madness (cf. e.g. Barnes and Berke 1971; Cusance 1951; Esterson 1970; Jerotić 1977; Laing 1967) and in general the theme of rebirth (cf. e.g. Plaut 1977; Wilhelm 1931) appear all to have useful implications for the understanding of this particular period of Jung's life.

However appropriate the above suggestions might be, they do not offer a developmental understanding of Jung's specific theoretical positions. For this purpose, a closer examination of this phase of Jung's life in relation to his psychological work is indicated.

In scrutinizing the various phenomena Jung described in the developmental

steps outlined above, one cannot fail to observe two similarities:

- (a) Jung's stages in his problematic of the Other since childhood approximately correspond with the specific steps that he had to follow during this period, and
- (b) There is a strong resemblance between the steps of this period and the phases that S.W. went through as discussed by Jung in his dissertation.

Jung's period of "inner uncertainty" and "disorientation" began when he broke with Freud after the unsatisfying effect of the Wandlungen. It is, rather ironic that the Wandlungen, the supposed 'cause' of the break, never satisfied Jung. In his foreword to the fourth Swiss edition he admitted openly that he

"... never felt happy about this book ... it was written at top speed ... without regard to time or method. There was no opportunity to let my thoughts mature. The whole thing came upon me like a landslide that cannot be stopped ... because of its imperfections and incompleteness it laid down the programme to be followed for the next few decades of my life" (1950, pp.xxiii-xxiv emphasis added).

There is no doubt that there was some genuine inspiration in the Wandlungen but it was not worked through sufficiently in order to give rise to a mature, appropriate method, a system/language able to match the material and its meaning. And this, above all, was what Jung needed; an adequate language, a "right language" to account for his experiences. The limitations of his existing (psychoanalytic) language were hopelessly exposed by the Wandlungen. The ensuing search was painful. His increasingly deeper and stranger experiences demanded a system within which they could be comprehended. The lack of such a system led to an

acute disharmony between the experiential and intellectual aspects of his personality. Therefore, the Breakdown (the title of this sub-chapter) refers to what Bateson (admittedly from a different perspective) called an "epistemological crisis" (1970, p.430). The breakdown is thus understood in this study not as a 'psychological', 'emotional', 'psychotic' or similar event, but as an epistemological one. Jung's system/language which he used to account for his reality and problematic in the face of new events and experiences broke down. The theoretical formulation of the problematic of the Other became inadequate to account for the actual manifestations and experience of the Other! Jung had already found the "terminology and theory" of psychoanalysis "too narrow".

It is important to note that Jung's first attempt to heal this state of disunity was to go back to childish games with stones. Consciously or (most probably) unconsciously he associated that state of inner disharmony with that which he experienced in his childhood, and thus he repeated the same activities. As presented in the chapter on his Childhood Period, Jung's early attempt to deal with the painful effects of his experienced Otherness was with a stone, his stone, to which he gave animistic qualities. The "conversation" between little Jung and "his stone" was limited, but now, in the advanced form of the same procedure Jung was able to have long and instructive dialogues. The method that he followed here was essentially the same: Personify the disturbing and incomprehensible aspects of the unconscious and then enter into a relationship with them. This was the method S.W., Jung's medium, had also adopted. The difference, however, lies in the quality of that relationship. Jung's primitive Others of his childhood were, in a sense, too external. Jung as a child did not carry them around in himself, but they had a definite external form and substance. Ivenes, on the other hand, was an exclusively

internal Other. Still she hardly had a relationship with S.W. . While as Ivenes, S.W. was virtually non-existent. Ivenes, in other words took over completely S.W.'s personality, at least during the times of her manifestation. Contrary to the above, Jung's internal Others of this period enter into an actual relationship with him in such a way that he can regulate up to a point their influence, and subject them to the ethical scrutiny of consciousness. This however does not reduce their significance. On the contrary, insofar as their message is allowed to be heard by consciousness, they facilitate greater interaction within the various parts/aspects of the personality. One may therefore justifiably call this relationship dialectical interrelationship. This is the ultimate form of the process which Jung later termed active imagination (Jung 1916/1958). A similar comparison between Jung's early play objects and his experiences in the breakdown , also in terms of active imagination, was undertaken by M. Fordham (1977). His approach was to examine these phenomena in the light of Winnicott's theory on "transitional objects".

As shown in the diagrams (vide supra p.134f , and infra p.267f) the process of personifying unconscious tendencies both in the case of S.W. with Ivenes and now with the new image- figures is similar. In addition, Philemon has striking resemblances to Ivenes. In the same way as Ivenes was the guiding spirit, so Philemon acted as Jung's "psychagogue" , "inner guru" and "psychologically ... represented superior insight" (M. D. R. , pp. 208-9). According to J. Hubback, he represented "the other within" (1966, p.97). Moreover, as Anticipated Whole Other, Philemon was indeed a personality with wisdom and harmony which not only served as Jung's example but also actually guided him to achieve that. In other words, it also had the teleological function of the Anticipated mature personality.

Thus, the process until this moment includes part recapitulation of the past history, and part repetition of the various stages the phenomenon of the Other followed. Indeed it might have been unnecessary to repeat the childhood manner of healing the disunity of his personality, but it may be argued that once the breakdown occurred a whole recapitulation might have been necessary in order to arrive at the critical point, but now with a new and corrective approach. Also, although Jung theoretically described the A.W.O. in S.W., he did not experience this himself and perhaps here was the beginning of the discrepancy which led him to feel "the gulf between the external world" with its conscious theoretical language and epistemology "and the interior world of images in the most painful form" resulting in the "irreconcilable contradiction between 'inner' and 'outer'" (M.D.R., pp.219-20). Jung had to experience his language as well as develop a language for his new experiences. A dialectical interaction was needed.

However, Jung's various attempts to develop the "right language" did not limit themselves to a recapitulation of the previous stages of the development of the formulation of the Other. A number of significant innovations were also introduced which indeed represent a breakthrough (the title of the following sub-chapter) in the elaboration and comprehension of his problematic. Briefly, they are the following:

According to the description Jung gave of Philemon, as an old, wise man and guide, this image-figure of the unconscious had all the characteristics of an Anticipated Whole Other, yet Jung also mentioned another figure which he experienced in opposition to Philemon. That was a figure he named "Ka".

"... Philemon ... was a winged spirit, whereas Ka represented a kind of earth demon or metal demon. Philemon was the spiritual aspect, or 'meaning.' Ka, on the other hand, was the spirit of nature ..." (M. D. R., p. 209).

This opposition is puzzling, since, if Philemon was indeed an A.W.O., then, according to the definition given in the chapter on the Psychiatric Period, he should have actually represented the unification of the previous opposing Fragment Others. Would Philemon then in fact be a F.O. instead of an A.W.O. ? The answer can emerge from an examination not only of Philemon and Ka, but also of what was to follow. In this way, it can be said that there is a new formulation of the problematic at hand, in which the existing A.W.O. itself is opposed and a higher synthesis of this dialectic is therefore expected. This assumption is further supported not only by what later emerged as a higher A.W.O. (to be discussed below), but also by the actual quality of Ka. He was certainly not a Fragment Other, in the sense that this term was defined earlier in this study. He was not an Extreme Unconscious Personality with a detrimental effect. He was not of a personal nature at all, but had the globality of an A.W.O. Jung's understanding that Philemon represented the spiritual aspect and Ka the spirit of nature epitomize this issue.

It now remains to investigate the kind of "higher A.W.O." this new formulation introduced. Jung wrote that a "principal event" which helped him to emerge (towards the end of the First World War) from the darkness was his understanding of his "mandala drawings" which he first painted "in 1916 after writing the Septem Sermones", and at the time did not understand (M.D.R., p.220). He later accepted that they were "spontaneous and natural" and "seemed to correspond to my inner situation". He gradually grasped their meaning in Goethe's words from Faust:

" 'Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation' And that is the self, the wholeness of the personality, which if all goes well is harmonious, but which cannot tolerate self-deceptions..." (M. D. R., p. 221 emphasis added).

Thus a new structure appeared, the Self (das Selbst) which is the "whole being" in its totality, a unity of all Others within one great whole. The fact that it dialectically supersedes (Aufheben) all Others is expressed in its abstract form - mandalas, which symbolically represent it, and are structural designs, beyond any personal psychological content.

The dialectical synthesis of opposing Others was aptly expressed by Jung when he wrote that subsequent to the emergence of the Self he

"... began to understand that the goal of psychic development is the self. There is no linear evolution; there is only a circumambulation of the self ... everything points towards the centre ... " (M. D. R., p. 222).

Before depicting the new formulation of the Other diagrammatically and through that discussing its characteristics and further implications for the central problematic, another image-figure will be examined briefly.

Soon after the appearance of Philemon Jung wrote that a female figure also started relating to him. It is significant that at first Jung experienced that image as the internalization of a female patient and only later did it become an autonomous inner Other. Jung named this "woman within me" "anima" (M. D. R., p.210). During this period Jung did not understand much about the "anima", his "inner feminine figure" except that he felt her negative aspects. He was "a little awed by her" and she appears to have cast a flattering and seductive spell on him. She kept on admiring his work as being of great artistic value and Jung felt that if he did not oppose this with his own conscious judgement he could have easily fallen into a self-deceptive image of himself as a "misunderstood artist". The fact that Jung attributed his emergence



from darkness to his "breaking with" the negative influence of the anima (in addition to his understanding of the mandala drawings) is most relevant here. In other words, the anima was definitely an Other of an inferior order than the Self. As far as the anima herself is concerned from the brief account of this period it appears that she could be understood as a Fragment Other, as an exaggerated tendency of the unconscious.

Returning to a closer analysis of the new system, the Other-as-Self, as developed so far by Jung during this phase of his life, the following characteristics will be discussed with particular emphasis on their implications for the understanding of both the pathological as well as healthy and growthful directions:

- (a) inner / outer
- (b) concrete / abstract
- (c) personal / collective
- (d) conscious / unconscious

According to the diagram below, the new Other (Ka in Fig.1.10), is growing from the opposite direction to Philemon, the initial and only A.W.O. (Fig.1.9). This novel development, according to the previous system would lead to a new and irrevocable disunion of the personality with disastrous effects. The revolutionary development is that this opposition to an existing A.W.O. leads to a new dialectical synthesis which has perforce to be of a higher order, of an even greater unity and wholeness. This in the diagram (Fig.1.11) is depicted in three dimensions in the vertical movement of both A.W.O.'s now meeting at a higher centre, the Self, which grows in such a way that it pulls all the personality into a three dimensional whole, a sphere, around which all the aspects of the personality will harmoniously function (Fig.1.12). A note of




Fig. 1.9




Fig. 1.10




Fig. 1.11




Fig. 1.12

warning is here given to the reader to regard these diagrams as representational guidelines only.

During the period of the break Jung found that the Freudian terminology was "too narrow" to express certain phenomena which he was now discovering. This claim was made by Jung nearly fifty years later and one is not sure whether he understood it at the time in such a conscious manner. However, whatever the case might be, consciously or unconsciously Jung went ahead to create his own terminology which would be broad enough to account for and express intelligibly at least the experiences which he underwent during the breakdown. Thus, one of the major characteristics of the new system that was forged in the breakthrough was the coincidence between the theory and the experience, the intellectual and the lived, the externally communicated and the internally felt. But, this coincidence did not obliterate the difference between these two polarities of the internal and the external; in other words it was not an absolute coincidence. That would have meant no distinction between these two levels which in turn would have meant insanity. Thus, the best expression for this relationship can be the dialectical interaction. The Self is indeed the centre of the personality, its innermost core, yet, at the same time, in a dialectical conceptualization, it is represented by the most abstract formula - a mandala.

This can be properly understood once another fact is drawn to the reader's attention: In attempting to comprehend the various figure-Others Jung made use of his knowledge of history, religion, archeology and mythology. The very names of the figures, "Philemon", "Ka", "Elijah", "Salome" and "Anima" betray Jung's way of making them intelligible to himself. It is

true that he did a lot of research in discovering more about these figures in the years that followed, but even at the very moment of their original emergence during this period, in the very act of personifying and naming them, Jung inadvertently revealed his epistemological direction. Further, following his previous system of the Other-as-symbol, where the Other also began having a collective meaning, Jung gradually appreciated that these autonomous images represented to him the same as they represented in general in bodies of collective psychological representations, such as mythology, religion, history of language etc. This became particularly clear to him with the mandalas. First, he drew mandalas "spontaneously" and then found that however paradoxical, those abstract patterns did somehow represent his own very concrete "inner situation" and his tendency towards the centre of his being. Subsequently he discovered that mandalas were used in the East with precisely the same symbolical meaning: a psychological representation of the centre! (cf. Jung 1929; 1937; 1943b; 1950b). All the undigested excursions into the territories of mythology, which brought so many premature expectations were now acquiring their exact place, having been filled with the life of their experiential substratum. Mythology was not just an area from which to make erudite references, but represented an invaluable treasure of accumulated forms of psychological meaning: symbols, rites etc all have a collective symbolism which at the same time can be experienced on a highly personal level. The dialectic of the personal/collective is here particularly apparent. Finally, the polarity conscious/unconscious can be viewed in the same light. Jung, time and again after the breakdown, stressed the importance of the interrelationship between the figures from the unconscious and consciousness (e.g. Jung 1928; 1936; 1956). The necessity of this dialectical interrelationship became evident to Jung during this

period. Since this issue has already been discussed above it would suffice to give only the final formula here. The conscious should not obliterate the image-figures, but also should not be governed by them totally. The first would lead to a highly defensive state where the unconscious messages are repressed, while the second would result in an uncontrolled influx of unconscious material, thus depriving the personality of any conscious functioning. Jung survived thanks to their dialectical interrelationship.

Thus, the Self, the ultimate psychological unity of the personality, unites dialectically all opposing Others and represents the ultimate Other to the present personality. In the Self the polarities of inner/outer, personal/collective, concrete/abstract and conscious/unconscious meet harmoniously. One particularly important implication of such a reformulation of Jung's problematic is that since the unconscious can be understood in both the personal as well as the collective sense, the collective unconscious can be legitimately accepted as "the matrix of mythopoeic imagination" (M. D. R., p.213) and therefore plunging into the unconscious by itself does not necessarily imply mental illness. It might indeed result in insanity if the person does not maintain the dialectical relationship between the two structures. If he does, the experience can only be enriching and corrective as it was for Jung (cf. Jaffé 1972).

Jung always referred to this period of his life and work with great humility. From the above analysis it is not surprising to read that

"... All my works, all my creative activity, has come from those initial fantasies and dreams which began in 1912 ..." (M. D. R., p.217), and

"The years when I was pursuing my inner images were the most important of my life - in them everything essential was decided. It all began then; the later details are only supplements and clarifications of the material that burst from the unconscious, and at first swamped me. It was the prima materia for a lifetime's work" (M.D.R., p.225).

This study has treated this period with the same seriousness that Jung saw in it, and for this reason this chapter, inspite of being a chapter-interlude, is actually the largest on Jung in this investigation.

The solemnity of this period has impressed itself upon many authors, even upon some who are not particularly favourably disposed towards Jung. Paul J. Stern in his controversial book "C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet" captured the importance of this period when he wrote:

"Jung had to forge singlehandedly the tools to fend off the soul-devouring demons ..." (1976, p.115).

It is these tools that this study will now examine further. In the next sub-chapter entitled The Breakthrough some light will be cast upon the initial form that these tools took.

THE BREAKTHROUGH

ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσις ἐστίν

("the resolution of a perplexity is discovery")

Aristotle: Ethica Nicomachea 1146b 6.

In this final sub-chapter of the chapter-trilogy The Break, The Breakdown and The Breakthrough an attempt will be made to present and discuss the initial phases of Jung's forging of the "prima materia" of the years of the break into "the tools to fend off the 'soul-devouring demons'" and thus the creation of his "independent line of thought".

The Wandlungen and the Septem Sermones will be reviewed here in order to trace the original conception and initial articulation of what Jung understood to be "everything essential" in his "lifetime work", so that in the Transition, at the end of this chapter, a comparison can be made between these first steps of the new direction and the previous line of development of his problematic of the Other. These two works mark approximately the beginning and end of the period of the break. The Wandlungen was written in 1911-12 and the Septem Sermones in 1916. Although an outline of this "independent" path has already been presented in the previous sub-chapter, it is felt that a more specific documentation of Jung's written material of this period should be produced. This section will, therefore, concentrate on the early formulations of what may be called a breakthrough in Jung's theoretical development.



W a n d l u n g e n u n d S y m b o l e d e r L i b i d o  
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So much reference has been made to this work that the reader deserves due warning that there is a real danger that unrealistic expectations could arise from this presentation. The full title of the first English translation by Beatrice M. Hinkle in 1916 was "Psychology of the Unconscious. A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido. A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought". The revised edition of 1952, whose original title was "Symbole der Wandlung: Analyse des Vorspiels zu einer Schizophrenie", was translated by R.F.C. Hull under the title "Symbols of Transformation. An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia". It is this edition that is included in the Collected Works of Jung. As previously mentioned, this work was originally published in two parts in the Jahrbuch (1911-12) of which Jung was still the editor at the time. In these two articles, Jung undertook an analysis of a series of fantasies written by a woman, Frank Miller (an assumed name), an American patient of Dr Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920), a psychiatrist from Geneva. The fantasies were published under the title "Quelques faits d'imagination créatrice subconsciente" with an introduction by Flournoy himself in the Archives de Psychologie (Geneva, 1906).

At the outset the following three observations should be made:

(a) Jung knew Flournoy well and held him in high esteem. He had already used extensively Flournoy's influential book "Des Indes à la planète Mars. Étude sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie" (1900) in his dissertation. This fact might lead one to expect that Jung would perhaps return in the Wandlungen to a similar problematic that gave rise to those early studies of his dissertation.

(b) On a personal level, Jung had a special relationship with Flourney. In the Foreword to the second Swiss edition of the Wandlungen (1924) Jung referred to him as "my respected and fatherly friend" (C.W., vol.5, p.xxviii). This strong characterization was repeated verbatim in "Memories, Dreams Reflections" (M.D.R., p.186). The relationship between the two men is further illustrated by Barbara Hannah who reported that Jung related to her

"... that after the break with Freud he still felt too young and inexperienced to stand alone and that Flourney was a helpful bridge to his later independence ..."  
(1976, p.98).

Two years after the publication of the Wandlungen, commenting on the "inevitable misunderstandings" that the book led to, Jung remarked in consolation that he had

"... had a satisfaction particularly to be valued, for the book won the approval of Flourney himself, who knew the case personally ..." (1914d, p188).

These might lead one to interpret Jung's association with Flourney on this project as a possible (conscious or unconscious) gesture on Jung's behalf to distance himself from Freud.

(c) Jung wrote in his memoirs that Miss Miller's fantasies

"... operated like a catalyst upon stored-up and still disorderly ideas within me ..." (M.D.R., p.186)

and Hannah advances the plausible argument that those fantasies were "a god-send" to him as he would have been unable to deal with his own

fantasies in that particularly fragile psychological state of his at the time. Emma Jung in fact considered that the writing of the Wandlungen in fact represented for her husband a "self-analysis".

In the Introduction of the Wandlungen Jung in his attempt to reinforce the validity of his methodology (i.e. of relating historical material in the analysis of individual psychological problems) evokes the example of Freud's undertaking in his essay of Leonardo. The irony is that Jung in the Wandlungen was not following Freud's methodology in Leonardo as much as the actual theme of that study. As Freud correctly observed in the Preface to "Totem and Taboo", his own work offered a "methodological contrast" to Jung's Wandlungen (which he dutifully acknowledged as the "source" from which he "received the first stimulus" for his own study) in that Jung endeavoured to "solve the problems of individual psychology with the help of material derived from social psychology" whereas his attempts were at "applying the point of view and the findings of psycho-analysis to some unsolved problems of social psychology" (Freud 1913b, p.xiii). One might still argue that there was some similarity in their respective methodologies in that both related individual to social psychology. This, of course, cannot be denied. However, on the other hand, as far as the theme of their studies is concerned, the similarity is even more striking: Freud's central thesis was that da Vinci's personality was of a "double nature": One "as an artist" and another "as a scientific investigator" (1910b, p.73). His task, therefore, in that essay was to interpret this phenomenon. He did this in terms of the great artist's childhood sexuality which he understood as expressing certain dynamics connected with his illegitimate birth. Freud observed a further duality which essentially revealed Leonardo's same "double nature" in two

celebrated paintings of his: "Mona Lisa", with the mysterious double smile, and "St. Anne with two others", where the motif of two mothers (St. Anne and Mary) is powerfully depicted. It is thus primarily the theme of Leonardo that Jung followed in the Wandlungen, i.e. the double nature of the personality which represents an old theme of Jung's and was again given a central place in the Wandlungen.

Some of the themes of the double, or, according to the terminology of the present study, the Other, that Jung examined in the first part of the Wandlungen were the following: "Two kinds of thinking", "The double role of Faust: creator-destroyer", the "Sun-hero: creative-destructive" and "Byron's Heaven and Earth".

Jung, after a detailed examination of the various theories of language, distinguished two types of thinking. He called them "directed" and "non directed" respectively. He related these to "Science" (directed, "thinking in words") and to "dream phantasy" (non directed, "thinking in images").

"... The first, working for communication with speech elements, is troublesome and exhausting; the latter, on the contrary, goes on without trouble, working spontaneously, so to speak, with reminiscences. The first creates innovations, adaptations, imitates reality and seeks to act upon it. The latter, on the contrary, turns away from reality, sets free subjective wishes, and is, in regard to adaptation, wholly unproductive ..." ("Psychology of the Unconscious"\*, p.11)

Insofar as non directed thinking was producing an "overwhelmingly

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\* Hereafter referred to as "P.U.", Hinkle's translation, London edition (1919)

subjectively distorted idea of the world" Jung regarded that "state of mind as infantile. It lies in our individual past, and in the past of mankind" (P.U., p.19). He understood non directed thinking as not only the characteristic mode of thought in the child but also of earlier historical times. Science was the product of directed thinking, and mythology of non directed thinking. The "naïve man of antiquity" held "an idea of the universe which was not only very far from reality, but was one which corresponded wholly to [his] subjective phantasies..." (P.U., p.13). Jung observed that many authors, and particularly Freud, had described the "infantile soul" as being involved in its own phantasy world (comparable to the dream state) and was able to conclude that there was an "intimate connection between dream psychology and myth psychology" (P.U., p.15). Jung drew a parallel "between the phantastical, mythological thinking of antiquity and the similar thinking of children, between the lower human races and dreams" and accepted that "ontogenesis corresponds in psychology to phylogenesis" (P.U., p.14).

Thus the two kinds of thinking were for Jung characteristic of two general, and one might say primary polarities: On one hand, mythology, dreams, phantasies, infantile, non directed thinking; everything subjective, primitive, effortless and spontaneous; and on the other hand, science, "scholasticism", adult directed thinking, concerned with adaptation and modern times and everything of an objective nature.

This kind of dichotomy of human faculties is not a unique phenomenon encountered only in Jung's writings. Apart from similar earlier attempts (e.g. ratio and intellectus in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas [Copleston 1950 vol. 2 part II]), in our century Henri Bergson, a few

years before Jung, drew a distinction between "intuitive" and "analytical" thinking (1903), and since Jung this issue has been reiterated in many different forms and variations by a long line of distinguished scholars, ranging from Max Weber (1949) and Karl Jaspers (1946) - both of whom elaborated on the division between verstehen and erklären, first introduced by Droysen and Dilthey in the nineteenth century (von Wright 1971) - E. Husserl (Kockelmans 1967), M. de Unamuno (1921), J. Maritain (1940), to modern authors such as T.S. Eliot (1916), C. Naranjo (1972), H. Osmond et al (1974), C.A. Reich (1970), L.A. Reid (1961), T. Roszak (1972), J. Starobinski (1977), K. Stern (1965), E.W. Straus (1930) and A. Watts (1972). This division may further be related to the polarities of Dionysian - Apollinian (e.g. Nietzsche 1872), the Chinese principle of Yin - Yang (e.g. Capra 1975; I Ching; Lao Tzu; Rawson and Legeza 1973; Versfeld 1979; Yu-Lan 1962), and the recent physiological controversy over the two separate functions of the right and left hemispheres of the human brain (Diamond and Beaumont 1974; Gazzaniga 1970; Gooch 1972; 1973; Hilgard 1977; Jaynes 1976; Ornstein 1972; 1973; Rossi 1977).

This basic distinction cannot but remind one of Jung's original dichotomy between the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities. It could therefore be ascertained with justifiable conviction that the two kinds of thinking that Jung introduced in the first part of the Wandlungen was his first serious attempt to conceptualize the problematic of the Other in a system that would accentuate its importance by elevating it to an almost universal principle, and also rendering it intelligible within a broader perspective which includes not only individual development, but also historical and phylogenetic development. It goes without saying that

directed thinking corresponded with No. 1 and non directive, phantasy thinking with No. 2 personality.

Against this background Jung then examined Miss Miller's fantasies. From her first poem, "The hymn of creation", Jung identified a "creative god" with "dual nature, moral and physical". In the chapter "The song of the moth" he interpreted her poem "The moth to the sun" as expressing "two things which never meet" (P.U., p.47) and compared this dichotomy to many similar examples from world literature, mythology and religion, all of which, according to him, conveyed essentially the same conflict:

"... a problem of modern man which has been turning in restless slumber since Renaissance, just as was done by the drama of Oedipus for the Hellenic sphere of culture. What is to be the way out between the Scylla of renunciation of the world and the Charybdis of the acceptance of the world? " (P.U., p.50).

"Renunciation of the world" meant a movement of the libido inward, an "introversion", an opportunity to deal with inner conflicts and tune in with the harmony of nature. "Acceptance of the world", on the other hand, implied an outward movement where "adaptation" was the priority. Jung compared Miss Miller's fantasies with among others the motif of "the double role of Faust: creator-destroyer", the "sun-hero: creative-destructive", and "Byron's 'Heaven and Earth'", which he understood as follows:

"... Love raises man, not only above himself, but also above the bounds of his mortality and earthliness, up to divinity itself, and in the very act of raising him it destroys him ..."

The conflict is not solved:

"... The longing of the moth for the star is not absolutely pure and transparent, but glows in sultry mist, for man continues to be man. Through the excess of his longing he draws down the divine into the corruption of his passion; therefore he seems to raise himself to the Divine; but with that his humanity is destroyed ..." (P. U., p.66).

In the second part of the Wandlungen, Jung commenced with an analysis of the libido in which he compared it with the Sun God and noted that "sun is not only beneficial, but also destructive" (P.U., p.70). Now, since the libido is represented mythologically with sun, which is god with "dual nature", the libido too, according to Jung, was pervaded with a fundamental duality: it had in addition to its sexual connotation also "desexualised derivatives". At this stage, still convinced that he was expanding along a direction that he and his "teacher" together saw appropriate (as discussed earlier), Jung saw fit to "replace the expression 'psychic energy' with the term 'libido'" (P.U., p.80). This widening of the concept was possible also because of his understanding of the "functional independence" of "biological impulses" in the history of evolution. Calling upon the Freudian terms of sublimation and repression he argued that the "primal" sexual libido can be transformed into "secondary impulses" of "associated functions". Such successful diversion is sublimation, and when unsuccessful, repression. He called this revision "the genetic conception" of libido (P.U., p.83). Jung attached great importance to the transformational properties of libido and speculated that in addition to "phantastic analogy formation" "human consciousness" itself might be the product of such transformation (P.U., p.86). Not only primitive fantasy formation (mythology), but also schizophrenic fantasies were produced by the same mechanism, both of them being of the non directed kind of thinking.



In analysing Miss Miller's third and last poem, which she called "a hypnogogic poem", Jung first discussed the "dualism of the human will" which consisted in the "forward and backward flow of the libido":

"... A part of the soul desires the outer object; another part, however, harks back to the subjective world, where the airy and fragile palaces of phantasy beckon ..."  
(P.U., p.107)

Jung, remarking on Miss Miller's description of the "circumstances surrounding the origin" of the poem (a series of psychological and physiological sensations of anxiety, excitement, relaxation etc), compared them to those usually preceding "intentional somnambulism often described by spiritualistic mediums" and suggested that it was a case of an essentially introverted mechanism in which

"... it seems that the libido has suddenly discovered an object in the depths of the unconscious which powerfully attracts it ..." (P.U., p.107).

Normally, there is a delicate "harmony of finely attuned opposition" in that "dualism". Only an "abnormal third frees the pair of opposites ... and causes their manifestation in the form of separate tendencies" (P.U., p.108). Jung, again following Freud's theories, argued that the incest problem is at the root of that "abnormal third". After considering the universality of the "incest problem" Jung interpreted it, and its mythical counterpart "the myth of the hero", as representing

"... the myth of our own suffering unconscious, which has an unquenchable longing for all the deepest sources of our own being; for the body of the mother, and through it for communion with infinite life in the countless forms of existence ..." (P.U., p.127).

In the same chapter Jung made some further remarks on the universality of the unconscious and its origin. He claimed that:

"... The unconscious contains the differentiated remnants of the earlier psychologic functions overcome by the individual differentiation ..." (P.U., p. 110).

And also that

"... The essence of consciousness is the process of adaptation which takes place in the most minute details. On the other hand, the unconscious is the generally diffused, which not only binds the individuals among themselves to the race, but also unites them backwards with the peoples of the past and their psychology ..." (P.U., p.110).

The incest conflict, however, does not have to be a cause of pathology. The union with the mother symbolically represents "rebirth". Through the transforming ability of the libido, the incestuous desires may be diverted to a symbolic rebirth. Thus the libido may be "spiritualized". Jung analysed a number of myths and religious symbolism to indicate the manifestation of precisely this transformation of libido and the rebirth theme. But the dangers of achieving rebirth are not to be minimised. A central conflict exists there:

"... When some great work is to be accomplished, before which weak man recoils, doubtful of his strength, his libido returns to that source [i.e. the mother] - and this is the dangerous moment, in which the decision takes place between annihilation and new life. If the libido remains arrested in the wonder kingdom of the inner world, then the man has become for the world above a phantom, then he is practically dead or desperately ill. But if the libido succeeds in tearing itself loose and pushing up into the world above, then a miracle appears. This journey to the underworld has been a fountain of youth, and new fertility springs from his apparent death..." (P.U., p.182).

This long quotation will undoubtedly remind the reader of Jung's own "journey into the underworld"!

In trying to summarize the chapter on the "Dual Mother Role" the temptation of quoting yet another lengthy paragraph cannot be resisted as Jung, in this passage, in a succinct and lucid style, expresses himself in the best possible manner:

"Man leaves the mother, the source of libido, and is driven by the eternal thirst to find her again, and to drink renewal from her; thus he completes his cycle, and returns again into the mother's womb. Every obstacle which obstructs his life's path, and threatens his ascent, wears the shadowy features of the 'terrible mother', who paralyses his energy with the consuming poison of the stealthy, retrospective longing. In each conquest he wins again the smiling love and life-giving mother-images which belong to the intuitive depths of human feeling, the features of which have become mutilated and irreconisable through the progressive development of the surface of the human mind. The stern necessity of adaptation works ceaselessly to obliterate the last traces of these primitive landmarks of the period of the origin of the human mind, and to replace them along lines which are to denote more and more clearly the nature of real objects" (P.U., pp. 235-6).

In the concluding chapter, "The Sacrifice", Jung emphasises that

"... the sexual phantasies of the neurotic and the exquisite sexual language of dreams are regressive phenomena. The sexuality of the unconscious is not what it seems to be; it is merely a symbol; it is ... a step forward to every goal of life - but expressed in the unreal sexual language of the unconscious, and in the thought form of an earlier stage; a resurrection, so to speak, of earlier modes of adaptation ..." (P.U., pp.239-40).

The Sacrifice refers to the sacrifice of the "Infantile hero", the "regressive longing (incestuous libido)" so that the libido, free and "unbound in familial bonds must be brought outside into human contact" (P.U., p.251). It is further the sacrifice of the mother, i.e. when one frees "himself from the midst of his unconscious lying in the mother".

"... the libido forced away from the mother by the incest prohibition seeks for the sexual object in the place of the forbidden mother. In this wider psychological sense, which expresses itself in the allegoric language of the 'incest prohibition', 'mother', etc, must be understood Freud's paradoxical sentence 'Originally we have known only sexual objects'. This sentence must be understood psychologically throughout, in the sense of a world image created from within outwards, which has, in the first place, nothing to do with the so-called 'objective' idea of the world ..." (P.U., p.254).

A brief examination of this book substantiates the three basic claims that were initially made about it, i.e. that it represents yet another attempt by Jung of formulating the problematic of the Other, and that despite being studded with gems of inspiration (which were to be developed later), it essentially precipitated and expressed his epistemological breakdown, in that it exposed the limitations of his adopted psycho-analytic language/system.

The division between No. 1 and No. 2 personalities in this book became a fundamental dichotomy permeating not only the individual psychological system but also extending to collective and cultural dimensions, broadly defined. The two kinds of thinking corresponded to historical periods of mankind. Since both the child and primitive man share the same kind of thinking, Jung claimed that there is a close relation between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. This issue was taken up by E. Neumann (1949) and developed further to become one of the main pillars of the Jungian theoretical structure. (For a brilliant critique of this axiom see Giegerich 1975; cf also Jaynes 1976; Starobinsky 1977). The same primary dichotomy between No. 1 and No. 2 gave rise here to yet another general principle of human development and functioning. Jung defined "the problem of modern man" in terms of the same dichotomy, i.e. how to solve the basic dilemma in following either the mode of directed thinking, an outward movement

of psychological energy for the purpose of external "adaptation", or the mode of fantasy thinking, an inward movement towards the realm of the unconscious, the original spring of consciousness. It was for the latter movement that Jung first introduced the term "introversion" which was elaborated further in his "Psychological Types" of 1921 (cf. also Shapiro and Alexander 1975; von Franz and Hillman 1971). However, in order that the libido would have this flexibility as well as account for the two kinds of thinking and their historical and cultural dimensions, Jung had to expand the Freudian concept of libido to denote psychic energy in general, with sexual impulse being one aspect of it. This modification, though, is still formulated in an awkward manner: Fantastic thinking still "concerns wishes" both on the individual and collective-cultural level. This, essentially Freudian formulation, although appearing perfectly logical on the individual level, on the collective level not only has a feeling of artificiality about it, but it also lacks explanatory clarity. Jung claimed in the Wandlungen that "phantastic thinking tells us of mythical or other material of undeveloped and no longer recognized wish tendencies in the soul" (P.U., p.20 emphasis added). Without referring here at all to the validity of the actual theory behind this formulation, one cannot but note the overstretching of the notion, wish to the wish tendencies of the soul. Wish in the Freudian theory is unequivocally connected to sexual libido and is a product of repression; in short, it is an integral part of the Freudian language/system. Jung's new usage of the term extracts it from its structural context, thus creating a contextual vacuum. Terms of a specific theoretical structure are not like bottles that can easily contain any kind of liquid in them. They are shaped by, as much as they shape their contents. Jung's attempts to re-create this context in the Wandlungen are incomplete.

The unconscious was still a personal one. Although he introduced many ideas implying an actual collective unconscious, the term appeared only four years later (Jung 1916b). The transpersonal aspects of the unconscious were suggested but not theoretically elaborated and explained.

Since the wish was expressing the libido one understands why here Jung attempted to expand its meaning, i.e. in order to base the new kind of "wish tendencies of the soul" on non-sexual grounds. Specifically, Jung proposed a "desexualised" , "spiritualised" libido which was a trans-formation of the primary sexual libido. This new and "secondary" function of the libido did not oppose the primary function but represented its superseded form. It was an extension of it and thus its apparent opposition was nothing but a transcendent form, both stemming from an identical source, the neutral base of psychic energy. The "secondary impulses" suggested in the Wandlungen can be considered to be the origin of G. Allport's theory of the "functional autonomy" of "motives" (1937) and modern Ego Psychology (e.g. Hartmann 1939; 1964).

An important methodological point is that for the first time here Jung freely used anthropological, mythological, historical and philological material without accepting the hermetically closed 'boundaries' of these disciplines. As far as he was concerned, insofar as these disciplines provide material which he understood as expressing in a symbolical form the "wish tendencies of the soul" he was perfectly happy that dealing in these areas was within his jurisdiction as a psychologist. This attempt was to subsequently receive much more attention from him and its methodology was justified and theoretical base broadened. It was in this context that Jung perceived "typical" images expressing symbolically

"typical" "wish tendencies" of the soul not only of the individual but also of mankind in general. Examples are the "hero" and the "mother" whom Jung termed "primordial images". These, as Jung himself noted in a letter were the first formulation of "archetypes" (Adler 1976, p.289). It was these images that Jung, having theorised about, was to experience in the period of the breakdown. The actual term "archetype" was to emerge later, in 1919, after Jung had acquired their experiential, as well as their full theoretical context. At this stage the notion of archetypes remained awkwardly attached to the "primordial images" which themselves did not belong to a cohesive theoretical structure. It is worth noting that Freud's initial response to some key ideas in the Wandlungen - the prototype images, imagos, as well as the notion of "introversion" - was positive (1912c, pp.100, 102). Then gradually this changed to his well known criticism which is typically exemplified in his praising of Ferenczi's attack on the Wandlungen (Freud 1923b, p.269).

After all, it seems that Freud's comment that Jung said too many things in the Wandlungen but not in his "own words" had much truth in it. It seems that at least Jung himself felt the validity of his master's remark and set himself the task of developing just that in the years to follow - a more adequate language to express his novel insights. Jung was indeed fully aware of the shortcomings of the Wandlungen. Even from his correspondence with Freud, the researcher gets a strong feeling that he was almost struggling for time: Time to digest the material properly, as well as to contain his excitement at the glimpse of the new vistas. And Freud kept pressing him, impatiently waiting to read the final draft ... Despite all the difficult circumstances under which it was written, as well as its inappropriate theoretical framework, the Wandlungen remains

a remarkable work, a milestone indeed which paved the way for Jung's later researches. According to the motto Jung used for this book

"... theory, which gives to facts their value and significance, is often very useful, even if it is partially false, for it throws light on phenomena which no one observed ... and gives the impulse for more extended and more productive researches ..."  
Guglielmo Ferrero 1895 (In Jung 1912).

The "Symbols of Transformation of the Libido", with its imperfect theoretical structure indeed exposed all areas which Jung subsequently had to attend to , thus proving to be the right impulse transforming the direction of his problematic.



S e p t e m S e r m o n e s a d M o r t u o s  
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The full title of this short and obscure piece composed by Jung in 1916 is "The Seven Sermons to the Dead". Written by Basilides in Alexandria the city where East toucheth the West. Translated from the original Greek text into German". As discussed earlier, this little book represented one of Jung's attempts to develop the "right language" which would account for and explain his overwhelming experiences during this period of "disorientation". It was printed privately and Jung's name did not appear on it. Jung's original comment about this book is included in a letter to his old friend and colleague Alphonse Maeder to whom he presented it. After expressing his "special joy" at the previous evening during which he saw "how close we are in spirit to one another in our different ways", he continued:

"Allow me to give you personally the enclosed little present - a fragment with far-reaching associations. I deserve no credit for it, nor does it want or pretend to be anything, it just is - simply that. I could not presume to put my name to it, but chose instead the name of one of those great minds of the early Christian era which Christianity obliterated. It fell quite unexpectedly into my lap like a ripe fruit at a time of great stress and has kindled a light of hope and comfort for me in my bad hours. Of course it won't mean anything more to you than what I mean by it: a token of my joy over our wordless understanding yesterday evening. I would ask you to find the little book a discreet resting place in your writing desk. I don't want a profane hand to touch my memory of those limpid nights ..." (Adler 1973, pp.33-4).

All other comments by Jung on the Septem Sermones are included in his memoirs, which, of course, were written nearly fifty years later.

Maeder was one of the few members of the Swiss Psychoanalytic group that stayed with Jung after his break with Freud. This book was translated

into English by H.G. Baynes and again privately printed in 1925. The editors of Jung's Collected Works did not see fit to include it in the twenty volumes and in general it has received extremely little attention (e.g. Heisig 1972; Hubback 1966; as well as Bateson 1970; 1972; Quispel 1968; Serrano 1966; Weaver 1977). It seems there is some controversy concerning Jung's ultimate evaluation of this book. Aniela Jaffé, his secretary for many years, wrote that "he described it as a sin of his youth and regretted it" (in the American edition of "Memories, Dreams, Reflections", 1961) and she makes only a passing reference to it in her authoritative article on his "Creative phases" (1972). Both Marie-Louise von Franz (1975) and Barbara Hannah (1976) consider this piece an error and clarify that Jung regretted the publication of the book, even in its private edition, but not its contents. Von Franz adds that Jung "renounced" the "style of writing" of the Septem Sermones (1975, p.121), which was of a "poetic proclamation or announcement", as well as being "too personal" (1975, p.36), and Hannah relates that "afterword he felt very strongly" that it should have been included "in the Red Book like his other fantasies and conversations with inner figures" (1976, p.121), which, incidentally, are still inaccessible. One, of course, is in no position to know what Jung said privately to these friends and collaborators of his. The only references to his own comments that exist are connected with his defence against Martin Buber's criticism that he was a Gnostic.

"To support his diagnosis Buber even resorts to a sin of my youth, committed nearly forty years ago, which consists in my once having perpetrated a poem. In this poem I expressed a number of psychological aperçus in 'Gnostic' style, because I was then studying the Gnostics with enthusiasm. My enthusiasm arose from the discovery that they were apparently the

first thinkers to concern themselves (after their fashion) with the contents of the collective unconscious. I had the poem printed under a pseudonym and gave a few copies to friends, little dreaming that it would one day bear witness against me as a heretic ..." (Jung 1952d, pp. 663-4).

And in a letter a year before his death he again wrote:

"... Buber has been led astray by a poem in Gnostic style I made 44 years ago for a friend's birthday celebration ( a private print!), a poetic paraphrase of the psychology of the unconscious ..." (Adler 1976, p.571).

The defensive tone in both passages is easily detectable and can be understood in the context of the accusations levelled at him.

Jung wrote this booklet (a total of thirty-four pages) within three "limpid nights" after a very tense period of several days in which a lot of strange phenomena took place, e.g. two of his daughters had their blankets snatched away during the night, the front door bell rang frantically but there was nobody there. Jung "knew that something had to happen", he experienced the "whole house ... filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely possible to breathe" and then he felt the urge to sit down to write and "as soon as I took up the pen, the whole ghostly assemblage evaporated" (M.D.R., pp.215-6).

The Septem Sermones actually consists of seven "sermons" which the author gave to the "dead" who "came back from Jerusalem, where they found not what they sought". They "prayed" to the author to "let them in" and

"besought" his "word" (Septem Sermones ad Mortuos,\* p.7) which he gave in the form of these seven sermons.

In the first and largest sermon a fundamental distinction is drawn between the realms of Pleroma and Creatura. Pleroma is "infinite and eternal, hath no qualities, since it hath all qualities" (S.S.M., p.7); it could therefore be said that it is an undifferentiated whole. Creatura, on the other hand, which is the realm of the created beings, is "confined within time and space", it is "changeable", it is "fixed and certain; because it hath qualities: it is even quality itself" (S.S.M., p.9); it is a quality of pleroma which pervades creatura. Thus, insofar as "we are parts of the pleroma, the pleroma is also in us" (S.S.M., p.8). Now if these two realms could be conceptualised as concentric circles, with creatura being anything within the outer circle and pleroma anything beyond the outer circle (see Fig. 2.1) the question arises as to what possibilities exist for communication between these two realms. Naturally, since there is no question of pleroma 'doing' anything, it is with creatura that these possibilities may exist. Basilides/Jung poses this question quite clearly: "Wherefore, then, do we speak of the pleroma at all, since it is thus everything and nothing?" (S.S.M., p.9) and later, "What use, say ye, to speak of it?" (S.S.M., p.10). The answer is given as follows:

"When we distinguish qualities of the pleroma, we are speaking from the ground of our own distinctiveness and concerning our own distinctiveness. But we have said nothing concerning the pleroma ..." (S.S.M., p.10)

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\* Hereafter referred to as "S.S.M.", Baynes' translation, London edition, (1967)

This, however, should not discourage us from indulging in any distinguishing activities, as being of the creatura our very nature is distinctiveness (cf. differentiation) and we have to actualise it. At this point a grave warning is given:

"If we do not distinguish, we get beyond our own nature, away from creatura. We fall into indistinctiveness, which is the other quality of the pleroma. We fall into the pleroma itself and cease to be creatures. We are given over to dissolution in the nothingness. This is the death of the creature ..." (S.S.M., p.11).

Therefore we have to pursue our nature. The "principle" of the "essence of the creature" is called Principium Individuationis. This is Jung's very first reference to this principle which was to be later expanded and termed "the process of individuation" (cf. Jung 1916; 1916b; 1917; 1921).

This principle, however, is not an easy one to follow as, inasmuch as "the pleroma is also in us", a mere pursuit of distinctiveness would not actualize our pleromatic nature. In order to deal with this issue the author reminds the reader of the pairs of opposites. The pleroma includes all opposites in a balanced and perfect manner so that they produce no overall effect. But in us, creatures, it is not the same. "We are the victims of the pairs of opposites" because they exist in us in an unbalanced way which produces distinctiveness. After enumerating a number of pairs of opposites which he also calls "qualities" (e.g. Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, Difference and Sameness), Jung/Basilides makes a finer qualification:

"The qualities belong to the pleroma, and only in the name and sign of distinctiveness can and must we possess or

live them. We must distinguish ourselves from qualities. In the pleroma they are balanced and void; in us not. Being distinguished from them delivereth us ..." (S.S.M., p. 12 emphasis added).

And later on

"Ye must not forget that the pleroma hath no qualities. We create them through thinking. If therefore ye strive after ... any qualities ... ye pursue thoughts which flow to you out of the pleroma ..." (S.S.M., p.13).

But, if in order to be delivered from qualities we have to cease our thoughts what is left for us to do? A new category is introduced - the being:

"Not your thinking, but your being, is distinctiveness. Therefore not after difference, as ye think it, must ye strive; but after YOUR OWN BEING. At bottom ... there is only one striving, namely, ... after your own being " (S.S.M., pp. 13-14 emphasis added).

This striving is what is needed and there is "no need to know anything about the pleroma and its qualities" for that. But, of course, the question is 'How does one achieve this?' How can one block out his thinking, and what does it mean to strive after one's own being? Basilides here underlines the alienating function of thinking:

" ... thought estrangeth from being ..." (S.S.M., p.14).

In the Second Sermon, Jung, responding to the cries from the dead, tells them about God. He states that insofar as God is "something definite" and distinguishable he is also of the creatura, like creatures, but with

this difference: He is "more indefinite and indeterminable than they" (S.S.M., p.15). Also, because *Creatura* is characterised by the pairs of opposites in their divided form, and therefore results in specific effectiveness of opposing qualities, God (who, in this text, is also referred to as Helios, or Sun) has its own counterpart, the Devil (see Fig. 2.1). God's nature is "effective fullness", and Devil's "effective void" (S.S.M., pp.15-16). Basilides/Jung introduces here another God whom "mankind forgot" and who represents that very commonness of both Helios and Devil, i.e. effectiveness, and named him Abraxas (see Fig. 2.1). Thus Abraxas is the union and totality of the pairs of opposing effectiveness and in this way is also of the *pleroma* because he "is the effectiveness itself, not any particular effect". Thus, "Had the *pleroma* a being, Abraxas would be its manifestation" (S.S.M., p.17). To this teaching the dead "raised a great tumult, for they were Christians" (S.S.M., p.18). In this sermon Jung made a significant methodological statement when he wrote (in connection with gods and devils) that

"We need no proof of their existence. It is enough that we must always be speaking of them" (S.S.M., p.16).

This could be accepted as a reference to psychic reality, an issue he elaborated later (cf. Jung 1933; 1954b), and even called it "the most important achievement of modern psychology" (Jung 1934, p.354).

The dead asked for further knowledge about that "supreme god", and the Third Sermon is devoted entirely to describing Abraxas. Abraxas is the source of "Life, altogether indefinite, the mother of good and evil". Abraxas is the ultimate union of all opposites, the supreme union "but ye




Fig. 2.1  
Simplified version of Jung's own  
coloured diagram (Jaffé 1979, p.77).



see it not, because for your eyes the warring opposites of this power are extinguished" (S.S.M., p.19). A series of contradictory qualities which exist in harmony within Abraxas is given. Abraxas is "the hermaphrodite of the earliest beginning", "love and love's murder", "saint and his betrayer", "the brightest light of day and the darkness night of madness", "the world, its becoming and its passing"; before Abraxas "there is no question and no reply ..." (S.S.M., pp. 20-22). This poetic account cannot but remind one of (besides many similar mystical writings e.g. de Estella 1575; Philocalia; Reys 1957; Venkatesananda 1970) the famous verses of the co-existing contradictory qualities of the Supreme in the Brihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad (vide supra p.113 and cf. P.E. Hume 1931; and S. Purohit and W.B. Yeats translations). This teaching, however, upset the dead "for they were unperfected".

The perplexed dead asked for further understanding of "gods and devils" and the Fourth Sermon concentrates on two: a Burning one, and a Growing one (see Fig. 2.1). These are, in a sense, minor aspects of Abraxas as they both include the opposites of Helios and Devil. A further elaboration is introduced when these two "god-devils" are equated with Eros and Tree of Life respectively. This gives a combination of four "god-devils"; God (Helios), Devil, the burning Eros and the growing Tree of Life. The last two are included in the first two. The picture becomes more confused and a stern warning is again given:

"For me, to whom knowledge hath been given of the multiplicity and diversity of the gods, it is well. But woe unto you, who replace these incompatible many by a single god. For in so doing ye beget the torment which is bred from not understanding, and ye mutilate the creature whose nature and aim is distinctiveness ..." (S.S.M., p.24).

Thus, a real danger exists for the person without the proper "understanding", knowledge or "right language" who tries to comprehend this cosmic complexity, for he would be tormented. Again the similarity between this teaching and the Hindu concept of avidyā (cf. e.g. Müller 1903; Venkatesananda 1976) is strongly suggested. Yet, the old problem still remains as to how creatures are to be true to their own complete and complex nature of both union and separation

"But men are weak and cannot endure their manifold nature. Therefore they dwell together and need communion, that they may bear their separateness ..." (S.S.M., p.25).

The dead demand to be taught of "the church and holy communion" and Basilides/Jung, in the Fifth Sermon, distinguishes between two manifestations of gods: "spirituality" and "sexuality". "Celestial" gods manifest in spirituality and "earthly" ones in sexuality. These are represented by Mater Coelestis and Phallos (see Fig. 2.1) respectively (S.S.M., p.27). These are "superhuman daemons which reveal the world of gods. They are for us more effective than the gods, because they are closely akin to our own nature" and further it is said that

"...spirituality and sexuality are not your qualities, not things which ye possess and contain. But they possess and contain you ... they ... are ... things which reach beyond you, existing in themselves ... (S.S.M., pp. 28-9).

Continuing with the indispensability of "communion" the preacher-author warns against excessive or insufficient communion. Communion may be either "under the sign of the Mother" or of the Phallos (S.S.M., p.29).

The opposite of communion, "singleness", is the result of distinctiveness, and as both do not correspond to the dichotomy of good and evil, but each one of them contains both, they are both to be pursued, but only in the "right measure". Both are desirable and useful in their own right: "...communion is depth. Singleness is height", "Communion giveth us warmth, singleness giveth us light" (S.S.M., p.30).

The Sixth Sermon deals with the negative and destructive aspects of sexuality and spirituality. Their representational forms which we experience are the "serpent" and the "white bird" (see Fig. 2.1) respectively. In Basilides' language these are the daemons of sexuality and spirituality. Both have devious ways of tempting us to succumb to the daemonic aspects of these qualities.

In the Seventh and final Sermon a summary of the teachings is given in which the relativity and especially the complexity of interwoven polarities is given with special emphasis on their application in and relation to "man". Man is essentially seen not as the centre of the universe, but only as a gateway through which the multiplicity of cosmic structures may walk in and out. Man, as Heisig aptly notes, "is a microcosm which mirrors the macrocosm" (1972, p.216). The symbol of the "Star" is finally introduced in this sermon and could be understood as an early symbol of the Self. In the Star, man and god co-exist "man here, god there" (S.S.M., p. 34). Man is not the active agent in the universe. On the contrary, he is acted upon. But he is active with respect to his own decision to either "turn" or not to turn "his eyes" to "the flaming spectacle of Abraxas" (S.S.M., p.34).

Man, though, is an integral part of the universe and as long as he acquires the right knowledge of it, his position in it can be redeemed when he realizes his double nature i.e. both of the creatura and the pleroma; both of man and god. If he chooses not to pursue that knowledge he is bound to be acted upon by all those forces that permeate him. Finally, if he acquires the wrong knowledge, not respecting his limitations and not acting according to the total perspective of his existence, woe to him.

The Sermons end with an incomprehensible "anagramma". One should be reminded that similar attempts by Jung at distorting ordinary language were encountered on two previous occasions: In his childhood efforts to avoid disunion with himself (by developing a "secret language" of his "own invention" which he wrote on some tiny scrolls and kept in the box with the manikin) and in his analysis of Ivenes' special magic language, which was also anagrammatic. Both these "languages" were understood as attempts at forging the language of the Other, the "right language" of the unconscious. Thus, this anagram should be interpreted in the same manner.

Reflecting on the language and style of the Septem Sermones in general, Jung's choice of poetry as the medium of expression deserves some consideration, and should be placed against the background of the following: On one hand, he was painfully aware of the terminological inconsistencies of the Wandlungen and the confusion that they precipitated, and therefore he intended to forge his own "right language" which should have been

closer to his own personal experiences and away from the interfering influence of theoretical systems. On the other hand, the very fundamental 'teaching' in the Septem Sermones demanded the necessity of "distinctiveness" and differentiation; in other words, a clear account of his experiences in a lucid and differentiated theoretical system. This 'teaching' was not an abstract schema, but a lived realization that Jung arrived at during his own "epistemological crisis"; an existential necessity, one might say. Jung solved this problem by opting for poetry. This freed him from the obligation of developing an entire theoretical structure with internal consistency and external validity, and granted him permission to stay closer to the experiential level of his inner world. With regard to the necessity for "distinctiveness", the language of poetry still allows for that. Poetical epistemology, in contrast to scientific epistemology, allows for a more subjective account of experiences without compromising the comprehensiveness of its system (cf. Harding 1963; Langer 1942).

Another advantage of the poetical language is that it is not propositional, but symbolic. The Septem Sermones abounds with symbols.

Jung's preference for symbolic language is thus understandable.

According to Fawcett

"Symbols do not denote things which are already understood, but attempt to push forward the frontiers of knowledge and to grasp the reality of things, the real nature of life, the stuff of existence itself ... Symbolical language operates for this task by taking images derived from the world of sense experience and using them to speak of that which transcends them ..." (1970, p.30).

It is therefore not surprising that after the discontentment from the

Wandlungen, Jung turned to a completely different medium of expression which offered all the opportunities of grasping the "real nature of life", of getting to grips with something more substantial and basic than that which a theoretical language may afford. From this perspective, Jung's Septem Sermones represents both a pause and a detour. A pause from the previous theoretical endeavours which exposed the epistemological and terminological gaps, and a detour from this direction in order to establish a new language system. Also, insofar as this poem was written in the archaic style and "high-flown language" which Jung observed to "correspond to the style of the archetypes" (M.D.R., p.202), it could be said that this was the only work of Jung's that was written 'entirely' by his unconscious, in the language of the Other. Poetry enabled Jung to express himself without having to justify either himself or the poem. The Septem Sermones enabled Jung to utter and formulate something from within, something invisible and inaccessible. This process, essentially one of externalization, made the contents of the unconscious available to Jung for examination and reflection. As the noted Yugoslav poet, Vasko Popa, remarked, it is not possible to either answer the question of how the poem is born, or to justify its existence:

"They ask you how you made the poem. Why don't they ask the stone how it made the little stone or the bird how she hatched her fledglings?" (Popa 1969, p.133)

It is in this same light that Jung's adoption of a pseudonym should be understood. By attributing this poem to Basilides, Jung, in a sense, disclaimed the authorship of its contents by distancing himself in order to afford a clearer and more objective study of the workings of his psyche.

At this point it would be instructive to briefly look at the case of Søren Kierkegaard, who systematically wrote pseudonymously. Most of his commentators and biographers did not fail to discuss this unusual phenomenon (e.g. Diem 1950; Lowrie 1944; Thomas 1957; Thompson 1974; Wahl 1949). It seems that there is a consensus of opinion among these authors in accepting the various pseudonyms as punctuations of the developmental stages in Kierkegaard's life and thought. Moreover, Lowrie advanced some interpretations which might be relevant to the understanding of Jung. He wrote that:

"[Søren Kierkegaard's] pseudonyms were for the most part personifications of aspects, or at least possibilities, which he discovered in his own nature ..." (Lowrie 1944, p.154 emphasis added).

According to Lowrie, the pseudonyms represented a form of "indirect communication" which Kierkegaard dropped after his "metamorphosis" in 1848, later never to use any pseudonyms again. Nevertheless, the same author considers the pseudonyms as ensuring "an apt form for meiotic instruction, the Socratic form" in that Kierkegaard's "essentially dialectical thought ... had to be expressed in the form of dialogue, as was the teaching of Socrates" (pp. 155-6). The dialogue is not only between the author, Kierkegaard himself, and the assumed personage of the pseudonym, but also within the works themselves. It should be remarked here that Jung's Septem Sermones is also constituted as a dialogue between Basilides and the spirits of the dead. Finally, Lowrie argued the possible interpretation that the use of a pseudonym was for Kierkegaard an expression of honesty as

"... he was fearful of admitting to himself a result he had not really acquired or had not personally appropriated by 'double reflection' ..." (p. 199).

This would make sense in Jung's case too, where the ideas expressed in the Septem Sermones had indeed not undergone the scrutiny of his "double reflection" and were thus not yet digested and appropriated by him.

In the years to follow, as will be seen later, he reflected upon these ideas in earnest.

Thus, placed next to the Wandlungen, the Septem Sermones represents Jung's attempt to delve more deeply into his own psyche and to deal with his own experiential problematic in a more direct manner: it represents Jung's unavoidable attempt to impose sense upon the storm of his experiences. It should be remembered that Hannah (1976) considered Miss Miller's fantasies a convenient catalyst for Jung because working on his own fantasies would have been very disturbing for him. Four years later this was more possible, but still, the pseudonym provided a convenient and safe distance.

Jung's emphasis on understanding should be noted. Since both the universe and man are composed of such multiplicity and diversity, the most important task that faces man is to develop the "right language", i.e. a proper understanding which would be discriminating in the realm in which discrimination is possible, and thus fit within the entire perspective of existence. This understanding should not be confused with intellectual thinking which, as has been indicated, "estrangeth from being". In this it should not be difficult to appreciate Jung's all-out effort to ground his theoretical language/system in an experiential



kind of understanding. At about the same time that he wrote the Wandlungen, Jung also wrote another paper, "New Paths in Psychology" in which he dramatically declared that

"... Anyone who wants to know the human psyche ... would be better advised to put away his scholar's gown, bid farewell to his study, and wander with the human heart through the world. There, in the horrors of prison ... in brothels and gambling-halls, in the salons of the elegant, ... through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than text-books a foot thick could give him ... Between what science calls psychology and what the practical needs of daily life demand from psychology there is a great gulf fixed" (1912b, pp. 246-7).

These strong words reflect Jung's determination that at least he himself was no longer prepared to cover under a "scholar's gown" real existential questions which were affecting "the practical needs" of his "daily life".

The Principium Individuationis which Jung introduced here calls for a differentiation of one's own nature within the broad undifferentiated *pleroma*. This process however is not without its hazards: they stem partly from an indiscriminate use of thought, intellectual functions and theoretical constructions. It is easy to develop theories, i.e. to amass collections of concepts fitted together, with the intention of solving all kinds of problems. But since thoughts belong to the *pleroma*, they, like the Homeric "winged words", are elusive and deceptive. Thus they should be grounded in the being. Loose theories without their experiential substratum are not only empty, but may also be dangerous because they can plunge the person into the chaos of indistinctiveness. Jung does not expand much on this issue in the Septem Sermones. What he does deal with, though, here, is the essential distinction within

which the thinking versus being is but one manifestation viz. the realms of pleroma and creatura. According to their characterizations, pleroma and creatura would correspond to the realms of the Self and Ego respectively. The creatura/ego is "effectiveness", action, differentiation, whereas the pleroma/self is a broader realm containing the first as well as its opposite (non-effectiveness) in a complete whole, in a state of total equilibrium. Now, since Abraxas represents the pleroma, it could be claimed that he may be accepted as an archetype of the Self. The distinction between the pleroma and the creatura might further be related to the two types of thinking of the Wandlungen. The effectiveness of the creatura would correspond to the directed thinking, and the indistinctiveness of the pleroma to the spontaneity and effortlessness of the non directed or fantasy thinking. Now, since the two types of thinking were in their turn found to suggest the primary problematical dichotomy between the No. 1 and No. 2 personalities, the Septem Sermones could be located in the same line of developments and reformulations of the original problematic of the Other. It could thus be remarked that although the two kinds of thinking were functional principles, in the realms of the pleroma and creatura, Jung offered perhaps the first ontological formulation of his problematic.

Abraxas is a 'forgotten' god, inclusive of, as well as above, all opposites. Abraxas represents the ultimate unity and wholeness. This could further be likened to the "genetic" theory of libido in the Wandlungen according to which libido represents the overall psychic energy out of which all opposites flow. Abraxas is the source of "Life, altogether indefinite" which like libido is the energy behind all effectiveness. But talking about the unity of opposites results in

paradoxical talk. Such attempts to conceptualize the union of opposites should be considered as neither nonsensical nor obscure and 'mystical' formulations, but rather as dialectical formulations. The latter are characterized by statements referring to two antithetical notions at the same time from a synthetic position which is higher than the opposing two notions.

The division between Eros and the Tree of Life can be accepted as an additional reference to the issue of sexuality and spirituality which had emerged in the Wandlungen. Jung's later treatment of them reflected the impartial validity he attributed to both of them, which represents a continuation of Basilides' treatment of them, viz. actualizing them in the "right measure".

A final qualification about the Septem Sermones is indicated. Basilides/Jung's teachings in these sermons have striking similarities with identifiable Gnostic views (Quispel 1948 ; cf. Grant 1961; 1966) as well as with the beliefs expounded in the Dead Sea Scrolls (van der Post 1975, p. 201; cf. Vermes 1968; Verettas 1978). Any excursion, however, in comparative attempts between these sources on the one hand and the Seven Sermons on the other would serve no purpose in this study. If the argument in favour of such an exercise would be to expose Jung as having borrowed the ideas expressed in this book from the above mentioned sources, or for that matter from others, it is of no consequence to the present analysis. The fact remains that Jung chose these ideas, whether they were his own invention or not, and not others. As such therefore they must have been intrinsically connected to his own theoretical and personal development. In other words the claim for

originality is unrelated to the present investigation. Similarly, the validity of the teachings as such in the Septem Sermones is equally irrelevant here. However, such a comparison would have its place in a discussion where the validity of the collective unconscious was at question. There it would indeed be of great importance if proved that Jung arrived at the same ideas expressed in these sources, but independently. This, though, is not the object of this section. The approach followed in the present study is to search for the meaning of this work within the developmental context of Jung's life and work. In this framework the Septem Sermones may be accepted as the first tangible expression of the autonomy of the archetype.

## TRANSITION

"It is impossible to grasp the import of Jung's contributions as long as one thinks of him as merely a split-off from psychoanalysis. He represents an altogether separate and independent line of thought based upon fundamentally different postulates" (Progoff 1953, p.18).

In this chapter-trilogy Jung's most critical period was examined. The intended play on words with the titles of its sub-chapters, Break, Breakdown, and Breakthrough, reveals immediately the positive light in which this period is viewed. The meaning of 'critical' should also be interpreted in the same spirit, and, since it is said that in Chinese the words crisis and opportunity are synonymous, the word 'critical' should thus refer to the particularly opportune chance that Jung had during this period to substantially develop further his exploration into the problematic of the Other.

This period proved to be a turning point in Jung's development. No authors seem to disagree about this, although some look at this positively and others negatively. It is characteristic that Friedman and Goldstein, after praising Jung's work before the break express a genuine regret at his branching out into his own direction as they feel that should he have "remained close" to his "original clinical interests" he would have elaborated and enriched his early concepts" (1964, p.220). In other words they fail to see the value of the Breakthrough and prefer his earlier paradigm.

Jung had claimed that "beyond Freud" he "knew nothing". It is now possible to appreciate the partial truth that this statement conveys.

Having accepted/borrowed the psychoanalytic terminology to formulate his own problematic Jung knew of no better one to replace it after having experienced its limitations. But, on the other hand, the same statement is also partially false as Jung had never identified completely with the Freudian theories, but had always stayed faithful to his own problematic; this suggests that he had a fairly clear direction although, again, not a theoretical language/system, a "right language" within which to express it.

Thus, the break may be understood not only as Jung's break from Freud (with regard to their personal and professional association), but also as Jung's break away from a particular terminological system. It should not refer to Jung's break from psychoanalysis as he had never identified his problematic with the Freudian theories and therefore he could not have been considered "as merely a split-off from psychoanalysis".

Reflecting again on the de-emphasis in this study of the theoretical differences between the two men during this period, the following may be said. The essential point is to understand that they were pursuing different problematics. This investigation has a task of analysing Jung's problematic and therefore it cannot afford a deviation of such magnitude: i.e. to formulate and follow Freud's own problematic as well. As delineated above, theoretical differences existed all the time and the question that a researcher has to answer is why at this point in time did the break have to occur. In attempting to answer this crucial question any reference to their theoretical differences only begs the question. New pathways in approaching this issue were cleared. Based on the central theme of this study these pathways revealed a combination of

critical moments in:

(a) Jung's development of his problematic -

In a sense, Jung's latest system, the Other-as-Symbol, had nearly all the ingredients of a perfected understanding of the Other, with the exception of one factor: the personal, experiential one. In other words, the Other-as-Symbol was almost a complete return to the original problematic, but not exactly. It was the ultimate formulation of structuring principles within a human context, but not explicitly within the human personality. The original division between No. 1 and No. 2 was not dealt with directly. Having arrived at its logical conclusion it made the lack of any account of this original dichotomy evident. It was as if a linear dimension had been extended to its full limit and a new vertical turn was imminent: i.e. a dialectical synthesis of the original thesis (of an experiential, existential problem) and the developed antithesis (of a highly sophisticated theoretical elaboration) resulting in a new formulation, grounded in Jung's existential reality of the time.

(b) their friendship and association -

Both men were in a particularly vulnerable position due to the over-estimated sets of expectations they had of each other, which at this very moment was aggravated by the all promising glare of their common expedition into the fields of archeology, history and mythology. It has been argued here that not only did they underplay their existing differences, but each one secretly believed that this common expedition would at any moment vindicate his own views, thus forcing the other to follow him. The subsequent events however proved that their common expedition

unexpectedly provided two separate and independent vindications!

Thus, the understanding of the break suggested here is based on a distinction between a primary conflict in Jung himself (with regard to his problematic), and a secondary one between the two men (in which personal/psychological/theoretical/political aspects of their association and friendship are accounted for).

The breakdown, again in the same perspective, is understood not in psychopathological terms (however valid such an approach might be, since it does not fall within the scope of this study, not being a clinical 'case study') but predominantly in epistemological terms. Jung's break-down refers to the collapse of his epistemological system which he experienced with the influx of new theoretical possibilities and the resultant painful alienation of his language/system from his existential reality. The "Confrontation with the Unconscious" which Jung was then forced to undergo was compared to similar experiences he had had in his childhood, as well as in his theoretical analysis of S.W.'s experiences in his dissertation. This exercise suggested that what happened during this period could be considered, in a sense, to be a recapitulation of the previous formulations of the Other, but with the notable innovation: the image-figures (Others) from the unconscious were not only personified, but also entered into a dialectical interrelationship with consciousness. Moreover, as far as the formulation of the Other is concerned, the already observed progression from global, undifferentiated and animistic Others, through all the described stages of finer differentiation to general structuring principles (the Other-as-Symbol) now took the shape of an internalized structuring principle with external and internal,




concrete and abstract, as well as personal and collective, conscious and unconscious aspects. The first stage of this new development was only to be completed with the introduction of Abraxas as the first precursor of the archetype of the Self.

Thus, Jung's reference to this period as the "prima materia" for his later life's work is understandable. This chapter-trilogy examined this whole period as a unit and the sub-chapters were not dealing with separate historical periods but rather with separate aspects of the same period. In this sense, the Breakthrough is contained in both the Break and the Breakdown. No clear delineation between the three aspects is absolutely possible. During this period all three processes interchanged in an extricable manner and gradually the crude shape of a new language/system started emerging.

One of the characteristics of this innovation was Jung's tendency to expand (for others, to abandon) the Freudian system. According to the present investigation this is seen as a continuation of his own problematic. Jung's continuing searches into the realm of the Other gradually led him into landscapes where Freud's psychoanalysis proved to be of little assistance. Jung had to therefore abandon the Freudian cart, which he had so enthusiastically helped to build (hoping that it would lead him/them to the inner territories of the Other) and alone piece together his own raft to sail along the route of his inescapable expedition.

A final point can now be made. It concerns a vital distinction in Jung's problematic which has clearly been alluded to earlier. At last, a separation between Jung's own experiential, existential relationship

with his own Other/s and his theoretical understanding and formulation of it/them was made. This does not suggest that these two facets are unrelated and capable of separate existences, but rather focuses on the discrepancy between them at this particular time. Jung's childhood experiences as well as his conceptualization of them were the first full reference to his own existential problematic. It was again brought up in his dilemma of choosing a career. The subsequent reformulations of the same problematic dealt with other people's experiences (e.g. S.W.), and even more, were by and large a product of intellectual and theoretical reasoning. This activity enabled Jung to develop to an enviable degree his theoretical and critical faculties (cf. "directed thinking", No. 1 personality) and establish himself well in the realm of "effectiveness" (cf. "Creatura", Ego). This essentially antithetical course of direction, from Nature to Ego (see diagram below, Fig. 1.13), must have reached its own limits by alienating the highly differentiated Ego from its own undifferentiated Nature.



*This diagram was developed by Papadopoulos and Saayman over the period of their common association and teaching. It was first reported by Papadopoulos (1974).*

Fig. 1.13.

Jung's own experience was left out of all his subsequent formulations of the Other. It is therefore not unexpected to witness now his return to his neglected existential reality. The experiences during the breakdown precisely represent this inevitable return. Leaving aside all his theories about the Other, Jung was now forced to confront the very Other in himself. Philemon could thus be understood as the neglected No. 2 personality of his childhood. In confronting these experiences Jung had no means of comprehending them, as his existing theoretical language had outpaced his existential position. This is the critical moment. Jung had to "forge singlehandedly the tools to fend off the soul-devouring demons", the overwhelming multiplicity of the Others and the confusion created by them. This is the unavoidable task of every person in a similar situation. Some persons survive it and some others roll down into the fascinating and terrifying world of insanity.

Jung painfully realised that his experiences were incomprehensible to himself, to his Ego which was moreover endangered by them. But what was the archemidian point he could find to stand on 'outside' himself, apart from his Ego in order to decode the experiences? On what should he rely apart from that which he considered to be the centre of his personality, his Ego? If no external system was at all helpful he had to forge his own 'private language' with all its possible ominous consequences. This route was dictated by his own previous similar childhood experiences. He then spoke to his stone, manikin, and wrote a new, obscure, magical language of his own. In following the same direction now, he again personified the unconscious impulses and in entering into a conversation with them ("there is a tremendous difference between

intending to tell something and actually telling it" M.D.R., p. 211), he gradually realised that he had indeed developed some kind of language/ system of his own. It was in this interrelationship of the Others and 'himself' that he first started becoming aware that, after all, his 'private language' was not so private as it had striking resemblances to other existing languages: those of mythology, religion, etc. That was the critical and redemptive moment. After that he proceeded to examine his experiences in the light of those languages as well as those languages in the light of his experiences, and he must have humbly realised that it made sense both ways. This dialectical process gradually led him to actually experience that which he had already theoretically conceived in the Wandlungen, i.e. that mythology and other bodies of symbolical expressions, by virtue of their development ( as collections of expression of individual psychological states, conflicts and aspirations) can actually assist a person in such difficulties by offering this archemedian point outside their own affected (and inflicted) Ego, in providing the much needed objectification of those personal experiences, within an established transpersonal structure with common validity and understanding. The opposite to this is the private language of insanity, where, in fact, no discrimination is at all possible - private language is like meaningless gestures in the undifferentiated chaos of pleroma, and thus no communication is possible.

In other words, having sufficiently developed his theoretical, "directed thinking" Jung was now forced to develop his "non directed fantasy thinking", the language not of the Ego, but of the ultimate Other, the Self (see again Fig. 1.12), with all its accompanied innovations which have already been mentioned.

Like the Homeric Odysseus, Jung, having sailed along on his own raft, wandered for years in the high seas of "disorientation" and among the luring landscapes of inner visions, before arriving at terra firma, his Ithaka of appropriate language/system. His transition saw him moving from the hybris of intellectual Ego consciousness to the fall into the darkness of the unconscious, to the final cathartic path of humility and congruency between language and experience. But, as with the Homeric hero, the task was not completed by arriving (incognito) at the shores of Ithaka. He still had to conquer the inner palace, establish himself as the king and receive the crown. No tumultuous welcomes with fanfares and adulation yet ... The final battle to crown all the previous efforts had just begun! ....

PART TWO

Chapter Five

C.G. Jung: The years of Individuation.

"The capacity for inner dialogue is  
a touchstone for outer objectivity"

C.G. Jung (1916/1958, p.89).

## Prolegomena

The title of this chapter refers to Jung's preoccupation with the process of individuation in both its theoretical formulation as well as its lived experience. This chapter will deal with Jung's final stage of development which starts approximately with the year 1916 and stretches until his death, in 1961. Although chronologically this period is by far the longest dealt with in this study, the decision to treat it here as one chapter is based upon the understanding that it contains a fairly unified formulation of the Other. This by no means suggests a definite and monolithic system which Jung had launched at the beginning of this period and kept unaltered until his death. His ultimate formulation, in the structure of the Other-as-Archetype, constantly underwent minor modifications and refinements, especially in his attempts to relate it increasingly to psychological and psychopathological issues in addition to various aspects of other spheres of human culture.

Jung, in this period, had arrived at his own Ithaka after a long series of reformulations of his problematic, and his "way" was indeed "full of adventure, full of instruction" (vide supra, p.119). As will be shown hereafter, it was also true that "everything essential" was found by him in the immediately preceeding years. However, it was only in the form of "prima materia" (vide supra, p.272), and still required much careful craftsmanship in forging and embellishing it into its final form.

In this chapter, the new reading of the Jungian opus will take the following form: Firstly, four early papers which Jung wrote in the years 1913 and 1914 will be discussed in order to provide the necessary background in addition to the previous presentation of the two major works in the chapter on the Breakthrough. The reason for not including the four papers in the previous chapter (where they belong, according to a strict chronological sequence) was not to detract from the impact of the two milestones (the Wandlungen, and the Septem Sermones). Indeed they do not include major innovations; however, they weave the insights offered by the two central works into the fabric of the Jungian thought, and it is here that their value lies: they consolidate the findings of the Breakthrough period.

These four papers serve as an appropriate preamble and background to the new emerging formulation. These are followed by a reading of a number of other works which gradually introduce the new pivotal terms of Jung's ultimate formulation of the Other; viz. collective unconscious, persona, anima/animus, transcendent function, active imagination, individuation, shadow, archetype, Self, etc. Thus, the "right language", that Jung was searching for for a long time, is here followed in its construction. The last work to be examined in this section is the "Psychological Types" which introduces for the first time the term "Self". This is the last of the main terms of the Jungian discourse on the Other. After this, the chronological sequence of reading is abandoned and the Jungian work is examined as a whole.

Having completed the developmental introduction of the crucial terms, and their implications to the entire Jungian thought, the relevance



that alchemy had for Jung is briefly explored. In this, a compendious account of the meaning of mysticism in connection with the Jungian approach is attempted.

The last section of this chapter examines the formulation of the Other-as-Archetype in relative detail. It commences by developing a series of diagrams to graphically represent the crucial elements and processes of this formulation. It is argued that they constitute a contribution of reasonable merit in the understanding of Jungian psychology with particular reference to the problematic of the Other.

In elaborating on Jung's final formulation, extensive use of quotations from his works is made in order to demonstrate that this re-reading indeed reveals Jung's own problematic.

The transition at the end of this chapter examines the totality of the Jungian discourse from the perspective of his ultimate formulation of the problematic of the Other with particular reference to the dialectical triad, Nature/Ego/Self.

Four early papers (1913-14):

Before writing the Septem Sermones Jung wrote three papers which reflect some significant aspects of his approach to psychopathological and psychotherapeutic issues. In the "Content of the Psychoses" (1914b) he commences with a serious questioning of the "scientific method" of Psychiatry. Since the great majority of psychiatric patients have an "unimpaired" brain

"Psychiatry, the art of healing the soul, still stands at the door, seeking in vain to weigh and measure as in the other departments of science" (p. 158 emphasis added).

In so far as Psychiatry is a "healing art" trying to find the "meaning" of the "so-called" psychopathological "absurdities" (p. 165) its future "can only be by way of psychology" (p. 162). He even goes so far as to argue that a poet's account of psychosis reveals that he "knows better than a psychiatrist" as the "world of the artist is a world of solved problems; the world of reality, that of unsolved problems" (p. 170). This is based on Jung's understanding that the unconscious (the eruptions of which into the realm of consciousness are creating the condition called insanity) represents the "foundations of our own being, the matrix of those vital problems on which we are all engaged" (p. 178). He regrets that people usually overlook the "richness" of the "inner life", of the unconscious and see psychotic patients as "burnt-out ruins of humanity" (p. 172). Once examined carefully the meaning of the "baroque jumble of words" of such patients demonstrate that they

"are fragments of an enigmatic inscription, bits and pieces of fairy-tale fantasies, which have broken away from hard reality to build a far-off world of their own" (p. 177).

These fantasies, according to Jung, appear as an attempt at "wish-fulfillment" (p. 176).

These ideas are further elaborated in a succinct form in a lecture he gave the same year in Aberdeen entitled "On the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology" (1914c). There, after defining the unconscious as "the sum of all those psychic events which are not apperceived", he clearly declared the "unconscious as the foundation upon which consciousness is built" (p. 203). He further argued that "mental balance" is no mere figure of speech (p. 207) but a state of being based on the "compensating" function of the unconscious. This function ("all extreme conscious tendencies are softened and toned down through a counter-impulse in the unconscious", pp. 205-6) is present equally in "normal people" as well as "insane patients". It moreover represents a natural "healing process" insofar as it actually identifies the conscious aspects that need "correction", and also provides the means for such "relief". Jung claimed that "these corrective impulses or compensations which .... break through into the conscious mind" will inadvertently turn "to the detriment of the individual" (p. 208) if they are resisted. The effect of that will then be an increasing "distortion" of the corrective impulses thus creating

"...a condition of excitation, which produces a great lack of harmony between the conscious and unconscious tendencies. The pairs of opposites are torn asunder, the resultant division leads to disaster, for the unconscious soon begins to obtrude itself violently upon conscious processes. Then come odd and incomprehensible thoughts and moods, and often incipient forms of hallucination, which plainly bear the stamp of the internal conflict..." (1914c, p. 208).

The revolutionary implication is that if there was a way to allow the compensation of the healing process to take its course, no pathology would be effected, as for example "primitives may have visions and hear strange voices without their mental processes being at all disturbed" (p. 206). It therefore appears unfortunate that modern man, unlike his primitive cousin, cannot distinguish and tolerate the presence of the unconscious material emerging from within himself. Jung understood that predicament well. He observed how these "compensating influences" do appear indeed in a "strange manner" because (a) they get "distorted" in their "struggle against the resistances already there" and (b) being unconscious they inevitably appear in their own language, viz. the inaccessible "language of the unconscious" (p. 209). Thus the tragedy is that the "corrective" (i.e. healing) "compensations" from the unconscious, due to their inevitably disguised form, are perceived by consciousness as threatening and are thus barred from it, so that their beneficial effect is reversed.

Before discussing the third paper, it would be useful to reflect on a number of salient points raised in the preceding papers: The dichotomy between "science" and "art" should remind one of Jung's own conflict between his No. 1 and No. 2 personalities when deciding to specialize

in psychiatry. He then thought that psychiatry would combine both tendencies in himself. It now appears that his expectations did not produce the anticipated harmony. Jung's discussion of this dichotomy further indicates that he was not unprepared for the experiences of the Breakdown. His unequivocal appreciation of both the unconscious material itself as well as its poetic language must have provided him with sufficient insights to "fend off the soul-devouring demons" that were to appear later. Moreover, the actual poetical language of the Septem Sermones is in accordance with the theoretical positions which he advanced in these papers. Finally, his preoccupation with the essential division between the conscious and unconscious "sides of the soul" as well as their complementarity, betray once again his original problematic. The solution implied here is that a dialectic union of the "pairs of opposites" (which again strongly resembles the themes in the Septem Sermones).

In his paper "On psychological understanding" (1914d), which was also read in the United Kingdom in July 1914 (in London), Jung attempted to systematize his thoughts on a more theoretical and methodological level. He then contrasted for the first time his own "constructive method" with Freud's "reductive method". He commented that the two methods dealt with two distinct kinds of understanding: Freud's method yielded "retrospective understanding", which was "objective" and "causal", whereas his own method enabled the clinician to reach "prospective understanding", which was "subjective" and not causal. This division reminds one of the "two kinds of thinking" in the Wandlungen, and the prospective aspect of this method, of his earlier discussion of what was here termed Anticipated Whole Other. As in

his previous writings Jung showed here again an appreciation of the complementarity of these two methods. "To understand the psyche causally is to understand only one half of it..." But causal understanding "does not show us its living meaning. That meaning only lives when we experience it in and through ourselves" (p. 183). The last quotation reveals that Jung must have been aware of what we was going through during the Breakdown as well as being aware of its potentially positive effects. Moreover, Jung's acute awareness of epistemological issues and their role played in insanity is lucidly illustrated by a discussion which is included in the same paper. He claimed that although not "objective", the constructive understanding, in contrast to the causal understanding, "also analyses, but it does not reduce. It breaks the system down into typical components" (1914d, p. 187). "Typical" is clarified to refer to commonness and "unmistakeable analogies with other systems" as "even the most individual systems are not absolutely unique" (p. 187). Therefore, in trying to understand a person, an "individual system", the clinician should compare him to some others from his own "experience and knowledge" (p. 187) with similar, "typical components", in order to

"...widen the basis on which the construction is to rest. At the same time [this] serves the purpose of objective communication. Without these parallels we would proceed entirely subjectively; we would go on constructing in the language and mental range of the patient, building up a structure which would be intelligible to him and to the investigator but not to the wider scientific public, who could not be expected to feel their way into the peculiarities of his thought and language" (pp. 187-188 emphasis added).

Jung's understanding of insanity in epistemological terms is further

demonstrated when he argued that insane patients fall victims to their legitimate "desire to create a new world-system....a Weltanschauung" which would

"...enable them to assimilate unknown psychic phenomena and so adapt themselves to their own world" (1914d, p.189).

At first this is a "necessary transition" in that an inward focus is needed (and only later a new "world-system") to account for the eruptions from the unconscious (which, as was shown in the previous paper, have a "healing" and "compensatory" role). But the real danger that exists is that the patient would "remain stuck in this stage" and substitute his "subjective formulation for the real world". Any such attempt to understand himself within this confined language system would worsen his situation as long as his understanding of his world remains merely subjective "and this precludes intelligible communication" (p. 189).

In other words, the individual's task is to allow the corrective, compensatory function of the unconscious to take its own course. It may be argued that to be in a position to permit this to occur, the person should be able to account adequately for the new manifestations of the unconscious which would appear unexpectedly. This would be necessary in order not to 'misunderstand' the eruptions and be frightened by them. This means that he will have to "assimilate" them in a system of language and thought, a Weltanschauung, which would also make their communication possible to other people. As noted earlier, a particularly helpful phenomenon in this process is the existence of "typical

components" among the various individual "systems". This commonness facilitates communication of the highly personal, inner and intimate experiences with others. The editors of Jung's Collected Works did not fail to note, very correctly, that these references "appear to be an early, very tentative formulation of the archetype theory, as well as of the method of amplification" (p. 187).

In addition to these "typical components" Jung mentioned yet further "typical" categories of the human psyche which he based on his original theory of the libido propounded in the Wandlungen: they are "extraversion" and "introversion" (the crucial terms which he developed in the Psychological Types (1921)), the terms which Jung used in an earlier lecture, "A contribution to psychological types" (1913b), to describe the outward and inward movement of the libido respectively. Jung read that paper at the last Psychoanalytic Congress he attended in 1913 in Munich, which was also the last time he met Freud. He then observed that these two "movements" existed not only in pathological conditions but also in normal persons; they were not only interchangeable "modes of psychic reaction", but that two human "types" may be distinguished displaying a "predominance of one or other of the two mechanisms" (p. 501) in the "depth of their being" (1913b, p. 505).

He also compared the two movements of the libido to a number of similar theories drawn from psychology (mainly the "tender-minded" and "tough-minded" division of William James), aesthetics (Worringer's distinction between "abstraction" and "empathy"), literary theory (Schiller's dichotomy of the "naive" and "sentimental" types), philosophy (Nietzsche's contrast between the "Apollinian" and "Dionysian"), as well as from



linguistics. From the latter Jung used Franz Finck's hypothesis concerning the structure of language, according to which there are two main types of linguistic structure: "one is represented ... by the transitive verbs" and the other "by the intransitive verbs" (1913b, pp.507-8). Jung remarked that the first "clearly shows a centrifugal movement of the libido going out of the subject" whereas the second "a centripetal movement of the libido coming in from the object" (1913b, p.508). Jung then attempted a classification of the Freudian and Adlerian psychologies according to this system. He argued that the former's "dominant note ... is a centrifugal tendency, a striving for pleasure in the object", while the latter's "is a centripetal striving for the supremacy of the subject", and concluded

"The difficult task of creating a psychology which will be equally fair to both types must be reserved for the future" (1913b, p.509).

This was indeed Jung's task: to develop a theory, an understanding which would be fair to both tendencies in his own personality, as he had already declared that "neurosis is a self-division" (1912b, p.261). These four papers (1914b, 1914c, 1914d, 1913b) should provide sufficient background not only to the understanding of Jung's subsequent works in the Years of Individuation, but also (in retrospect) to his previous writings and experiences which were covered in the Breakdown and the Breakthrough.

#### "The structure of the unconscious"

In the same year that Jung wrote the Septem Sermones he gave a lecture in Paris which he later published in the Archives de Psychologie under the title "La structure de l'inconscient" (1916b). In its English translation it now appears in the seventh volume of his Collected Works. This is a significant work as for the first time Jung introduced the distinction between the personal and the collective unconscious, the

concepts of anima and animus, as well as the principle of individuation (in a psychological context).

Continuing on the themes from the previous articles, Jung clarified that the contents of the unconscious do not only consist of the repressed "infantile-sexual wish-fantasies" but also include "all the psychic material that lies below the threshold of consciousness" (emphasis added). This comprises all the components that "have fallen below the threshold, as well as subliminal sense-perceptions" in addition to "material that has not yet reached the threshold of consciousness (Jung, 1916b, p. 270). In elucidating this latter material Jung wrote that "these are the seeds of future conscious contents" (1916b, pp.270-1). Insofar as

"...Human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functioning thereby made possible is collective and universal..." (p. 275).

Thus these "seeds" must spring from a "collective psyche" which Jung further subdivided into the "collective mind" (which refers to "collective thinking") and the "collective soul" (which refers to "collective feeling") (1916b, p. 275). Jung based this assumption not only on the anatomical similarities of all human brains but also on the "quite remarkable correspondence" of unconscious processes "of the most widely separated peoples and races" which "displays itself ....in the extraordinary but well-authenticated analogies between the forms and motifs of autochthonous myths" (p. 275). He had already discussed common motifs from comparative mythology in the Wandlungen,

and, in addition to his clinical knowledge and the experiences from his own psyche, he had observed a similar correspondence in the psychoses of negroes in America during his lecture tour there (1913).

The introduction of the collective unconscious at this stage should surprise no one, as it represents a most natural development in Jungian thought. The gradual ripening of this concept may be easily observed in the works of the Breakthrough, and its seeds may be identified in Jung's dissertation, and even as far back as the insights of his childhood experiences. After connecting this new term to his original problematic it should become evident that No. 2, Ivenes, and Philemon are image-figures of the collective unconscious and that the Pleroma was its first concrete reference. The "corrective", "healing", "mythopoeic" propensities of the unconscious should be attributed to this larger part of the unconscious, the collective one. Moreover, the references to the matrix of human consciousness, the source of creativity, the prospective and teleological functions of the unconscious, would again better suit the collective rather than the personal unconscious which is by and large a product of personal repressions.

It is of great significance to carefully note and appreciate the phenomenon of the emergence of a new terminology in the Jungian problematic now. This terminology is not a mere odd collection of fancy sounding terms but represents an entire structure, system, language, Weltanschauung, where the concepts are interrelated among themselves to create a coherent whole. As Jung observed earlier it is not enough to "think" about something but one has to "write it", 'name it', identify it (or even personify it); in other

words, locate it within a larger framework.

Jung had indeed alluded to the collective unconscious many times before. But it was not until he actually "baptised it" (Janet, 1906) that it acquired its own life. Moreover, it is more important that once named it was able to enter into new and further relationships with other terms and phenomena, thus making possible further revelations. It is categorically stated here that it is by no means accidental that in this very paper, after introducing the term "collective unconscious", Jung also 'coined' three additional terms, all crucial in the mature formulation of Analytical Psychology. It is strongly argued here that the forging of additional and new terms was an inevitable result of initially identifying the collective part of the unconscious in clear and distinct manner and applying a separate term to it - i.e. collective unconscious, which is more than a simple descriptive adjective. It represents its own 'trade mark', and 'copyright', it is an official declaration of its existence, it is its 'birth certificate' with the distinguishing name attached to it, so that from now on its existence is guaranteed and thus it has to be accounted for.

Having identified the collective unconscious, the problem had to inevitably arise, concerning a precise delineation between it and the personal unconscious, as well as the multiple implications of such a distinction. Jung discussed this issue at great length in this same paper. He began by observing the detrimental effects of a confusion of the collective and the personal. He argued that if the individual "annexes the unconscious heritage of the collective psyche" he will "enlarge"

"the scope of his personality in an illegitimate way" with the results that he will suffer "the consequences" (1916b, p. 276). This could take two main possible directions, as the collective psyche (like the Pleroma) being a neutral and undifferentiated source of all psychological potentiality contains all pairs of opposites, which from the perspective of a differentiated individual are seen as divided into positive and negative. Thus this 'annexation' would lead to either a

"stifling of self-confidence and...an unconscious heightening of the ego's importance to the point of a pathological will to power",

or to the creating of

"a hypertrophy of self-confidence, which in turn would be compensated by an extraordinary sense or inferiority in the unconscious" (p. 276).

Jung very sternly warned against the dangers of the "fusion" of the collective and the personal psyche. He noted that a person's possible

"...identity with the collective psyche always brings with it a feeling of universal validity - 'godlikeness' - which completely ignores all differences in the psychology of his fellows" (p. 278).

One cannot avoid having the strong impression that Jung's own experiences are reflected in this discussion. Then, having outlined all the possible grave consequences of the experiential confusion or fusion of the two realms of the psyche, Jung proceeded in an absolutely logical sequence to underline the "ineluctable psychological necessity" of individuation (1916b, p. 279).

Since the principle of individuation has already been mentioned in the Septem Sermones an explanatory note is here indicated. Historically, Jung first mentioned the principium individuationis in the lecture that he presented at his last Psychoanalytic Congress. This principle originates in Schopenhauer; and Jung (1913b) quoted Nietzsche's reference to it in a different context, i.e. in connection with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality (a theme which in its own right is closely related to the duality in the Jungian problematic). Returning to the paper under present consideration (Jung 1916b), one has to admit that Jung still did not offer a comprehensive account of this principle. Moreover, at this time Jung did not distinguish between individuation and individuality as he did later (1928). Hence in the 1916b paper he used the terms interchangeably and thus, one may claim that strictly speaking Jung's first reference to the principle of individuation in its present meaning was only made in 1928. However, since the negative meaning of individuality, an exclusion and denial of anything collective in one's personality, was only given by Jung when he contrasted it with individuation (1928, p. 174), the original assertion (i.e. that Jung's first reference to individuation in a psychological context was made here, in 1916b paper) may still stand.

"Individuality" was here defined in broad terms as

"the principle which makes possible, and if need be compels, a progressive differentiation from the collective psyche...." (1916b, p. 301).

Individuation was the essential and imperative task of differentiating the individual from the collective. In another paper written the same year Jung amplified on this definition stating that individuation "is exclusive adaptation to inner reality" (1916c, p. 451) as opposed to "psychological adaptation to outer conditions". This task, however, could not be easy as "the personal grows out of the collective psyche and is intimately bound up with it" (1916b, p. 279). The parallels with the relationship between Pleroma and the Creatura of the Septem Sermones are again self-evident.

A further logical step in the description of this differentiation process was to isolate and discuss all possible complications in this pursuit. The first one Jung observed was the tendency of the collective psyche to develop

"a mask that feigns individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks" (1916b, p. 281).

Jung called this mask "persona" and understood it as a "compromise formation between external reality and the individual. In essence.... it is a function for adapting the individual to the real world" (p. 298). Jung very carefully examined some further dangers resulting from a lack of clarity between the persona and the collective psyche (and one again strongly suspects the role that his own experiences played in formulating this understanding).

In analysing the persona of patients a critical point comes when, if analysis is pushed far enough, the personality "dissolves" in the collective. It is at this stage that the individual experiences the feeling of "god likeness" which is often accompanied by peculiar symptoms even of a somatic nature, in which the person's boundaries seem endless.

"Psychologically this state is marked by a peculiar disorientation in regard to one's own personality; one no longer knows who one is..." (1916b, p. 282).

Two possible attempts to deal with this unbearable state, which Jung compares with insanity, may take the following form. The first is described as a "regressive restoration of the persona", in which, in order to avoid the "dissolution", the persona is strengthened and its dominance over the collective is reestablished. This, obviously, does not bring about a natural solution to this conflict as the collective, being the ground and source of all psychic functions, cannot be effectively silenced. The second possibility takes the form of an "identification with the collective psyche". This is another ill-fated alternative in which "godlikeness" is totally accepted and "exalted into a system." This leads the individual to consider himself as "the fortunate possessor of the great truth", and fills him with "prophetic inspiration and desire for martyrdom" (1916b, p. 286).

Jung's conclusion is that neither of these alternatives are viable and helpful in the further growth of the personality, as



"...the mischief...lies neither with the collective psyche nor with the individual psyche, but in allowing the one to exclude the other" (1916b, p. 288).

Afterwards, relating these alternatives to the question of whether the object of study in psychology should be the collective or the individual, he comments that

"the fundamental error of both procedures consists in identifying the subject with one side or the other of his psychology. His psychology is as much individual as collective, but not in the sense that the individual ought to merge himself in the collective, nor the collective in the individual. We must rigorously separate the concept of the individual from that of the personal, for the persona can be entirely dissolved in the collective" (1916b, p. 289).

Jung proposes to resolve the suggested separation by a "synthesis" of the individual with the collective. This might seem a contradiction but under closer examination does not appear so, as this "synthesis" refers to the "constructive method" of "hermeneutical treatment" of the unconscious material, in which the patient's symbolic material is enriched by and compared to additional analogies, first from the patient himself and then from the analyst's experience, as well as his knowledge of general "typical" themes in mythology and other forms of accumulated psychological representations.

"...this procedure widens and enriches the initial symbol, and the final outcome is an infinitely complex and variegated picture, the elements of which can be reduced to their respective tertia comparationis. Certain lines of psychological development then stand out that are at once individual and collective" (1916b, p. 291).

This method is not at all different from that which was suggested in this study as being the one that Jung followed during the Breakdown: a progressive objectification of intimate experiences, a progressive development from an idiosyncratic, 'private' or confused language to a language which would adequately account for those experiences by placing them in a broader perspective. The original dangerous confusion and antithesis between the personal and the collective is solved in a dialectical synthesis. This essential duality of personal and collective with its potential conflict is yet another reflection of Jung's problematic and it should therefore be closely scrutinized.

More specifically, in trying to disentangle the seemingly paradoxical interrelationships between the personal and the collective, Jung introduced another concept, which he named anima. The anima was for Jung essentially a "kind of persona". He understood her as the "feminine being in man", and her counterpart animus as the male being in woman. Thus her basic nature was "compensatory" in that it balanced the feminine part of a male and vice versa in the case of the animus. Moreover, anima represents a "compromise formation between the individual and the unconscious world" (1916b, p. 299).

It is here necessary to emphasize that both the anima and animus are not only the "repressed feminine side of man" and the "repressed masculine side of woman" respectively (Thompson, 1950, p. 167, emphasis added), as some authors erroneously interpreted them. As Jung clarified repeatedly (e.g. 1928; 1929; 1951) both the anima and animus, insofar as they belong to the personal as well as the collective unconscious, include non-personal (Jung called them "impersonal",

"transpersonal" and "collective") aspects, not subject to the defence mechanism of repression, but existing there in potentio. These issues were further discussed competently by Jung's wife Emma (1934; 1950) as well as De Castillejo (1973), Harding (1933), Hillman (1972), Howe (1974), Singer (1976) and Ulanov (1971).

Both the anima and animus represent additional "typical" aspects of the human psyche which have to be accounted for in the process of individuation, i.e. the inevitable direction of differentiation of the individual psyche from its collective background. The persona as well as the animus/anima are, in a sense, mediating agencies between the individual consciousness and the collective unconscious. As such they may facilitate communication between these two parts of the personality, or, at the same time, may either contribute towards a differentiation of the personal from the collective or a fusion between them and a dissolution of the former in the latter.

In other words, Jung introduced in this paper not only the distinction between the two realms of the unconscious, but also the channels connecting them. They are the persona, the animus and the anima, and he further demonstrated how they may be used and/or abused.

The emphasis given to this paper (1916b) in this study is not without justification. It has both illustrated as well as accounted for a number of new issues and concepts which gradually occupied a central position in his later psychology.

"The transcendent function":

Still in the same year of 1916 when Jung wrote the Septem Sermones and "The structure of the unconscious" (1916b), he also wrote a paper entitled "The transcendent function" (which was revised in 1958), in which he described the process of active imagination (although at this stage it was not named by this term). The importance of this paper lies in its explicit account of the transcendent function "i.e., of the collaboration of conscious and unconscious data" (1916/1958, p. 82), which is none other than the central issue of individuation (as seen in the previous papers), and its concrete proposals of how to deal with this delicate problem (i.e. by means of the process of active imagination).

Jung at the very beginning of this paper compares the psychological "transcendent function" with its synonymous equivalent in mathematics and concludes that they are both a function of the "real and imaginary" (in mathematics of course it refers to "real and imaginary numbers"). Thus, the transcendent function "arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents" (p. 69). This constitutes the "synthetic" approach which has already been mentioned earlier. The seeming paradox of both "synthesis" and "union" of the personal and the collective in their effort to secure separation and differentiation (leading to individuation) is reiterated here.

He further maintained that the qualities of "definiteness and directness" of the conscious mind despite their irreplaceable contribution to the process of "external adaptation" and the development of technological

civilization with its necessary emphasis on the "rational judgement", inevitably inhibit any other material and processes which appear to them "incompatible" and "unreasonable" (1916/1958, p. 70). This inhibition leads to "one-sidedness" which "is an advantage and a drawback at the same time" (p. 71), although, one may add, not for the same reason. In other words, such a "one-sidedness" is of great advantage to the process of external adaptation but a drawback to the internal adaptation. Jung remarked that the human psyche is "a self-regulating system" (p. 79), a statement which logically follows his previous argument that the unconscious has a "compensatory" and "healing" function, but this does not apply any longer to the "psyche of civilized man" (p. 79), where the one-sidedness of rational dominance reigns supreme. The transcendent function is thus essential in making "the transition from one attitude to another organically possible, without loss of the unconscious" (1916/1958, p. 73 emphasis added).

The 'technique' of active imagination is the vehicle to bring about the needed "transition". It is basically comprised of certain unconscious material which is brought into the light of consciousness in a special manner so that a dialogue develops between them. Jung specified that the unconscious material must be accompanied by a reasonable intensity of energy, which would be at the "disposal" of the individual in order to bring about this transition. To achieve this Jung suggests using unconscious material in an "artificial" (p. 81) manner, i.e. to develop an existing fantasy to a degree that is sufficiently emotionally changed.

"In order...to gain possession of the energy that is in the wrong place, [the patient]....must make the emotional state the basis or starting point of this procedure...." (1916/1958, p. 82).

The opportunity should be used to mention in passing a similarity between Jung's method of active imagination and many techniques which appeared on the psychotherapeutic scene (especially in America) during the last decade and a half. These techniques, based on extremely diverse, identifiable and non-identifiable sources, have in common an intense emphasis on feelings, their experience and expression (e.g. Burton, 1969; Custaitis, 1969; Egan, 1970; Lewis and Streitfeld, 1972; Perls et al, 1971; Rogers, 1970; Schutz, 1967). Without entering into any detail of this parallel (as this would constitute an unjustifiable deviation from the theme of this study) only two sharp distinctions should be drawn between these techniques and Jung's methods: Firstly, while the former's understanding of "feelings" is in terms of some accent on the here and now, derived from a philosophy (mostly implicit) that man can act consciously and change his motives almost instantly in a manner approximating abreaction, Jung's reference to the "emotional states" is firmly based on the unconscious (partly personal but mainly collective). Secondly, while these techniques often propagate the supremacy of "feelings" and at times to a point of indulgence, Jung's approach makes a clear stipulation that the unconscious material should be confronted with the conscious in order to integrate it.

"The whole procedure is a kind of enrichment and clarification of the affect, whereby the affect and its contents are brought nearer to consciousness, becoming at the same time more impressive and more understandable" (1916/1958, p. 82).

The important stage in active imagination is when the unconscious material is given a certain shape. Jung observed that this is not always an easy task as different people have different abilities in this regard. Thus the emotionally charged unconscious material should be expressed in any way that suits the person - i.e. by painting it, sculpting it, acting it, dancing it, singing it, or articulating it in whatever other manner might be suitable to the individual. The aim is to express that "'other' voice" (p. 83) from the unconscious, and in such a way that the conscious will also participate. In this common participation a "collaboration of conscious and unconscious data" is ensured, and this produces the "constructive" and "synthetic" "union" of the two realms in which the "meaning" of the unconscious product emerges, thus overcoming the one-sidedness. This process is the same as that which Jung himself followed in the writing of the Septem Sermones and one should therefore agree fully with Judith Hubback's suggestion that

"the writing of 'Seven sermons to the dead' was the personal experience out of which the paper 'The transcendent function' emerged later in the same year, 1916" (1966, p. 110).

Further elaborations in the understanding of the collective unconscious:

In an article in 1918 under the title "The role of the unconscious" Jung after recapitulating his theories of the unconscious clarified that the "suprapersonal" or "collective unconscious" should not be understood in terms of "inherited ideas" but rather in terms of "innate possibilities

of ideas" which "though....[they] do not produce any contents themselves,....give definite form to contents that have already been acquired" (1918, pp. 10-11).

"Being part of the inherited structure of the brain, they are the reason for the identity of symbols and myth-motifs in all parts of the earth" (p. 11)

He also added that the compensating function of the unconscious is accomplished through another function: its "symbol-creating function" (1918, p. 18). The latter Jung considered as the "most important" function of the unconscious and its most important product, the archetype, a concept which he introduced a year later, in a lecture which he gave (again in English!) at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, the Mind Association, and the British Psychological Society, at London University in July 1919. It might not be coincidental that Jung first proposed the term archetype at a joint philosophical and psychological gathering, as its implications reach much wider landscapes than traditionally considered to be within the boundaries of psychology.

In this short lecture "Instinct and the unconscious" (1919b), Jung defined archetypes as "typical modes of apprehension" and maintained that

"wherever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing with an archetype, no matter whether its mythological character is recognized or not" (1919b, pp. 137-138).



This definition followed a parallel definition of instincts:

"Instincts are typical modes of action, and wherever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of action and reaction we are dealing with instinct, no matter whether it is associated with a conscious motive or not" (p. 135).

It is worth noting that what has been observed earlier in connection with the consequences of the introduction of a new term, are equally valid here. Although Jung had grasped the general idea of the archetype in earlier writings, it was only after he 'baptized' it with its proper name - archetype - that he was able to observe it in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion, thus documenting its implications for other interrelated principles, functions and fields.

Thus, the biological aspect of the archetype is here taken a step beyond, from the broad implication suggested earlier that since all brains have a similar structure they would also have similar potential capacity in terms of their "mental functioning". Jung argued that although "instinctive action is characterized by an unconsciousness of the psychological motive behind it" (p. 130), one should not class all unconscious processes as instinctive;

"...only those unconscious processes which are inherited, and occur uniformly and regularly, can be called instinctive" (1919b, p. 131).

Jung had little difficulty in asserting that instinct, almost by definition, is an "essentially collective, i.e. universal and regularly

occurring phenomenon which has nothing to do with individuality" (p. 134). He also noted that besides instincts, the collective unconscious includes

"a priori, inborn forms of 'intuition', namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes" (p. 133).

Thus archetypes, insofar as they are also "collective phenomena", together with instincts "form the collective unconscious" (pp. 133-134). However, Jung did not accept instincts and archetypes as two unrelated components of the collective unconscious:

"...in my view the question of instinct cannot be dealt with psychologically without considering the archetypes, because at bottom they determine one another" (1919b, p. 134, emphasis added).

This interrelation between instincts and archetypes was made even clearer when Jung maintained that in fact the archetype is the "instinct's perception of itself" or the "self-portrait of the instinct" (p. 136).

"Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetypes determines the form and direction of instinct" (1919b, p. 137).

In this manner Jung related the collective typical psychological phenomena with the collective typical biological phenomena and made the former into the psychological (symbolic) representation of the latter.

The new terminology was almost now complete, except for the last and perhaps most significant term, which, although existing in potentio in Jung's writings and insights from the beginning, had to wait its turn to be 'baptized'. It cannot be accidental that it had to wait for the coining of all the previous terms as it itself represents their totality, and the wholeness of the entire personality.

### "Psychological Types":

Jung first introduced the Self by name only in 1921, in his book on "Psychological Types"<sup>+</sup>. This significant book constitutes a true milestone in Jung's development along the path of individuation, i.e. differentiation of his own individual thought and terminology from the collective background of his theoretical sources, not so much because it introduces new theories (in fact apart from the Self it does not) but because it offers the first comprehensive and systematic presentation of Jung's new language system until that period. All the new insights that appeared in the papers mentioned earlier were now collected into one whole in which they were all meaningfully inter-related. By providing this new solidified and systematic structure Jung was after this able to proceed with the process of renovating and expanding his theories on this existing structure.

Jung worked on this book during the years of the Breakdown and the Breakthrough and one may easily trace in it themes from the Wandlungen, the Septem Sermones and all his subsequent papers. Jung's claim that he became interested in psychological types after the break with Freud, in his attempt to conceptualize the differences among Freud's, Adler's

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<sup>+</sup> Hereafter referred to as P.T., Baynes' translation of the first edition. This is here preferred to Hull's translation of the eighth edition for the sole reason that it is the former which Jung wrote in 1921.

and his own outlooks (M.D.R., p. 233) has been frequently reiterated and accepted as the one and only motive for writing this work (e.g. Cox, 1973; F. Fordham, 1966; Goldbrunner, 1964; van der Post, 1975). In addition to this motive, Storr (1973) mentions Jung's earlier "observations upon hysteria and schizophrenia" as "equally important" (p. 63) and Cohen (1975) argues that the Psychological Types represented the culmination of the second phase of Jung's work" which for him was centered around the "question of opposites" (p. 17).

One may not doubt that it was indeed Jung's conscious intention in investigating the differences between the psychologies of Adler, Freud and himself, in order to account for the break in some tangible manner that led him to write the "Psychological Types". But if one compares carefully the suggested dichotomies of human functions in this book and Jung's previous attempts at such divisions (e.g. the two kinds of thinking in the Wandlungen, the distinction between the Pleroma and the Creatura of the Septem Sermones) one cannot but accept that the "question of opposites" in this book is yet another reformulation of Jung's central problematic. According to this point of view, the motive of comparing and contrasting the Freudian, Adlerian and Jungian "outlooks" was secondary to the primary motive of further exploring his problematic of the Other. In other words, it could be argued that the parameters of comparing the three psychologies were the original parameters of his own problematic. A few lines after writing about his "need to define the ways in which" his "outlook differed from Freud's and Adler's", Jung admitted:

"My book, therefore, was an effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things..." (M.D.R., p. 233).

Psychological Types is a big volume (over six hundred pages) of almost encyclopaedic scope and is Jung's only book which includes a glossary, an extensive one hundred page chapter! Jung synthesized here material from a wide spectrum of fields, including mythology, theology, philosophy, the arts, literary criticism, and history, treating it all as essentially an expression of the human psyche and thus accepting it as legitimate subject-matter of his psychology. The motto of the book is a passage from Heine in which Plato and Aristotle are contrasted as representing

"two distinct human natures, which from immemorial time, under every sort of cloak, stand more or less inimically opposed.... Though under different names, always and essentially it is of Plato and Aristotle that we speak" (P.T., p. 9).

"Platonic natures" are characterized as "enthusiastic, mystical" whereas "Aristotelian" as "practical, ordering". These descriptions answer perfectly to the previous distinctions of Jung which have been examined. The significant innovation, however, which appears in this motto is a uniting third entity:

"The Church eventually embraces both natures...yet both incessantly at feud" (P.T., p. 9).

This is precisely what this book is about: A discussion of two main kinds of human nature, two psychological types (the introvert and the extravert)

and of the Self, a uniting totality of the whole personality, which, however, does not obliterate the psychological types.

Jung defined the Self as "the subject of my totality" which "also includes the unconscious psyche" in addition to the conscious Ego (P.T., p. 540). He maintained that

"... the individual Self is a portion, or excerpt, or representative, of something universally present in all living creatures, and, therefore, a correspondingly graduated kind of psychological process, which is born anew in every creature...." (P.T., p. 475).

This should be received with no surprise as it is a logical consequence of Jung's previous observations, viz. that in addition to the personal unconscious there is also a collective unconscious with material stored from the history of mankind. Thus, since the Self is comprising all the layers and all psychological functions of the personality it should also have a collective aspect. Moreover, what was said about the highly delicate relationship between the personal and the collective in his previous papers may also apply to the inter-relationship between the Self and the ego. Any "one-sidedness" would have detrimental effects for the individual. Jung understood neurosis, in these terms, as an unconscious identification of the ego with the Self,

"whereupon the importance of the Self is reduced to nil, while the ego becomes inflated beyond reason...." (P.T., p. 477).

One-sidedness of the Self cannot take place, as by definition the Self is a totality including all unconscious and conscious parts of the

individual. Thus, if an obliteration of the ego occurs it would not be from any usurpation by the Self but by the unconscious. The latter condition would still be of detriment to the personality, and it would lead, if left to reach uncontrollable dimensions, to insanity.

The Self, as the Church in the motto, "embraces both natures". However, introversion and extraversion represent two natural and complementary movements of the libido, ie. inwardly towards the subject or outwardly towards the object. Once one such movement becomes "habitual" (P.T., p. 567) and characteristic of a person, then one speaks of either an introverted type or an extraverted type. Jung further distinguished four "psychological functions": thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition which he understood as the four primary "phenomenal forms of libido" (P.T., p. 547). The first two were "rational" and the latter two "irrational". Jung also claimed that the selection of these four "basic" functions was based only on his experience and that no a priori reason for such selection existed. One may certainly not doubt this. It is the same principle that Jung used in both the Wandlungen and the Septem Sermones, viz. after a general and primary division to further divide the various realms and functions of existence.

Since Jung had already introduced most of the ideas included in the Psychological Types in his earlier works, the great value of this book lies in the introduction of the actual term Self. The appearance of this term brought into relief all other crucial terms and thus added the last cornerstone to the ultimate structure of Jung's psychological language. He clarified that "in unconscious phantasy the Self often appears as a super-ordinated or ideal personality"

(P.T., p. 540). Thus No. 2 personality and Ivenes might be accepted as Self images. In the 1960 edition of this book Jung wrote a separate definition of the Self (which was previously included under the entry of Ego) and clarified that it is

"an archetypal idea which differs from other ideas of the kind in that it occupies a central position befitting the significance of its content and its numinocity" (1921, p. 461).

Finally, Colonel van der Post (1975) emphasized a significant implication of this work which is worth mentioning. He argues that Jung by distinguishing different unique human natures (types) shows that each one had its own particular mode of expression because each one's own "psychology demands a different idiom of utterance". Thus Jung was the first, according to van der Post, who provided "mankind with a common code" of understanding and appreciating the differences between people (1975, p. 192).

#### Further researches - Alchemy:

Having completed the basic terminology of his new language, Jung proceeded to further develop it by adding supplementary terms and exploring the resulting implications of their interrelationships. The concept of the collective unconscious needed additional validation. He had hypothesized from his own experience, clinical practice, literature research and limited field research that common themes exist in the psychological representations of different individuals and cultures in different geographical places, of different stages of 'civilization', and in different historical times.



From 1920 he began his extensive field research. That year he travelled to Algeria and Tunisia. Between 1924-25 he spent a short period of time with the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico. During 1925-26 he undertook a long expedition to East Africa (including Kenya, Uganda, and the Nile). In 1938 he visited India. At the same time he considerably expanded his researches into most forms of collective symbolical representations, e.g. in history, archeology, mythology, anthropology, the arts, religion and philosophy. His aim was to find further substantiation for his theory of the collective unconscious with its "typical components", the archetypes, and thus expand the network of recorded instances of their manifestation. His researches were extensive and intensive and, in addition to the above mentioned fields, included, naturally, his own clinical psychotherapeutic practice.

A subject that received Jung's particular attention was alchemy (Cf. Volumes 12, 13, and 14 of his Collected Works). His overenthusiasm in studying this field, as well as both western and eastern religion. (Cf. Volume 10 of his Collected Works) gave rise to the well known criticism that he was a 'mystic'. Since this criticism has been repeatedly levelled at him, a brief examination of the meanings of 'mystic' is here indicated.

One may observe that there are essentially two types of definitions of "mysticism" and "mystic". One bestows basically negative connotation to these words and attributes to them the meaning of "mystery" ("hidden or inexplicable matter"), "mystify" ("hoax, play on credulity of"), and contrasts this to "scientific" which is understood as clear, rational truth based on tested evidence. There is, however, another

definition of "mysticism" which is not at all a negative one. Attributing a positive meaning to the "mysterious" aspect of "mysticism", a "mystic" is accepted as a person being preoccupied with a "hidden meaning", perhaps in trying to unravel it. Exploring further than ordinary dictionary definitions and entering the Greek etymological meaning of "mystic", it is established that although it is still related to "mystery", the latter does not have a negative connotation. Mysterion (mystery) is a "secret rite" which is attended by "mystics". A mystic "μύστης" is the "initiated one" and the verb "μυέω" means to initiate, to "instruct". In other words, a mystic is none other than but the person who has been instructed, who has been trained within the language system of that particular theory/phenomenon/activity. Thus it might indeed be a "mystery" to somebody how the aeroplane flies or how the television works but this might simply mean that he has not been instructed in the functioning of these technological gadgets. Certainly it does not imply that either the appliances themselves are mysterious or anybody who studies or has mastered their mechanism is a "mystic", in the negative sense of the word. But "mystic" and "mystical" have become so heavily loaded with emotional meaning given to them by two opposing groups of people that it has little discriminating value nowadays, although it is rich with psychological meaning. Certain individuals are proud to be identified as mystics while others consider this label with ultimate contempt. Thus, if a neutral definition of "mystic" is accepted, the decision of whether a negative or positive meaning should be applied will depend on three factors: firstly, the kind of activity/theory/phenomenon with which the "mystic" is preoccupied; secondly, the manner in which he goes about investigating the "hidden meaning"; and thirdly, the purpose and/or gain inherent in this.

Another dimension of the "mystical", which is inextricably related to the above discussion is experience. The "mystical" is understood as something almost synonymous with "experiential" as opposed to something intellectual and propositional. According to this meaning the mysterious part of the "mystical" would relate to its highly personal and intimate nature as opposed to being demonstrable, common and public. A "mystical language" would then be a language which would be understood only by those who have undergone similar experiences, who have been "instructed" in the same system. A "mystical language" should not be dismissed as a contradiction in terms, in that language is something common and a non-private affair. This is illustrated when one examines particular systems (such as the technology of aeroplanes and televisions) which are inaccessible to the majority of people, but are indeed accessible to those who care and are able to be instructed in them. In other words this discussion has striking similarities with the Heraclitean "common logos". The key to a proper understanding of a "mystical language" is the shared experience: the incomprehensibility of such a language might be a result of (a) either not having gone through those experiences that the language accounts for, or (b) not having been instructed in utilizing that particular language to refer to, and account for those experiences even if one has undergone them. The mysterious aspect of "mysticism" might thus be understood as resulting from the cautious attitude of those "instructed" in allowing those who are not instructed to use a language that the latter cannot understand due to their lack of relevant experience. Now if one starts questioning the openness or closedness of a group in offering others the particular instruction with reference to those experiences and their expression,

i.e., the "mystical language", the discussion leaves the realm of epistemology and becomes an open issue with social, political and a host of other uncontrollable variables involved. This confirms the initial comment that the words mysticism and mystic, as commonly used, lack discriminating value and become mere tools in mud slinging. In a moment of indignation at the unjust accusations of being a mystic, Jung wrote the following to Calvin S. Hall, the editor of the widely used textbook on Theories of Personality (1957), a work which is typical of the (perhaps inevitable) simplification and compartmentalization in the modern teaching of psychology:

"...If you call me an occultist because I am seriously investigating religious, mythological, folkloristic and philosophical fantasies in modern individuals and ancient texts, then you are bound to diagnose Freud as a sexual pervert, since he is doing likewise with sexual fantasies..." (Adler 1976, p. 186).

Returning to the subject of alchemy, it is here suggested that Jung approached it in exactly the same manner that was suggested above, i.e. he discovered that the "hidden meaning" that alchemy expressed was none other than the typical steps the human psyche has to follow on the path of individuation. After years of intensive research he was satisfied that despite and besides any other intentions, alchemists through the highly elaborated process of their opus were essentially expressing the "typical" and universal stages and aspects of the differentiation of the personal from the collective in a balanced manner in order that no one-sidedness would result.

"...The language of the alchemists is at first sight very different from our psychological terminology and way of thinking. But if we treat their symbols in the same way as we treat modern fantasies, they yield a meaning such as we have already deduced from the problematical modern material..." (Jung 1956, pp. 518-519).

viz. a symbolical expression of the process of individuation.

"Psychologically, [alchemy]... was a representation of the individuation process by means of chemical substances and procedures, or what we today call active imagination" (Jung 1956, p. 494).

To prove his interpretation Jung called upon the alchemists' own confession that their symbols, although seemingly referring to a physical process of manipulating tangible materials with the aim of producing gold or some other magic elixir, were in fact understood in a "moral and philosophical sense" and not merely in a physical sense. He thus concluded that "their 'philosophy' was, indeed, nothing but projected psychology" (Jung 1956, p. 519). It is necessary to quote in some length Jung's understanding of what alchemy represented, and why he used it so extensively, as well as his feelings for those who rejected his allegations and methodology.

"I would therefore counsel the critical reader to put aside his prejudices and for once try to experience on himself the effects of the process [of individuation which] I have described, or else suspend judgement and admit that he understands nothing. For thirty years I have studied these psychic processes under all possible conditions and have assured myself that the alchemists as well as the great philosophies of the East are referring to just such experiences, and that it is chiefly our ignorance of the psyche if these experiences appear 'mystic'" (Jung 1956, p. 535).

Jung in fact, according to his own words, had suspended judgement on his observations of mandala symbols in alchemy (and elsewhere) before committing himself on their significance:

"I have observed these processes and their products for close on thirty years on the basis of very extensive material drawn from my own experience. For fourteen years I neither wrote nor lectured about them so as not to prejudice my observations" (1936b, p. 99).

The cardinal criterion again emphasized was that of experience. Jung never lost an opportunity to underline that

"....everything about this psychology is, in the deepest sense, experience; the entire theory, even where it puts on the most abstract airs, is the direct outcome of something experienced" (Jung 1943, p. 117).

The unfortunate misunderstanding arises from the fact that a) one does not easily admit one's own prejudices (as more often than not they are unconscious, in the first place, and b) when a particular language is "understood" grammatically and syntactically no additional criteria are usually used for its interpretation, and therefore with the symbolical dimension of language missing, one considers it legitimate to query its validity. The one-sidedness and resulting blindness and arrogance of mere intellectual learning leads one to criticize and reject something that he does not understand in the first place, as he lacks its experiential substratum. This a fundamental factor in understanding Jungian psychology and its critics. But an intellectual, rational understanding and formulation is not to be despised. Although for Jung still

"...the experience itself...[was] the important thing, not its intellectual representation or clarification, [which] proves meaningful and helpful when the road to original experience is blocked...." (Jung 1956. p. 545).

Thus, Jung developed an appreciation of the significance of the language in which an experience is conveyed: With particular reference to alchemy he wrote:

"The alchemist... interpreted his experience as best he could, though without ever understanding it to the degree that psychological explanation makes possible today",

and placing experience and the expression of it in perspective concluded:

"....his inadequate understanding did not detract from the totality of his archetypal experience any more than our wider and more differentiated understanding adds anything to it" (Jung 1956, p. 545).

Returning to the central function alchemy had in Jung's psychology, it should be added that he did not simply note its psychological interpretation, but also, in a reciprocal manner, maintained that it had an expanding effect on his experience:

"Alchemy has performed for me the great and invaluable service of providing material in which my experience could find sufficient room, and has thereby made it possible for me to describe the individuation process at least in its essential aspects" (Jung 1956, p. 556).

Moreover, alchemical language had the precious advantage of expressing through its symbolical form the seeming paradoxes engendered in the individuation process: As discussed earlier, individuation is the

process of differentiating the individual from the collective (but not in a one-sided manner), in order to achieve the Selfhood, the totality of the personality in which the pairs of opposites harmoniously unite. According to the diagram (Fig. 1.13, p. 315) the antithetical realms of Nature (which is characterized by unconsciousness) and the Ego (which is characterized by consciousness) must unite in the emergence of the Self. But, as Jung logically remarks, such union is logically impossible, and "theoretically incomprehensible" (1956, p. 539). What is needed is a "third thing, a neutral nature" (1956, p. 538), a "third" a "solvent" which "can only be of an irrational nature" (1956, p. 495). In other words, the real, lived, experienced dichotomy (usually in the form of a "hybris of ego-consciousness" [p. 546]) cannot be solved conceptually/intellectually, but only in an "indirect" and "symbolical" manner (p. 539). Jung made an apt analogy

"In nature the resolution of opposites is always an energetic process: she acts symbolically in the truest sense of the word (a σύμβολον is a 'throwing together'), doing something that expresses both sides, just as a waterfall visibly mediates between above and below. The waterfall itself is then the incommensurable third. In an open and unresolved conflict dreams and fantasies occur which, like the waterfall, illustrate the tension and nature of the opposites, and thus prepare the synthesis" (Jung 1956, p. 495).

The symbolical and irrational process of the transcendent function results in an alteration of both antithetical poles (p. 546). In alchemy this was symbolized by Mercurius, the lapis philosophorum, the "initial material of the process but also its end-product".  
Mercurius is



"...the primordial matter from which God created all material things. The change which the artifex proposes to induce in it consists, among other things, in giving it 'immense weight' and indivisible wholeness" (p. 502).

Jung studied the descriptions given to Mercurius in the immense alchemical literature and its role in the alchemical opus and concluded that in fact it constituted a symbolic representation of the Self, the ultimate wholeness of personality. For example, Mercurius was referred to as aqua permanens, as water

"which occupies a middle position between the volatile (air, fire) and the solid (earth), since it occurs in both liquid and gaseous form, and also as a solid in the form of ice" (p. 503).

But Mercurius was not unique in representing the end-product of alchemy. Dorn (a noted alchemist whom Jung studied in depth) referred to the end-product as coelum and described it as a "universal medicine (the panacea, alexipharmic, medicina catholica, etc)...the balsam and elixir of life... a 'living stone', a λίθος ἑμφυχος ..." (p. 539), a λίθος οὐ λίθος (stone that is not stone) (p. 536). The last description is a very successful characterization of a combination between Nature and the Ego: a "stone that hath a spirit" which in fact "is not a stone" is indeed a 'conscious nature', the paradoxical description of a transcendental idea, viz. the Self.

It was for this reason that Jung welcomed the alchemical treatises, as according to his reading of them they spoke in a symbolical language about the transcendent process, of the union of opposites in the form

of active imagination. Their descriptions of the lapis left no doubt in Jung's mind that, "considered psychologically", they were in fact referring to the archetype of the Self (1956, p. 544). The alchemical opus was, for Jung, definitely more than a mere physical juggling of peculiar materials. This should also become clear to anybody who reads any alchemical text. The fact that their attempts were not only aimed at the transforming the substances they were manipulating but transforming themselves too, is typically exemplified in Dorn's dictum that

"you will never make the One unless you become one yourself"  
(In Jung, 1956, p. 529).

Therefore, having "translated" (p. 537) alchemy into psychology Jung observed the advantages of using the alchemical language. Not only did it represent the "typical" tendencies of the psyche but it also stored an enormous amount of experience accumulated "through the centuries" (p. 555) thus enabling the individual, researcher, analyst or analysant to enrich their understanding of their own experiences by placing them in the larger framework/language of alchemy. In alchemical terminology, a broad language offers the necessary vessel in which particular individual experiences may be contained, i.e. acquire meaning and become intelligible by being adequately accounted for. Individual experiences must be placed against the collective background in order to be understood and communicated to others appropriately, otherwise, the painful confusion of insanity is imminent. Jung repeatedly made the point that both the understanding and communication of one's experiences (a division which ultimately might not exist) must be done according to a particular

language-system, where a "consensus of opinion" (1956, p. 549) exists. However, his researches into various 'closed' language-systems (alchemy, eastern and western religions, mythology, etc.) demonstrated something substantially radical in its implications: that the "consensus of opinion", very much like the Heraclitean "common logos" is not what everybody knows, i.e. an absolute statistical model of the normal curve of understanding of the population in general, but is more restrictive; it refers to any particular group of well differentiated concepts which developed dialectically from and with the relevant experience. In other words, Jung's researches indicated that there are a great number of bodies of psychological representations expressing the same "typical" components of the human psyche and once one has the experiential background (which is common in its basic outline for all) he may be able not only to decode and translate one or several of them (depending on the depth and clarity of one's own experience and knowledge of their symbolic code) but also then find their common denominators which would then distil the essence of the human psyche. This is what Jung actually achieved himself. Thus, it is within this perspective that his explorations into the "mystical" areas of the "irrational" should be located and understood. One will, therefore, have to group all those who throw the "mystical" criticism at Jung (e.g. Glover, 1950; Reich, 1972) and those who accuse him on the grounds that he "neglected the part of the rational ego" (Weigert, 1942, p. 359) into the same category with the "critical reader" whom Jung counselled to either drop his "prejudice and try to experience" what the language which he calls "mystical" conveys or "admit that he understands nothing".

The Other-as-Archetype:

Casting a fresh look at Figure 1.13 (p.315) the following additions and clarifications may now be made. Although the basic outline of direction of psychological development still remains the same, i.e. a horizontal line from Nature to the Ego, and an upward one from the Ego to the Self, Jung commented that:

"The process of development proves on closer inspection to be cyclic or spiral" (1944, p.28).

This may still be represented by the same diagram by modifying the straight lines from Nature to Ego and then to the Self, so that the model is depicted in three dimension as a spiral, where the Ego (E) is the farthest apex of the line and Nature (N) and Self (S) occupy the beginning and end of the spiral with the Self on a higher level than Nature but nevertheless on the same vertical plane, one directly above the other. This is depicted in Figure 1.14 (p. 368 ).

Although this refinement is important, for the sake of simplicity the earlier form (Figure 1.13) will be retained in the subsequent elaborations on this basic diagram, which are contained in the discussion below:

A significant innovation in Jung's ultimate language system concerns the development from the Ego to the Self. This direction does not take place in a vacuum. Jung showed how certain "typical" and identifiable tendencies from the unconscious (which may be personified)

actually guide, and lead this development. This is in fact the function and role of archetypes. Being collective and existing in the individual in potentio they are present during the entire development of the Ego. However, during this development, archetypes assume a latent role, giving priority to the needs of adaptation to the external world and social reality, in short, to the Ego. It is only after sufficient development of the Ego that they become activated and commence their movement towards the fulfillment of the totality of the Self. The diagram may now thus be further modified to reflect this differentiation. Figure 1.15 (p. 368) presents what might be termed the 'cable model' of development. The transcendent pathway from the Ego to the Self is here initiated by isolated archetypes ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $\epsilon$ ,  $\zeta$ ,..) which gradually, one after another, start seeking their expression. Jung clarified the mediating role of archetypes when he wrote that

"... the transcendent function reveals itself as a mode of apprehension mediated by the archetypes and capable of uniting the opposites. By 'apprehension' I do not mean simply intellectual understanding, but understanding through experience ..." (Jung 1943, p.109 emphasis added).

He further expounded that

"An archetype ... is a dynamic image, a fragment of the objective psyche, which can be truly understood only if experienced as an autonomous entity" (Jung 1943, p.109),

and also that

"... the meaning and purpose of [the transcendent function]  
...is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality

originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness ..." (Jung 1943, p.110).

When these are applied to the understanding of Figure 1.15 (p.368 ) they lead to some further modifications of the diagram which contain additional elements of the process of development depicted more accurately. To summarize; a) archetypes are fragments of the Self, (itself an archetype), which exist in potentio from birth and during the first half of development, i.e. from Nature to the Ego; and b) their autonomy is a significant aspect of their function in that they start to tend toward the wholeness of the personality, the Self, by distancing themselves from the Ego direction (which is depicted horizontally in the diagram), and separating themselves from the Ego contents of consciousness. In this way they appear as independent unconscious tendencies thus breaking the restrictive and self perpetuating sterility bond of Ego-consciousness. The Self, being the totality and wholeness represents the state of union of (ideally) all archetypes together. Hence, the more archetypes bending towards the Self, the closer that personality is to achieving its wholeness. Not all archetypes are activated at the same time and they do not all move in the same direction at the same speed.

This model was here named the 'cable model' because of its resemblance to a cable containing, and consisting of individual wires interwoven together. An effective fold of the cable depends on the greatest number of individual wires curved in the same direction, as shown in Figure 1.16 (p. 368 ).




Fig. 1.14




Fig. 1.15




Fig. 1.16




Fig. 1.17




Fig. 1.18




Fig. 1.19






Fig. 1.20




Fig. 1.21




Fig. 1.22

In relating the last diagram (Figure 1.16) to the observed trends as depicted in the previous series of diagrams (Figures 1.9, 1.10, p. 267; 1.11, and 1.12, p.268; and 1.13, p.315) which illustrated the emergence of the Self from the antithetical Anticipated Whole Others and smaller Fragment Others, certain new developments are evident. These will be followed below in the light of additional theoretical innovations that Jung made during this period.

Firstly, the issue of the bipolarity of the archetypes should be incorporated in this model. Jung repeatedly emphasized that archetypes are bipolar entities.

"All archetypes have a positive, favourable, bright side that points upwards, ... also they have one that points downwards, partly negative and unfavourable, partly chthonic ... "(Jung 1948d, p. 226).

"Archetypes ... are always bipolar: they have both a positive and a negative side ... "(Jung 1946b, p.229).

This bipolar quality has been discussed in a number of contexts (cf. Jung 1937b, p. 471; 1946b, p. 237; 1951, p. 267). In its graphical presentation the bipolarity of archetypes suggests that the transcendent direction from the Ego towards the Self, insofar as it is guided by specific archetypes, should not be restricted to only an upward movement but should include a downward one as well which would represent their counter pole. In this manner, Figure 1.16 should be modified to depict more faithfully the bipolarity of archetypes. This is depicted in Figure 1.17 (p.369).

Secondly, a puzzle arises from the new figure: The bipolarity has given rise, in Figure 1.17, to 'two' Selves. However, if these

seemingly 'two' Selves are accepted as representing two poles of one axis which at the same time also passes through the starting point, Nature, (Figure 1.18, p.369) one may appreciate that this clarifies in a more reliable manner Jung's understanding of the Self: in that the axis of the Self passes through Nature and thus reflects Jung's observation that "the self exists from the very beginning, but it is latent, that is unconscious" (1936b, p. 81n). Moreover, it corresponds with Jung's comment that

"...the Pole is the point round which everything turns - hence [it is] another symbol of the self..."(1936b, p.188).

Thus it is not a question of 'two Selves, but of an axis with two poles. Figure 1.18 represents a modification with marked improvements on figure 1.13 (p. 315) in that a) the mediating role of archetypes is graphically exhibited (in the cable model), and b) the bipolarity of archetypes is also taken into account.

Continuing the development of the series of diagrams in figures 1.9 - 1.13, the spheric representation of the totality of the personality may now be understood in a modified manner which incorporates Jung's later innovations:

If the bipolar unfolding of archetypes is added to the earlier diagrams (and particularly that of Figure 1.11, on page 268) the result would be an improved diagram (figure 1.19, on page 369) where the original beginning point of Nature is represented as the centre of a sphere. From that central point the first phase of development (that of the Ego) is depicted as a horizontal movement towards the periphery of the

sphere in directions covering the full spectrum of 360 degrees. This is represented in Figure 1.19 by the horizontal arrows emitted from the centre N (Nature) and extending to the periphery E (Ego).

When the entire spectrum is taken into consideration, the effect can be represented by a disc consisting of the individual radials extending from the centre N and thus expanding the central core of Nature by reaching out to its periphery. Figure 1.19 portrays this disc in two dimensions. The upward and downward transcendent movements toward the Self would therefore begin to turn towards the axis of the Self once the Ego development reaches its optimum growth. This is illustrated by the four arrows starting from the E and pointing towards the Self. In this manner, Figure 1.19 may be understood as a cross-section of the sphere that would be created when Figure 1.18 is spun around the axis of S, N, S.

Figure 1.20 (p.370) represents the same diagram of Figure 1.19 but in a three-dimensional fashion. The disc of Ego development is here depicted in a clearer way, as well as the spheric effect of the totality. Figure 1.20 depicts a personality with a sufficiently developed Ego and near individuation, in that the arrows are closing the open gaps and reaching near the poles of the Self. In contrast to the unipolar movement of Figure 1.12 (p. 268) the present figure represents an improvement as it conveys the bipolar quality which was discussed above.

Figure 1.21 (p.370) is another view of the same effect and is here offered to provide a clearer understanding. This time the three-dimensional sphere is viewed from above (or below) the pole of the Self. In this manner the Self is seen as a central point where all tendencies of

the personality converge. Jung's emphasis on the central and centering function of the Self is well documented (e.g. 1928, p. 238; 1950b, p. 357; etc.).

Having completed the spheric representation of the Self as the totality of the personality, it now remains to explore one additional dimension: the collective and personal unconscious in relation to consciousness. Figure 1.22 (p.370) represents the collective unconscious as the two inner cones which share the same basis. The area covered inside these cones depicts the inner core of personality, the collective part of the unconscious. It should be noted that this shows the unconscious basis of Nature as well as the unconscious beginnings of early personality development (insofar as a line is drawn from the centre towards the Ego periphery along the disc of Ego development). The inner cone represents the collective unconscious, the outer cone the personal unconscious and the rest of the sphere, the conscious area of personality. This corresponds with Jung's understanding that the collective unconscious constitutes the nucleus and core of the personality, and that consciousness is an outer growth from the inner centre of the collective unconscious.

A significant achievement of this diagrammatical representation of the psyche is the depiction of the Self as an axis and central point of not only the collective unconscious, but also of the personal unconscious as well as of the conscious part of the personality. Ultimately, the Self is not only the poles but the entire sphere. As Jung stated, "the wholeness" of the Self

"... can be expressed by roundness, the circle or sphere ..." (1940, p. 164)

These graphical representations of the development of the personality and the constitution of the psyche should therefore be accepted not as an extraneous interpretation of Jung's psychology, not as a reading into Jung an understanding that is foreign to his thought, but indeed a reading of his work which enables the researcher to reveal and systematize the salient aspects of his thought. Finally, the warning sounded earlier in connection with the previous drawings (vide supra, p. 269) needs to be reiterated here: All models are approximations of what they model, and particularly when one attempts to model the highly complex reality of the psyche, however successful the depiction of certain aspects of it might be it would ultimately be impossible to achieve a comprehensive series of diagrams representing all elements, functions and processes of the psyche. These diagrams should therefore be accepted within their logical and graphical limitations.

These diagrams offer a pictorial account and a distilled version of the process of individuation as well as the structure of the psyche, as discussed by Jung in his ultimate formulation of the problematic of the Other. In the following pages this formulation will be examined in greater detail, viz. terms and insights that were mentioned earlier will be integrated with his latest positions within the framework of his new and "right language" and related to his ideas concerning psychopathology and particularly psychotherapy. Hence in

the ensuing discussion repetitions will be inevitable. Moreover these are intended to gradually reconstruct his formulation, in the light of his innovations, that will consecutively appear in this narrative.

It would be now useful to examine compendiously the contribution of the archetypes in the development of the Self, the ultimate archetype, whose realization is the goal of the individuation process. This will offer a gradual unfolding of the last formulation of the dialectic Other (the Other-as-Archetype). Any such attempt should not overlook Jung's warning that archetypes cannot be ultimately explained because they precede the language in which they perforce have to be explained:

"Not for a moment dare we succumb to the illusion that an archetype can be finally explained ... Even the best attempts at explanation are only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language. (Indeed, language itself is only an image). The most we can do is to dream the myth onwards and give it a modern dress ..." (Jung 1940, p.160).

The archetype is an autonomous tendency with universal validity and applicability. It is essentially a transpersonal and "typical" "quality of psychic phenomena" (Jung 1946, p. 108). Insofar as it is an autonomous entity manifesting itself (in addition to any other forms) within the personality it may be called an Other, according to the understanding developed in this present study. Jung assumed that the origin of archetypes could be explained in terms of "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity". In other words, "archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions" (1943b, p. 69). These "deposits" exist in myths, rites and other

collective cumulative representations of experiences. He further argued that the individual personality is a product of these "quasi-personal" entities.

"...Man derives his human personality only secondarily from what the myths call his descent from the gods and heroes; or to put it in psychological terms, his consciousness of himself as a personality derives primarily from the influence of quasi-personal archetypes ..." (Jung 1952c, pp. 255-6).

Therefore, archetypes "may be regarded as the effect and deposit of experiences that have already taken place, but equally they appear as the factors which cause such experiences" (1943, p. 95n); they are both the result of as well as the predisposition towards experiencing "typical" human themes. "The collective unconscious being the repository of man's experience and at the same time the prior condition of this experience, is an image of the world which has taken aeons to form" (1943, p. 95).

Jung thus propounded the primacy of the Other. But before jumping to early conclusions and misplaced evaluations one has to examine carefully the qualifications to this statement. His notion of objective psyche represents "the psychic substratum upon which the individual consciousness is based" and which is "universally the same" (Jung 1934b, p. 179). Jung clarified that "the collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche, and the personal unconscious for the subjective psyche" (1943, p. 66). This 'universal' Other can only be manifested in individually experienced forms:

"... since life only exists in the form of living units, i.e., individuals, the law of life always tends towards a life individually lived" (1934b, p.179).



Jung clarified that

"although the objective psyche can only be conceived as a universal and uniform datum, which means that all men share the same primary, psychic condition, this objective psyche must nevertheless individuate itself if it is to become actualized, for there is no other way in which it could express itself except through the individual human being" (1934b, p. 179).

In other words, the objective psyche is indeed the primary Other par excellence, the universal and global Other which includes the collective unconscious with its archetypes and out of which all individual consciousnesses are born. The relevance and precise role of the objective psyche is usually misunderstood: Because Jung spent a great deal of effort in developing this idea (of the objective psyche), it does not mean that he also considered it of greater significance than the conscious ego as far as the development of one's personality is concerned. Jung placed his emphasis on their dialectical interrelationship and not on one particular aspect of this successive strata of un/consciousness. Lack of such interrelationship results in pathology:

"The neurosis is thus a defence against the objective, inner activity of the psyche, or an attempt, somewhat dearly paid for, to escape from the inner voice and hence from the vocation. For this 'growth' is the objective activity of the psyche, which, independently of conscious volition, is trying to speak to the conscious mind through the inner voice and lead him toward wholeness ..."  
(Jung 1934b, p. 183).

Therapy, insofar as it facilitates the "dialectical process of individuation" (1952d p. 665), should establish adequate channels for

communication between the "subjective ego" and the "autonomous contents of the collective unconscious", the archetypes. Jung likened this objective psyche to the "Thou" of Martin Buber (cf. Buber 1947; 1957) in the dialectical relationship of the "I and Thou" (Jung 1952d, p. 665). The "most characteristic function" of the objective psyche is for Jung "the compensation of the conscious mind" (Jung 1944, p.46), as shown in the early papers of this section. (Objective psyche and collective unconscious are for Jung synonymous [1934c, p. 147; 1943, p. 66n]). It may now be appreciated that the compensatory and healing function of the unconscious is performed through its archetypes. When activated they convey in an experiential manner the corrective objectivity of the unconscious and thus force the individual to differentiate himself from the collective Other. It is for this reason that Jung repeatedly emphasized the necessity for analysts to be well versed in mythology, ethnology and other bodies of "deposits" of the typical experiences of humanity (e.g. Jung 1958, p. 267).

The dialectical process of individuation may now be formulated in this modern garment: since consciousness develops from unconsciousness, the newborn infant is essentially constituted by the Other, i.e. the collective unconscious coupled with the equally objective, impersonal and universal instinctual and other biological forms of behaviour. (cf. vide supra, p. 151). From there (the Nature in the diagram, fig 1.13) he will move towards the other extreme, the Ego, where the differentiated consciousness which has been acquired is externally conditioned ("the conscious mind allows itself to be trained like a

parrot" Jung 1944, p. 46). Although the ego by virtue of its constitution, which is consciousness (1951 pp. 3-7) considers itself to be the centre of (and for that matter the entire) personality, such an assumption is but blind arrogance. By its very substance, consciousness excludes unconsciousness and thus any supposedly "self-knowledge" if only based on the ego is defective and illusory as it excludes its own very roots. This is what Jung called the hybris of ego consciousness (1934d, p. 408; 1945, p. 99; 1954b, p. 260; and particularly 1956, p. 546). Consequently, the ego insofar as it is just an autonomous tendency within the broad totality of the personality, i.e. a complex (Jung 1926, p. 323f; 1935, p. 11f, 1948, p. 100), may be accepted as another Other. The dialectical process of individuation may now be appreciated as being a hazardous passage through the Scylla of the unconscious and the Charybdis of decentred consciousness, as well as their integration resulting in the superceding (aufgeben) third quality, the Self. The characterization of the two oppositions of the psyche as Scylla and Charybdis is indeed an apt one in that it suggests the perils of being thrown on either of these two lethal rocks, i.e. man has to pave his way through the dangers of an overwhelming unconscious which does not allow any conscious growth, and an overdominant consciousness which banishes its unconscious roots.

Very careful consideration of the exact nature and identity of the Other is now demanded: Since both the Ego and Nature have been identified as being essentially Others, the real and true totality

of the personality of the Self, that which was earlier accepted as being the fruition of the ultimate Anticipated Whole Other at this moment reveals itself as the only entity comprising the total personality. As in the Septem Sermones, the cosmic game plays its tricks (as does the lila in Sanscrit philosophy); where there was man now there is god and where there was god now there is man (vide supra p. 301, and S.S.M. p. 34). What one usually understands by 'me' is nothing but the externally fashioned lenses through which the vision of what is considered 'me' and 'non-me' is determined (cf. Narcissus' eyes in the Introduction of this study). These lenses of consciousness, the ego, is thus indeed an epiphenomenon, an Other.

"Consciousness develops in civilized man by the acquisition of knowledge and by the withdrawal of projections" (Jung 1954d, p. 92).

Consciousness arises by differentiation

"during the individual's lifetime. It seems to arise in the first place from the collision between the somatic factor and the environment, and, once established as a subject, it goes on developing from further collisions with the outer world and the inner" (Jung 1951, p. 5).

The concept of differentiation in the psychology of child development has received much attention and validation. The essence of differentiation is progress from a relative state of undifferentiation to a more articulated state in which the differentiated parts become more active and distinct. This development should, however, be balanced by an appropriate integration of the differentiated parts, otherwise

one cannot talk about progress of the personality. (cf. Lewin 1935; Werner 1948; Witkin 1962). The ego is thus understood as a refinement of the unconscious objective psyche Other, in conjunction with the external environment. It is significant to note that in both cases it is a question of impersonal, transsubjective, and collective entities. This gives rise to pondering the idea of where the 'me' is coming from if all constituent elements are essentially non-personal. Jung wrote: "My idea of the ego is that it is a sort of complex" (1935, p. 11). He also defined the ego as "a relatively constant personification of the unconscious itself" (1956, p. 107). Moreover, it is the "centre of consciousness". On this relation Jung wrote:

"The important fact about consciousness is that nothing can be conscious without an ego to which it refers. If something is not related to the ego then it is not conscious. Therefore you can define consciousness as a relation of psychic facts to the ego (1935, p. 11).

Jung distinguished three stages in the development of consciousness in the individual:

a) When the person (in fact small child) "recognizes" or "knows" something by merely "linking a new perception to an already existing context" (1931b, p. 390). This stage is characterized by the lack of "the feeling of subjectivity or 'I-ness'" (p. 390), and is thus "an anarchic or chaotic state" (p.391).

b) When the person develops an "ego-complex" and becomes aware of his "I-ness" Jung calls this stage "monarchic or monistic" because the "ego-complex" reigns supreme, considering itself as the one and only agency of the personality.

c) When the person realizes his "divided or dualistic state" (p. 391) which results from the internalization of external limitations to his "subjective impulses". These include both instinctual as well as any other demands that the "ego-complex" imposes on its environment. The internalized limitations become "ego-contents" and coexist "side by side" with the "ego-complex" gradually creating an "inner division", a "division with oneself" (p.391).

It is for this reason that Jung repeatedly said that consciousness "our Promethean conquest") has made "the psychic life of civilized man ... full of problems"

"Our psychic processes are made up to a large extent of reflections, doubts, experiments, all of which are almost completely foreign to the unconscious, instinctive mind of primitive man. It is the growth of consciousness which we must thank for the existence of problems; they are the Danaän gift of civilization. It is just man's turning away from instinct ... that creates consciousness. Instinct is nature and seeks to perpetuate nature, whereas consciousness can only seek culture or its denial..." (1931b, p. 388).

Consequently, modern man longs to return to nature, to the original garden of Eden away from problems. The greater the differentiation, the larger the gap from nature:

"By becoming conscious, the individual is threatened more and more with isolation, which is nevertheless the sine qua non of conscious differentiation. The greater this threat, the more it is compensated by the production of collective and archetypal symbols which are common to all men ..." (Jung 1954, p. 301).

Thus, it is here that the archetypes, as the messengers from the unconscious, reach the conscious ego by means of their inarticulated gestures and cries which try to shake the desperate ego out of its cul-de-sac.

Jung understood the intervening function of the archetypes in terms of the essentially compensating role of the unconscious. When a particular area of psychological functioning reaches a state of sterility due to the lack of its corresponding input from the unconscious then, according to Jung's terminology, the relevant archetype is activated and makes its presence known by flooding the ego with unconscious material of a fascinating nature. Jung wrote that "it is very probable that the activation of an archetype depends on an alteration of the conscious situation, which requires a new form of compensation" (1948e, p. 151n). This is how Jung conceived the function of psychotherapy: to facilitate this compensation

"... If ... neurotic symptoms appear, then the attitude of consciousness, its ruling idea, is contradicted, and in the unconscious there is a stirring up of those archetypes that were the most suppressed by the conscious attitude. The therapist then has no other course than to confront the ego with its adversary and thus initiate the melting and recasting process ..." (Jung 1956, p. 359 emphasis added).

As far as the activation of the archetypes is concerned, Jung maintained that it happens as a "compensatory" mechanism "under the influence of extraordinary psychic situations, especially life crises" and it takes the shape of "archetypal forms or images spontaneously invading consciousness" (1953, p. 828).

In another context he wrote on this very topic:

"There are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life. Endless repetition has engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images filled with content, but at first only as forms without content, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears, which, like an instinctual drive, gains its way against all reason and will, or else produces a conflict of pathological dimensions, that is to say, a neurosis" (Jung 1936, p.48).

But the compensatory and "healing" function of the archetypes was not restricted to the individual psyche. Insofar as archetypes are essentially collective entities Jung maintained that they compensated for "one-sidedness" of the collective, objective psyche as well. He found that this particular function is especially evident in artistic creativity:

"The creative process ... consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present, and so makes it possible for us to find our way back to the deepest springs of life. Therein lies the social significance of art: it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, conjuring up the forms in which the age is most lacking. The unsatisfied yearning of the artist reaches back to the primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the inadequacy and one-sidedness of the present..." (Jung 1922, p.82).

The activation of the archetypes would thus initiate a confrontation of the collective parts of an experience with the personal parts of it so that an appreciation of the latter in the perspective of the former



could be effected.

"We always find in the patient a conflict which at a certain point is connected with the great problems of society. Hence, when analysis is pushed to this point, the apparently individual conflict of the patient is revealed as a universal conflict of his environment and epoch. Neurosis is thus nothing less than an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, to solve a universal problem; indeed it cannot be otherwise, for a general problem, a 'question' is not an ens per se, but exists only in the hearts of individuals" (Jung 1912b, p.265).

This confrontation if handled constructively and creatively would result in the wholeness of individuation, but if undertaken in a destructive spirit would then develop into a pathological disunion within the personality. Since all psychological development is fundamentally a process of differentiation from the collective with an awareness of its context, a very frequent form of psychological function is the unconscious projection of collective forms of experience onto figures and situations of one's psychological environment, so that the collective contents become 'visible' and 'tangible' in order to be perceived and accounted for as such (cf. Harding 1965). This projection is by and large a similar process to the active imagination that was discussed earlier. Jung, however, noted that

"the word 'projection' is not really appropriate, for nothing has been cast out of the psyche; rather, the psyche has attained its present complexity by a series of acts of introjection ..." (1954c, p.25).

He elaborated on this process in his discussion on the specific archetypes. Although the number of archetypes is as many "as there are typical situations in life", Jung discussed only a limited number of them. The

obvious reason is that these were the most "typical".

"Just as certain biological views attribute only a few instincts to man, so the theory of cognition reduces the archetypes to a few, logically limited categories of understanding" (Jung 1919b, p.135).

Among them, the mostly commonly encountered in the literature are anima and animus, persona, shadow and Self. Apart from the archetype of the shadow all the rest have already been discussed, to some extent.

Jung had already encountered an image figure with shadow quality during his "confrontation with the unconscious". It had the form of a "brown-skinned savage" (M.D.R., p.205). By 'shadow' Jung understood

"... the 'negative' side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious ..." (1943, p.66n).

But, insofar as unpleasant and negative qualities also exist outside the realm of the personal psyche, as in mythology, religion and so forth (e.g. as devils, demons etc), the shadow also belongs to the collective unconscious. The shadow, Jung noted, is essentially a "moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort" (1951, p.8). At the same time, the recognition of the shadow is the sine qua non of self-knowledge. Jung observed that in the early stages of development the shadow is "projected" onto the "other person" (1951, p.9). The negative qualities of one's own self being unconscious are only noticed once projected on the screen of the outside world; on persons, groups

of people , ideas etc. The first step is to appreciate that the negative aspects one hates in his neighbour are none other than one's own unconscious shadow.

"

"The magical or daemonic effect emanating from our neighbour disappears when the mysterious feeling is traced back to a definite entity in the collective unconscious. But now we have an entirely new task before us: the question of how the ego is to come to terms with this psychological non-ego" (Jung 1943, p.97).

This is the second step of integrating the shadow.

"To confront a person with his shadow is to show him his own light. Once one has experienced a few times what it is like to stand judgingly between the opposites, one begins to understand what is meant by the self. Anyone who perceives his shadow and his light simultaneously sees himself from two sides and thus gets in the middle" (1959, p.463).

The autonomous existence within the personality of a "non-ego" entity characterized by what the conscious ego-personality considers to be inferior and negative qualities poses a serious problem.

"Confrontation with the shadow produces at first a dead balance, a standstill that hampers moral decisions and makes convictions ineffective or even impossible. Everything becomes doubtful, which is why the alchemists called this stage nigredo, tenebrositas, chaos, melancholia ..." (Jung 1956, p.497).

This is understandable as the person finds himself in a "torn and divided state" (pp.497-8), unable to decide whether to accept the burden of the shadow or not. An usual response to this painful dilemma is avoidance of the issue by a "trick" of the unconscious. This might

take the form of either a justification of oneself that "it is not so bad after all", or an exaggeration of one's "remorseful feeling" (Jung 1959, p.468). In both situations the confrontation with the shadow is set aside while at the same time the person feels that he has indeed dealt with it. However, if one manages not to be seduced by the "tricks" of the unconscious and vigilantly stays face to face with the shadow " ... in the end this must lead to some kind of union" (1956, p.365). Since no rational solution exists (as rational would imply opting for one side of the personality), Jung argued that the resulting "union" although of an unpredictable outcome, would have only one "certain thing": "both parties will be changed". This "union" would come about after "the struggle" has gone "on until the opponents run out of breath" (1956, p.366).

One cannot fail to appreciate that this "union" of the two opposing entities is a dialectical synthesis which produces an outcome of an order higher than the previously antagonistic Others, in a seemingly paradoxical synthesis, which is the Self. Jung described this state as:

"... where I am indivisibly this and that; where I experience the Other in myself and the other-than-myself experiences me ..." (1954c, p.22).

Such a state can indeed be very confusing if a strong sense of consciousness is not maintained. The Self, according to Jung, is such a state where the paradoxical existence is firmly supported by a discriminating consciousness. The ultimate awareness of oneself is in the proper perspective of the collective, the objective psyche.

"No, the collective unconscious is anything but an incapsulated personal system; it is sheer objectivity, as wide as the world and open to all the world. There I am the object of every subject, in complete reversal of my ordinary consciousness, where I am always the subject that has an object. There I am utterly one with the world ..."(1954c, p.22).

Jung called a person individuated if he could firstly survive in this state without losing his consciousness and the effectiveness of the ego, thus remaining adapted to the external physical and social world, and secondly, could maintain himself in this state over more than fleeting periods. The emphasis of the term individuation lies in the in-divisibility of the person; to be non-divided not only from one's own parts within the personality, but also from the collective, universal and objective aspects of one's existence.

"I use the term 'individuation' to denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual', that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'wholeness'" (1939b, p.275).

Jung understood this process as fundamentally dialectical (e.g. 1952d, p.665) in that it transcended the pairs of antithetical opposites: Conscious-unconscious, personal-collective, inner-outer, subject-object. The Self is a new quality in which both the ground of Nature as well as the epiphenomenon of the Ego are synthetically united in a state of 'conscious nature'. The Self is the new entity in which all previously opposing Others unite in a supreme identity which is not a mere sum of the individual Others comprising it. Above all, what is of paramount importance is to develop an adequate language/system to account appropriately for these states so that correct discrimination is effected. As Jung constantly maintained,

"Psychic experiences, according to whether they are rightly or wrongly understood, have very different effects on a person's development... The pathological element only reveals itself in the way the individual reacts to them and how he interprets them ..." (1950c, p.351).

Thus it is necessary to have "an adequate understanding" (p.351), a discriminating consciousness systematized in a comprehensive and objective manner. Jung observed that religious systems (besides fulfilling any other functions) ensure precisely this, i.e. enabling their followers to adapt to the external environment while at the same time being rooted in the collective and objective unconscious psyche. They (religious systems) maintain this delicate balance by means of their intricate systems of experiential knowledge which, by referring to concepts, actions, and experiences, provide an "adequate understanding" of these paradoxical (to the ego consciousness) states, situations and relationships. Religions offer a person the opportunity to grasp these issues by means of rituals and other organized and defined activities. Jung singled out several such religious practices which he found to exist (understandably in varied form) in most religions. Perhaps the most significant of these was meditation (e.g. 1943b; 1937). The various meditative techniques, apart from their religious and other functions, psychologically may be seen as frameworks in which the meditator can place and understand his experiences of the contradictory and fragmenting Others within his own personality as well as the experiences of the collective Other.

Jung's searches into his problematic of the Other culminated in his understanding of the development of the personality from the thesis of Nature, with its undifferentiated, impersonal Others (e.g. instincts),

to the antithesis of the Ego, with its differentiated, individualized (personal) Others (various complexes), to the synthesis of the Self, the supreme totality of the personality in which all antithetical Others are harmoniously united in a new consciousness, a 'conscious Nature'. In a sense, all but the Self are fragmentary Others. From the perspective of Nature, the Ego as well as its tendencies may be seen as Other/s. From the perspective of the Ego, Nature and any of its tendencies may also be perceived as Other/s. The Self, which was until now accepted as an Anticipated Whole Other, may now be accepted as in fact the only non-Other, the only 'me' or 'I-ness', the only real and whole 'me'; but with the great difference that now the 'me' is no longer defined in the narrow confinement of the Ego consciousness in which the individual is conceptualized as a separate, unique and totally independent existence, but rather as an indivisible existence, an instance, an expression of wholeness and unity.

The linguistic relationship of the words unit and unity betray a similar kinship that was found in the discussion of the meanings of the word Other at the beginning of this study. Unit and unity have opposing meanings. Unit, unitary etc. denote the unique, the separate, the individual, the isolated particle, whereas, unity, union, refers to a collection, a gathering, a non isolation, a wholeness. It is a matter of perspective. If seen from the perspective of either the Nature or the Ego, the Self or any of its qualities or tendencies would be accepted as (an)Other/s to whatever ground was assumed to constitute the 'me', the subject. But from the perspective of the Self, only the Self may have the right to the real identity of the 'me'; in fact all

the preceding stages of the personality are indeed Other fragments of the 'me' proper. Thus the only real subject that can be accepted is the Self. This is not a subject as defined from the perspective of Ego-consciousness, according to which a subject is opposed to an object. The closest way of expressing this subject might be as a subjective or individualized manifestation or expression of the wholeness.

The Self is the supreme archetype and the ultimate Anticipated Whole Other which at the end of the process of individuation proves to be the only true non-Other. As far as other archetypes are concerned, it has been shown that they are instrumental in achieving the final goal of individuation due to their role of connecting all three realms of development (Nature, Ego, and Self). As such archetypes constitute an important link between all three stages of development.



## TRANSITION

The re-reading of Jung based on a developmental analysis which was provided in this entire chapter, has traced Jung's treatment of a problematic that was documented as being central to his development as a theorist, a psychotherapist, and a person. These three identities were closely interwoven. It has been shown that Jung formulated this problematic in a progressively more elaborated and complete way. The direction of his conceptualization of this problematic followed the broad lines of the diagram in figure 1.13 (vide supra p.315) from Nature to the Ego and from the Ego to the Self; from thesis to anti-thesis and then to synthesis; from the undifferentiated unconscious to differentiated consciousness and then to their dialectical union; from a fusion with Nature to an individual entity and then to what might be called cosmic identity; from an analytical process to a synthetic, transcendent process; from the goal of adaptation to external, physical and broadly defined, social reality, to an adaptation to the inner reality.

The new reading of the successive reformulations of this problematic has revealed in a developmental approach Jung's gradual construction of an adequate, indeed a "right language" in his discourse on the Other. A number of progressions and refinements have been noted which portray the movement towards a more complete, comprehensive and precise language. The "unconscious intellectuality" in his dissertation (vide supra p.138) which he postulated in order to account for the purposeful activity of the unconscious, was later termed "wish tendencies of the soul" in the Wandlungen (vide supra, p.286), and eventually was formulated in terms

of the compensating and healing functions of the collective unconscious. The animistic language of his childhood was later replaced by the experimental language of his early psychiatric days, to be followed by the psychoanalytic terminology of Freud's, and finally it acquired its own adequate form to account for the paradox of the Self, which although being the ultimate Other, at the same time represents the only non-Other.

It now remains briefly to scrutinize Jung's own references to the term Other in his writings, with special reference to the dialectical triad Nature/Ego/Self, before making certain closing observations.

Firstly, Jung referred to his No.2 personality as the Other. Examined in the light of the above triad, it may be argued that No.2 personality was a combination of Nature and the Self. He was very close to nature and also had archetypal wisdom. No. 2 was definitely not an Ego personality. Jung's subsequent use of the term the Other mainly covered aspects of Nature, e.g. the unconscious, the undifferentiated, the instinctual and organic etc. Examples are the following: Writing about the technique of meditation as an "inner dialogue" by "which things pass from an unconscious potential state to a manifest one", Jung termed the inner interlocutor, with whom one should have a "living relationship", "the 'other' in ourselves, i.e. ... the unconscious" (Jung 1937, p.274). Following the same suggestion Jung also regarded Paul as the "'other self' who dwelled in [Saul's] bosom" (1943, p.35). Also,

"... the somatic man, the 'adversary' is none other than the 'other in me' ..." (Jung 1940, p.77).

The accent in defining the Other was placed on anything that was anti-thetical to the Ego, to consciousness, to the accepted moral code that one espouses. Jung's views remained by and large the same as far as the place of the Other in the development of the personality was concerned: the Other, similar to the rest of the psyche in Plato (vide supra, p.15), had to be confronted, accounted for, integrated with the rest of the personality in order to reach a state of wholeness:

"For nothing in us ever remains uncontradicted, and consciousness can take up no position which will not call up, somewhere in the dark corners of the psyche, a negation or a compensatory effect, approval or resentment. This process of coming to terms with the Other in us is well worth while, because in this way we get to know aspects of our nature which we would not allow anybody else to show us and which we ourselves would never have admitted ..." (Jung 1956, p.496).

Also,

"The subtle process of self-knowledge often begins with a bomb-shell ...The 'other' person we dream of is not our friend and neighbour, but the other in us, of whom we prefer to say: 'I thank thee, Lord, that I am not as this publican and sinner'" (Jung 1934c, p.152).

The opposition with the Other was a source of energy:

"... This 'other' personality is the very thing he ought never to lose sight of, for it is his own inner antithesis, the conflict that must be fought out again and again if life is to go on. Without this initial opposition there is no flow of energy, no vitality ..." (Jung 1934c, p.169 emphasis added).

And again,

"The 'other' in us always seems alien and unacceptable; but if we let ourselves be aggrieved the feeling sinks in, and we are the richer for this little bit of self-knowledge" (Jung 1928c, p.486).

If the Other is rejected the result will be psychological imbalance, one-sidedness, neurosis, thus,

"... the patient has not to learn how to get rid of his neurosis, but how to bear it. His illness is not a

gratuitous and therefore meaningless burden; it is his own self, the 'other' whom, from childhood laziness or fear, or for some other reason, he was always seeking to exclude from his life.... We should even learn to be thankful for it, otherwise we pass it by and miss the opportunity of getting to know ourselves as we really are. A neurosis is truly removed only when it has removed the false attitude of the ego. We do not cure it - it cures us" (Jung 1934, pp.169-70).

It is interesting to observe two more usages of the Other employed by Jung: In his book on "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity" (1948e), surveying trinity concepts in ancient Greece, Jung made some acute observations which have a direct impact on understanding his own system of the dialectical triad as well. He maintained that "number one" is "not a number at all" in that it represents an indivisible unity. For him "the first number is two" as only with it "separation and multiplication begin, which alone make counting possible".

"With the appearance of the number two, another appears alongside the one, a happening which is so striking that in many languages 'the other' and 'the second' are expressed by the same word" (1948e, p.118).

The "other" suggests

"...something opposite and alien ... Two implies a one which is different and distinct from the 'numberless' One. In other words, as soon as the number two appears, a unit is produced out of the original unity split into two and turned into a 'number'. The 'One' and the 'Other' form an opposition ... The 'One' ... seeks to hold to its one-and-alone existence, while the 'Other' ever strives to be another opposed to the One. The One will not let go of the Other because, if it did, it would lose its character; and the Other pushes itself away from the One in order to exist at all. Thus there arises a tension of opposites between the One and the Other. But every tension of opposites culminates in a release, out of which comes the 'third'. In the third, the tension is resolved and the lost unity is restored ... There is the unfolding of the One to a condition where it can be known - unity becomes recognizable ... Three therefore appears a suitable synonym for a process of development in time ..." (Jung 1948e, pp. 118-9; cf. also Jung 1956, p.462; as well as Plaut 1959).

Jung used this "conceptual model" to interpret the Christian dogma of Trinity. He applied it in his understanding of the One as the Father, the Other as the Son and the Third as the Holy Ghost. He remarked that the Other's opposition to the One, which originally takes place by "splitting off from it" (1948e, p.133), does not have to be understood in antagonistic terms, but should be comprehended as "supplementary" (p. 134). He also noted that "out of the tension of duality life always produces a 'third' that seems somehow incommensurable or paradoxical". In the case of the Holy Trinity, Jung observed that the Holy Ghost, the "third", "unlike Father and Son, ... has no name and no character. He is a function, but that function is the Third person of the Godhead" (1948e, p.159).

Transposing this model onto the dialectical triad of Nature, Ego, Self, an exercise which is legitimate as this triad also represents "a process of development in time", one may discern some revealing similarities: Nature, like the "numberless" One, is not "recognizable" as it possesses no consciousness and no discrimination (cf. Pleroma). The Other would correspond to the Ego (cf. Creatura) which is a "split off" from or a differentiated form of the One. It is both antagonistic, antithetical as well as supplementary to the One. This tension between the two leads to the "incommensurable and paradoxical 'third'", the Self, which represents a dialectical synthesis, a unity of a higher and different order from the other two, and it represents a "function", not a concrete form of existence with "name and character" but a state of constantly renewed synthesis. In this manner, the Self may be justifiably called a "function", a process and not a static given state.

"The self, ... is absolutely paradoxical in that it represents in every respect thesis and antithesis, and at the same time synthesis" (Jung 1944, p.19).

Elsewhere Jung referred to the Self (with reference to its quality of uniting the opposites) as a "transconscious process" (1956, p.381).

The last meaning that Jung attached to the Other was the Self: This could have been inferred from earlier excerpts, such as the one in which he calls the Paul within Saul's bosom his "other self". Paul could be accepted as the Anticipated Whole Other of Saul. The Self is the

"'Other', a 'non-ego' which has the conscious mind as its object. It is as if the subject-character of the ego had been overrun, or taken over, by another subject which appears in place of the ego" (Jung 1939c, p.546).

It is clear from the context of this passage that Jung does not refer to any split-off personality here, but rather to the "influence" behind an "empty" and "non-ego" consciousness. The search for this Other is the search for the "knowledge of the knower" (p.547) the source of consciousness beyond the Ego. Jung also mentioned Rudolf Otto's reference to the "Wholly Other" in his book "The Idea of the Holy" (Otto 1917). According to Jung, the "wholly Other" (or "totally Other", from das ganz Andere) is the "perfect" Other "reality" outside man (Jung 1939, p.482). For Otto, this Other could be named

"...'spirit' or 'daemon' or 'deva', or be left without any name. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether, to interpret and preserve their apprehension of this 'other', men coin original imagery of their own or adapt imaginations drawn from the world of legend ..." (Otto 1917, p.27).

This is precisely what Jung also remarked about the names and symbols of the Self (cf. Jung 1936b; 1940; 1941; 1944; 1948f; 1951; 1957b; 1958b).

It is therefore evident that Jung did not reserve the term Other for one particular entity or function, but used it to denote an antithetical position from whatever position he was taking at the time. In this sense, any one of the three points of the dialectical triad Nature-Ego-Self could be assumed to be the Other of the point which is accepted as the thesis. In abstract terms and in their developmental sequence, the Other is firstly the Ego, the differentiation of the One and indivisible Nature. From the perspective of the Ego, from which most of Jung's writings were based, the Other referred to either Nature (or aspects of functions of it), or the Self as an anticipated state of dialectical resolution of the opposites. According to the diagram (Figure 1.13, p.315), the Other from the "horizontal" perspective of consciousness (cf. Jung 1958b, p.408) is the Self which represents an "upward", movement of consciousness (1934, p.339).

This multiplicity of meanings given by Jung to the term "the Other" should not lead to a state of confusion. Firstly, the present reading indicates that each definition depended on the given perspective from which Jung was referring to that particular Other. Moreover, of real importance, as has been repeatedly emphasized, is the formulation of the problematic of the Other, and not the mere definition of the singular term "the Other". It was through the successive re-formulations of this problematic that Jung developed his unique psychology which includes a tangible and experiential documentation of and towards psychological

wholeness.

C.P. Cavafy in his poem Ithaka which was used as the motto for chapter Two (p.119) of this Part understands Ithaka as a means:

"When you set out for Ithaka  
ask that your way be long,  
full of adventure, full of instruction  
... Have Ithaka always in your mind.  
Your arrival there is what you are destined for.  
But don't in the least hurry the journey.  
Better it last for years,  
so that when you reach the island you are old,  
rich with all you have gained on the way,  
not expecting Ithaka to give you wealth.  
Ithaka gave you the splendid journey.  
Without her you would not have set out.  
She hasn't anything else to give you.  
And if you find her poor, Ithaka hasn't deceived you.  
So wise have you become, of such experience,  
that already you'll have understood what these Ithakas mean.

Similarly, Jung's problematic of the Other led him to the inner landscapes of the territory of the Other. What he actually discovered was that the only non-Other is the psychological wholeness of the Self. He also realised that there is no one and definite Other. The "splendid journey" however, offered him not only his own personal psychological development, but also the riches of the theoretical exploration. It was the reformulations themselves that provided the context as well as the main features of his psychological understanding. Some of the many gains he had "on the way" were the theories of complexes, symbols, archetypes, the universality of the collective unconscious ... Without the initial problematic of the Other, Jung would not have set out on the long and fruitful journey, towards the process of individuation.

As for the final stage, the crowning of all previous efforts, the end



result of the individuation process, the achievement of the psychological totality, the Self, Jung gave many indications of its phenomenology and how it is approached, as well as some descriptions of the final state itself. But, as he characteristically confessed, the Self is a

"...term on the one hand definite enough to convey the essence of human wholeness and on the other hand indefinite enough to express the indescribable and indeterminable nature of this wholeness" (Jung 1944, p.18).

The ultimate journey cannot be reproduced in an exact manner so that anybody can follow the given steps and without any personal input also reach the final stage. Insofar as the Self is the transmutation of the existing personality, or the actualization of its potential state, it cannot be objectively expressed and one has to respect its indescribable form. Jung ultimately knew that

"How the harmonizing of conscious and unconscious data is to be undertaken cannot be indicated in the form of a recipe" (1939b, p.289).

All psychological theories, descriptions and suggestions can be of help only in the early stages of individuation. Later these become redundant if not actually misleading. The person has to carry on his own way. Discussions of whether Jung himself actually achieved the goal of individuation or not; or if he did, what 'proofs' of this exist, are indeed irrelevant. Jung wisely noted that

"...nobody has ever been able to tell the story of the whole way ..." (1950c, p.348).

The descriptions of the process and of the dynamics of its dialectical unfolding should be sufficient for the initial steps. Then, like the Wittgensteinian ladder, the problematic of the Other, which provided all these descriptions, should be dropped. Having climbed the problematic of the Other, the centre shifts from the Ego to the Self (cf. Jung 1929, p.45). And from the new centre of the Self being the ultimate unity and wholeness, no problematic exists anymore, nor for that matter an Other.

Wittgenstein aptly expresses this twist at the end of his Tractatus:

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.  
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (1921, 6.54-7).

PART THREE

Introductory note

This Third and last Part of this study represents a final attempt at integrating all salient aspects of this investigation. In addition to integrating, this section also examines the problematic of the Other from a broad perspective. The qualification "final attempt to integrate" is here pertinent as it reminds the reader that integrating attempts are to be found throughout this study and are not reserved exclusively for this section.

The first three chapters of Part Three constitute a return to the three theorists in Part One in the light of the later findings that emerged during the development of the dialectic of the Other in the Jungian discourse (in Part Two). Thus, Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel are revisited and their relation to the problematic of the Other is brought into focus.

In Chapter One (on Heraclitus) the concept of enantiodromia is introduced, and in Chapter Two (on Plato) particular emphasis is given to the question of similarities between archetypes and forms, but this time in the perspective of the dialectic of the Other. In Chapter Three (on Hegel) special attention is given to the puzzle that although some striking similarities were observed between the Hegelian and Jungian understanding of the Other, Jung himself had a strong negative attitude towards Hegel and his work. In this discussion Jung's negative views on philosophy in general are also explored.

In Chapter Four the concept of the Dialectic is placed in the context of the formulations of Jung's problematic and

Jung's own references to this term are traced and discussed. Then, the modern dialectical movement in psychology is briefly presented and juxtaposed to the Jungian discourse. Finally, in Chapter Five, a tentative idea of considering the Other in terms of language is proposed. In this chapter, Jung's references to language are brought in, in support of an argument which attempts to throw some new light on the role of language in the development of Jung's problematic of the Other. Following this, certain aspects of the Lacanian discourse are investigated and compared with the Jungian thought.

Part Three is followed by an Epilogue in which certain closing comments are made about the entire study.

## PART THREE

### Chapter One

#### Heraclitus Revisited

The ever growing recognition of Heraclitus' relevance to (or even direct influence on) the early development of scientific thought (cf. Lloyd 1979; Moutsopoulos 1978), as well as on the history of modern thought in general (cf. Axelos 1974; Kyriazopoulos 1973) represents a startling phenomenon in its own right. The Ephesian "Riddler" has been hailed, among other things, for "bridging the heights of the objective with the depths of the subjective" (Djurić 1979, p.17) and for using authentic philosophical language "in its original and authentic connection with being" (Seidel 1964, p.93) before logos slid down, degenerating into logic (Seidel 1964, p.93).

Heraclitus' influence spread not only to Plato and the later Greek philosophers, but also to other European thinkers right up until recent times, including Hegel, and of course, Jung. The latter made considerable reference in his writings to Heraclitus, and held him in high esteem for his originality (e.g. Jung 1914d, p.193; 1919b, p. 137; 1928b, p.53). Jung acknowledged many similarities between Heraclitus' thought and medieval alchemy (e.g. 1936b, p.120; 1937, p.92; 1937b, p.229; 1951, p.250n; 1954c, p.33; 1956, p.195; 1958b, p.333) and gnosticism (e.g. 1951, p.219; 1954, p.310). Above all, Jung valued Heraclitus' theory of enantiodromia (e.g. 1921, p.96; 1931c, p.82; 1943, p.72). It seems almost certain that the actual term enantiodromia was never used by Heraclitus himself. Stobaeus attributed it to Heraclitus, and Jung accepted it as such. However, modern classicists judge the relevant fragment where enantiodromia appears as not a genuine Heraclitean aphorism (Wheelwright 1959; Kirk 1954; Kahn 1979). Whatever the case might be, enantiodromia refers to the theory of "running counter to", and it is used to designate the play of opposites in the course of events - the view that everything

that exists runs into its opposite" (Jung 1921, pp.425-6).

This indeed represents an obvious and central Heraclitean motif. Jung made explicit his usage of the term when he wrote

"I use the term enantiodromia for the emergence of the unconscious opposite in the course of time. This characteristic phenomenon practically always occurs when an extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in time an adequate powerful counterposition is built up, which first inhibits the conscious performance and subsequently breaks through the conscious control" (1921, p.426).

As shown in the development of Jung's problematic, this principle is of fundamental importance as it accounts for the dialectical movement of development from Nature to the Ego and from the Ego to the Self. The compensatory and healing functions of the unconscious could also be understood as an enantiodromic instance. In fact the whole of the problematic of the Other, the inner opposition, could, in this light, be traced back to the Heraclitean opposition which was one of his pivotal axioms. Here some striking parallels are worth singling out:

In both Jung and Heraclitus the emphasis is on dynamic and constant becoming through a successive series of oppositions, rather than on static being of indivisible composition without internal and external strife and conflict. Moreover, the dialectical movement from a 'me' to the 'other' and then to a state of a higher 'other' which is suggested by Heraclitus would correspond to the Jungian triad: Nature, Ego, Self. These two theories are dissimilar in that Heraclitus, unlike Jung, does not have specific stages of development which would be the direct equivalent of Nature, Ego, Self. According to the Ephesian, the



movement of opposition and resulting change occurs constantly and has no crude identifiable milestones, except, of course, in the achievement of a higher plane of existence in which a person would be established in the common logos after abandoning his own private understanding. However, the elements of the development are similar. In Jungian terminology, the Heraclitean constant and harmonious flux, would consist of successive oppositions between Nature and the Ego. In the final analysis, this understanding would in fact not be so dissimilar from the Jungian approach, especially if one takes into consideration the less global and more function-type Others, such as the complexes, the Fragment Others, etc. Both authors also converge with their theories of the essentially transcendent nature of the "third" part of the triad. Both of them underlined the higher level of the Self or the person in the common logos. The Ego (or the 'internal other') has to be abandoned in order to reach the Self (or the 'external other'). As Ioannides aptly noted:

"The sharpness and depth of Heraclitus' logoi culminate in the differentiation of planes of reality. Every kind of temporality or historicity can be overcome easily by the person who is able to identify with the supreme Being ... A reading of Heraclitus presupposes a differentiation of planes" (1977, p.27).

Similar to the Jungian Self, the Heraclitean higher Other, in a true dialectical transformational twist, at the end appears as the inner core of the being existing there in potentio all the time before being realised. From the perspective of common logos, the higher Other, the constant changes are comprehended in their proper meaning: as necessary and integral aspects of development, as internal minute steps of opposition and not as disintegrating forces destroying the continuity of the personality.

It is this aspect of Heraclitean thought that made commentators refer to him as "prescientific" and "mythical". His writings demonstrate clearly the acceptance of contradiction, the coexistence of the positive and negative, the positive enantiodromic function of negation and vice versa. It is in this light that he has also been compared to Eastern philosophers (cf. Aurobindo 1941; West 1971). He is the philosopher of antiquity par excellence in whom the opposites harmoniously unite, like the Chinese principle of the Yin and Yang. It is perhaps this aspect of the Heraclitean logic that disturbs many critics of Jung too. To the modern man trained in straightforward Aristotelian logic with its cardinal principle of contradiction, any attempts at dialectical logic in which the union of opposites is advanced are looked at with suspicion.

Yet this particular aspect of Heraclitus has been hailed by philosophers of the stature of Heidegger as a unique moment in the history of philosophy. It may be argued that Heraclitus' language is not accidental and irrelevant to the contradictions that it was referring to. In other words, the harmonious synthesis of oppositions is reflected in the very fabric of the Heraclitean language. This is what makes it 'paradoxical' and incomprehensible to many. However, it should

"not be at all paradoxical that Heraclitus' meditations are expressed in the form of aphorisms, which is a direct and compact form, diametrically opposite from the form in which πολυμάθεια is articulated" (Bousoulas, 1970, p.96).

According to the fragment,

Fr. 26 "Much learning [πολυμάθεια] does not teach understanding" (Kahn 1979, p.37).

Understanding comes from grasping the common logos and it has to be expressed in a manner suitable to its content. This is what Jung, perhaps, was attempting to develop. A "right language", a language which would adequately account for all aspects and processes of the dialectical triad. He also opposed any intellectual and dry theoretical elements in it, as he considered them products of one particular state of psychological development, i.e. of the Ego. Perhaps the emphasis on the unity of experience and language that Jung advocated and himself tried to achieve is a close parallel to the Heraclitean language. It is this unity that Heidegger marvels at: According to him, Heraclitus was the Western philosopher where an "essential bond between" logos and physis (nature) is maintained (Heidegger 1953, p.114). After him this bond gradually weakened and logos degenerated into logic. Heidegger arrives at this argument by developing the meaning of logos as "gathering and togetherness"; then he writes that

"Gathering is never a mere driving-together and heaping-up. It maintains in a common bond the conflicting and that which tends apart. It does not let them fall into haphazard dispersion. In thus maintaining a bond, the logos has the character of permeating power, of physis. It does not let what it holds in its power dissolve into an empty freedom from opposition, but by uniting the opposites maintains the full sharpness of their tension" (Heidegger 1953, p.113).

Kahn makes a similar remark but from a different perspective. Starting with a comment on Fragment 16 (according to his translation it reads: "The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares not conceals but gives a sign") he writes that the

"sign may be of different types: image, ambiguous wording, or the like" (Kahn 1979, p.123).

It may be suggested that a better translation of σημαίνει would be to retain its literal meaning; the fragment would then read "... neither declares nor conceals but it signifies". Be that as it may, his acute perceptiveness and clarity of expression demand that he be quoted in some length. Professor Kahn also observes a bond between "the discourse of Heraclitus and the structure of reality" and continues:

"...this parallel between Heraclitus' style and the obscurity of the nature of things, between the difficulty of understanding him and the difficulty of human perception, is not arbitrary: to speak plainly about such a subject would be to falsify it in the telling, for no genuine understanding would be communicated. The only hope of 'getting through' to the audience is to puzzle and provoke them into reflection. Hence the only appropriate mode of explanation is allusive and indirect: Heraclitus is consciously and unavoidably 'obscure'.

The point is not that Heraclitus's paradoxical style is designed to mirror the nature of reality ... The paradox lies in any attempt to comprehend and formulate this structure in human terms: 'opposites are one, and conflict is justice'. It is not that reality as such is contradictory: what is reflected in the semantic difficulty of interpreting these utterances is the epistemic difficulty of grasping such a structure, the cosmic logos, as the underlying unity for our own experience of opposition and contrast" (Kahn 1979, p.124).

The discussion by Heidegger and Kahn illuminate not only Heraclitus' language but also that of Jung; the Swiss psychologist tried essentially the same thing - to express, to "signify" opposing states and processes within a language which itself is a product of only one of these antithetical states (the Ego). The paradoxical style is thus inevitable and the only one in fact which has some hope of accounting adequately for what is referred to. The difficulty is that language, the product of the Other, if not the Other itself (cf. Part Three, Chapter Five) is expected to express a state where all Others are superceded, resulting in one psychological totality and wholeness, the Self. As Swami Venkatesananda states:

"All expressions [of Unity] are inadequate and ... dualistic... Unity cannot be expressed. When you utter the word 'one', you have divided that one into two ..." (1976, p.33).

PART THREE

Chapter Two

Plato Revisited

A systematic comparison between Plato and Jung could easily constitute a separate study on its own, and thus here, only the three aspects of the Platonic treasurehouse, those which were briefly sketched in Part One of this investigation, i.e. the Forms, or Ideas; the structure of the psyche, and the Dialectic, will be revisited in the perspective of the discussion of the development of Jung's problematic of the Other.

Much has been said about the relationship between archetypes and forms or ideas. Liliane Frey-Rohn states that Jung was "initially inspired by Plato" in his "attempt to elaborate the general formal structure of the archetype" (1969, p.94). This guarded comment implies that a) Jung did not borrow the concept from Plato (no argument in support of this claim could be considered seriously, especially in the light of the discussion on the organic development of the archetype in Jung's thought), and b) Jung used Plato as a reference point in formulating his own already conceived concept only in the initial stages of his attempt. Jolande Jacobi (1957) mostly reiterating Jung's own comparisons, indicates some similarities and some differences between the use of the term by the two men, constantly emphasizing the empirical nature of Jung's archetype as opposed to the "metaphysical" concept of the Platonic forms (p. 49f). Her remark that archetypes are bipolar whereas ideas are unipolar and always 'good' has already been discussed. To counteract the romantic tendency of misreading Plato and perceiving the Forms as entities of only Beauty and Goodness (and at the same time not becoming involved in protracted and misplaced argument) it should be adequate to mention an example of some modern Platonists who accept Forms as "composed substances" ( *μεικτή οὐσία* ) in which "inferior Ideas"

are synthesized together (Bousoulas 1974, p.129 and Rodier, In Bousoulas 1974). This reading of Plato makes archetypes and Forms more similar than usually considered.

Jung's own references to this issue are varied. At times he considers them synonymous (Jung 1929b, p.9; 1954f, p.75) and analogous (1953c, p.517; 1954c, p.33). He also called archetype "an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic idea" (1954c, p.4). In a letter to Bernhard Milt in 1946, Jung summed up the discussion when he wrote:

"I must leave it to the philosopher to hypostatize the archetype as the Platonic eidos. He wouldn't be so far from the truth anyway ... In Augustine, who was still a Platonist, the archetype has absolutely the connotation of a primordial image, and so far as it is meant Platonically it does not agree at all badly with the psychological version. The old Platonic term differs from the psychological one only in that it was hypostatized, whereas our 'hypostatization' is simply an empirical statement of fact without any metaphysical colouring" (Adler 1973, p.418).

Jung repeated several times his claim that Plato's forms were "metaphysical" and "transcendental" whereas his own archetypes were empirical facts (e.g. 1919b, p.135; In Adler 1976, p.152) and characteristically wrote that

"If I posited the archetypes ... I would not be a scientist but a Platonist ..." (In Adler 1973, p.329).

This candid admission reveals Jung's well known concern for not being labeled a metaphysician, philosopher, mystic or the like; he always wanted to firmly maintain the reputation of being a scientist. Thus, it is possible that Jung refused to acknowledge any stronger links between the forms and the archetypes because of the fear of being identified



as a "Platonist", a characterization which he obviously disliked. The fact however remains that he did accept that archetypes are "immanent - transcendent" (1952d, p.665), a qualification that Copleston aptly developed in connection with the Platonic Forms (vide supra, p.49). One may sympathetically note Jacobi's eagerness to correct any possible misunderstanding arising from this admission of Jung's. She concedes that indeed archetype, like Form, is transcendent, in that "it precedes all conscious experience" and warns that

"Here of course 'transcendental' must be taken not as a metaphysical concept but empirically as signifying 'beyond consciousness' ... " (Jacobi 1957, p. 50).

Jung also found similarities between the Platonic Forms and aspects of the alchemical opus (cf. 1937b, p.263; 1954e, p.191; 1956, p.153n; 352n; In Adler 1973, p.265). Moreover, he argued that the Self is a Platonic Form, a claim which in a sense is redundant as the Self is the archetype par excellence:

"... the self, on account of its empirical peculiarities, proves to be the eidos behind the supreme ideas of unity and totality that are inherent in all nontheistic and monistic systems" (Jung 1951, p.34).

Be that as it may, a conclusive treatise on the similarities and differences between these two important terms would have no place in this study. It would here suffice to sketch the main arguments and establish that as far as the problematic of the Other is concerned, both archetypes and Forms can with not undue justification and substantiation be considered as similar Other structures. Whether they are in fact identical or not, is a matter beyond the scope of the present investigation

and a matter of a separate philosophical concern. Ramfos (1978) maintained that

"Platonic motion is a movement towards some other, which beings tend towards, [this other] represents their destination or their idea" (p.47 emphasis added).

This could equally be valid for the Self, or any archetype, for that matter, as long as this passage is understood as referring to the process of actualization and individualization of the archetype in terms of its realisation.

In the discussion on the structure of the psyche, what has already been said may only be reinforced in the light of the unfolding of Jung's problematic. Both the Platonic and Jungian psyches are composed of a number of opposing Others within it, and both men accepted that a harmonious unity of all antithetical Others within the psyche represents the natural goal of development. Plato called this process justice (Cooper 1977) and his emphasis was on not doing violence to any part of the psyche by over- or under-actualizing it. Jung called it the process of individuation, where the accent was on achieving a state of indivisibility. But the similarity between the two theorists does not stop here. Both also argued that when this state of inner harmony is attained, when the inner Others are united in a new synthesis, the quality of being reaches another higher state. The chariot of the Platonic psyche when all its parts function harmoniously in accordance with a common and united rhythm, is able to fly higher, realize its true nature and, in so doing, get closer to the realm of the Forms. But, if an inner disharmony occurs and individual horses follow their individual urges, then the entire psyche falls. According to Jung, the process of

individuation leads to a higher state of psychic wholeness, the Selfhood. In the Self all opposing Others (both Fragment Others as well as Anticipated Whole Others) unite in a dialectical synthesis. The Self, according to Jung, is also an archetype existing in latency right from the infancy of a person. Moreover, once the inner Others are united, the higher Other paradoxically represents the ultimate wholeness not only of the inner Others but also of all universal and 'cosmic' Others. In other words, the higher state of inner wholeness shares a close kinship with the higher realm, the domain of Forms.

It is worth noting the role that music and harmony had for Plato in the development of the psyche. Without entering into unnecessary details, and remaining within the framework of the present argument, the essentials of rhythm were the "θέσις" (thesis = placing) and "ἀρσις" (arsis = lifting); the placing and lifting of the foot in the steps which in combination produces dance. The same principle of "on" and "off" was followed in the metre of poetry and music (cf. Ioannides, 1978; Moutsopoulos 1959). Harmony is nothing else than a 'harmonious' combination of these series of 'theses' and their 'negations' (antitheses). Music and dance were central in the suggested educational programme of Plato's Republic because they helped to lift the psyche from its conflicting state of internal negations (read: Others).

Professor Ramfos holds that the Platonic revolution consists in the introduction of the "interior dimension" (1978, p.85) in ancient Greek thought by assuming that the psyche is a complex (in the meaning of 'composed', 'synthetic', 'interwoven cluster') entity, made up of many "parts" and thus it may develop towards a state of harmony (among all its parts); or fall. He elaborates on this theme by adding the possibilities of

freedom, choice, immortality of the soul and other psychological, ethical and epistemological issues which, according to him, Plato was able to introduce only after having accepted the complex nature of the human psyche. These motifs (naturally, in their psychological representations) were echoed in the Jungian opus as well. According to Jung, psychological disintegration is precisely the result of a disharmonious existence of all internal Others.

The third aspect of Plato's work that was examined earlier was the Dialectic. Solmsen (1968) captured the seriousness of the role that the Dialectic played in Platonic thought when he wrote:

"In one sense philosophy is for Plato identical with dialectic; in another it achieves its culmination in dialectic" (p.49).

Sinaiko also succinctly declared that

"dialectic is the self-movement of the soul towards the ideas" (1965, p.118).

Many parallels have already been indicated between the Platonic dialectic and Jungian thought. The Dialectic, as was repeatedly underlined in Part One of this study, was not an external technique which could be applied to situations or material unconnected to its very fabric. The Dialectic was not the methodos (meta = after; odos = way, path) for the realization of the Forms, but the very path (odos, way) itself! In much the same manner Jung also declared that individuation is a dialectical process by its very nature.

Understanding the dialectical progression of consecutively challenging one's own assumptions (which are a product of one's existing state of being) within the context of the Jungian problematic, one may observe that there are two dialectical movements. The first deals with the minute internal oppositions within the personality, and the second with the dialectical progression of placing the Ego (which may be also understood as in opposition to and negation of Nature) in the perspective of its Nature roots. In this way a discrimination of the "real" from the "apparent" will be achieved. The false reality of the Ego as the centre of the personality and indeed the only 'personality' at all, will be exposed. The person would thus experience the narrow limits of the Ego. The Ego itself is not false at all. It is false insofar as it assumes the role of the entire being (pars pro toto). The Ego cannot become conscious of its own limitations as consciousness expresses itself in a manner which cannot threaten itself; Ego consciousness cannot go beyond its own limits, as a part cannot become aware of the whole. The limitations of the Ego have to be experienced. This understanding throws more light upon the issue of the language of the unconscious in Jung and his aversion to intellectual systems in support of experience is again brought into focus. Heraclitus, as has been indicated, as well as Plato, also had strong views on the significance of experience and a great impact on the language of the unconscious. Plato's doing of philosophy, as opposed to writing about philosophy has been stressed.

"The abstract, verbal formula is not, and cannot be, philosophy of itself; only the 'living word' in the soul, the principle actually expressed through the pattern of man's life, constitutes philosophical knowledge"

Therefore

"to engage in philosophy involves above all else subjecting oneself to a real and dangerous risk, a risk which most men are understandably not willing to face"

wrote Sinaiko (1965, p.8) expressing the essence of the Platonic quest. Jung knew the truth of these words only too well! Philosophy, as the love of truth, had no place, according to Plato, for intellectual games about the truth (cf. de Strycker, 1966); that was sophistry. Learning was again not an intellectual, an Ego, activity. Many people may hear but few can learn, he claimed. Any Ego knowledge, if divided from the totality of the personality, remaining dry and intellectual, is harmful and does not promote the dialectical movement towards the realization of the Forms. Ramfos convincingly argues that it is for this reason that Plato used so many myths in his writings, because

"myth, ... enables man to formulate the beyond without having to rationalize it" (1978, p.63).

The "beyond" here is not meant in any metaphysical manner, but merely refers to whatever consciousness cannot grasp, whatever the Ego cannot intellectualise because it falls outside the boundaries of its epistemological competence. As Jung clarified (and one may not unduly discern a confessional tone in it)

"Unequivocal statements can be made only in regard to immanent objects; transcendental ones can be expressed only by paradox" (1956, pp.501-2).

More openly, he wrote in a letter in 1952:

"The language I speak must be ambiguous, must have two meanings in order to be fair to the dual aspect of the psyche's nature. I strive quite consciously and deliberately for ambiguity of expression because it is superior to singleness of meaning and reflects the nature of life. ... Clarity makes sense only in establishing facts, but not in interpreting them ..." (In Jaffé, 1967, p.160).

This admission should be appreciated within its proper context which is the dialectical development of psychological functions. These functions should not be considered as exclusively the property of the ego; this would lead to dangerous stagnation and a perpetuation of internal conflicts without the opportunity of their dialectical resolution, without the chance of their synthetic integration in a psychic wholeness. Moreover, those who raise a disapproving eyebrow to this bold statement by Jung should be reminded that "The virtues of vagueness in the language of science" is a topic of current discussion in philosophical circles. Professor Rosenberg, in his article with the same title, argues that

"There are two ways to proceed when a theory comes into conflict with recalcitrant experience. One is to raze and construct anew. Sometimes this may be unavoidable, but only sometimes. It is difficult, costly and in its wholesale form rarely undertaken, even in times of crisis for normal science ... Far easier than razing a theory is modifying it, patching it up, qualifying it. This is much the simpler, cheaper, and more reasonable way to proceed, if it can be done.... However, ... modifying a theory is harder to pursue when all the concepts of the theory are exactly defined ... If we do not insist in this exactness throughout, we can avoid ... difficulties and take greater advantage of the opportunities to modify, instead of pulling down our theoretical edifices ..." (1975, pp.303-4).

For an example of this debate the reader is referred to two more articles Körner (1975) and Rosenberg (1975b). These arguments are relevant for a better understanding of Jung's epistemological position as argued in the present study.

After Heraclitus, Plato further developed the "internal dimension" by articulating the dynamics of internal opposition as well as its natural self-development towards a dialectical resolution. In doing so, he broadened the gap between logos and being, the ego and its nature: this occurred as the ego-consciousness had to adequately account for its own one-sidedness: itself an ironic and enantiomorphic inevitable process. Jung, many centuries later, picked up the dismembered pieces of logos and tried to piece them together again in a harmonious whole.



PART THREE

Chapter Three

Hegel Revisited

Unlike towards both Heraclitus and Plato, Jung had distinctly negative feelings towards Hegel. Reflecting back on the impact the great German philosopher had on him during the years of his youth, Jung wrote:

"Hegel put me off by his language, as arrogant as it was laborious. I regarded him with downright mistrust. He seemed to me like a man who was caged in the edifice of his own words and was pompously gesticulating in his prison" (MDR, pp.87-88).

This opinion did not change significantly in the years to follow. Jung considered Hegel "fit to bust with presumption and vanity" (In Adler, 1973, p.332) and one of those "tender minded rationalists" who go "by principles ... arranging everything in conformity with their preconceived system" (1921, p.502). Moreover, he called him a romantic in a derogatory sense (In Adler, 1973, p.194; 1976, p.249) whose "intuitive ideas" that "underlie his whole system" were in fact "subordinated to intellect" (Jung, 1921, pp.320-1). One of Jung's strong criticisms of Hegel was that he was a "psychologist in philosopher's garb" (1935b, p.772). He explained this in the following manner:

"A philosophy like Hegel's is a self-revelation of the psychic background and, philosophically, a presumption. Psychologically it amounts to an invasion by the unconscious. The peculiar high-flown language Hegel uses bears out this view: it is reminiscent of the megalomaniac language of schizophrenics, who use terrific spellbinding words to reduce the transcendent to subjective form, to give banalities the charm of novelty, or pass off commonplaces as searching wisdom. So bombastic a terminology is a symptom of weakness, ineptitude, and lack of substance (1954e, p.170).

He also claimed that "when you examine carefully" Hegel's writings, "you

see they are full of projected psychology" (Jung, 1960, p.14 ). According to him, Hegel's "intellectual juggling" (Jung, 1954e, p.170) was the "gravest blow to reason" (1954e, p.169). Jung's tone of criticism is unusually strong. Yet, he also made some (admittedly superficial) references to the similarity between his own theory of archetypes and Hegel's "views" (cf. Jung 1932, p.515; and in Adler 1973, p.61).

The reader is thus faced immediately with a paradox: Although it appears (from all preceding chapters of this study) that the Hegelian system has by far the most striking similarities to the Jungian problematic, in comparison to those of Heraclitus and Plato, Jung was highly critical of Hegel, indeed almost to a point of insult. Before attempting to understand this paradox, it is indicated that these similarities be made even more explicit.

To begin with, the very dialectic of self-consciousness in Hegel and Jung seem almost identical: Hegel's initial step of "simple existence for self", "undivided" and without consciousness of itself seems to correspond perfectly to Jung's initial state of Nature. Both these states are essentially undifferentiated and without individuality, and represent the thesis of the dialectic of self-consciousness. In a truly dialectical manner, an antithesis is then developed from the original position of "self-identity", and this new position is a negation of the first: self-identity becomes, what might be called, 'other-identity'. Hegel emphasized that during this antithetical moment the original subject is lost in the other. This would again be similar to the Jungian Ego, where consciousness may assume the blind and arrogant attitude that it is an independent entity and not an antithetical continuation of its own Nature. Finally, the mediated self-consciousness, the Hegelian synthesis of a mature consciousness

is a state where the earlier opposing positions are overcome. It would not be a daring comparison at all to suggest that this kind of consciousness would correspond to the consciousness of the Self according to Jung. In both cases it is a differentiated consciousness which, at the same time, incorporates and accounts for both its Nature and its Ego, its "self" and its "other" in an adequate "recognition". In order to further illustrate the similarities between Hegel and Jung as far as the process of self-consciousness is concerned, it is almost irresistible to quote a description of an aspect of this process according to Hegel:

"Hegel thus presents us with a situation in which the individual brings to awareness a neglected content of the psyche by first (at least vaguely) apprehending this content as objectively 'other'. The more adequately this objective content is grasped, the more the mind comes to grasp its subjective side apart from which this content could neither be understood nor the understanding of it accounted for. It is when this subjective side is grasped that true objectivity is achieved" (Christensen 1968, p.370).

Any additional attempt to compare this passage to Jungian thought is redundant. The similarities with Jung are so startling that it would not be an exaggeration if one was simply to replace the first name in this excerpt, 'Hegel', with 'Jung'.

In addition, the following description of the dialectic of consciousness could accurately epitomize the approaches of both Jung and Hegel:

"Consciousness, in bearing on the object, discovers that, as consciousness of an object, it is consciousness of self. It must pass through the other in order to attain itself. In this permanence of the same, it relates to the other without being lost or disappearing in it. What is marvellous about the relation is that neither is the object lost in the subject nor is the subject lost in the object, since it rediscovers itself there" (De Greef 1970, p.264).

In both accounts, the element of self-sacrifice is present. 'Self' here does not mean the Jungian Self, but the idea which the subject holds of his own identity at the time. The paradoxical statements of having to 'lose' oneself in order to 'find' oneself is in fact not paradoxical because the 'oneself' in the two situations does not refer to the same thing. The 'self' (or more precisely defined, the idea of one's own identity) is not a static entity but subject to dialectical development in time. Thus, no reason should exist for disputing the validity of the above statement, insofar as the understood 'self' in the first instance refers to the Ego and the second to the Self. This means that if the Ego considers itself as the goal and final stage, the telos of personality development, it would not abdicate this illusionary office in order to enter into confusing states, which, from its existing position, it judges as being destructive. And indeed these states are destructive of an Ego which is an independent, alienated and uprooted point; but this destruction, however, (as a dialectical negation) would lead to reinstating the Ego within its proper perspective of the Self. As Jung clearly insisted:

"Only unreserved surrender can hope to reach such a goal"  
(1943, p.82).

Another evident point of similarity between Hegel and Jung is their understanding of the collective nature of consciousness. Even Jung, as already mentioned, acknowledges this similarity. The Hegelian Geist is "objective" and universal and the source of all experience. Moreover, the entire dialectic is the evolution of the Geist itself. This, in addition to that which has already been stated in Part One, would suffice in supporting a positive correlation between Geist and the Jungian

"objective psyche". According to Jung this was the ground and source of all individual consciousness.

A researcher may discuss many more similarities in their respective theories. Although any further isolated comparisons would be beyond the scope of this investigation, a final suggestion could be made concerning their overall approach. Both Hegel and Jung did not consider their writings to be mere theoretical speculations springing from one particular theoretical system or position, but essentially what might be termed, a "meta-commentary" on the existing reality: Hegel accepted his entire system as an attempt to describe the dialectical movement of the Geist in history (both individual and collective). Insofar as he described this movement in terms of the dialectical spiral of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, his own approach, according to him, did not represent part of this dialectic, but its description as well as a commentary on it. He thus believed that this description lay outside the dialectical overcoming (aufhebung) as it was its very formula and principle according to which it unfolded (cf. Part One, Chapter Four). This evaluation gave him the sense of superiority that his own philosophy had an intrinsic truth in it and was eternal. It was the principle of change and thus it, itself, was not subject to change.

Jung had similar thoughts about his own approach. Firstly, he considered his own psychology as standing outside, and indeed above, the Freudian and Adlerian psychologies because it constituted a superstructure which (cf. interpreted the other two). Moreover, Jung believed that insofar as his psychology discovered the universality of the collective unconscious and documented its varied manifestations in various cultures, historical times, as well as in specific philosophical and psychological theories,

his own theory itself was not just like any one of those passive manifestations of the archetypal structures but a theory beyond time, as it constituted a description of the timeless. The alchemists, according to Jung, were not aware of their psychological projections into their opus, neither was Freud, nor Hegel for that matter. But his own psychology, being in fact an unveiling and description of these archetypal manifestations, represented their "metatheory".

A poem by Vasko Popa illustrates this situation eloquently. It is entitled "A story of a story" and it is about a story whose

" ... heroes talked  
About some earth about some heaven  
They said all sorts of things  
  
Only they didn't say  
What they themselves didn't know  
That they are only heroes in a story ..." (Popa 1969b, p.81).

Similarly, both Hegel and Jung considered themselves as the story tellers and not as heroes in the story... The tragedy of misunderstandings, or perhaps the beauty of variety, in psychological and philosophical theories might lie in the fact that almost every theorist considers himself the storyteller and above all that all other theorists are only the "heroes in the story" ...

Professor J. Rychlak, shortly before Jung's death, addressed a letter to him (in 1959) asking him to comment on "the possible influence of the dialectic on his thought" and more specifically on some "parallels between ... Hegelian philosophy and Jungian thought" (1968, p.341). Professor Rychlak, a scholar with particular competence in the dialectic and philosophy of science in general as they apply to psychology, did not fail to observe

"parallels" in the writings of Hegel and Jung. Jung's reply is published in full in Rychlak's authoritative book on "A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory" (1968). In that, Jung responded in a manner which the reader by now might consider predictable: He dismissed Hegel again

" ... In my very incompetent opinion [Hegel] is not even a proper philosopher, but a misfired psychologist. His impossible language ... denotes the fact, that his philosophy is a highly rationalized and lavishly decorated confession of his unconscious ..." (In Rychlak, p.342)

and stated

"I have never studied Hegel properly, that means his original works. There is no possibility to conclude to a direct dependence, but, ... Hegel confesses main trends of the so-called unconscious and can be called 'un psychologue rate'. There is, of course, a remarkable coincidence between certain tenets of Hegelian philosophy and my finds concerning the collective unconscious ..." (Jung in Rychlak 1968, p.343).

Rychlak, in his comments on the reply writes that although Jung rejected any direct influence from Hegel, he "accurately placed himself in the dialectical tradition". Moreover, he reiterated that

"Jung has, in fact, many similarities to Hegel in his tendency to stress the collective history of peoples, the play of supra-individual forces on a given life, the importance of a balanced existence, and an identical interpretation of the dialectic" (p.343).

Rychlak has since expanded on the dialectical nature of Jungian thought (Rychlak, in press). Interpreting Jung's characterization of Hegel as a "misfired psychologist" Rychlak maintains that it



"evidences the compatibility he [Jung] sensed in their views. Man is men on both positions, and can be properly understood only through an examination of historical (including mythological) background facts ..."  
(p.343).

However, Rychlak offers no explanation for Jung's negative views on Hegel. An attempt will be made here to locate this strong dismissal in a hermeneutical context, not so much in order to ponder further the issue of the Hegel-Jung similarities (which is otherwise of secondary importance to this study) but in order to discuss some further characteristics of Jungian thought thus paving the way for the closing sections of this investigation.

Jung's own negative comments on Hegel will be examined briefly in two stages: a) with regard to Hegel specifically and b) with regard to his reservations and mistrust of philosophy in general:

a) It may be argued that Hegelian theories constituted the philosophical establishment in Europe at the turn of the century, during Jung's youth. Jung, espousing the approaches of Kant and Schopenhauer, placed himself in opposition to the Hegelian establishment. It might not be that far fetched to also assume that young Jung with his fiery temperament (he was known to his University and drinking friends as the Barrel cf. Oeri 1970) would have joined the vibrant antihegelian trend of the early twentieth century rather than identify with the Hegelian establishment which at the time had lost its vitality and might have reached Jung in the form of sterile and academic ramblings.

b) On a more psychological and personal level, Jung might have had additional reasons for disliking Hegel. A return to Jung's reference

to Hegel in his autobiography is necessary and demands closer scrutiny: Jung writes about Hegel just after the telling passage quoted above (vide supra, p 427).

"Between my sixteenth and nineteenth years the fog of my dilemma [with regard to No.1 and No.2] slowly lifted, and my depressive states of mind improved. No.1 personality emerged more and more distinctly" (M.D.R., p.87)

This indicates that i) Jung's judgement of Hegel was directly related to his own dilemma between No.1 and No.2 personalities, and ii) that Jung had those strong feelings against Hegel even at that young age (sixteen to nineteen)! These, coupled with his later admission to Rychlak that he "never studied Hegel properly" force the independent researcher to stop and carefully reconsider this issue. Jung was usually so meticulous and careful in his comments which he passed only after long and exhaustive research, and here, in the case of Hegel, he appears to have adopted a hasty and strongly negative stand. In a letter to the American psychologist Calvin S. Hall, he led a devastating attack on him for not reading all of his works before passing any judgement on them. Jung wrote that if one wanted, for example, to present Plato's philosophy,

"We in Europe should expect that .. [he] would read all of Plato's writings and not only barely half and chiefly the earlier part of them. Such a procedure would not qualify and could hardly be called responsible or reliable ..."  
(In Adler 1976, p.185)

Yet this is what he admitted doing with Hegel. According to Jung's own criteria, his attitude towards the Hegelian opus can hardly be considered "responsible or reliable". The intention here is not to judge Jung but

rather to establish that his stand on Hegel is indeed strange, and then, to try to understand it. Having presented sufficient substantiation for the first, it now remains to continue with an hermeneutical exploration:

The context that has gradually been drawn throws into relief the possible exegesis, that Jung's rejection of Hegel might be a result of his own problematic of the Other. Specifically it was at that early period, during which he formed his premature evaluation of Hegel, that Jung had just decided to ease his dilemma by opting for No.1 personality and avoiding the adventurous and seemingly unprofitable routes of No.2 personality. He had just had a glimpse of the disastrous effects of abandoning the "little flame" of consciousness which No.1 guaranteed. Jung quite likely might have suspected that Hegel's "high-flown" and "bombastic" language could only come out of one source: the No.2 personality. He had already experienced the pomposity of the archetypal world and subsequently (as mentioned here) had a number of opportunities to confirm the link between such language and the collective unconscious. If this is a reasonable hypothesis, (and Jung himself bears this out in the above quoted passage, p. 427), it would then follow that in rejecting Hegel, Jung was in fact turning away from his own No.2 personality which, at that particular time, was threatening his own consciousness and existence with its luring fascination. Moreover, Jung held that Hegel was unaware of the infiltration of the unconscious in his theories. Thus, Jung's reaction to Hegel may be understood in terms of Jung's projected fears of his own unconscious.

The understanding developed above would therefore suggest that Jung's judgement of Hegel's work and his evaluation of their possible similarities

might have been tainted by psychological reasons related to his own problematic of the Other.

This same puzzle of the discrepancy between the findings of the present comparison between Hegel's and Jung's writings and Jung's denial of their kinship, could also be looked at from a broader perspective which concerns his general mistrust of philosophy. This will be examined below under two separate sections, the first:

(a) dealing with Jung's championing of a psychology independent from philosophy, and the second

(b) dealing with Jung's impression of what philosophy was.

a) Jung started his career at the turn of the century and identified very strongly with the movement which aimed at freeing psychology from its philosophical background. His temporary participation in the psycho-analytic movement strengthened his fighting spirit for the legitimization of the psychological. He considered philosophy, religion and medicine as hindering the development of the new science of psychology (cf. Jung 1948g, p.276; 1951b, p.122; 1953b, p.355). Characteristically he wrote that

"psychology is still a hybrid, inasmuch as the subject of experimental psychology is still in many institutions a very poor relation of philosophical psychology. The dogmatic nature of the latter is to blame for the manifold misunderstandings between the two kinds of psychologist ..."  
(1906, p.408),

It may thus be accepted that in his attempt not to be considered as a philosopher or philosophical psychologist, Jung denied any similarities with Hegel's philosophical system.

b) The above may be clarified once Jung's views of what constituted philosophy and more specifically, philosophical methodology, are closely examined. According to him, philosophy was a purely speculative activity which forms its theories and impressions exclusively ex cathedra (e.g. Jung 1912b, p.245). He disliked the philosopher because he

"more or less laid down the law as to what the human soul had to be according to the premises of his particular philosophy ..." (1946, p.65).

This view of philosophy is very similar to that which Jung had of Hegel i.e., that he arranged everything in conformity to his preconceived system (Jung 1921, p.502). In sharp contrast to this, Jung considered himself above all an empiricist. He repeatedly proclaimed that he had no "system" at all and that his entire psychology was based on observable facts and working hypotheses (e.g. 1928, p.124; 1936b, pp.43-4; 1952d, p.666; 1954, p.328; 1956, p.108n). The irony of the matter is that Jung was accused of precisely the same things of which he accused Hegel, viz. that his system was speculative (e.g. Guntrip 1973, p.190), and that he used an unnecessarily fancy and strange vocabulary (e.g. Smith 1978, p.1060). Before initiating any further hermeneutical expedition into this new puzzle, a brief revision of the previous paradox should be undertaken:

The present analysis revealed some marked similarities between the Jungian and Hegelian writings. Jung, in an unexpected manner, not only denied such conscious connections but he also had unusually harsh things to

say against Hegel. A way of understanding this could be found in the hermeneutic context of four possible observations/hypotheses. The first two refer specifically to Hegel, the philosopher, and the other two to Jung's reaction to philosophy in general: Jung's dislike of the Hegelian approach might be seen as a reaction to the academic establishment of the time which was by and large Hegelian. He might also have had reasons for this related to his own problematic of the Other, insofar as Hegel might have represented the threatening realm of the archetypal world. Jung's unusually abrupt reaction to Hegel might also be understood as part of his attempt to free psychology from philosophy, especially because he thought philosophy was an unsubstantiated activity based on abstract and preconceived ideas. Jung, on the other hand, considered himself a staunch empiricist.

It is therefore curious that he has also been criticized for not being that which he argued that he was, and for that which he himself criticized Hegel. Without attempting a comprehensive interpretation of the whole spectrum of criticisms levelled at Jung (which would fall beyond the scope of this work), the following salient points can be made as a way of understanding only the criticisms mentioned above.

Firstly, it is possible that they express nothing but a polemical attitude from a different ideological platform of rival theoretical schools.

Secondly, it is possible that they are a product of the 'misunderstanding' that was outlined in the discussion of 'mysticism' (vide supra, p.354f). According to that argument, such criticisms might be the result of any one or more of the following three possibilities:

- i) that the critic did not have the same experiences that Jung was describing,
- ii) that the critic had the same experiences but accounted for them through a different language and conceptual system,
- iii) that the critic had the same experiences but was unable to translate his system into Jung's system (or vice versa), and he thus failed to see that they experienced the same things, and moreover accused Jung of talking about unsubstantiated abstract and speculative theories, which not only could not be 'objectively' proved, but their logical validity, independent from experience, could not be shown.

Thirdly, it is possible that what Jung meant by empirical empiricism are not what the critics understood by this. In terms of standard definitions, by empirical one understands that which is "relating to experience" or "having reference to actual facts" (Runes 1974, p.89). But the terms "experience" and "facts" are by no means noncontroversial, especially when one considers the question of psychic reality as constituting the facts in the analytical process (cf. Feyerabend 1970; Folse 1977; Hook 1959; Ricoeur 1977; Wallerstein, 1976). Moreover, empirical has often been accepted recently as referring to "experimental" (in the sense of laboratory manipulation of variables)" which some authors find an unacceptable restriction on the meaning of the term, especially when one speaks of an empirical "enterprise ... (in the sense of taking publicly observable data as its epistemic base)" (Meehl 1973, p.106). One wonders whether Jung's understanding of "empirical" was not even different from the 'softer' definition offered by Meehl. Some critics accuse Jung's "empiricism" of not including "publicly observable data". The following passage illustrates this controversy and at the same time exemplifies Jung's indignation at being accused of not being "empirical":

"Curiously enough I have critics who think that I of all people want to replace the living psyche by intellectual concepts. I do not understand how they have managed to overlook the fact that my concepts are based on empirical findings and are nothing but names for certain areas of experience. Such a misunderstanding would be comprehensible if I had omitted to present the facts on which I base my statements. My critics assiduously overlook the obvious truth that I speak of the facts of the living psyche and have no use for philosophical acrobatics" (Jung 1954, p.328 emphasis added).

And again,

"My business is merely the natural science of the psyche, and my main concern to establish the facts. How these facts are named and what further interpretation is then placed upon them is of secondary importance. Natural science is not a science of words and ideas, but of facts. I am no terminological rigorist - call the existing symbols 'wholeness', 'self', 'consciousness', 'higher ego', or what you will, it makes little difference. I for my part only try not to give any false or misleading names. All these terms are simply names for the facts that alone carry weight. The names I give do not imply a philosophy, although I cannot prevent people from barking at these terminological phantoms as if they were metaphysical hypostases" (Jung 1946c, pp.319-320).

The difficulty, of course, arises from the different meanings attached to "the facts of the living psyche" by different epistemologists. The space and scope of this study regrettably prevents any further expansion on this issue, but before closing the matter, two further brief comments are here indicated:

Firstly, it appears that what is in question here are different models of science. Jung repeatedly emphasised that his work was "scientific" according to a model of the natural sciences. This was a product of Jung's historical location as well as his own personal education. Yet, according to present day evaluations it could be said that he was in fact one of the early pioneers of the models more adequately suited



to the social sciences, such as the hermeneutical, phenomenological, structuralist or dialectical models. A lot of unnecessary confusion could be avoided if this distinction is made.

Secondly, it is sad to observe that with the exception of Professor L. Rauhala's work (1969; 1973; 1974; 1976), there is an almost complete absence of any studies examining the status of Jung's analytical psychology from a philosophy of science standpoint. By contrast there is an increasing body of research investigating Freud's positions (e.g. Cosin, Freeman & Freeman 1971; Cioffi 1970; Ricoeur 1970).

This is a pity as Jung seems to have anticipated a great deal of the present day debates and movements in the philosophy of science, (e.g. Coan 1973; Clark 1973; Demos 1955; Keen 1972; Read 1968; Stein 1958), It is an even greater pity to read that when Jungians today make pleas for a more "scientific approach" what they mean by this is in fact to

"support our own convictions by statistical evaluations, as statistics are the closest we can come to the truth in psychology" (Meier 1971, p.284 emphasis added).

PART THREE

Chapter Four

The Dialectic

The kinship of the Jungian thought to the dialectical theories of Heraclitus, Plato and Hegel has already been examined, as well as the dialectical nature of Jung's treatment of his problematic of the Other. It now remains to investigate Jung's own references to the dialectic and finally his whole dialectic in the light of more recent movements in psychology.

Jung above all called the individuation process dialectical (e.g. 1952d, p.665). This means that he acknowledged the dialectic root in both a) the development per se from Nature, via the Ego to the Self as well as b) the therapeutic process that this development facilitates. Ultimately, both converge in the dialectic of the Other, insofar as both are essentially two perspectives of the same central process: the rise of the Other, the struggle with it and its final integration. That the dialectic runs through most of Jung's theories is evident from his position on the very nature of the "psychic energy" i.e. it is a product of "the play of opposites" (1931, p.337, cf. also 1921, p.202; 1943, p.29; 1956, p.418).

From there onwards, the dialectical process manifests itself in almost all other aspects of his theory, until the very goal of personality development, the Self, which for Jung itself as a dialectical product is realized (1946c, pp.318-9). This consists in the "dialectical discussion between the conscious mind and the unconscious, a development or an advance towards some goal or end" (1944, pp.4-5). The aim of psychotherapy is for Jung to "compensate the onesidedness and narrowness of the conscious mind by deepening its knowledge of the unconscious" (1948h, p.316),

to bridge the gap between the antithetical tendencies of conscious and unconscious, "to narrow down and eventually abolish the dissociation by integrating the tendencies of the unconscious into the conscious mind" (1952c, p.442). In other words, to integrate the opposing Others within a new synthesis. Insofar as this was, according to Jung, the very same telos of the psyche itself, (i.e. with enantiodromic interventions to compensate one-sidednesses in a healing manner towards creating a new harmony), psychotherapy was a mere facilitation of the natural development. This, in turn, implies that the dialectic of natural development and the dialectic of psychotherapy essentially coincide. The therapist would thus augment the dialectic process of overcoming the opposites in his patient.

Jung defined dialectic as "the term for the process of creating new syntheses" (1935c, p.3). Psychotherapy was not "a method which anybody could apply in stereotyped fashion in order to reach the desired result" (1935c, p.3), neither a technique "based on premises held to be generally valid" (1946c, p.329), but a highly individualized relationship in which the "psychic systems" of both therapist and patient entered "into reciprocal reaction" with one another. This means that

"If I wish to treat another individual psychologically at all, I must for better or worse give up all pretensions to superior knowledge, all authority and desire to influence. I must perforce adopt a dialectical procedure consisting in a comparison of our mutual findings ..."  
(Jung, 1935c, p.5).

A little further Jung added

"the prime rule of dialectical procedure is that the individuality

of the sufferer has the same value, the same right to exist as that of the doctor" (p.10).

In this climate a maximum reciprocal reaction of the two psychic systems would be ensured. This is what Fordham calls "open-system theory" as opposed to "closed-system" theories which allows "the patient and analyst ... to interact all the time" (1978, p.107), (Cf. also, Hochheimer 1950, p.48). This reaction would also include aspects of the patient's problematic of the Other: As shown earlier, the new synthesis would assimilate all opposites in the patient's psyche, or, according to the present terminology, all his Others. As the psychic interrelation in therapy would inevitably include the projection of some of the patients' Others onto the therapist, as part of the transference (cf. Jung 1946c), the integration of the Others would then become a dyadic process. These Others would at times be the Shadow (cf. Jung 1944, p.29), the animus/anima (cf. 1928, p.210), the unconscious in general terms (cf. 1952d, p.664), or other specific archetypes (cf. 1952d, p.667).

Another aspect of the dialectical procedure in psychotherapy was, for Jung, the relationship between the collective and the individual. Following very much the same line of argument that he advanced in connection with the development of individual consciousness from collective archetypal roots, and their dialectical relationship, Jung similarly discussed the same dynamics in psychotherapy. The patient has a unique individuality but at the same time he is also a member of the human race and thus shares in the commonness of the collective consciousness, in addition to many other characteristics. His individuality, or that which Jung called "qualitative differences" should be understood and accepted as well as his similarities and collective aspects and characteristics.

"In spite of the differences between people, we must recognize that there are a great many similarities. As long as the analyst moves within a psychological sphere that is similar in kind to the patient's, nothing of fundamental therapeutic importance has happened. He has at most laid the foundations of a mutual understanding, and this can be appealed to when he comes up against those essential differences in the patient to which the pathological process is always ready to return. These qualitative differences cannot be dealt with by any method that is based on premises held to be generally valid. If one wants to give a name to the process of coming to terms with them, one could call it a dialectical procedure - which means no more than an encounter between my premises and the patient's" (1946c, p.329).

Finally, Jung also referred to his type of interpretation of "symbolic contents" which he adopted in his psychotherapy as dialectical (1935c, p.8). This is related to the method which he had earlier called "synthetic" as opposed to the Freudian method which he called "analytical" reductive. Jung considered his own "synthetic-hermeneutic interpretation" dialectical as it did not reduce the meaning of symbolical material presented in the course of therapy by the patient to a set of preconceived interpretations dished out by the therapist. Instead, Jung, advocating the principle of "multiple significance of symbolic contents" (1935c, p.8), allowed his patients to amplify by themselves on the presented material and gradually facilitate the unfolding of figures or images that would themselves lead the person to the unconscious meaning. This unfolding would happen in the framework of the dialectical interaction with the therapist, who would allow no overconcretization or one-sidedness to develop, thus destroying the meaning and intent of the unconscious tendencies.

Jung's emphasis on a dialectical approach has preceded (and in a sense indeed pioneered) the modern dialectical trends in psychology. Having not witnessed the miraculous advances promised by Behaviourism, and after

experiencing the (potential) sterility of her technological and positivistic models, psychology has recently left the limited and identifiable paths which she was following, and scattered in all directions looking for an adequate model and paradigm that would enable her not only to survive, but especially to respond to the expectations of the difficult times of today. In this state of crisis, some psychological systems represent typical defensive actions by ignoring the seriousness of the inner conflict and disorientation and concentrating instead on externally polished appearances, and instant and 'authoritative' solutions. Some others, are struggling to survive their own endless introspections. From the same dilemma, Dialectical Psychology has emerged recently with what seems to be (for the time being) a balanced vitality coupled with seriousness. A short discussion of this movement appears below. This is followed by an examination of Jung's work in relation to it.

Professor Stróżewski distinguishes at least "three fundamental concepts of dialectics: (1) dialectics as a theory of reality,

(2) dialectics as a method of cognizing reality,

(3) dialectics as a research method" (1973, p.82),

and Adler (1927) discriminates three aspects of the dialectical discourse: empirical, logical, and metaphysical (p.79). These two classifications

correspond fairly well, in that Stróżewski's 1) would correspond to Adler's metaphysical, 2) to Adler's logical, and 3) to empirical.

Although these appear to be integral aspects of the Dialectic, as Stack (1971) correctly states,

"It is not necessary to embrace a universal metaphysics of dialectics in order to appreciate the use and value of the concept of dialectic" (p.290).

Professor Rychlak (1968; 1973; 1975; 1976; 1977; in press), who has been a pioneer in the introduction of the dialectic in modern psychology, draws the important distinction between the meanings of the dialectical versus the demonstrative approaches. He clarifies that demonstrative conceptions are based on the Aristotelean logic of the law of contradiction (A is not not-A) and follow the legacy of syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle's major concern in developing the logical form of syllogism was the "accuracy or inaccuracy of the original (major) premise". According to Rychlak's example, "all men are mortal", would be the major premise, "this is a man" the minor premise: "therefore, this is mortal", the conclusion. Thus

" .. if our major premise contains erroneous meaning relations (e.g., All men are hostile) then even if we reason soundly ("logically") we can arrive at an incorrect conclusion" (Rychlak, in press).

Dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, proceeds to contest the major premises as well, by means of a process in which "truth and error [are] interlaced oppositionally (dialectically)". It also focuses on "the meaning of meaning" insofar as it concentrates on the "relational" rather than the "solitary features" of concepts and language. Demonstrative formulations are characterized by "unipolarity in meaningful denotation" (Rychlak, 1975, p.29) whereas dialectical formulations by "bipolarity in meaning" (p.28). In this way

"dialectical formulations have always been intrinsically related to dynamic accounts, for even when we have a resolution of opposition into a synthesis there remains that tension of contrasting meanings to threaten the delicate balance. Theories of change which take their motive power from conflict are likely to be dialectical in conceptualization" (p.28).



The distinction between these two modes of thought and theoretical formulation is very useful in understanding the structure of psychological approaches and offers valuable insights in comprehending the Jungian thought. A further sample of modern remarks on the dialectic is offered below in order to sketch a more complete picture of its meaning in contemporary psychology and epistemology in general.

The Yugoslav philosopher Mihajlo Marković writes that the

"essential characteristics of ... the dialectical structure are: a systematic unity of its parts, a dynamic character of each system which is based on internal conflictual forces, the creating of new qualities as a result of the reorganization of its elements, the element of self-determination and self-production, the progressive historical change of the whole system towards a direction of a definite limit" (Markovic et al., 1971, p.20).

And Korsch (1976) also emphasizes the revolutionary structure of the dialectical thought in that it contains:

- "a) A detachment from the immediately given, radical split from whatever exists, an overturn, a new beginning,
- b) The principle of opposition and negation,
- c) The principle of unceasing change and unceasing development - of the qualitative leap" (p.61).

Maurice Cornforth in his book "The Open Philosophy and the Open Society" (1968) which he wrote in reply to Karl Popper's two volume study on "The Open Society and Its Enemies" (1966) defines the dialectical approach as merely "to study 'interconnections' " (1966, p.6). He later adds that

"dialectic consists in following up the connections of opposites, as discoverable in the real processes of nature and society."

All three authors stress qualities of the dialectic which may be applied to societal analysis and action, as well as the philosophical pursuit. Without commenting at all on the political implications of such applications, it is important to note the versatility of the dialectic: In addition to an understanding of man (e.g. Kvale 1978; Riegel 1975, 1978, 1979), formulations may be made in connection with nature, society, science (e.g. Harris 1975), sex (e.g. Datan 1976; Firestone 1971; Hefner et al 1975), logic (e.g. Kosok 1976; Riegel 1976), intellectual history in general (e.g. Riegel 1975), etc. As Professor Bahm concludes, "dialectic" is ultimately "a category of existence" (1974, p.209). All these approaches share that which Rychlak (1976b) considers to be the "core meaning in the dialectic".

".. the idea of bipolarity, opposition or contradiction. To be true dialectic, one end of the bipolarity must directly imply the other. The opposition cannot be artificial" (p.14).

This last description would be sufficient to place Jung firmly in the dialectical perspective. The bipolarity was a central theme of his work, e.g.: inner-outer, personal-collective, conscious-unconscious, abstract-concrete. In addition, the essential bipolarity of the archetypes and the entire dialectic of development along the dimensions Nature-Ego, and Ego-Self, should be recounted.

Before leaving this discussion on modern dialectical trends, two further points should be made in order to appreciate Jung's position in, and contribution to the development of this approach.

The first one concerns the question of facts: Kvale (1976) in his article on "Facts and dialectics" rejects a sterile and distorting definition of facts according to a technological model which emphasizes an "objective" and detached account of facts (cf. also Hudson's book on "The Cult of the Fact", 1972).

"From a dialectic perspective, the absolutizing of facts as the access to reality comes to give a distorted one-sided conception of human relations" (Kvale 1976, p.89).

Instead, Kvale advocates an approach where facts and theory dialectically relate to each other, where psychological data "have their origin in the intentional behavior of a bodily subject in a material situation" (p.92), and are considered within their societal and historical context. Such an approach prevents a "reification of consciousness" (cf. Gabel 1975) which is not ultimately unscientific but also destructive. In the light of this modern analysis, Jung's treatment of facts in the dialectical understanding of his problematic of the Other assumes an enviable position.

The second point refers to the paradoxical use of language in dialectical formulations. Stack (1971) writes that

"Dialectical thinking bears an asymptotic relationship to what it describes simply because language universalizes what it is used to describe. Dialectical analysis of any phenomenon must be concerned with extracting the fundamental form or structure of what Sartre has called 'indefinite multiplicity of reciprocities' which comprise the concrete world of human experience" (p.290).

The difficulty is therefore, how to describe in language the "infinite multiplicity of reciprocities". Such a description would also have to

be infinite in its multiplicity. Joachim Israel (1977; cf. also Israel 1979) examining the same dilemma argues that

"conceptual analysis cannot be carried out in a 'dialectical way', because it is static and abstract. Therefore we cannot grasp dialectics through conceptual analysis. On the other hand we cannot understand dialectics without conceptual analysis. (We use the words 'grasp' and 'understand' according to the Hegelian distinction between 'Vernunft', i.e., reason and 'Verstand', i.e., understanding). Thus we can reformulate our dilemma: in order to use dialectical reason, we have to understand the meaning of the concepts of dialectics. But in order to understand the meaning of its concepts we have to grasp dialectics. This is dialectics and at the same time it is what dialectics is about" (1977, pp.17-8).

This is not sophistry. If followed carefully, these passages reflect the very same dilemma that Jung also faced in formulating his own problematic. The paradoxical nature of his formulations are a direct result of his efforts to account adequately for both the realms of the Ego, and the Self, as well as that of the ground of Nature - and yet, language is a product of the differentiated consciousness of the Ego. Jung's inclusion of imagination and fantasy, in his therapeutic treatment, his use of mythological and religious 'data' and 'facts' (in themselves, in a sense, a paradox); his emphasis on experience (versus intellectual logic), symbolic functions (which combine both the experiential and logical); and finally the very dialectical definitions of archetypes and Self as entities of integration of opposites (inner-outer, unconscious-conscious, personal-collective, abstract-concrete), all bear witness to his own particular dialectic. His own formulations should thus be appreciated in their historical perspective, at a time when not only were the present advances in the philosophy of science (the gradual acceptance of the limitations of logical positivism and idealistic empiricism) absent, but when psychology itself was struggling for its existence and recognition outside the disciplines of philosophy and medicine.

Before examining the last implication of this study, the Other as language, mention should be made of some modern formulations of the dialectic of the Other in order to locate Jung in the contemporary perspective:

As discussed in Part One, the question of inner division in its various forms and conceptions has interested many authors and artists at different times. It would be impossible to even attempt an outline of all of them or even arrive at any meaningful classification of them. Thus only a few instances will be mentioned. In modern times, this issue has received much attention in its particular psychological formulation of alienation as an estrangement from one's own nature (e.g. Holland 1977; Marcuse 1966; Mészáros 1970; Petrović et al 1973). Professor Scharfstein (1973) observes that in addition to Jung both Valéry and Sartre also shared the same problematic. He wrote that

"Valéry's struggle over his own unity is the main theme of his writing" (Scharfstein 1973, .p.86)

and he referred to the struggle as his "crisis of self-division that he was afraid would end in madness" (p. 86).

As far as Sartre is concerned, one may note his "self-division" and attempts at healing it appearing as early as during his childhood (cf. his autobiography "Les Mots", 1964). His theoretical formulation of it appears in his philosophical works, particularly in "The Transcendence of the Ego" (1937), and in the "Being and Nothingness"

(1943) where he divides the ego into an "I" and a "Me" and discusses their interrelationships in the perspective of self-consciousness.

Much closer to the Jungian thought, the recent theories on "object relations" (e.g. Jacobson 1964; Fairburn 1952; Guntrip 1968) and particularly Donald Winnicott's work (e.g. 1971; 1971b) would offer most fruitful ground for exploring a psychology of the Other. The main preoccupation of this school is the development of personality through the scope and dynamics of the relations between the subject and the "objects" which might be inner or outer, or most usually, a combination of the two. Of particular interest to such an undertaking would be the work of British analytical psychologists (e.g. Fordham 1973; 1974; Plaut 1973; Moore 1975; Newton and Redfearn 1979).

### PART THREE

#### Chapter Five

#### The Other as Language

"Our words are many people's children.  
Sown, born like babies  
rooted in and nurtured by blood.  
Just like pinetrees  
retain the form of the wind  
although the wind is gone, not there any more  
the same with words  
retain the form of man  
although man is gone, not there any more ..."

Seferis 1972, p.290.

Throughout this study a number of references have been made to the role and function of language in various contexts. The purpose of this brief chapter is to examine its overall meaning within the framework of the problematic of the Other, as developed above, thus offering a tentative conception of viewing the Other in terms of language.

Without aspiring to develop here a (yet to be written) Jungian theory of language, it would still be a worthwhile exercise to examine certain salient features of his understanding of language, which will then be related to certain modern trends in this field.

Initially the researcher is faced with a puzzle: Language appears to belong to the realm of the Ego, insofar as it is "causal" and "conceptual" (Jung 1952b, p. 515) its inevitable quality of differentiation would indeed place it within the context of "consciousness" (Jung 1954, p. 301), and would thus represent perhaps the characteristic process of the "conscious mind" (Jung 1929, p. 28).

Accordingly, in Freudian terminology, language would belong to the secondary process. In his distinction between two kinds of thinking in the Wandlungen, Jung located language in the context of directed thinking, along with "logical", "conceptual", "abstract" and other differentiated functions of the psyche. ("The material with which we think is language and speech concept" P.U. p. 7 or according to the Hull translation ... "language and verbal concepts" Jung 1952c, p. 12), Moreover, he called "directed thinking" a "thinking with words" (P.U., p. 8). In order to support these claims Jung quoted



Abelard's dictum

"Sermo generatur ab intellectu et generat intellectum"  
(Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn  
generates intellect) (In P.U., p. 8)

Yet, Jung also made extensive reference to the unconscious aspects of language. First of all he accepted that the roots of language are to be found in the unconscious (P.U., p.8f), a claim which should be received with little surprise insofar, as according to Jung, the collective unconscious represents the fountain spring of all consciousness. Moreover, in his investigations into the phenomenology and history of symbols, he found that a study of the history of language would be relevant in tracing the native land of symbol formation (cf. *supra*, p.197ff). He also wrote how "language.... contains plenty ....unconscious contaminations" (1921, p.113). In a significant passage where he wrote about the manner in which "we assign meaning" Jung maintained that

"The forms we use for assigning meaning are historical categories that reach back into the mists of time - a fact we do not take sufficiently into account. Interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images. From whatever side we approach this question, everywhere we find ourselves confronted with the history of language, with images and motifs that lead straight back to the primitive wonder-world" (1954c, p.33, emphasis added).

The far-reaching implications of this passage include an example of Jung's understanding of the primacy of language in the formation of meaningful relations with both the inner world of the psyche as well as the outer world at large, in addition to a clear hint at the

fundamentally unconscious origin and nature of language.

This puzzle, of the dual affiliation of language (to the conscious and the unconscious), might be accounted for, and temporarily solved, by accepting it not as a contradiction, but rather as an affirmation that Jung did refer to language both in terms of the conscious, and the unconscious. This formulation would pave the way to a broader understanding of the place of language in the Jungian discourse with particular reference to his problematic.

Jung indeed differentiated two kinds of language. This is particularly evident when he referred to the necessity of translating "the language of the unconscious ... into proper language" (1939d, p.285). From the context of this quotation it becomes clear that by "proper" language Jung meant that language which was not unconscious, i.e. the language of consciousness, or the Ego language. Thus one may observe here the distinction between two languages and the immediate effort on Jung's part to find some way of relating them. One of these ways was translation of the one into the other. Translation is only possible wherever there are both similarities as well as differences between two systems. That differences should exist is obvious. Otherwise no need for a translation is necessary. What usually is forgotten is the necessary presence of similarities between the two systems; without similarities and common ground in certain aspects, no translation is possible as no correspondence between the two systems would then at all exist. These similarities do not have to be in terms of specific elements of the systems, i.e. in terms

of identical particles or processes. In the case of two languages, e.g. English and Arabic, one would not expect to find similar or common words or even phrases between them before undertaking a translation of the one into the other. According to the present example, the similarities, or common ground between them would lie in their common grammatical, syntactical or other structural similarities, in addition to both being means of referring to a number of identical objects and processes. Hence, once there is talk of translation between the languages of the conscious and the unconscious it would be imperative to examine not only their difference but also their common aspects.

Jung's attempts at such translations have been documented throughout this study. Specifically, the "secret" language of his childhood, his interpretation of S.W.'s "mystical" language, and the poetical language of the Septem Sermones, may be accepted as such attempts to translate certain unconscious urges into "proper" language. His early researches into word-association might also be perceived as a similar attempt at reaching the unconscious by bypassing "proper" language, again essentially a process of translation. On all these occasions Jung connected the new "languages" (which represented the attempts at translation) with the Other: The secret language of his childhood was closely associated with the tendency in himself which a little later was named No. 2 personality; Ivenes' "mystical language" was also the "language of the Other" insofar as Ivenes was S.W.'s Other; finally, besides the issue of the very authorship of the Septem Sermones (i.e. that it was supposedly written by Basilides of Alexandria), Jung made explicit reference in his

interpretation that the text "might have been" the product of Philemon (M.D.R., pp. 214-5); an already identified Anticipated Whole Other figure.

However, a distinction should be drawn between a translating attempt and an invasion of the unconscious, veiled in "proper" language. Without necessarily sharing Jung's evaluation, one has to remember Jung's unusual aversion to the Hegelian language. Hegel as well as Nietzsche were, according to Jung, examples of the latter, i.e. their language was expressing their uncontrolled unconscious impulses in hardly a disguised manner. In other words, they were haphazard formulation, at best bad translations and thus not only unreliable in terms of their content, but also examples to be avoided because they were in a way threatening the conscious functions. On the contrary, Jung must have considered his own attempts as careful and contained trials at developing a good translation, what he called a "right language".

A second possible relation between the two languages (which does not exclude the first one, which was the translation of the one into the other) is that one develops out of the other. It has already been mentioned that Jung considered the conscious language a differentiated form of the unconscious one, the latter one being that which he considered "primitive language":

"The language of the unconscious is particularly rich in images, as our dreams prove. But it is a primitive language, a faithful reflection of the colourful, ever-changing world" (1918, p.17).

According to Jung's positions, which he developed in the Wandlungen, the development of consciousness in the individual corresponds to the evolution of human consciousness in general. Thus, it follows logically that when he referred to the "language of infancy" of a person he also considered it as "mythological" (1928, p.227). (CF. also supra, p. 151). This correspondence was not of mere academic interest to Jung. He employed it in his analysis of dreams:

"To make the language of dreams intelligible we need numerous parallels from the psychology of primitive and historical symbolism, because dreams spring essentially from the unconscious, which contains remnants of the functional possibilities of all preceding epochs of evolution" (1943, p.85).

This understanding of the evolutionary sequence of the two languages opens up new vistas to this issue: All that has been said about the collective unconscious, especially with reference to it being the matrix of mythopoeic imagination (vide supra, p.271), would have its parallel in the understanding of the unconscious language. The peculiarity of the language of the unconscious lies in its reference to more primitive, less differentiated and non-integrated material. Commenting on the fundamentally unconscious nature of glossolalia, Jung wrote to Professor Tenney:

"It is probable that the strangeness of the unconscious contents not yet integrated in consciousness demands an equally strange language ..." (In Adler 1976, p.227)

But this strangeness is not a negative effect in itself. It is inevitable. Once this is accepted as such, and not confused and

thought to refer to the external reality, the richness and unlimited potentiality of the unconscious language which is "more fundamental" than conscious language is revealed:

"We have only to discard the dependence of dream language on environment ... in order to arrive at the more universal and more fundamental language of mythology. This gives us access to the primordial images that underlie all thinking and have a considerable influence even on our scientific ideas" (1954b, p.289).

This insight was reached by Jung as early as 1912, when in the Wandlungen he quoted extensively Baldwin's similar views which he later developed further in the context of his own theories and problematic. Some examples are the following:

"Language grows, therefore, just as thought does, by never losing its synnomic or dual reference; its meaning is both personal and social ... Language is the register of tradition, the record of racial conquest, the deposit of all the gains made by the genius of individuals ... The social 'copy-system' thus established reflects the judgmental processes of the race, and in turn becomes the training school of the judgment of new generations ... In language, therefore, to sum up the foregoing, we have the tangible - the actual and historical - instrument of the development and conservation of psychic meaning" (In Jung 1952c, p. 15).

Thus, unconscious language may be accepted as the treasure house for the conservation of collective psychic meaning. As such, it also serves as a "training school" for the infant, who, by entering into language acquires the accumulated psychic meaning. In this way, language represents a particularly significant instance of what was

earlier termed collective psychological representations (vide supra, p.270). In 1905 Jung wrote that

"The process in the world at large is repeated in the smaller world of language" (p.101; vide supra, p.142);

The crucial question, however, is how does an individual make use of this "deposit" of meaning. Although the language of the conscious springs from the collective pool of the unconscious language, their relationship remains problematical. This is because the one is not comprehensible to the other (as was shown above) and a translation is necessary in order to make the connection at all possible. As long as no such translation is available, conscious language ignores and rejects its unconscious predecessors in whatever manifestation they might appear, as they are indeed "strange" and incomprehensible. This creates an opposition between the two languages.

It is this tension and antithesis between the two languages that might be accounted for as the third possible kind of relation between them. However, this antagonism in view of the preceding chapters, should be understood as a dialectical opposition and not as destructive and futile friction. The dialectical "third", the Other of these antithetical kinds of language would be found in their dialectical synthesis. It is this Other language that Jung pursued throughout his problematic, and it is this one which he called "right language". This is the language of the Self. This is what Jung repeatedly called "personal myth" (e.g. M.D.R., p.224). Logically, a personal myth is a contradiction, insofar as myths are collective

representations of psychological meaning. By personal myth Jung meant the "living and lived myth" (1940, p.180) which enables the individual to re-establish contact with his "psychic origins" in a manner which would not be detrimental to the integrity of the individual.

A personal myth would indeed represent the dialectical union of the preceding opposing Other language: the language of the lived, past and now unconscious psychic meanings, as well as the language of the living actuality through which a conscious meaning is created and accounted for. The realisation of the Self which represents the goal of the individuation process, cannot be achieved in a vacuum. It may be argued that Self-realization is possible only in language, within, and through language. It may further be argued that this is what Jung himself suggested when, for example, referring to a good philosopher he wrote

"He alone is a philosopher who can transmute a vision born of nature into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into a universally valid language" (1916b, p.272);

From the context of this passage it is evident that Jung's intention was not simply to establish clear cut criteria for a good philosopher. A little further, Jung wrote of the same effect, this time in terms of the goal of self-realization which was for a person to "assimilate his unconscious self and keep himself fully conscious" (1916b, p.273, emphasis added).

These quotations support the argument that the process of individuation



consists in a dialectical unity of the unconscious with the conscious language. A "vision born of nature" is an aspect of the unconscious language. The language of the unconscious, as has been shown, can only "speak" in mythical, visionary, dreamlike, and similar other forms. However, the acceptance of this unconscious content should be done with the utmost care, so that both languages retain their truth and yet at the same time lose it in the new Other language of the Self. It is for this reason that Jung uses the verb "assimilate" in order to approximate the meaning of this essentially paradoxical language: Paradoxical because it expresses the Objective Psyche of the collective unconscious, the primitive and mythopoeic Other in a manner that is personally relevant to the individual. (Cf. Gordon 1977).

Another aspect of this view of the role of language is the understanding of Jung's insistence on the congruent relationship between experience and language in terms of the dialectical union of the two languages. It has been indicated that since Ego consciousness cannot correct itself by overstepping its own limitations and viewing itself from a different perspective, the compensating and healing energy of the unconscious reaches consciousness through all kinds of devious messages. These messages insofar as they are not composed in the language of consciousness are incomprehensible, and the only way for them to be translated is through experience. Thus, Jung's repeated claims that his own language was grounded in experience may be accepted as an expression of the dialectical union of language proposed here. Jung's insistence on the baptizing and naming

of the unconscious tendencies and image figures may further be understood in the context of the present argument. A mere nebulous 'understanding' or 'appreciation' or 'intuition' of them was not sufficient for Jung. He demanded that they be externalized and their unconscious language be forged into a single language with the conscious language. Writing, or speaking about them was necessary. Even when they were expressed in an artistic form, they still had to be expressed in a certain language form, that of the relevant art. They had, ultimately, to be articulated in any form which Jung called "universally valid language".

Only through the dialectical union of the two languages, was any progress and creative movement possible; otherwise, the opposition between them would neutralize any positive impulse in that it would be either not recognized at all or if noticed it would be misunderstood and its message ignored. This is what Jung perhaps meant when he wrote about the "alive" language which "can therefore change" (1954b, p.223). Alive language would be the language that ensures an open and reciprocal communication between language and experience, between the conscious and the unconscious.

Thus, an individual, born in language acquires the stored meaning by personally relating to it and making it his own experiential reality. He then becomes individuated if the unconscious experiences which appear to him personally are understood (read: translated) and expressed in a "universally valid language". If this is not achieved, he will remain captive to his "private understanding" (Heraclitus)

having not developed their common Logos. Thus remaining in a state of internal strife where meaning between the two languages cannot be translated, his psychic chariot (Plato) cannot remain in flight but will inevitably fall. A harmony and common logos between the parts of the personality is necessary in order that the psychic system in its totality reaches the heights of the Selfhood. As in the dialectic of self-consciousness of Hegel, language is the necessary mediator through which a person may realise himself.

Such a reading of Jung's problematic of the Other in terms of language finds itself in close association with modern theoretical trends in the fields of language, symbolism and semiology. The eminent Cambridge theorist of language George Steiner (1973) noted that

"... the whole question of the Freud-Jung quarrel is a much bigger one than an incident in the history of psychoanalysis ... Until now we had only the dirty washing and the gossip of a great quarrel. We have lacked the philosophical substance. I think that one day the quarrel may relate to the Plato-Aristotle argument. It looks like one of those great divisions of the way you think about meaning and truth, which comes again and again in the history of Western culture ... Plato would join hands with Jung, and Aristotle with Freud ..."

and added that

"it looks as if Jung, more deeply than Freud, understood the whole problem of the nature of universality ..."

in the way that language creates fictions, creates life lies, creates complex symbols. The problem with Jung is going to be to separate the best work from the very odd and often repellent fringe ..."  
(p.67).

The present study does not aspire to provide either the "philosophical substance" of the Freud-Jung differences, or the separation of Jung's "best work" from the "odd" and "fringe" work. It is not concerned with the latter in that it does not constitute an evaluation of his work; and to systematically develop the former would represent a serious deviation from the main aim of this study, which remains a new reading of Jung's work in which his problematic of the Other emerges prominently. However, this reading has indeed offered a number of suggestions for understanding the Freud-Jung differences in a broader perspective which is not devoid of philosophical implications. Steiner's positioning of Jung next to Plato, as well as emphasizing his (Jung's) grasp of the role of language, have also been dealt with, to some extent, in this investigation.

Steiner is one of the very few modern theorists who have acknowledged these implications of the Jungian opus. This is in sharp contrast to the enormous interest that Freud's psychoanalysis has received in recent years (e.g. Edelson 1975; Mahony and Singh 1975; Peller 1966). The pioneer of this revived interest in Freudian theories from the perspective of language is the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who, although his writings stretch back to as early as 1931, only recently received the attention of the English speaking world. Apart from an address to the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1951

(which was published in English in 1953) and two translations of his articles (Lacan 1966b; 1968b) Lacan's work remained almost unknown outside France and the Continent in general. Although Lacan, or better, the phenomenon of Lacanism, had been the centre of heated controversies in European intellectual circles for the last thirty years, the first serious study on his discourse to appear in English was only in 1968, when Anthony Wilden translated and introduced his "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse" under the title "The Language of the Self" (Lacan 1968). Since then three more books invaded the fairly settled understanding of Freud held by the Anglophone academics and clinicians: "The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis" (Lacan 1977), "Ecrits: a Selection" (Lacan 1977b), and Anika Lemaire's "Jacques Lacan" (1977). During this time a limited number of reviews (e.g. Althusser 1971; Holland 1977; Leavy 1977; Miel 1966; Roussel 1968; Ysseling 1970) brought to the English speaking readers aspects of the Lacanian message.

One of the main difficulties that any review of Lacan's theories faces, stems from his strong emphasis on the avoidance of compartmentalization. He is identified as an exponent of structuralism, a movement which underlines the essential interrelatedness of elements within structures and their contexts (Broekman 1974). Lacan himself refuses to define crucial terms of his discourse, advocating that his readers (or preferably audience) should develop an appreciation of them in the course of their use. Moreover he scorns any efforts by others to explain or interpret his work, and considers them as "denaturing".

In front of this dilemma, as Papadopoulos (1978) suggested, the reviewer is thus left with three possible choices: (a) to initially present Lacan's entire system (a possibility too absurd to even be considered), (b) to translate Lacan's system into another smaller and explanatory structure, or (c) to attempt to capture the spirit of the Lacanian discourse with thick impressionistic brush strokes. The last would be the only endeavour acceptable to Lacan himself, and it is this that will be followed here in order to observe a number of similarities between his approach and that of Jung's as far as the issue of the Other as language is concerned. Thus, a presentation of the Lacanian views is here undertaken with full knowledge of its inherent limitations, and its vulnerability to criticisms.

Lacan has been advocating a return to Freud by attacking the psycho-analytical establishment first of France and later outside its boundaries (Lacan 1973, pp.7-17) for abandoning the original Freudian discourse and opting for the pragmatics of adaptation (a legacy of the Ego Psychology). His plea has been for a reading, a proper reading of Freud which would reveal Freud's own problematic. The irony for him was that psychoanalysts fell into the very same trap that Freudian psychoanalysis was exposing, i.e. "reading into" Freud whatever they themselves desired. This led to Lacan's expulsion from the psychoanalytic movement leaving him to follow his own (read: Freud's) path in firm determination.

However, it was not only Lacan's urging for a return to Freud that created that unfavourable climate against him. His very style still

remains a matter of vivid controversy. He feels that he has no responsibility towards his audience's or readers' difficulties in understanding him. (He actually makes no effort at all to even be audible during his famous seminars in Paris). Absorbed fully in his own language, he feels entirely free to coin new terms, tell idiosyncratic jokes, venture into esoteric excursions, in all, weaving a tapestry of meaning in innovative patterns. Some find him nonsensical or arrogant (e.g. Pichon 1941) while others most poetic.

It might be paradoxical that in reading Freud, Lacan makes use of a number of approaches which certainly did not exist during Freud's lifetime: First of all, structuralism as developed in the works of de Saussure (1974) and Jakobson (cf. Culler 1976; Hawkes 1977), Mauss and Levi-Strauss in anthropology (Shalvey 1979); also a combination of modern theories which incorporate aspects of the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre, existentialism and phenomenology, as well as mathematics and semiological literary criticism (cf. Coward and Ellis 1977; Macksey and Donato 1972; Markides 1977). Lacan does not see any paradox in this. "Return to Freud" means to return to the "meaning of psychoanalytical experience" (1968, p.30). Once this is accomplished, the "routinization" of the psychoanalytic terminology will cease, and a meaningful reference to the experiential substratum will be enabled. It is therefore possible to remain true to the original Freudian word even if recent theoretical insights are utilised enabling more adequate expression. As Lemaire (1970) put it,

"Lacan has literally rejuvenated psychoanalysis by rethinking it within the framework of contemporary thought" (p.247).

Lacan claims that his approach can redeem the scientific character of psychoanalysis: Psychoanalysis is a distinct scientific discipline as it has a distinct subject matter: the unconscious. His contribution becomes more evident when one examines his proposals for the methodology of this allegedly new science. Here Lacan takes a bold step when he proclaims that the proper method of studying the unconscious is in terms of structural linguistics and since the scientific credentials of this approach are not in question there should be no argument against accepting psychoanalysis as a science.

The suggestion to study the psyche through the established methods of analyzing linguistic structures might be received with scepticism and the connections between these two fields might be queried. However, Lacan claims that, first of all, all analytical material should be considered as verbal in the sense that it belongs to a language. Even when the patient is talking about life conflicts or instinctual drives he is in fact offering no other data to his analyst than his speech (Lacan 1968, p.17). Moreover, Freud himself, as well as Saussure and Lacan demonstrated the equivalence of certain linguistic processes (metaphor and metonymy) to the mechanism of unconscious dreamwork (condensation and displacement). Finally, another similarity between the unconscious and language should be appreciated: Both constitute a certain level of abstraction. The unconscious represents the undifferentiated and non-specific and individual aspects of reality in the same manner as language is a universal tool. Both refer to some collective structures within and through which the individual realizes himself. It is for these three broadly sketched reasons that Lacan (e.g. in 1966; 1972) declared



his famous dictum: The unconscious is structured like a language.

Miel summarizes this position:

"Linguistic analysis is thus the method appropriate to the scientific study of the unconscious, not just because psychoanalytic material is verbal, but because linguistics can be shown to offer us the best available model to account for the structures and laws of that material" (1966, p.108).

One of the main themes of Lacanian thought is what constitutes the subject (e.g. Galanes 1979; Laplanche and Leclaire 1966; Mannoni 1970; Veltsos 1978). In the Cartesian view, the subject is located in his thinking. Using that as a point of departure, Lacan discusses the Freudian innovations which were introduced with the theories of the unconscious, and underlines the fundamental "decenteredness" of the Freudian subject. The primary order for Lacan is that of language. This lies outside the subject:

"The law of man has been the law of Language"  
(Lacan 1968, p. 35);

Man is constituted by language as his very awareness of himself is not outside the order of language. "The subject is spoken rather than speaking" Lacan repeatedly states. Many of his insights have a distinct paradoxical slant and this contributes to his negative reputation. However, this might be an unavoidable price he has to pay when discussing in language the intricacies and levels of language itself. On the question of the subject's identity he wrote:

"It is not a question of knowing whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of which I speak ..." (1966b, p.135);

The problem for Lacan is the disentanglement of the levels of language and signification in order to arrive at the truth of the subject.

"It is therefore always in the relationship of the subject's moi to the je of his discourse that you must understand the sense of the discourse in order to achieve the dealienation of the subject" (1968, p.68).

This suggests that a differentiation of the individual from the collective is essential in avoiding the alienation of the subject which would be unavoidable if his identity was lost in the collective structure of language. This teaching is extremely close to the Jungian positions discussed earlier. Moreover, Lacan in discussing the transindividual nature of language and of the unconscious, according to the reading of the present study, places himself even closer to Jung.

"... The Word confers a meaning on the functions of the individual; its domain is that of the concrete discourse, insofar as this is the field of the trans-individual reality of the subject..." (Lacan 1968, p.19)

Gimeno (1973) summarizes the Lacanian position with regard to the transindividuality of the unconscious when he wrote

"The relative stability of meanings in everyday speech can only be explained by the existence of an unconscious

chain of significantia produced by repression"  
(p.136).

The last explanation as to the role of repression betrays the fact that Lacan argues from what he considers to be a Freudian position. Not only does Lacan not see similarities between his views and those of Jung's but, perhaps because he considers himself a loyal member of a "rival party", occasionally attacked Jung. As far as it is known, only Maffei (1976) and Papadopoulos (1979) draw parallels between the theories of these two eminent psychologists. The theoretical kinship between Jung and Lacan might further be exemplified in a more specific examination of the Lacanian understanding of the Other and its relation to the Jungian positions developed above:

Kallias (1978) in a terminological note on Lacan aptly observes that the term Other is "loaded with philosophical traditions" stretching back into antiquity and he includes both Plato and Hegel in them (p.65). Fages (1971) writes that for Lacan the Other is the order of language which constitutes the transindividual culture and the unconscious of the subject (p.113). Leavy (1977) however, discerns that "the concept 'Other' has a shifting meaning for Lacan"; Sometimes it refers to the "locus of the unconscious",

"But Lacan also means that: 1. the unconscious talks about the other person...., and 2. perhaps most idiosyncratically of all, the unconscious originates in the other person..." (p.210);

Lacan himself often stated that "the unconscious is the discourse of

the Other."

It would be beyond the scope of the present study to undertake a detailed investigation of all definitions of the Other given by Lacan along with their specific nuances of meaning. However, it might be suggested that (regardless of their developmental sequence) they may all be understood in terms of the Jungian Objective Psyche or the collective unconscious. Indeed the collective unconscious, according to Jung, represents the product of other persons throughout history, and also 'talks' about them insofar as it contains their collective experiences.

It thus appears that Jung would have had no objections in accepting that the "Other is the locus of the unconscious" nor that the Other is the order of language. According to Steiner again, Jung had strong similarities with another structuralist, the French anthropologist Levi-Strauss, in that both their studies

"...affirm that symbolic representations, legends, image-patterns, are means of storing and conceptualizing knowledge, that mental processes are collective because they reproduce fundamental structural identities..." (1967, pp.271-2);

Levi-Strauss is responsible for demonstrating the parallels between the structure of language and the structure in family relations in society as well as other social laws (cf. Levi-Strauss 1963; Shalvey 1979).

D'Aquili (1975) also emphasized the Jungian elements in Levi-Strauss' thought and moreover argued that that was a result of a direct influence

from Jung. D'Aquili underlines "what appears to be a major influence of C.G. Jung on the thought of Levi-Strauss and on the subsequent course of French Structuralism in general" (p.41).

It might therefore be considered sufficient to accept these tentative views on the similarities between the Jungian understanding of the role of language in relation to the Other and a corresponding view held by structuralist psychologists (cf. Lacan) and anthropologists (cf. Levi-Strauss). Jung showed a keen appreciation for the role of language in his psychology, and offered a number of significant insights in his writings. Modern developments in the structuralist study of language and psychology (with its interdisciplinary approach) have contributed substantially to an increased awareness of the relationship between the organisation of the psychological and interpersonal structures and that of language (cf. Harre 1976), and as Steiner (1972) argued,

"The whole future of psychology is bound up with that of linguistic study, with our deepening grasp of man's unique speech status. Psychology can no longer be separate from our realization of how radically a particular language, a specific linguistic world-image, conditions the life of the mind" (p.88);

As quoted earlier (vide supra, p. 458 ) Jung was well aware of this, when he wrote about the manner we "assign meaning" as well as language being the treasure house where "psychic meaning" is stored (vide supra, p. 463).

Before closing this discussion, one remark concerning a seemingly

substantial difference between Jung and Lacan is indicated: it concerns the very meaning of the unconscious as the Other.

Lacan (1968) writes:

"The unconscious is that chapter of my history which is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored chapter. But the Truth can be found again: it is most often already written down elsewhere. That is to say:

- in monuments: this is my body - that is to say, the the hysterical nucleus of the neurosis where the hysterical symptom reveals the structure of a Language and is deciphered like an inscription which, once recovered can without serious loss be destroyed..." (p.21);

He goes on to enumerate a number of such places where "the Truth can be found", among them are

"- ... my childhood memories....  
- in semantic evolution: this corresponds to the stock of words and acceptance of my own particular vocabulary, as it does to my style of life and to my character,  
- in traditions as well, and not only in them but also in the legends which, in a heroicized form, transport my history..." (p.21).

A superficial reading of this passage, which is indeed characteristic of and faithfully represents the Lacanian views of the unconscious, might lead to an erroneous conclusion based on an interpretation that, for Lacan, the unconscious is the very "blank" itself, or the "falsehood" of one's psychological Truth. This might in turn be contrasted to a Jungian position according to which the unconscious, as the objective psyche par excellence, represents the very Truth itself. The inference might be drawn that for Jung the unconscious represents the subject's general and overall history, if not the history of mankind at large

(to remain within the phraseology of the above quoted excerpt), whereas for Lacan the unconscious is only the censored chapter of that history. This interpretation might indeed be correct. A detailed discussion on its merits would deviate from the scope of the present study. What should nevertheless be clarified here is that such an interpretation should not lead to the conclusion that the views of Lacan and Jung differ here radically. The hasty impression that would lead to opposing these two theories in terms of usually accepted categories applied in the case of distinguishing between the Freudian and Jungian approaches to the unconscious, (i.e. that Freud attributed an essentially negative meaning to the unconscious whereas Jung viewed it positively as being the source of all creative forces) should be resisted in this case.

The argument should proceed by examining more closely the places where Lacan claims that the censored Truth is to be found. He mentions pathological symptoms within a person as well as collective representations ("traditions", "legends"). This might lead to a certain degree of suspicion. Of what kind of history is Lacan talking, after all? Is it personal or collective history? It in fact appears that talking from a structuralist position, Lacan was not concerned with such a distinction between the two insofar as both are structured in the same way. Both are structured as language. It should be borne in mind that one of the essential characteristics of the structural laws governing language, psychological experience as well as social relations, were, according to Levi-Strauss the principle of binary opposition, i.e. of the tendency to organize material in opposing pairs. In studying myths, for example, Levi-Strauss observed the universal occurrence of antimonies

(in terms of young-old, male-female, etc). He maintained that such structural laws have no historical dimensions in that they are manifested in all cultures, all places and in all times, regardless of the actual content (e.g. Levi-Strauss 1963). Similar laws were found to exist in the structure of language (cf. Wilden 1977). Thus, the places where the Truth is found are not static treasure houses with specific contents but rather in dynamic structures which create meaning ceaselessly. Such an interpretation, which in fact corresponds with the central tenets of the structuralist approach renders futile the preceding direction of the argument and opens up new vistas of this issue.

Having accepted the fundamentally potential nature of the Truth, which is recreated through structures, a proper, more adequate reading of Jung is now enabled. It now becomes apparent that this position coincides with Jung's understanding of the objective psyche. Although Jung did not use expressions such as treasurehouse, and storehouse to refer to the collective unconscious, these should be taken as figurative terms and not as revisions of his main theory in which archetypes are structural principles and convey no specific content in themselves but only in potential form. This was often misunderstood and Jung had to repeatedly reiterate it. In the last work before his death Jung emphasised this again and it would be necessary to quote it in length:

"My views about the 'archaic remnants,' which I have called 'archetypes' or 'primordial images,' are constantly criticized by people who lack a sufficient knowledge both of the psychology of dreams and of mythology. The term 'archetype' is



often misunderstood as meaning a certain definite mythological image or motif. But this would be no more than a conscious representation, and it would be absurd to assume that such variable representations could be inherited. The archetype is, on the contrary, an inherited tendency of the human mind to form representations of mythological motifs - representations that vary a great deal without losing their basic pattern... One finds these représentations collectives practically everywhere, characterized by the same or similar motifs. They cannot be assigned to any particular time or region or race. They are without known origin, and they can reproduce themselves even where transmission through migration must be ruled out"(Jung 1961, p.228).

Thus archetypes are not "inherited ideas" , but mere tendencies, and possibilities for psychological meaning. Jung also made at least two references to more precise structural laws in language which would positively correspond to modern structuralist theories. The first one has already been discussed and refers to his utilization of Finck's hypothesis about the structure of language in his preliminary understanding of psychological types (1913b). According to this hypothesis there are mainly two types of linguistic structures represented by the transitive and intransitive verbs respectively. Jung expanded this to refer to two types of movement of the libido (Part Two, Chapter Five), thus proposing an intrinsic relationship between the structure of language and the structure of psychic energy and in broader terms psychological disposition at large. The second one reads:

"Through the migration of language the meaning of a word is transformed into its historical opposite" (Jung 1911c, p.443).

Although Jung does not expand much on this hypothesis it nevertheless represents yet another instance of his affinity to the structuralistic

understanding of psychology. Finally, once the bipolarity of archetypes is brought into the present discussion, one may argue that Jung did make some attempts towards comprehending the very structure of the objective psyche as manifesting in different contexts.

The last comparative discussion does not exhaust the potentially rewarding exercise of examining the interrelations between Jungian psychology and modern structuralist approaches and one can only hope that their intrinsic kinship will soon receive serious attention thus enabling a fuller exploration of the present tentative formulation of understanding the Other in terms of language.

epilogue

These closing remarks constitute neither a summary of the entire study nor a conclusion on its findings. A number of Transition points have provided sufficient cohesion of the material presented, thus rendering any overall summary redundant. Summaries are possible and necessary where specific research findings may be neatly classified and codified. This investigation, as has been repeatedly emphasized, represents a new reading of the Jungian psychology, and as such it does not have major data in isolated and independently identifiable forms, outside of their structural context, to report on. It does not aspire to either prove or refute the Jungian opus. As an attempt at understanding Jung and his work within the framework of the dialectic of the Other, its value lies in the coherence of the arguments and directions presented, its ability to account adequately for Jung's writings and life as a whole in their developmental evolution, and the rewarding new vistas which such a reading of Jung unfolds.

In this investigation certain Jungian contributions were either insufficiently dealt with or not included at all (e.g. the principle of synchronicity, his theory of dreams). The basic reason for this was the unavoidable limitations of space. An adequate treatment of them would have demanded further extensions to this already big volume. References to the extensive Jungian literature (i.e. studies on Jung by Jungian authors) were intentionally kept to a minimum to facilitate the impact of the new reading.

The central theme of the Other has received relatively little attention in psychology outside the structuralist approaches (cf. Bakan 1966,

Jarret 1979; Lustman 1972; Rank 1914). James Hillman emphasized that "perhaps" Jung's "main contribution lies not so much" in the ideas of psychological complex or the archetype, "but in his radical, personified formulation of them" (1975, p.20).

The progressive reformulations of the Other led Jung to the only non Other, the Self. Without creating an abstract and systematic treatise on the Other, Jung gradually developed an experiential as well as a theoretical understanding of the Other, which in fact includes a comprehensive account of its aetiology and origins, its teleology; with clinical as well as broader cultural implications. At this time when Jung's psychology is approached from a wide variety of perspectives, e.g. politics (Odajnik 1976), aesthetics (Philipson 1963), ecology (Gelb 1974), literary criticism (Allen 1973), anthropology (Blake-Palmer 1962) etc, the inclusion of a consideration of his treatment of the dialectic of the Other would only mutually enrich both the Jungian thought as well as the field concerned.

Placed in the developmental context of the theorists of the Other, from the Ephesian Riddler to Hegel and the modern structuralist "riddlers", Jung occupies a central position in that he provides an essential bridge by combining his predecessors and anticipating his successors. Fully aware of the value of his contribution Jung wrote with humility:

"When people say I am wise, or a sage, I cannot accept it. A man once dipped a hatful of water from a stream. What did that amount to? I am not that stream. I am at the stream, but I do nothing ... (M.D.R., p. 388).

This is a rather different approach from that of Narcissus, who instead saw his own external image in the water ...

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